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PREFACE
This book originated in a research project “Sharīʿa Debates and Their 
Perception by Christians and Muslims in Selected African Countries” 
in which a group of African junior scholars at different stages of their 
academic careers were invited to participate. This research project was 
financed for three years (2006–2009) by Volkswagen Foundation under 
the funding initiative “Knowledge for Tomorrow—Co-operative Research 
Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa”. Most of the research and writing spon-
sored by the project has been done by these African junior scholars, who 
include both Muslims and Christians. They have been closely supervised, 
assisted and evaluated by a group of senior scholars with a view to their 
proper training, their exposure to current ideas, methodologies, and 
milieus, and the enhancement of their formal academic qualifications. 
The research here being reported on developed from a previous joint 
research project on the current sharīʿa debate in Nigeria, “The sharīʿa 
Debate and the Shaping of Muslim and Christian Identities in Northern 
Nigeria”. This was also funded by Volkswagen Foundation and organized 
by the Universities of Jos, Nigeria, and Bayreuth, Germany, in 2002/2004. 
At an early stage of that research project it became obvious that the 
sharīʿa debate in Nigeria is not a single and locally-restricted phenom-
enon. In many other African countries with a Muslim population, heated 
public debates on certain aspects of Islamic law, and/or the relationship of 
Islam or religion in general and the state, are nowadays an important part 
of daily political life. Thus, a preliminary workshop was held in Limuru, 
Kenya, in July 2004, where the basic idea for the new research project 
was to develop new theoretical bases and research methods to exam-
ine this current phenomenon in a series of African countries. To reach 
this objective it was first of all necessary to get a general idea of these 
recent developments. Thus the organizers, John Chesworth, St. Paul’s 
United Theological College (now St. Paul’s University), Limuru, and Franz 
Kogelmann, University of Bayreuth, invited mainly junior scholars, both 
Muslims and Christians, from Austria, Germany, Kenya, the Netherlands, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and the USA to 
attend the workshop. Keeping in mind that debates on Islamic law are not 
limited to sub-Saharan countries in Africa, the organizers also invited schol-
ars from Egypt, Iran and Malaysia to attend. Due to the multi-disciplinary 
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and international backgrounds of the participants, fruitful discussions 
took place and the first results of cross-fertilisation appeared. The work-
shop in Limuru gave the junior scholars the opportunity to establish new 
academic networks (south-south and north-south) and was also successful 
in taking first steps across the existing academic divides. One of the most 
important outcomes of the workshop was the insight that the quality of 
our understanding of the current sharīʿa debates in sub-Saharan Africa 
and their side-effects on society was highly unsatisfactory. 
The University of Bayreuth worked in partnership with St. Paul’s 
University, Limuru, Kenya; with the University of Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria 
and with the University of Khartoum, Sudan. Initially, the University of 
Cape Town, South Africa and the University of Zanzibar were also part-
ners, but withdrew when no suitable junior scholars were proposed.
Following the Limuru workshop in 2004, a successful funding pro-
posal was made to Volkswagen Foundation for a project called Sharīʿa 
Debates and Their Perception by Christians and Muslims in Selected African 
Countries. From late 2005, the selection of a group of junior scholars from 
the different countries began. The successful candidates were at various 
stages of post-graduate work; four were completing their MA research, 
four were working on their doctorates and three were conducting post-
doctoral research. Four of the junior scholars were Christians and seven 
were Muslims; four were women and seven were men. They came from a 
variety of disciplines, Anthropology, Economics, Politics, Religious Studies 
and Theology. 
They all met in Bayreuth for three months in the summer of 2006, 
where they trained in a variety of research methods in social science and 
learned about working on multi-disciplinary research. As a group we met 
with them on several occasions in Limuru, Kenya; Shendi, Sudan; Bamako, 
Mali; Jos, Nigeria and Kisumu, Kenya as well as for a further two months 
in Bayreuth during the summer of 2007.




John Chesworth and Franz Kogelmann
All over the world, in recent years, there has been a resurgence of reli-
gion in the public sphere. In many sub-Saharan African countries this 
has manifested itself most noticeably in claims by Muslims for increased 
recognition of Islamic religious symbols within political and civil spaces 
hitherto dominated by ‘Western’ systems, and especially for the imple-
mentation, in some form or other, of the sacred law of Islam, the sharīʿa. 
These Muslim claims, different in their character and scope from country 
to country, have sparked off intense debates in all the countries where 
they have been made.
Unfortunately, the quality of our understanding of these recent and 
important developments, and of where they are leading, is highly unsat-
isfactory. General introductions in Islamic law are available,1 the role 
of Islam in African constitutionalism is discussed,2 and the influence of 
Islamic law in Africa on the eve of colonial rule is also well described.3 
However, country specific studies focused on sub-Saharan Africa and 
based on empirical research are relatively scarce. 
For Sudan, Fluehr-Lobban tried to survey the history and to detail the 
practice of Islamic law during the second half of the 1980s.4 Her findings 
are partly based on field-work on the day-to-day working of the sharīʿa 
in Khartoum. A far more in-depth study, but lacking empirical research, 
is Layish and Warburg’s book on the sharīʿa in Sudan under Numayrī.5 
1 Schacht, J., An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964; Doi, A. R. I., 
Sharīʿah: The Islamic Law, London: TaHa Publishers Ltd. 1984; Vikør, K. S., Between God 
and the Sultan, London: Hurst & Company, 2005; Hallaq, W. B., A History of Islamic Legal 
Theories. An Introduction to Sunnī uṣūl al-fiqh, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
(CUP), 1997; Hallaq, W. B., The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, Cambridge: CUP, 
2005; Hallaq, W. B., Sharīʿa—Theory—Practice—Transformations, Cambridge: CUP, 2009a; 
Hallaq, W. B., An Introduction to Islamic Law, Cambridge: CUP, 2009b. 
2 an-Na⁠ʾim, A. A., African Constitutionalism and the Role of Islam. Philadelphia, Pa.: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006.
3 Anderson, J. N. D., Islamic Law in Africa, London: Frank Cass & Co., 1970.
4 Fluehr-Lobban, C., Islamic law and society in the Sudan, London etc.: Frank Cass, 1987.
5 Layish, A. and G. R. Warburg, The Reinstatement of Islamic Law in Sudan under 
Numayrī. An evaluation of a legal experiment in the light of its historical context, methodol-
ogy, and repercussions, Leiden: Brill, 2002.
© John Chesworth and Franz Kogelmann, 2014 | doi:10.1163/9789004262126_002
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Important as these two studies are, as well as others in this field,6 they 
do not take into consideration the period after the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement of 2005. 
There are polemical articles, both Muslim and Christian, written about 
Nigeria post-1999, when the wave of re-implementation of Islamic law in 
the northern part of the country commenced, but also serious academic 
studies on this phenomenon.7 For any future research on the re-implemen-
tation of Islamic law in Northern Nigeria, Ostien’s five volume sourcebook 
on sharīʿa implementation in Northern Nigeria since 1999 will be indis-
pensable.8 However, certain aspects of the so-called sharīʿa project, such 
as its influence on education in northern Nigeria, are not covered. Studies 
on the impact of Islamic law on the Muslim community of Yorubaland in 
south-western Nigeria are almost non-existent.9 
For East Africa, the situation is much the same. The practice of Islamic 
law in Zanzibar and the coastal strip of Kenya and mainland Tanzania is 
well-covered by the publications of Hashim, Hirsch, Stiles and Stockreiter.10 
6 See: Köndgen, O., Das islamisierte Strafrecht des Sudan. Von seiner Einführung 1983 
bis Juli 1992, Hamburg: Mitteilungen des Deutschen Orient-Instituts 43, 1992; Köndgen, O., 
‘Sharia and national law in the Sudan’, in Sharia Incorporated. A Comparative Overview of 
the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present, Otto, J. M. (ed.), Leiden: 
Leiden Univ. Press, 2010, pages: 181–230; Sidahmed, A., Politics and Islam in Contemporary 
Sudan, London: Routledge, 1997; El-Affendi, A., Turabi’s Revolution. Islam and Power in 
Sudan, London: Grey Seal, 1991; Nageeb, S. A., New Spaces and Old Frontiers. Women, Social 
Spaces and Islamization in Sudan, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004.
7 Ostien, P. and A. Dekker, ‘Sharia and national law in Nigeria’, in Sharia Incorporated, 
Otto, J. M. (ed.), Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010, pages 553–612; Weimann, G. J., 
Islamic Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010; 
Ostien, P., ‘Divine Law and Local Custom in Northern Nigerian Zina Trials’, Die Welt des 
Islams 49. 3–4, 2009, pages 429–465; Ostien, P., ‘Islamic Law and Muslim Governance in 
Northern Nigeria: Crimes Against Life, Limb and Property in Shariʿa Judicial Practice,’ 
Islamic Law and Society 17, 3, 2010; Ludwig, F., ‘Christian-Muslim Relations in Northern 
Nigeria since the Introduction of Shariʿah in 1999’, Journal of the American Academy 
of Religion 76, 2008, pages 602–637; Christelow, A., ‘Persistence and Transformation in 
the Politics of Shariʿa, Nigeria, 1947–2003: In Search of an Explanatory Framework’, in 
Muslim Family Law in sub-Saharan Africa. Colonial Legacies and Post-colonial Challenges, 
S. Jeppie, E. Moosa & R. L. Roberts (eds.), Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010, 
pages 247–272.
8 Ostien, P., Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999–2006: A Sourcebook, 5 vol-
umes, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd., 2007 (http://www.sharia-in-africa.net/pages/publications/ 
sharia-implementation-in-northern-nigeria.php).
9 See Makinde and Ostien’s recent article: Makinde, Abdul-Fatah ‘Kola, Ostien, Philip, 
Legal Pluralism in Colonial Lagos: The 1894 Petition of the Lagos Muslims to their British 
Colonial Masters, Die Welt des Islams 52:1, 2012, pages 51–68.
10 Hashim, A., ‘Coping with Conflicts: Colonial Policy towards Muslim Personal Law 
in Kenya and Post-Colonial Court Practice’, in S. Jeppie, E. Moosa & R. L. Roberts (eds.), 
2010, pages 221–245; Hirsch, S. F., ‘State Intervention in Muslim Family Law in Kenya and 
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However, the hinterland and the current political context are mostly 
neglected.11 
Thus, there is some scholarly literature on various sharīʿa debates in 
sub-Saharan Africa, but its coverage is in many cases patchy. The studies 
contributing to this literature tend to be mono-disciplinary, often unin-
formed by history, and, a very serious problem from African points of 
view, are mostly done by foreigners whose approach and perspective is 
different from African Muslims, and also from African Christians.
The present book takes up that challenge with an examination of 
various aspects of sharīʿa debates in sub-Saharan Africa, carried out by 
Africans, both Muslims and Christians.
The contributors to this book have sought to explore the impact of 
sharīʿa debates on Christian-Muslim relations in their own countries. 
They have done this by mapping the reactions and responses to sharīʿa 
debates in various communities, finding various levels of understanding 
and misunderstanding therein. 
The countries involved in the research all have prior experience of 
sharīʿa for historical reasons in that, prior to European colonisation, they 
were either colonised by Muslim powers, for example the Coastal Strip of 
Tanzania: Applications of the Gender Concept’, in S. Jeppie, E. Moosa & R. L. Roberts 
(eds.), op. cit., pages 305–329; Hirsch, S. F., Pronouncing and Persevering: Gender and 
Discourses of Disputing in African Islamic Court’, Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998; Hirsch, S. F., ‘Kadhi’s Courts as Complex Sites of Resistance: The 
State, Islam, and Gender in Postcolonial Kenya’, in Contested States: Law, Hegemony, and 
Resistance, M. Lazarus-Black & S. F. Hirsch (eds.), New York: Routledge, 1994, pages: 207–
230; Stiles, Erin E., An Islamic Court in Context: An Ethnographic Study of Judicial Reasoning, 
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009; Stiles, Erin E., ‘Broken Edda and Marital Mistakes: Two 
Recent Disputes from an Islamic Court in Zanzibar’, in Dispensing Justice in Islam: Qadis 
and their Judgments, Masud, M. K., R. Peters & D. S. Powers (eds.), Leiden: Brill, 2006, 
pages: 95–116; Stiles, Erin E., ‘There is No Stranger to Marriage Here!’ Muslim Women and 
Divorce in Rural Zanzibar’, Africa: Journal of the International Africa Institute, 75, 4, 2005, 
pages: 582–598; Stiles, Erin E., ‘When is a Divorce a Divorce? Determining Intention in 
Zanzibar’s Islamic Courts’, Ethnology, 42, 4, 2003, pages: 273–288; Stockreiter, E., ‘Child 
Marriage and Domestic Violence: Islamic and Colonial Discourses on Gender Relations 
and Female Status in Zanzibar, 1900–1950s’, in Domestic Violence and the Law in Colonial 
and Postcolonial Africa, Burrill, E. S., R. L. Roberts, & E. Thornberry (eds.) Athens, OH: Ohio 
University Press, 2010, pages 138–158; Stockreiter, E., Tying and untying the knot: Kadhi’s 
courts and the negotiation of social status in Zanzibar, 1900–63, unpublished PhD thesis 
SOAS, University of London, 2008; Stockreiter, E., ‘Islamisches Recht und sozialer Wandel: 
Die Kadhi-Gerichte von Malindi, Kenya, und Zanzibar, Tanzania’, Stichproben. Wiener 
Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien 2/3, 2002, pages 35–61. 
11 Exceptions are this short article: Hashim, A., ‘Muslim State Relations in Kenya after 
the Referendum on the Constitution’, in AASR Bulletin 24, November 2005, pages 21–27; and, 
more recently, Tayob, A. & J. Wandera (eds.), Constitutional Review in Kenya and Kadhis 
Courts, Cape Town: Centre for Contemporary Islam, University of Cape Town, 2011.
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East Africa and Sudan, or were independent Muslim states, for example 
the Sokoto Caliphate in what is now Northern Nigeria.
The four countries where research has been carried out were chosen 
because they are all impacted by sharīʿa to a greater or lesser extent and 
they all have significant numbers of both Muslims and Christians in their 
populations.
The countries are not alphabetically or geographically presented, but 
are ordered from the perspective of the level of sharīʿa present in the 
country. We therefore begin with the total sharīʿa of the Sudan, where 
the September Laws were introduced by the Numayrī regime in 1983. We 
then move to Nigeria and the re-implementation, from 1999, of Islamic 
penal law in most of the states of Northern Nigeria, flanked by other mea-
sures to Islamize society. Then on to Kenya where the place of Kadhi’s 
Courts in the Constitution was one of the factors leading to the rejection 
of the proposed Constitution in 2005. Finally we move to Tanzania where 
Kadhi’s Courts were abolished on the mainland after independence and 
where there are now calls for their re-introduction. 
Since the implementation of the September laws of 1983, Sudan has 
been a sharīʿa state. Islamic laws, including the application of corporal 
punishments, have been imposed on all Sudanese regardless of their 
religious affiliation. After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 
the situation changed fundamentally: Southern Sudan is exempted from 
sharīʿa and Khartoum as the capital of the state enjoys a special status. 
Even the states of Northern Sudan traditionally inhabited by a Muslim 
majority mostly stopped applying Islamic criminal law. The Sudanese 
junior scholars have been researching the impact of these changes on 
public life from different angles. They took especial note of the changes 
brought about by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) between 
the Khartoum government and the South, leading to the creation of a new 
state, South Sudan, in 2011. 
Osman Mohamed Osman Ali was the project’s country co-ordinator 
for Sudan. He is assistant professor of anthropology at the Department of 
Sociology and Social Anthropology at the University of Khartoum. In his 
contribution to this book he offers in a nutshell the results of his PhD  thesis 
“The Dynamics of Interpretation of Textual Islam in Northern Sudan: Case 
Study among the Rural and Urban Population of Shendi Province”. He 
did extensive field work on multicultural and multiethnic communities 
in the southern part of the River Nile State. He identified four subcultures 
in Shendi Province: Shendi town itself, the villages south and north of 
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Shendi town, and nomads’ camps. To a varying extent in each, there are 
within these subcultures five active Sunni Muslim groups: the Republican 
Brothers, the Sufis, the Anṣār al-Mahdī (Arab. followers of the Guided 
One, i.e. members of a religious movement associated with the teachings 
of Muḥammad Aḥmad, the self-proclaimed mahdī of the 19th century), 
the Anṣār al-Sunna (Arab. followers of the sunna, i.e. those who call for 
the revival of the traditions of the Prophet Muḥammad), and the Islamic 
Movement. His chapter “sharī‛a and Reality”: A Domain of Contest among 
Sunni Muslims in Shendi Province, Northern Sudan” shows that sharī‛a is 
not a monolithic entity. In fact it is a body of transmitted knowledge from 
which the actors draw different conclusions. It is shaped and appropriated 
according to their own perspectives. 
Salma Mohamed Abdalla, a political scientist from the University of 
Khartoum and nowadays a PhD candidate at Bayreuth International 
School of African Studies in Germany (BIGSAS), researched “Christian-
Muslim Relations among the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in 
Khartoum: The Case of Mandela and Wad al-Bashīr Camps”. Her research 
is based on field-work administered in these two IDP camps. The primary 
data of her research was collected using the methods of individual inter-
views, group discussions and focus group discussions. Her research ques-
tions were centred around the behaviour and attitudes of members of 
the IDP communities regarding inter-faith dialogue in daily life, on the 
one hand, and examining the political structure and the role of the state 
in Christian-Muslim relations on the other hand. Whereas problems do 
not occur in the day to day interactions of members of different religious 
groups, the research revealed issues of conflict at the level of the state. 
Many Christians see public order as a critical issue in Christian-Muslim 
relationships in the camps. Both religious groups agree on conflicts 
between Christians and the state. 
In Nigeria, sharīʿa debates have a long tradition. The debate on the 
new Nigerian constitution during the second half of the 1970s inspired 
the first ‘Grand Debate’ on the future role of Islamic law in the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria. It was only after the return to democracy in 1999 
that twelve states of Northern Nigeria started to re-implement ‘full-
sharīʿa’ i.e. all aspects of Islamic law in personal and in criminal mat-
ters. The South West of Nigeria is inhabited by about 40–50 per cent 
Muslims, but Islamic law was never part of the official jurisdiction 
there. Nevertheless there is a tendency by certain Muslims to organize 
independent sharīʿa panels. 
6 john chesworth and franz kogelmann
After Abdul-Fatah Makinde, a lecturer in Islamic studies, had submit-
ted his PhD thesis “The Institution of Sharīʿah in Oyo and Osun States, 
Nigeria, 1890–2005” at the University of Ibadan, he focused his research 
on independent sharīʿa panels in the South West of Nigeria. Makinde 
arranged interviews with religious leaders and government officials. These 
show that there are Muslims in this region of Nigeria who demand that 
the government legislate for the establishment of Islamic jurisprudence 
in civil matters. Neither the state nor the Christian population seem to be 
happy with a formal state-sanctioned implementation of sharīʿa courts in 
South West Nigeria. Christians regard sharīʿa as the religious law of the 
Muslims, a private matter, hence the government’s involvement is seen as 
superfluous. Government officials on the other hand show certain reserva-
tions and do not see the political necessity to act. 
The education of Muslim women in Northern Nigeria is the topic of 
Chikas Danfulani’s research. In her PhD project “The Re-Implementation 
of Sharia in Northern Nigeria and the Education of Muslim Women 1999–
2007”12 she shows how some Muslims in Northern Nigeria conceptualise 
education. The research is based on in-depth interviews conducted in 
Northern Nigeria with Muslim educators, professionals and policymakers 
in five states. Her results clearly show that there is in most cases a gap 
between the literature and the reality in the field. Even if there is a strong 
debate over the educational status of women in Northern Nigeria, very 
few states that have re-implemented sharīʿa have so far introduced new 
programmes on female education. 
The Muslim population of Northern Nigeria is not a monolithic block. 
Various Sufi brotherhoods still have a great influence in this region. 
Whereas the time immediately before and after independence was char-
acterised by a struggle between the two dominating turuq, Tijāniyya 
and Qādiriyya, since the 1970s there have been frequent violent clashes 
between Sufis and members of a reform Islam movement, the Yan Izala. 
Ramzi Ben Amara, who is trained in religious studies, worked on “The 
Development of the Izala Movement in Nigeria: Its Split, Relationship to 
Sufis and Perception of Sharia Implementation”. His research was con-
ducted through a series of interviews with adherents, supporters and 
opponents of the movement in a number of the Northern states of Nigeria. 
12 Danfulani, Chikas, ‘The Re-implementation of Sharia in Northern Nigeria and the 
Education of Muslim Women 1999–2007’, University of Bayreuth, 2012, available as an e-thesis 
via http://opus.ub.uni-bayreuth.de/opus4–ubbayreuth/frontdoor/index/index/docId/1134.
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However, since the re-implementation of sharīʿa in Northern Nigeria, 
most of the inter-Muslim conflicts seem to be settled. Consequently most 
Muslim organizations gather under the banner of sharīʿa. Moreover the 
Izala movement claims to be the driving force behind the re-implemen-
tation. Part of the success of the Izala movement is its ability to involve 
Muslim women by educational programmes. 
In East Africa Islam has been present since the 10th century. When 
the Sultanate of Zanzibar became a British protectorate in 1890, the Ten-
Mile strip on the Mainland was ceded to British Imperial East Africa and 
Deutsch-Ostafrika with an agreement that Kadhi’s Courts should con-
tinue to operate in this area, which was populated mainly by Muslims. 
As a result of the negotiations leading to independence, the future Prime 
Ministers of Kenya and Tanganyika agreed to continue the treaty of 1890. 
However, following independence changes were made.
In Kenya, Kadhi’s Courts are an integral part of the national legal sys-
tem and were established in every province of Kenya. Their jurisdiction 
is strictly restricted to Muslim personal law and nobody seemed to take 
serious offence at their existence until the Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission published the so-called Bomas Draft Constitution in 2004. 
The amendment of the position of the Kadhi’s Courts in the new constitu-
tion has sparked off a heated public debate. 
In his MA thesis “Debates on Kadhi’s Courts and Christian-Muslim 
Relations: A Case Study of Isiolo Town”, Halkano Abdi Wario, a student in 
religious studies from Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya, examined how the 
debates on Kadhi’s Courts had impacted Christian-Muslim relationships 
in a town of Northern Kenya with an ethnically and religiously-mixed 
population. The Kadhi’s Courts issue acted as a focus for the tensions in 
the town and had implications for Christian-Muslim relations in the area. 
Wario’s research is a multi-disciplinary study with in-depth interviews with 
community leaders and group interviews with ‘focus groups’ representing 
different communities. A specific focus of the research was the ways in 
which civic society groups prepared people for the constitutional refer-
endum in November 2005. A number of thematic issues and emergent 
trends were revealed through the research. While most Muslims empha-
size the courts’ role and call for its improvement, most Christians cite 
the courts’ illegitimacy due to the secular nature of the state. The debate 
about the courts was interpreted in terms of a majority-minority struggle 
to influence policy formulation in the country, accompanied by fears and 
suspicions. Furthermore, the debate linked past conflicts with present 
concerns—pointing to the question: Who owns Isiolo? 
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In addition to finalising her PhD on “Islam and Divination Among the 
Swahili of Kenya Coast” at Maseno University, Kenya, Esha Faki Mwinyihaji 
also researched “The sharīʿa and Muslim Women’s Participation in the 
Public Sphere”. Her method was to use in-depth interviews with mem-
bers of the Swahili community. These were mainly women, in particular 
Swahili women who had become involved in politics and had stood for 
office at local and national levels, but she also included some male com-
munity leaders in her interviews. Various elements emerged that have 
prevented Swahili Muslim women’s involvement in the public sphere, 
such as widespread ignorance of general and public affairs or the lack of 
access to the financial means needed for political mobilization. Customs 
such as early marriage, or the assumption that women cannot lead men, 
are also obstacles inhibiting Swahili women from organizing themselves. 
Furthermore, the idea of the empowerment of women among the Swahili 
is being questioned on Islamic doctrinal and cultural grounds. Swahili 
Muslim women are facing traditional interpretations of religious scripts 
that have for centuries reinforced patriarchal structures. They are faced 
with religious authorities who do not guide them but rule them, as well 
as by deeply rooted values of their culture.
The day to day practice of Kadhi’s courts on the shores of Lake Victoria 
is the topic of Rebecca Osiro’s PhD research “Women’s Views on the Role 
of Kadhi’s Courts: A Case Study of Kendu Bay, Kenya”. Osiro holds an 
M.A. in Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations from St. Paul’s University 
in Limuru. Her research has been conducted through interviews with 
the community, as well as by following cases through the Kadhi’s Courts’ 
system. An important part of the project was the examination of vari-
ous Islamic legal practices and how they are understood and followed in 
the local context. The research also highlighted the fact that many of the 
women who have become Muslims on marriage are ignorant of their rights, 
both under Islamic and civil law. So, if a case comes to court, the Kadhi 
often cannot act because the lack of documents means that the validity of 
a marriage cannot be proved. Another phenomenon, which is also observ-
able in many other Muslim communities, is that locally-embedded tradi-
tions are followed even when at odds with Islamic practice. The women 
interviewed supported the view that Kadhi’s courts should be entrenched 
into the constitution and demanded more courts of this kind in Kenya. 
The two parts which form the United Republic of Tanzania handle 
the sharīʿa question differently. At independence Zanzibar retained a 
legal structure with both State Courts and Islamic Courts. However, on 
the mainland, the Kadhi’s Courts were abolished. The provisions of the 
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Uniform Marriage Act 1971 were regarded by the government as cover-
ing all the aspects of sharīʿa that were the remit of the Kadhi’s Courts. 
Members of the different religious groups of mainland Tanzania have, 
most of the time, co-existed peacefully since independence, although some 
violent clashes have occurred since the 1990s. In the late 1990s, requests to 
re-establish Kadhi’s Courts again surfaced in mainland Tanzania. 
For his PhD project, William Kopwe, who holds an M.A. in Islam 
and Christian-Muslim Relations from St. Paul’s University, Limuru, did 
research on “The Prospects and Problems of Sharīʿa Implementation on 
the Tanzanian Mainland”. Through a series of interviews, the views of dif-
ferent sections of society concerning the prospects and problems of sharīʿa 
implementation on the Tanzanian mainland were explored. The research 
is about the social challenges posed to and by sharīʿa implementation on 
the Tanzanian mainland. Two major concepts, ‘social’ and ‘challenge’, are 
fundamental to this study. Three areas: legal pluralism, religious pluralism 
and state secularity are included in the term ‘social’. The term ‘challenge’ 
is a two-fold concept. The first aspect is the whole matter of the legal and 
constitutional provisions for sharīʿa implementation in the country. The 
possibilities of, and hindrance to, sharīʿa implementation in the country 
in accordance with the country’s constitution and legal system are exam-
ined. The second aspect of ‘challenge’ is the exploration of the impact 
of sharīʿa implementation on Christian-Muslim relations in the country 
with regard to the religio-socio-political heterogeneity of the country. The 
research shows that there is fear that the Kadhi’s Courts will have a divi-
sive effect on Christian-Muslim relations. It also demonstrates that there 
is general ignorance about what sharīʿa is and what the functions of the 
Kadhi’s Courts are. The demand for Kadhi’s Courts has created mutual 
suspicions between Christians and Muslims and raised fears that the 
re-establishment of Kadhi’s Courts heralds the start of a move to create 
Tanzania into an Islamic state. 
The second study on sharīʿa and its accompanying debates in Tanzania 
is very different. Bernadin Mfumbusa, who holds a PhD in mass commu-
nications from the Gregoriana in Rome and since 2011 has been Bishop of 
Kondoa, Tanzania, focused his research “Sharīʿa Debates and the National 
Consensus in Tanzania” on grassroots sharīʿa debates and their impact 
on the national consensus. His research concerns the profile of religion 
in Tanzanian public life. A series of thirty in-depth interviews were con-
ducted with Muslims and Christians in the community, together with 
observation. Kondoa, a small town in Dodoma Region in central Tanzania, 
was selected for the case study largely because it is a microcosm of the 
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country: multi-ethnic, multi-racial and multi-religious. Although people 
have lived there in relative peace and harmony since independence, signs 
of radicalization along religious lines are now apparent. Over the last two 
decades there has been a discernible shift in the trend of debates, from 
the pre-occupation in the pre-1985 period with the relationship between 
ujamaa (African socialism) and religion, or between religion and state, 
to the marginalization and victimization rhetoric which has taken on 
Muslim versus non-Muslim nuances in the post-1985 period. The research 
also shows that that the extent of conflict among Christians and Muslims 
has often been exaggerated. It also found that ethnic bonds transcend reli-
gious affiliations. In spite of generally peaceable relations in Kondoa, two 
areas of tension were found: one that was recognised as specifically caus-
ing tensions between Muslims and Christians was the impact of Christian 
NGOs on the Muslim way of life. The research documented the activities 
of one group, Compassion International, which on arrival linked itself 
to several churches in Kondoa and offered educational scholarships to 
Muslim children. Acceptance of the scholarship involved attendance at 
Bible Classes. The second area of tension is amongst Muslims themselves 
and results from the presence of new attitudes emanating from some 
Muslim youth who have been trained outside the country and are intro-
ducing different interpretations of Islam. This group of Muslim youths has 
formed the Ansaar Sunni, who are “Wahhabi” in temperament and cause 
tensions with older Muslims in the community who continue to adhere 
to the Shāfiʿī Madhhab.
The variety of research topics discussed in the different chapters reveals 
the range of reactions and responses to sharīʿa debates encountered in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Together, these pieces of research inform the continu-
ing discourse of religious identities as Muslims and Christians seek ways 
of co-existing in the nation-states studied.
PART ONE
SUDAN: “TOTAL SHARĪʿA”
Map 2 Map of Sudan: Showing principal places referred to in Part One
CHAPTER TWO
“SHARĪʿA AND REALITY”: A DOMAIN OF CONTEST AMONG  
SUNNI MUSLIMS IN THE DISTRICT OF SHENDI,  
NORTHERN SUDAN
Osman Mohamed Osman Ali
Introduction
This chapter examines the way in which some Muslim groups in Northern 
Sudan take opposite sides over the issues of sharīʿa and reality. It consid-
ers the Muslim diversity in Northern Sudan to be an argument that any 
attempt to implement the sharīʿa will be fraught with conflict. This prem-
ise is supported by field data from the urban and rural communities of the 
District of Shendi (Arab.: muḥāfaẓat Shandī),1 which represents the south-
ern part of the River Nile State (wilāyat nahr al-Nīl), on the eastern bank 
of the Nile. These communities are multicultural, multiethnic and inclusive 
of some Muslim and Christian religious groups.2 The existence of Shendi 
town in between the villages of the north and the south, the natural envi-
ronment, the economic activities, the kinship ties, and other aspects, all 
distinguish four subcultures in the District of Shendi: that of Shendi town, 
villages north of Shendi town, villages south of Shendi town, and nomads’ 
camps. The Muslim groups (i.e., the Republican Brothers, the Sufis, the 
Anṣār al-Mahdī, the Anṣār al-Sunna, and the Islamic Movement), which 
are all Sunni, are found here and there within these subcultures, includ-
ing both males and females in their memberships.3 As there were no other 
Muslim groups in this region during the time of the research, the discus-
sions in this chapter are restricted to these groups. Dividing the Muslims 
into these groups in the District of Shendi has been in response to their 
self-identification, as the boundaries among these groups are clear in the 
1   Fieldwork for collecting these data was done in 2002 and then updated in 2008, just 
before writing and finalising this chapter.
2 Ali, O. M. O., ‘Death-related Beliefs and Practices, an Area of Conflict in a Multicultural 
Community: Rural Shendi’, M.Sc Thesis, University of Khartoum, 1994, pages 1–2.
3 Ali, O. M. O., ‘The Dynamics of Interpretation of Textual Islam in Northern Sudan: 
Case Study among the Rural and Urban Population of Shendi Province’, Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of Khartoum, 2004, pages 202–203.
© Osman Mohamed Osman Ali, 2014 | doi:10.1163/9789004262126_003
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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region. Importantly, as expressed by many Sufi informants, there are no 
essential differences among the various Sufi orders as regarding their teach-
ings and cardinal rituals. They all adhere to both the Islamic sharīʿa and 
voluntary or optional religious services, and follow the same one path that 
is believed to lead to the Prophet Muḥammad, and ultimately, God. Even 
in their literature, the Sufi Sheikhs constantly urge their followers to assist 
and show respect and love to the followers of all the Sufi orders. For these 
reasons, all the Sufi groups have good, friendly relations with each other 
and cooperate in their religious activities and festivals. Building upon this, 
the Sufis are taken as a homogenous group in this chapter. Also, the Anṣār 
al-Mahdī feel an intimate relationship between the Sufi and Mahdist 
schools of thought. They utter not a single criticism against the Sufis. They 
respect the Sufis and think of them as following the right way, as they do. 
However, they state that the imām al-mahdī had been a Sufi disciple for a 
long time before he declared the Mahdiship. He presented his own legal 
rules and judgements only after that declaration. He then invited Sufis 
who were his contemporaries (including the Sufi Sheikhs) to follow him 
and criticized many of their manners of conduct, which he considered as 
not conforming to the Islamic religion. It is only for these reasons that 
the Anṣār al-Mahdī regard themselves as distinct from the Sufis who are 
presently existing in the District of Shendi, as do the Sufis in their feelings 
towards the Anṣār al-Mahdī. 
The District of Shendi, due to the above considerations and for other rea-
sons, is worthy of being described as a miniature representation of Northern 
Sudan. That is to say, this chapter deals with the philosophical underpinnings 
of the above-mentioned Sunni Muslim groups in the District of Shendi, but 
of course this has implications for the whole of Northern Sudan. Historically 
speaking, in the centuries known in Europe as the Middle Ages, the north-
ern region of Sudan was divided into three kingdoms: Nobatia, Makuria 
and Alodia. Between these kingdoms and the Red Sea lay the Beja country.4 
The introduction of Christianity into these kingdoms in the sixth century 
marked a new era. Christianity was adopted to such an extent that it 
became the state religion.5 With the fall of Egypt into the hands of the 
Muslims, preparations began for the conquest of Sudan. By 652 Islamic 
forces invaded Makuria, the northern kingdom, which defeated the invad-
ers decisively and for six centuries thereafter was able to impose its own 
4 Hasan, Yusuf Fadl, ‘The Penetration of Islam in the Eastern Sudan’, in Islam in Tropical 
Africa, Lewis, I. M. (ed.), London: Oxford University Press, 1966, pages 144–159, (page 144).
5 Hasan, 1966, pages 144–145.
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terms upon relations with the Muslim world. The Muslim forces, then, 
turned their acquisitive attentions eastward towards the Beja. Raids were 
undertaken to impose tribute upon nearby chiefs and open their country 
to Muslim traders. In years to come, many immigrant Arabs would be 
absorbed into the northern Beja lineages, creating mixed-descent com-
munities that were recognized as the first Beja Muslims.6 After a time, 
many Arabs drifted towards Alodia, the southern kingdom, which by the 
twelfth century began to break up.7 Then, hostilities between Makuria 
and Muslims began to erupt. In 1276 an Islamic force conquered Makuria 
and, under the terms of settlement, its people were allowed to keep their 
religion as protected persons under sharīʿa and were to be governed via a 
puppet king chosen by the conquerors. In 1324 Muslims seized the throne 
from the old dynasty.8 Over the next few centuries, renewed centripetal 
social forces restored royal rule to the Nile and introduced a form of state 
government to the western highlands. Thenceforth, the Sudanese king-
doms were lands of Islam.9
It was the influence of traders and Muslim holy men that finally won 
the victory for Islamic culture in Northern Sudan. The holy men trans-
mitted the version of Islam known as Sufism. The more charismatic of 
them bonded with their followers into orders (Arab.: ṭarīqa / ṭuruq). The 
coming of the ṭuruq into Northern Sudan can be divided into two stages. 
The first, which may be dated from about the 16th century, began with the 
recruitment of some holy men into the decentralized “ancient” ṭuruq, 
the Qādiriyya and the Shādhiliyya. The second stage took place in the 18th 
and 19th centuries when the country came to be dominated by a number of 
centralized reformist ṭuruq, namely, the Sammāniyya, the Khatmiyya, the 
Idrīsiyya and the Tijāniyya.10 In 1881, a Sufi leader by the name Muḥammad 
Aḥmad proclaimed his mission as imām al-mahdī (Arab.: divinely guided 
leader). He called upon people to fight against the Turks who, because 
of their impiety and oppression, were unbelievers. By the time of his 
death in 1885, the Mahdist forces controlled most of northern Sudan and 
began to establish a centralized state based on principles of rule defined 
6 Spaulding, Jay, ‘Precolonial Islam in Eastern Sudan’, in The History of Islam in Africa, 
Levtzion, Nehemia & Pouwels, Randall L. (eds.), Oxford: James Currey Ltd, 2000, pages 
117–118.
7 Hasan, 1966, page 151.
8 Spaulding, 2000, pages 118–119.
9 Spaulding, 2000, pages 119–120.
10 Karrar, A. S., The Sufi Brotherhoods in the Sudan, London: Hurst & Company, 1992, 
pages 1, 20.
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by al-mahdī. The followers of al-mahdī, the Anṣār al-Mahdī, did not dis-
appear when the Anglo-Egyptian army conquered the Mahdist state in 
1898–99. In the 20th century, they emerged as the largest organized group 
in Sudan.11 One important new element in Sudan was the emergence of 
a significant Islamic grouping: the Muslim Brotherhood (Arab.: al-Ikhwān 
al-Muslimūn), which began as a student organization in the 1940s and had 
some following among urban intellectuals and professionals.12 One more 
Muslim group in Sudan was the Republican Brothers (Arab.: al-Ikhwān 
al-Jumhūriyyūn), which was founded by Maḥmūd Muḥammad Ṭaha in 
1945. The Republican Brothers aim at constructing a new civilization that 
is based on the Qurʾān.13 The different Muslim groups, except the Sufis, con-
sider the Republican Brothers as the most genuine Sufi group in Northern 
Sudan. A recent Muslim group in Northern Sudan is Anṣār al-Sunna, which 
calls for the revival of the traditions of the Prophet Muḥammad. Their 
simple version of Islam is akin to that of the Wahhābiyya, the influential 
followers of the dominant religious doctrine in Saudi Arabia.14
It is worth mentioning here that the word ‘reality’ is used in the pres-
ent chapter with two different meanings. The first meaning refers to the 
‘inner, hidden reality’, the synonym of the transcendental world, which 
consists of everything that some people assume to exist independent of 
and beyond their experiences, as maintained in the Sufis’ arguments in 
the coming few pages. In short, it is whatever is deduced from observa-
tions and cannot be directly perceived. The second meaning of reality is 
simply the realm of undeniable facts, which exist in the manifest world. 
It is whatever is experienced as physical. This second meaning is used in 
dealing with the adaptability of sharīʿa to the recurrent developments in 
the manifest world. So, the first meaning of reality becomes clearer as it is 
contrasted with its second meaning from which alone it is inferred.
It should be made clear in this introduction that the chapter makes one 
central point, which is amply bolstered by empirical research and which can 
be stressed: the sharīʿa is not a monolithic entity, but is a body of  knowledge 
11  Voll, J. O., ‘The Eastern Sudan, 1822 to the Present’, in The History of Islam in Africa, 
Levtzion, Nehemia & Pouwels, Randall L. (eds.), Oxford: James Currey Ltd., 2000, pages 
153–155.
12 Voll, 2000, pages 161, 163–164.
13 Ṣāliḥ ʿAbd al-Qādir Ṣāliḥ al-Shaykh, Al-munaẓẓama al-siyāsa al-waḥīda alatī lahā 
athar ʿalā al-waḥda al-waṭanīya fiʾl-sūdān [The One Single Political Organization and its 
Impact on the National Unity in Sudan], npd, 1997, pages 27–29.
14 Human Rights Watch ‘Behind the Red Line: Political Repression in the Sudan’, www 
.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Sudan.htm (accessed: 27.07.2004).
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from which different actors draw in different ways, i.e., it is shaped and 
appropriated according to the perspectives of the relevant groups.
Background of the Followers of the Muslim Groups  
in the District of Shendi
The nomads live along khūrs and wādīs,15 which are found throughout the 
region away from the Nile and where the soil tends to be of loose mud and 
is fertile for grazing, rain-fed cultivation and the growth of large clumps 
of thorn-bushes (almost all of which are species of acacia). At the begin-
ning of the rainy season many nomads move eastwards beyond Kassala 
State boundary for water and grass. Villagers, who are mostly farmers, live 
along the Nile in areas north and south of Shendi town. Cultivation is the 
most-practised occupation in the villages, followed by grazing and then all 
the other occupations (i.e., trade, railway-worker, etc.). The population of 
Shendi town engages in much more widely diversified occupations.
The ethnic origins of the majority of the inhabitants of the District of 
Shendi are peculiar to those people stretching out into the area between 
the Southern boundary of the Central Nilotic Sudan and the Mediterranean 
Sea, in addition to Eastern Sudan. Observably, Shendi town is a mosaic of 
blocks inhabited by people of different ethnic origins, from all parts of 
Sudan and from African and Asian countries. About 60% of these ethnic 
groups have representation in the rural areas. Also, the town population 
includes a fair number of Copts, who constitute one of the Christian groups 
in the region. The majority of the ethnic groups in the rural communities 
are from Northern and Central Nilotic Sudan. People from Southern and 
Western Sudan do not constitute major groups in any of these communi-
ties though their numbers are remarkable in Shendi town. Those from 
Eastern Sudan appear as major groups only at the nomads’ camps and 
the villages north of Shendi town. The traditionally indigenous population 
of the District of Shendi (the Jʿalīyyīn) still exist as major groups in both 
village and nomadic areas. In the villages south of Shendi town is found a 
major group tracing its descent from the Egyptians (i.e., the Muwalladīn). 
There are major groups who trace their descent back to dead holy men 
in the villages north and south of Shendi town. Most of the ethnic groups 
that exist in the villages north of Shendi town are open to each other in 
15 A khūr is a watercourse, usually dry, except during the rainy season; a wādī is a water-
course which is usually dry, except during the rainy season, but wider than the khūr.
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terms of marriage, as are most of the ethnic groups in the villages south of 
Shendi town. Marital relations between the populations of the North and 
the South of the Nile area are rare, and, when found, they appear to be 
indirect and via few widely spread ethnic groups. All the nomadic ethnic 
groups are open to each other in terms of marriage and in turn have links 
with the ethnic groups along the Nile.
The link between the rural population and Shendi town has been devel-
oped partially because the town provides them with services including 
administration, education, health, marketing, business, finance, commu-
nication and transport. Shendi town is closely tied to the surrounding rural 
areas via a bus-network. The District of Shendi as a whole is connected 
with the National Capital (Khartoum), Atbara, Al-Damar, Gedaref, New 
Halfa and Kassala, also through the bus service. These internal and exter-
nal networks are able to function because of the existence of a number 
of paved and unpaved routes. Besides these, there is a newly-built bridge 
connecting the District of Shendi with the District of al-Matamma on the 
western bank of the Nile. In addition, the railway lines pass through the 
area from the South to the North.
As to basic and higher secondary education, it is observed that an acute 
shortage in the educational services reveals itself in the rural residential 
areas. Such an observation becomes more marked at the nomads’ camps. 
At all educational levels, males and females have equal opportunities as 
far as the number of schools available to each gender is concerned. A 
point applicable to both sexes is that the higher the educational level 
the lesser will be the chances for many of them to continue their educa-
tion. This is mainly due to the small number of higher secondary schools. 
For the same reason, boys and girls from rural areas are enrolled in the 
higher secondary schools in Shendi town. Adults’ education is limited to 
women’s guidance and to Shendi town and villages (particularly north 
of Shendi town). Such a kind of adults’ education is intended to provide 
women (usually ten to thirty years old) with information on writing and 
reading, handicrafts and domestic economy.
The Sufi orders (i.e., the Khatmiyya, the Tijāniyya, the Qādiriyya, the 
Sammāniyya, etc.) dominate the majority of the rural areas in the District 
of Shendi. They dominate approximately 77% of the villages north of 
Shendi town and 92% of those of the south. As far as the nomads are 
concerned, the Sufis predominate in approximately 68% of the camps. 
Next to the Sufi orders come the Anṣār al-Mahdī representing 20% and 
2% of the villages north and south of Shendi town, respectively. Also, 
they are the main group in about 32% of the nomads’ camps. The Anṣār 
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al-Sunna comprise about 3% of the villages north of Shendi town and 6% 
of those of the south. It is remarkable that, though the Anṣār al-Sunna are 
a relatively new Muslim group in the area, its adherents are increasing 
at the expense of the traditional Sufis and the Anṣār al-Mahdī. But none 
of the nomads’ camps is dominated by the Anṣār al-Sunna. The reason 
for this may be due to intact beliefs of the Sufi and Anṣār al-Mahdī doc-
trines among the nomads who have also remained away from the external 
agents of socio-cultural change. Again, the spread of education among the 
nomads in the District of Shendi has been very slow. Even the Sufi and 
Anṣār al-Mahdī leaders exploit this situation to build resistance against 
the penetration of the Anṣār al-Sunna into the nomadic areas. However, 
few young nomads join the Anṣār al-Sunna. Some of those who do are 
reprimanded or even beaten so as to encourage them to retreat from the 
Anṣār al-Sunna doctrine. Even more harshly, certain families may disasso-
ciate themselves from their youngsters who insist on continuing as Anṣār 
al-Sunna. In Shendi town, we find adherents to all these Muslim groups, 
as well as to the Republican Brothers, amongst the Muslim population. 
The distribution of these Muslim groups in the District of Shendi may be 
an attribute of historical factors. The degree of dominance of each Muslim 
group coincides with the time of its emergence in the region. In other 
words, the older the group is, the more dominant are its adherents. The 
Sufi orders have been in existence since the beginning of the Islamization 
of the Shendi population. The Anṣār al-Mahdī cropped up during the 
Mahdist Regime. The Anṣār al-Sunna date their appearance as an orga-
nized group in Shendi to the late 1970s. Large Christian groups are found 
residing with the Muslim urban population.
Sharīʿa as Divine Blueprint
It is commonly argued, particularly among the Sufis, the Anṣār al-Mahdī, 
the Anṣār al-Sunna, and the members of the Islamic Movement in the 
District of Shendi, that the Islamic sharīʿa is a system of thought and orga-
nization that is always characterized by its availability to human beings, 
mainly because it is from the presence of Allāh16 and, therefore, inclusive, 
and free of any deficiency. To these Muslim groups, Allāh projected the 
sharīʿa for all human beings, and therefore it is inclusive of all things that 
could bring about happiness to them. One can find in the sharīʿa the best 
16 The name ‘Allāh’ is used for God in the Islamic religion and in the communities 
under study.
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planning for even the smallest or largest element in all aspects of social 
life. It is stressed that no-one is more knowledgeable about Allāh’s cre-
ation than Allāh. To Ernest Gellner, this is a model which is available in 
writing, and equally available to all literate men, and to all those willing 
to heed literate men. This model holds that Islam is a distinctive historical 
totality, which organizes various aspects of social life. It maintains that a 
set of rules, which are to be implemented throughout social life, exists, 
eternal, divinely ordained, and independent of the will of men, which 
defines the proper ordering of society.17
Building upon the above arguments, the Sufis, the Anṣār al-Mahdī, the 
Anṣār al-Sunna, and the members of the Islamic Movement in the District 
of Shendi refuse the adoption of democracy, communism, socialism and 
capitalism in constructing any Islamic state. They consider the trend that 
rejects Islam as the base of the political and other practices in a state, and 
restricts it only within the places of worship, as an attempt to destroy the 
Islamic religion. This is mainly because the historical literature lets it be 
seen that Islam flourished only after it had been enacted as both religion 
and state. Moreover, these urban, villagers and nomad Muslim groups 
argue that the communists, the socialists, the capitalists, and others who 
are also bearers of systems of thought and organization, which human 
beings reached through their own experiences, presented ideas that Islam 
preceded in time with more perfect ones. Because of this belief, these 
Muslim groups feel in no need of such man-made ideas or systems of 
thought and organization. As such they declare that communism, social-
ism and capitalism have brought nothing new or better to the benefit of 
human beings. They put it the other way round, saying that Islam was 
communicated to human beings by Allāh who created them and who is 
the most knowledgeable about their own various affairs; whilst commu-
nism, socialism, capitalism, democracy, etc., are just human references 
that should not be looked at with favour, whatever level of development 
they reach.
The members of the Islamic Movement, the Anṣār al-Sunna, and the 
Anṣār al-Mahdī in the urban, village and nomadic areas of the District of 
Shendi think that, in any Islamic state, all sharīʿa laws should be imple-
mented over all fields of life in a given society without the omission of a 
single point. As an exception, the Anṣār al-Sunna in the villages south of 
17 Gellner, Ernest, Muslim Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pages 
1–2.
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Shendi town restrict the government’s efforts in this implementation to 
what they call ‘the general sharīʿa’ that deals only with social facts out-
side the domestic sphere. They assert that a Muslim government is not 
concerned with what they call ‘the private sharīʿa’, which deals with facts 
within the domestic domain. 
The Adaptability of Sharīʿa
As to how they deal with the Islamic texts, the Anṣār al-Mahdī in the vil-
lages and nomads’ camps of the District of Shendi resort to the ḥadīth 
text: 
Allah said: ‘. . . and My slave keeps on coming closer to Me through perform-
ing Nawafil (praying or doing extra deeds besides what is obligatory) till I 
love him, so I become his sense of hearing with which he hears, and his 
sense of sight with which he sees, and his hand with which he grips, and his 
leg with which he walks.’18 
They understand by this text that whenever a person penetrates deeply into 
the practice of his religion, his religious knowledge deepens, as Allāh drops 
good (the faith) into his heart and presents him with extraordinary senses 
of hearing, sight, etc. Only then detailed perfect religious knowledge will be 
bestowed upon that person from the presence of Allāh. He could then see 
even what will happen in the future. Accordingly, these village and nomad 
Anṣār al-Mahdī think of two levels of interpretation of the Qurʾānic and 
ḥadīth texts: the esoteric and the exoteric. They consider the esoteric 
exposition of the hidden meanings of the texts (i.e., ta⁠ʾwīl), which they 
associate only with the higher degrees of religious understanding and 
wide-ranging knowledge, to be better and more perfect than the exoteric 
interpretations. However, they point out the necessity of taking the recent 
scientific and technological developments in the ever-changing world into 
consideration, in the interpretations of the Islamic texts. They see the 
necessity of renewing (or modernizing) the Islamic religious teachings, 
in order to cope with such developments. Here, they cite one of imām 
al-mahdī’s sayings: “All that have been brought by the Qurʾān are on our 
heads; all that have been brought by the ḥadīth are on our shoulders; but 
all that have been brought by the Prophet’s Companions or the Scholars 
of Jurisprudence are questionable, for we are men just like them: We can 
18 Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, volume 8, book 76, number 509, see: http://www.usc.edu/schools/
college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/hadith/bukhari.
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also derive qualified judgements”. In effect, imām al-mahdī tried to derive 
judgements and to renew the Islamic religious teachings. Nonetheless, the 
Anṣār al-Mahdī stipulate that the renewal of the Islamic religion should 
fall in with the Qurʾān, the sunna and the sayings of al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ (Arab.: 
the worthy ancestors of Islam, the venerable forefathers).19 They present 
an example of such updated interpretations of the Islamic texts. They 
state that people in the recent past used to explain sūrat Luqmān (31): 34: 
Knowledge of the Hour [of Resurrection] belongs to God; it is He who sends 
down the relieving rain and He who knows what is hidden in the womb. No 
soul knows what it will reap tomorrow, and no soul knows in what land it 
will die; it is God who is all knowing and all aware.
as meaning that no one could, for example, know whether a foetus is 
male or female other than Allāh. Given the fact that science and technol-
ogy are now able to show the sex of a foetus after it reaches the fourth 
month of its age, this Qurʾānic text could now be understood as that Allāh 
knows whether a foetus is male or female even before its mother becomes 
pregnant.
The supporters of the Islamic Movement bring forward the ḥadīth text: 
On the day he returned from the Battle of Ahzab, the Messenger of Allah 
(may peace be upon him) made for us an announcement that nobody would 
say his Zuhr prayer but in the quarters of Banu Quraiza. (Some) people, 
being afraid that the time for prayer would expire, said their prayers before 
reaching the street of Banu Quraiza. The others said: We will not say our 
prayer except where the Messenger of Allah (may peace be upon him) has 
ordered us to say it even if the time expires. (When he learned of the dif-
ference in the view of the two groups of the people, the Messenger of Allah 
(may peace be upon him) did not blame anyone from the two groups.20 
Such an admission, to the supporters of the Islamic Movement, took into 
account that some people deal only with the manifest meanings of texts, 
while others look into the reasons behind these texts and into their latent 
meanings. So, they have concluded that the sharīʿa allows any interpreta-
tion of the Islamic texts.
The members of the Islamic Movement do not restrict themselves to the 
outer or the inner meanings of Islamic texts, or to a particular doctrine. 
19 As will be mentioned frequently, later in this chapter, all Muslim groups in the District 
of Shendi use the Arabic phrase, al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ to mean the Prophet’s Companions, their 
successors, and the successors of their successors.
20 Ṣaḥīḥ al-Muslim, book 19, number 4374, see: http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/
crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/hadith/muslim/019.smt.html.
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However, they lay out the various issues for consultation, and what the 
scholars (ʿulamāʾ) recommend, they take as the right opinion. They take 
into consideration both the understanding of al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ and recent 
developments that were previously unknown—in the financial, the criminal 
and other aspects of social life. For example, no views are to be found in 
the Qurʾān and the ḥadīth in respect of stealing in a big commercial house 
that is watched by a closed television network, or of blood groups that are 
identified by modern laboratories. Such new developments create the need 
for giving free play to the ijtihād (Arab.: deriving qualified up-to-date judge-
ments) and to rational thinking. The members of the Islamic Movement 
argue that the Islamic jurisprudence, which was written 700 years ago, did 
not imagine the problems that have resulted from the recent great scientific 
developments and the modern way of life, and did not face issues similar to 
those of the present.
These proponents of the Islamic Movement implicitly think about 
modernizing the sharīʿa to make it cope with the many developments 
that have taken place in all aspects of modern life. They see great dif-
ferences between the human beings of the 7th century and those of the 
present time, as to the complexity of their life, knowledge, technology, etc. 
They seem to have the opinion that the conventional sharīʿa could not 
stand up to the changes in current human society, and that the Muslims 
should therefore derive up-to-date qualified judgements.  The members 
of the Islamic Movement state that it is as if they are living between two 
men: the first one knows well the sharīʿa in the texts, but does not know 
the society; the second one knows well the society, but does not know the 
sharīʿa. The former represents those Muslims who studied the old books 
of Islamic jurisprudence, but were ignorant of many developments of the 
modern age, i.e. they live out of their age. Consequently, they seek the appli-
cation of the Islamic laws as they are. The latter stands for those Muslims 
who studied the Western culture, but were ignorant of the sharīʿa, and as a 
result they became consciously or unconsciously secular. Finally, the mem-
bers of the Islamic Movement intend to deal with these challenges by study-
ing the sharīʿa while living in the modern society, to live in their age. They 
have begun treating the new issues accordingly. In other words, Muslims 
should comprehend both sharīʿa and modern society, and the Qurʾān and 
the ḥadīth should be treated as suitable everywhere and at any time. 
The Anṣār al-Sunna in Shendi town and villages north and south of it are 
in an exactly contrary position to the above opinions. They claim that they 
understand the Islamic texts only “as understood by al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ”. They 
mean by al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ the Prophet’s Companions, their successors, and 
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the successors of their successors according to the ḥadīth text: “It was asked 
from Allah’s Apostle (may peace be upon him) who amongst the people 
were the best. He said: (People) of my generation, then those next to them, 
then those next to them . . .”.21 Al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ are taken as models of human 
behaviour and belief for the Muslims, so that to follow them is like follow-
ing the Prophet Muḥammad. The phrase “as understood by al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ” 
points at guarding against one’s own attempts to interpret the Qurʾānic and 
ḥadīth texts, and instead points to sticking to the understanding of the 
Companions, their successors, and the successors of their successors up to 
the four Scholars of Jurisprudence (Imām Ibn Ḥanbal, Imām Mālik, Imām 
al-Shāfiʾī and Imām Abū Hanīfa). Importantly, the Anṣār al-Sunna take Ibn 
Ḥanbal as their Imām insofar as he laid down the legal school according 
to which they now live. Al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ, to them, means the people who 
become a model in deeds and understanding. For the Anṣār al-Sunna, their 
creed is based on the genuine beliefs that al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ stood for in their 
understanding of the Islamic religion. These beliefs are thought to be inher-
ent in the Qurʾān and the ḥadīth and detailed by the scholars. The Anṣār 
al-Sunna say that they depend on the true ḥadīth and the plain Qurʾānic 
verses, as they consider them as the original Islamic texts. They even look 
at the ḥadīth as being elucidative of the Qurʾān and circumstantial to the 
Qurʾānic judgements, i.e. it could restrict the absolutes, unbind the restricted, 
make exceptions of rules, generalize the specifications, or specify the gen-
eralities. Not only this, but also some ḥadīth are thought to abrogate some 
Qurʾānic texts. When the Qurʾān is absolute or generalizing as to the refer-
ents, the ḥadīth texts come to be restrictive or particularizing, respectively. 
An instance is the absolutistic sūrat al-Māʾida (5): 38: “Cut off the hands of 
thieves, whether they are man or woman, as punishment for what they have 
done—a deterrent from God: God is almighty and wise”. This Qurʾānic verse 
orders the thief ’s hand to be cut off, but it does not specify what amount of 
stolen property renders such cutting to be appropriate or from where to cut 
along the arm from shoulder to hand. A ḥadīth answers such questions, as 
the Prophet Muḥammad said: “Allah’s Messenger (may peace be upon him) 
cut off the hand of a thief for a quarter of a dinar and upwards”22 and he 
used to cut at the hand joint.
21  Ṣaḥīḥ al-Muslim, book 31, number 6151, see: http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/
crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/hadith/muslim/031.smt.html.
22 Ṣaḥīḥ al-Muslim, book 17, number 4175, see: http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/
crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/hadith/muslim/017.smt.html.
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To the Anṣār al-Sunna in the urban and village communities in the District 
of Shendi, ijtihād should act only where there is no single Qurʾānic or ḥadīth 
text. They state that to derive a judgement when there is text could lead 
to a great deviation from the right course. Also, it should only be used by 
the legal scholars who know its tools and operate as the so-called absolute 
mujtahidūn who are able to Islamise, demonstrate and apply the rules.
The Anṣār al-Sunna in the District of Shendi hold the opinion that those 
who propose the re-fashioning of the Islamic teachings so as to cope with 
the recent developments in the world cannot bring even a single legal 
evidence to support their argument or pursuit, simply because nothing in 
Islam could be re-fashioned, i.e. all the Islamic teachings suit everywhere 
and every age. They even think that it is not allowable to transgress the 
apparent usages and meanings of words in the Qurʾān and the ḥadīth, 
since scholarly people lay it down that because the texts are sacred, one 
should not transgress the bounds of words. To them, the esoteric exposi-
tion of the hidden meaning (ta⁠ʾwīl) leads to stray beliefs and practices.
Dale Eickelman repeatedly deals with such controversy in his many 
writings, where he describes and analyses the processes by which religious 
symbols and institutions are reinterpreted and modified to accommodate 
new and evolving social and historical realities, and describes how reli-
gious ideologies themselves shape the social order.23 He states that the 
key traditions of world religions remain vital and meaningful through the 
actions of their carriers, who maintain and shape them over long histori-
cal periods and in diverse contexts. Thus religious traditions are linked 
to the changing relations of authority and domination in which they are 
shaped and transformed. Eickelman adds that some carriers of world reli-
gions claim that their tradition possesses a core of formative ideals and 
immutable religious truths, and most share common rituals. Yet these 
ideals, truths and rituals must be open to reformulation and reinterpreta-
tion by their carriers over successive generations and in novel contexts. 
To Eickelman, many earlier studies tended to concentrate on the search 
for an Islamic ‘essence’. This coincided with the premise held by many 
Muslims that Islamic beliefs and practices are unaffected by historical 
change. A number of recent studies of Islam, however, combine textual 
23 Eickelman, Dale F., Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Centre, Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1976, pages 3–4.
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analysis with analysis of the social historical contexts in which notions of 
Islam are developed, transmitted, and reproduced.24
Sharīʿa and Reality as Halves of Worship, a View of the Sufis
As expressed by Sufi informants in the District of Shendi, there are no essen-
tial differences among the various Sufi orders regarding their teachings and 
the cardinal rituals. They all stick to both the sharīʿa and the voluntary reli-
gious services (Arab.: nāfila / nawāfil), and as such follow the same one path 
that is believed to ultimately lead to Allāh.
These Sufis see the necessity of always sticking to the Islamic texts. 
However, they are of the opinion that to take these texts only into account, 
without them being interpreted (to find out their true concealed meanings) 
by an expert, may put a person or a group in the wrong. As to taking the 
experts’ interpretations into consideration, the Sufis in the urban and rural 
communities of the District of Shendi depend on their understanding of 
sūrat al-Furqān (25): 59: 
It is He who created the heavens and earth and what is between them in six 
Days, and then established Himself on the throne—He is the Lord of Mercy; 
He is the Best Informed. 
A lay Sufi is expected to look for the proofs and the uncovering of the 
ḥaqāʾiq (Arab.: truths) and the ʿilla (Arab.: pretext, ratio legis, purpose of 
the reason of religious law) from the Sheikhs who are believed to be the 
successors or heirs of the Scholars of the Reality (of Islamic religion). If 
a lay Sufi tries to interpret by her or himself, she or he may not catch 
the true meanings or may lose the right way. To the Sufis, the Qurʾānic 
texts cannot be explained only via the usages and the meanings of words, 
mainly because the Arabic words in the different texts may have acquired 
other usages and meanings than those that were understood earlier by the 
Prophet and his Companions. They consider both ilhām (Arab.: inspira-
tion) and ta⁠ʾwīl as useful tools. Ilhām is the state in which Allāh infuses 
truth onto one’s tongue or other limbs. Ta⁠ʾwīl is the esoteric exposition of 
the inner, hidden meanings of texts.
To the urban and rural Sufis in the District of Shendi sūrat al-Raḥmān 
(55): 1–2: “It is the Lord of Mercy who taught the Qurʾān” means that if a 
human develops spiritually and her or his soul reaches the so-called “Home 
24 Eickelman, Dale F., The Middle East and Central Asia: An Anthropological Approach, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1997, pages 249, 252–253.
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for Divine Attributes”, Allāh will teach her or him ta⁠ʾ wīl, so as to be able to 
correctly interpret and understand the Qurʾān. Importantly, the Sufis treat 
some Qurʾānic texts, mainly those which deal with the obligatory religious 
services and the manifest judgements about what is permissible, prohibited, 
etc., as postulates that human beings should not subject the texts to mental 
measurements. They should be taken only in their apparent meanings. The 
human mind here is reckoned as minor.
The Sufis in Shendi town, villages north and south of it and nomads’ 
camps argue that to be acquainted with all branches of knowledge could 
not be the fruits of one’s efforts. A human who makes great efforts to learn 
could be acquainted only with some branch of knowledge (e.g., econom-
ics, law, etc.), but could not reach the depths of all branches. However, 
the knowledge that is bestowed upon a human from the presence of Allāh 
(i.e. ta⁠ʾ wīl) is believed to be free of any deficiency or ignorance, i.e. it is 
comprehensive of all details in all fields. For this reason, we find in the Sufi 
vocabulary titles like aʿrif billāh (Arab.: having esoteric spiritual knowledge 
from Allāh). Nevertheless, the Sufis say that no human being could ‘thor-
oughly’ be acquainted with Allāh’s knowledge.
The Sufis in the District of Shendi maintain that the Prophet Muḥammad 
was ordered (by Allāh) to communicate to people the exoteric knowledge, 
but was given the option whether or not to communicate the esoteric knowl-
edge. Accordingly, the Islamic religion, for these Sufis, has two aspects: exo-
teric (i.e. the sharīʿa) and esoteric (i.e. the Reality of religion). To these Sufis, 
one should stick oneself to both these aspects, because they complement 
and affect each other and together lead one to have a perfect faith in Allāh. 
If one restricts oneself to the sharīʿa only, or to the Reality of religion only, 
one’s worship of Allāh will be fruitless and could not be accepted. These 
two aspects of the Islamic religion are inseparable. Each is regarded as half 
of worship. To the Sufis, the Anṣār al-Sunna, for example, adhere only to the 
sharīʿa, and refuse to acknowledge the esoteric aspect (or the Reality) of 
the Islamic religion, and hence they have gone astray. To the Sufis, such 
Muslim groups seem to adopt mutilated bodies of thought. For an Islamic 
thought to be perfect and sound, it should take hold of the whole Islamic 
religion, i.e., both its exoteric and esoteric aspects.
The esoteric component, which the urban, villager and nomad Sufis in 
the District of Shendi define as the Reality of religion, has something to do 
with the nawāfil, which mean, as mentioned before, the voluntary religious 
services. To these Sufis, each of the five pillars of Islam (i.e., the recital of 
shahāda, the prayers, the legal almsgiving, the fasting during the month 
of Ramadan, and the pilgrimage) has a nāfila of its same kind. A person is 
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expected to do as much as s/he can of these nawāfil. Importantly, the dhikr 
(Arab.: remembrance, incessant repetition of certain words or formulae in 
praise of God) is a word usually used as a synonym of the nawāfil. Here 
the Sufis in the different subcultures of the District of Shendi appeal to the 
ḥadīth text:
Allah said, . . . and My slave keeps on coming closer to Me through perform-
ing Nawafil (praying or doing extra deeds besides what is obligatory) till I 
love him, so I become his sense of hearing with which he hears, and his 
sense of sight with which he sees, and his hand with which he grips, and his 
leg with which he walks; and if he asks Me, I will give him, and if he asks My 
protection (Refuge), I will protect him; (i.e. give him My Refuge). . . .25 
This text is explained as meaning that the obligatory religious services 
may or may not keep a person continuing to come closer to Allāh, but 
the nawāfil do so without fail. To the Sufis, only one who—via the dhikr 
and the sharīʿa—comes closer to Allāh or one onto whose limbs Allāh 
infuses truth and consequently becomes aʿrif billāh can learn the esoteric 
knowledge.
The Republican Brothers and the sharīʿa as ‘Non-original’ in Islam
The Republican Brothers, who appear entirely as an urban elitist group 
in the District of Shendi, differ from the other Muslim groups, whom 
they call al-salafiyyūn, in their definition of the sunna. The other groups 
define the sunna as whatever the Prophet Muḥammad said, acted or tac-
itly approved. The Republican Brothers understand by the term sunna 
merely whatever the Prophet acted; whatever he said or tacitly approved 
are parts of the sharīʿa. The sunna, for the Republican Brothers, is the 
level of religion that the Prophet Muḥammad, and all other prophets and 
a few Muslims embodied. The Republican Brothers believe that mankind 
is in progress26 and on the way to adopt such a level of religion—as the 
law of the group and not the law of one individual as it was in the past. 
In other words, they define the sunna as “the personal example of the 
Prophet Muḥammad”27 as opposed to the sharīʿa, which was applied to 
25 Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, volume 8, book 76, number 509, see: http://www.usc.edu/schools/
college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/hadith/bukhari/076.sbt.html.
26 Here, the Republican thought assumes that mankind shall be at more progressive stages 
in the future. It states that Allah now is taking all mankind up a ladder to stages of higher 
perfection.
27 Esposito, J. L., ‘Sunnah’, in The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003, page 305.
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the nation at large. The Republican Brothers call the other Muslim groups 
al-salafiyyūn also because they do not derive their judgements purely from 
the ‘original Qurʾān’.28
The Islamic religion, to the Republican Brothers, rests on a seven-stage 
ladder starting with three successive stages, the first Islam, the faith, and 
the iḥsān (Arab.: beneficence, performance of good deeds), then shifting to 
three other successive ones (knowing the truth with the certainty of mind, 
knowing the truth with the certainty of sight, and knowing the very truth 
with the assured certainty), and ending in the stage of second Islam, which 
is believed to be the same religion that the Prophet Muḥammad prac-
tised. This means that human knowledge is continuously increasing as it 
is changing from the stage of faith to that of knowing the very truth with 
the assured certainty (i.e., the science). In accordance with this belief, the 
Republican Brothers consider all mankind to be ignorant at present, but 
as far more developed when their ignorance is compared to that of the 
7th century. If another message of religion is revealed, it will make man-
kind cover a long distance of progress. When the Prophet Muḥammad came 
with the Islamic religion, he found people in the so-called ‘former Time of 
Ignorance’ (Arab.: jāhilīya).29 He then passed with them over great stages 
of progress. Importantly, the Republican Brothers expect the return of the 
Prophet Muḥammad in the sense that mankind will progress to the point 
at which it will live up to his personal example (i.e. the sunna), which is the 
Second Message of Islam, i.e. the end of the seven-stage ladder on which 
the Islamic religion rests. By then, Islam will predominate throughout 
the world.
The Republican Brothers believe that Allāh is leading mankind to the 
stage of maturity that it missed when Adam committed sin, as cited in sūrat 
al-Tīn (95): 4–5: “We create man in the finest state then reduce him to the 
lowest of the low”. To them, mankind was degraded to the lowest stage of 
material incarnation, which is hydrogen. It later on developed into water, 
into inorganic substances, into plants, into animals, and then into its pres-
ent form (i.e. mankind). So, mankind has started to recover its origin. This 
is to say: mankind is now in progress from a constituent form into a better 
creation till it reaches its origin, i.e. to become human again. Such recovery 
will take place with the enactment of the Second Message of Islam.
28 This point will be clarified in the coming paragraphs.
29 Esposito, ‘Jahiliyyah’, Oxford Dictionary of Islam, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003, page 154.
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Following on from the above, the Republican Brothers believe that 
Islam came with two messages: a first message at one end correspond-
ing to Judaism, and a second message at the other end corresponding to 
Christianity. They state that Allāh sent Moses to a society with a more recent 
experience of the law of the jungle, hence his message (the Old Testament 
or the Torah) to that society was little more than the requirement to be 
just and fair (a life for a life, and an eye for an eye), as that was closer, and 
more acceptable to their primitive nature. In that way, the laws of the Old 
Testament came at one extreme, more in the nature of excessive material-
ism. Then Jesus Christ came with a message (the New Testament or the 
Gospel) that went to the other extreme. Hence the New Testament came 
more in the form of excessive spirituality, in response to the previous revela-
tion of excessive materialism. These were, however, lofty moral command-
ments that remained suspended high above the primitive reality. Thus Jesus 
told his disciples: “You have heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye and a 
tooth for a tooth.’ But I say to you, Do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone 
strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also”; (Matthew 5:38–39). 
Such correspondences to Judaism and Christianity are thought to be cited 
in sūrat al-Fatḥ (48): 29: 
Muḥammad is the Messenger of God. Those who follow him are harsh towards 
the disbelievers and compassionate towards each other. You see them kneel-
ing and prostrating, seeking God’s bounty and His good pleasure: on their faces 
they bear the marks of their prostrations. This is how they are pictured in the 
Torah and the Gospel: like a seed that puts forth its shoot, becomes strong, 
grows thick, and rises on its stem to the delight of its sowers. So God infuriates 
the disbelievers through them; God promises forgiveness and a great reward 
to those who believe and do righteous deeds. 
Both messages of Islam, according to the Republican thought, are con-
tained in the Qurʾān as revealed to the Prophet Muḥammad. The First 
Message was based on the sharīʿa, which had to come down to the primi-
tive realities of the 7th century. Hence, it was founded on the principles 
of guardianship, that of Muslims over non-Muslims, of the ruler over his 
subjects, and of men over women. It is to be found in those parts of the 
Qurʾān revealed in Medina, which adjourned,30 at that time, those parts 
previously revealed in Mecca. The Second Message, on the other hand, 
30 The Republican Brothers modify the use of the term “abrogated” in reference to the 
difference between Meccan and Medinan Qurʾānic messages, preferring instead the word 
“adjourned”, which means “put off until a future day”. This is a point that the coming few 
paragraphs elaborate further.
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is based on the personal example of the Prophet Muḥammad himself 
(i.e. the sunna), in contrast to the sharīʿa for the nation at large. It is 
based on the principle of freedom, and is to be found in the parts of 
Qurʾān revealed in Mecca, which were binding on the Prophet personally, 
although they were adjourned with respect to the nation as a whole. This 
Second Message is regarded as the original Islamic religion.
The Republican Brothers tell the story that the Prophet Muḥammad 
came in the Meccan era with the Second message of Islam to all people, 
and he preached Islam at its scientific level, but it was rejected because 
of the infancy of society at that time. So, he was instructed—by Allāh—to 
migrate to Medina, hence the Medinese era, where the Second Message 
was adjourned, and the First Message was implemented.31 The Prophet 
became the prophet of the Second Message, as implemented by himself 
personally, and the messenger of the First Message, in which he preached 
Islam at its faith level, and it was accepted and implemented by that 
nation. Here, the Prophet said: “I received three types of knowledge from 
Allāh. Allāh ordered me to communicate the first one to the upper and 
lower classes of people, gave me the option to or not to communicate the 
second one, and restricted the third one to me alone because no other one 
has the power over it”.32 Even the Prophet’s Companion Abū Hurayra said: 
“I have memorized two kinds of knowledge from Allah’s Apostle. I have 
propagated one of them to you and if I propagated the second, then my 
pharynx (throat) would be cut (i.e. killed)”.33 For the Republican Brothers, 
such ḥadīth texts hint at an extra knowledge ensconced in the Qurʾān for 
mankind when they become qualified enough to understand it.
The phenomenon of the two messages, as reflected in the Qurʾān 
of Mecca and that of Medina, may be clearly observed by contrasting 
Qurʾānic texts of the two eras. From the Qurʾān of Medina, expressing the 
First Message, the Republican Brothers quote sūrat al-Baqara (2): 193: 
Fight them until there is no more persecution, and worship is devoted to 
God. If they cease hostility, there can be no [further] hostility, except towards 
aggressors. 
31  Here it is stated that Allāh intended by doing so just to convince people that they could 
not cope with the scientific level of Islam.
32 A text which is not presented in any edition of the Hadith books.
33 Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, volume 1, book 3, number 121, see: http://www.usc.edu/schools/ 
college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/hadith/bukhari/003.sbt.html.
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This is contrasted, for example, with the Qurʾān of Mecca, reflecting the 
Second Message, sūrat al-Naḥl (16): 125: “[Prophet], call [people] to the way 
of your Lord with wisdom and good teaching. Argue with them in the 
most courteous way, for your Lord knows best who has strayed from His 
way and who is rightly guided”. The Republican Brothers say that being 
convinced of these two messages of Islam removes the contradictions 
which some people see between the so-called ‘abrogating’ and ‘abrogated’ 
verses of the Qurʾān. To them, really there are no contradictions between 
the Islamic texts, but it is a matter of two messages.
The phenomenon of the two messages of Islam may also be observed in 
other Qurʿānic and ḥadīth texts, which say that the Prophet Muḥammad 
has two nations: one of believers (muʾminūn) who were illiterate, and the 
other of submitters (muslimūn) who should be educated persons. This dis-
tinction is included in sūrat Āl ʿImrān (3): 102: “You who believe, be mind-
ful of God, as is His due, and make sure you devote yourselves to Him, to 
your dying moment”. God also says in sūrat al-Jumuʿa (62): 2–3: 
“It is He who raised a messenger, among the people who had no Scripture, to 
recite His revelations to them, to make them grow spiritually and teach them 
the Scripture and wisdom—before that they were clearly astray—to them and 
others yet to join them He is the Almighty, the Wise”. In consequence the 
Prophet said: “Longing for my brothers who have not come yet”!
Then the Companions asked him: “Are we not your brothers?” He replied: 
“No, you are my companions”.34 To the Republican Brothers, such texts 
indicate that the people whose coming is prophesied are Muslims who 
shall follow the prophetic (scientific) model. They are believed to come 
just by the coming of the Second Message of Islam.
To the Republican Brothers, the First Message of Islam was detailed in 
the Qurʾān and the ḥadīth, while the Second Message was expressed only 
in general terms, with no details except insofar as given in the Prophet’s 
personal example (i.e., the sunna). However, a man (i.e., the final Messiah) 
is prophesied to come from among the Muslims to detail the Second 
Message of Islam and its laws. Here, they quote from sūrat al-Naml (27): 
82: “When the verdict is given against them, We shall bring a creature out 
of the earth, which will tell them that people had no faith in Our revela-
tions”. Such beast is the final fulfilment of the event that is to be carried 
out by the final Messiah as cited in sūrat al-Aʿrāf (7): 53: 
34 Musnad Ahmad: 7652, Sunan El-Nassaee: 150. 
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What are they waiting for but the fulfilment of its [final prophecy]? On the Day 
it is fulfilled, those who had ignored it will say, “Our Lord’s messenger spoke 
the truth. Is there anyone to intercede for us now? Or can we be sent back 
to behave differently from the way we behaved before?” they will really have 
squandered their souls, and all [the idols] they invented will have deserted 
them. 
The final Messiah is to bring the accurate knowledge and to inform people 
of the true usages and meanings of the Qurʾān. Only then shall people know 
the real value, and the correct ways of performing religious services.
The coming of the final Messiah is, therefore, dependent upon the 
revival and the implementation of those parts of the Qurʾān which were 
adjourned in the 7th century, the Second Message, and making them the 
Islamic laws for today (after they had been of special application to the 
Prophet Muḥammad alone), thereby abrogating those parts which were 
appropriate and applicable in the 7th century. Whereupon the final Messiah 
will preach Islam at its scientific level, in the same way the Prophet 
Muḥammad first preached it in the Meccan era, but this time it will be 
accepted and implemented throughout the world, because of the matu-
rity of society today, with its tremendous intellectual and material capaci-
ties. The Republican Brothers see that mankind now has become ready to 
receive the Second Message, which the final Messiah will bring forth.
The Republican Brothers argue that there is a series of prophecies 
from the Prophet Muḥammad on the coming of the final Messiah, and 
they all clearly demonstrate that he will come with the Second Message 
of Islam, and its laws, and not those of the First Message. It is reported, for 
example, that the Prophet said: “By Him in Whose hand is my life, the son 
of Mary (may peace be upon him) will soon descend among you as a just 
judge. He will break crosses, kill swine and abolish Jizya and the wealth 
will pour forth to such an extent that no one will accept it”.35 because he 
will scientifically show its benefits and because people shall do it with 
deep knowledge. It is added, in another report, “If only one day of this 
world remained. Allah would lengthen that day (according to the version 
of Za⁠ʾidah), till He raised up in it a man who belongs to me or to my fam-
ily whose father’s name is the same as my father’s, who will fill the earth 
with equity and justice as it has been filled with oppression and tyranny 
(according to the version of Fitr). Sufyan’s version says: The world will not 
pass away before the Arabs are ruled by a man of my family whose name 
35 Ṣaḥīḥ al-Muslim, book 1, number 287, see: http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/
engagement/resources/texts/muslim/hadith/muslim/001.smt.html.
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will be the same as mine”.36 To the Republican Brothers, there is a spirit 
of peace in the prophecies of the final Messiah in a way that ends all 
sorts of enmities and antagonism. To fill the earth with equity, to them, 
 presupposes the achievement of social justice, namely socialism, democ-
racy and social equality between sexes, creeds, etc. In the phrase, “the 
wealth will pour forth to such an extent that no one will accept it” they 
find reference to the fruits of socialism, where through increased pro-
duction and fair distribution, the wealth of earth will be shared in a way 
which will accommodate everybody. The phrase, “abolish Jizya,” means for 
them that all compulsion and discrimination on grounds of religious faith, 
as well as any other features of guardianship derived from the Medinan 
Qurʾān shall be abolished and replaced by rules of tolerance, freedom and 
equality derived from the Meccan Qurʾān.
By enacting those previously revealed parts of the Qurʾān, Islam would 
be elevated from its faith level (related to the First Message) to its scientific 
level (related to the Second Message), where people may be distinguished 
according to their intellect and moral values, and not according to their faith 
or sex. One may not be asked about his religion or sex, but only about his 
clarity of thought and perfection of deed. Thus, in the “Islamic laws of the 
Second Message,” and in accordance with the Islamic constitution, there will 
be no discrimination against any citizen because of his religion or sex. The 
constitution itself is not described as Islamic, because it does not purport to 
establish a theocratic regime, but rather a humanist regime where all people 
share and enjoy rights and duties, regardless of race, sex, religion, etc.
As the Republican Brothers show, the Second Message of Islam pro-
vides the legislative groundwork for the construction of an Islamic state 
where democracy and socialism are reconciled, and where social equity, 
which is between man and man and between man and woman as to the 
advantages and the law, prevails. To them, the need for this kind of state is 
global. The constitution that would be adopted in the state is based on the 
parts of Qurʾān that were revealed to the Prophet Muḥammad in Mecca. 
In other words, the Islamic legislation, for the Republican Brothers, should 
be based on what they call “the Original Qurʾānic Texts” (i.e., those texts 
which were previously adjourned), and not on what they call “the Offshoot 
Qurʾānic Texts” (i.e., those texts which have already attained their targets). 
36 Sunan Abū Dawūd, book 36, number 4269, see: http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/
crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/hadith/abudawud/036.sat.html.
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The Islamic legislation, for them, is simply the process of replacing the ‘off-
shoots’ by the ‘originals’.
The fact that the Republican Brothers seek to apply the Second Message 
of Islam and not the sharīʿa does not mean that they intend to drop the 
doctrinal punishments. They maintain that they never attempt to break 
the restrictive ordinance of Allāh. To them, the known doctrinal punish-
ments, such as those for murder, committing highway robbery, etc., all 
remain as ‘minor’ well-fixed standards. This is mainly because Allāh has 
revealed them with the ultimate aim of bestowing honour upon the human 
beings or treating them with civility and deference. In other words, such 
punishments are not intended just for killing, cutting hands off or the like, 
but they are aimed at protecting people’s properties, honour, etc, and as 
such making them feel always at ease. However, the Republican Brothers 
think that the doctrinal punishments should be extracted merely from the 
Second Message of Islam, and should be applied only after all people in 
a given society get well-instructed, and after justice is achieved as to the 
maintenance of equal opportunities for all of them, and after their basic 
needs are sufficiently met. This means that no one should remain in a 
state of ignorance, inequity or poverty.
The Anṣār al-Sunna and the ‘Reality’ as Heretical
The Anṣār al-Sunna in Shendi town and villages north and south of it con-
ceive the esotericists as different groups, who commonly accept as true 
that things are of a dual nature: inner and outer, reality and laws, hidden 
and manifest, etc. The properties of inner, reality, hidden, etc., stand for 
the same thing in the same way as the properties of outer, laws, manifest, 
etc., stand for the opposite thing. As stated by these Anṣār al-Sunna, the 
esotericists built this dichotomy on their belief that the Prophet al-Khiḍr 
was concerned with ‘reality,’ since his knowledge had been based on the 
mukashafāt (Arab.: revelations), and the Prophets Moses and Muḥammad 
were concerned with laws, since their knowledge had been based on the 
waḥī (Arab.: divine inspiration). To the esotericists, as these Anṣār al-Sunna 
say, some people could also attain the ability of mukashafāt, i.e. reveal 
the secrets, the unknown, the psyche, etc. The Anṣār al-Sunna describe 
such dichotomization and beliefs as non-Islamic. They argue that both 
Allāh and the Prophet Muḥammad proved the falsity of divination, and 
revealing the screened or unknown as human faculties. For them, humans 
enjoy no more than the normal sight, for all the human senses are finite. 
They resort to sūrat al-Naml (27): 65: “Say: ‘No one in the heavens or on 
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earth knows the unseen except God’. They do not know when they will 
be raised from the dead”. 
Also Allāh said in sūrat al-Aʿrāf (7): 188: “Say [Prophet], ‘I have no control 
over benefit or harm, [even] to myself, except as God may please: if I had 
knowledge of what is hidden, I would have abundant good things and no 
harm could touch me. I am no more than a bearer of warning, and good 
news to those who believe’ ”. To these Anṣār al-Sunna, the esoteric groups 
trust a knowledge that is bestowed upon human beings from the presence 
of Allāh. They deny the existence of such esoteric knowledge.
The members of the Islamic Movement in the urban and village com-
munities of the District of Shendi have the notion that esotericism is a 
philosophical doctrine alien to Islam. Esotericism maintains that, as these 
members of the Islamic Movement argue, every Qurʾānic or ḥadīth text 
has inner and outer meanings. It shows the truth of this belief through the 
ḥadīth text, which states that when the Prophet Muḥammad had ascended 
to Allāh, he was acquainted with three types of knowledge. Allāh ordered 
him to keep one of these as a secret, gave him the freedom to communicate 
the second or not, and ordered him to communicate the third. The Prophet 
Muḥammad was ordered to communicate the sharīʿa. To the members of 
the Islamic Movement, such interpretation is refuted on the grounds that 
the Prophet’s wife ʿĀʾisha once said: “He who says that the Prophet kept as 
secret some of what Allāh had revealed to him commits a great sin”.37 They 
argue that the Prophet did not conceal something that Allāh had revealed to 
him. Following on this, the members of the Islamic Movement always issue 
censure against those who take up the esoteric thought.
Hence, both the Anṣār al-Sunna and the members of the Islamic 
Movement criticise the Sufis’ argument that the sharīʿa and the Reality are 
inseparable aspects of the Islamic religion, as each is half of worship. They 
consider this aspect of ‘Reality’ as heresy.
Concluding Remarks
Though they all share the opinion that the sharīʿa is the best divinely 
ordained plan for even the smallest or largest element in all aspects of 
social life, the followers of the Muslim groups in the District of Shendi 
use different-coloured lenses to view its interpretation and understanding. 
37 This hadīth is not found in the most reliable hadīth collections.
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From one point of view, the Anṣār al-Mahdī and the members of the 
Islamic Movement feel that a law that came for older times cannot really 
be applied to the modern times. They maintain that the Islamic texts, 
teachings and laws should continuously be reinterpreted, whether eso-
terically or exoterically, to cope with the many developments in our ever-
changing world. This requires the giving of free play to the ijtihād and to 
rational thinking. Contrarily, the Anṣār al-Sunna believe that the Islamic 
religion, including the sharīʿa, is universal and permanent, as they stick 
to the understanding of al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ, whom they take as their model in 
deeds and understanding. To them, nothing in Islam could be re-fashioned. 
To the Sufis, in a second point, ta⁠ʾ wīl, which is bestowed from the presence 
of Allāh, is a useful tool for correctly interpreting and understanding the 
Qurʾānic texts, as it helps in reaching the truths and the purpose or the rea-
son of the Islamic laws, and hence in looking for the reality of religion. The 
Islamic religion, for the Sufis, has in accord with each other two inseparable 
aspects: the sharīʿa and the Reality of religion. One should stick to both 
these aspects, because they complement and affect each other and together 
lead one to have a perfect faith in Allāh. The Anṣār al-Sunna deny ta⁠ʾ wīl, 
which, as they strongly argue, leads to stray beliefs and practices. In a third 
point, the Republican Brothers define the sunna as whatever the Prophet 
acted personally. When mankind becomes human with enough scientific 
qualifications in the future, it shall live up to this Prophetic model on which 
the Second Message (the original Islamic religion) will be based. The final 
Messiah is to come to detail the Second Message of Islam and its laws. The 
Islamic laws shall be extracted purely from this Second Message of Islam. 
The First Message, which was based on the conventional sharīʿa, will then 
be abolished. All other groups in the District of Shendi reject this Republican 
perception.
Taking these arguments into account and using Michael Gilsenan’s 
terms, which describe Islam as the anthropologist’s label for a heteroge-
neous collection of items, each of which has been designated Islamic by 
informants, one has to give a more cautious awareness of what the term 
sharīʿa comes to mean in different economic, political, and social struc-
tures and relations. Gilsenan’s aim is to always situate the religious, cul-
tural, and ideological forms and practices that people regard as Islamic in 
the life and development of their societies.38 This becomes more sound 
38 Gilsenan, Michael, Recognizing Islam: An Anthropologist’s Introduction, London & 
Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984, pages 11–12, 19.
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when we listen to Abdul Hamid el-Zein, who argues that the diversity of 
experience and understanding revealed in many anthropological studies 
challenges the premise of the unity of religious meaning. El-Zein’s con-
tention is that there are diverse forms of Islam, each equally real, each 
worth describing. He suggests replacing the term Islam by islams, better 
to emphasize the multiplicity of Islamic expression and to show that the 
islams of elite and non-elite, literate and illiterate, theologians and arti-
sans, tribesmen and peasants are equally valid expressions of a fundamen-
tal, unconscious set of principles.39
The above makes the imposition of sharīʿa in Sudan almost impossible. 
Not even two of the Muslim groups interrogated agreed on a single sharīʿa 
interpretation or understanding. If the sharīʿa interpretation or under-
standing of one group is imposed, then it will not just be the non-Mus-
lims who will be dispossessed of the fundamental right of participation 
in the country’s legislation, but within Islam also there would be many 
groups who would be deprived of this right. Disagreement resulting from 
such different viewpoints was clear in 1983 when President al-Numayrī 
announced the imposition of the Islamic penal code (Arab.: ḥudūd).40 
Ḥasan al-Turābī, who was the Islamic Movement’s secretary general and 
al-Numayrī attorney general at that time, played a key role in the intro-
duction of that Islamic penal code. Ṣādiq al-Mahdī, who has been head of 
the Umma Party and spiritual leader of the Anṣār al-Mahdī since 1970, was 
imprisoned for his opposition to the government’s foreign and domes-
tic policies, including his denunciation of the 1983 penal code. Al-Mahdī 
did not object to the sharīʿa being the laws of the land, but rather to the 
‘un-Islamic’ manner al-Numayrī used to implement the sharīʿa through 
the 1983 Laws. The leader of the Democratic Unionist Party and the spir-
itual guide of the khatmiyya Sufi order since 1968, Muḥammad ʿUthmān 
al-Mirghānī, tried to keep in check the tensions stemming from the dif-
fering perspectives of secular-minded professionals in the party and the 
traditional religious values of the khatmiyya supporters by avoiding firm 
stances on controversial political issues. In particular, he refrained from 
public criticism of al-Numayrī’s Islamic Laws, so as not to alienate the 
khatmiyya followers who approved of implementing the Islamic sharīʿa. 
Rather he supported the idea that al-Numayrī’s Islamic Laws could be 
39 El-Zein, Abdul Hamid, ‘Beyond Ideology and Theology: The Search for the Anthropology 
of Islam’, Annual Review of Anthropology, vol. 6, 1977, page 227.
40 Mahmoud, Mohamed , ‘When Shariʿa Governs: The Impasse of Religious Relations in 
Sudan’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2007, page 275.
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revised to expunge the ‘un-Islamic’ content.41 Even the founder of the 
Republican Brothers, Maḥmūd Muḥammad Ṭaha, was arrested and subse-
quently executed for heresy in January 1985 when he opposed the imple-
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Argument
This chapter intends to highlight the contradiction between trends in inter-
faith practice in the camp communities and the post-1989 state-ideology 
that has promoted Islam as a state religion and, to a significant extent, 
stigmatized and marginalized other faiths, especially Christianity. Little 
academic attention has been paid to perceptions of Christian-Muslim 
relations in the camps. I would argue that, in Mandela and Wad al-Bashīr 
camps, contrary to the state ideology, ordinary people of different faiths 
including Islam and Christianity seem to be sharing common concerns, 
common problems and common mentalities towards the state. Though 
one would have expected the stereotype of a Christian-Muslim divide to 
be playing out in the Camps, findings demonstrate that the divide is not 
detectable. A caveat to this argument is that this is not an illustration of 
what happens all over Khartoum, but is specific to the Internally Displaced 
Camps and is not necessarily replicated in the rest of the community of 
Khartoum State. An analysis of the impact of the state ideology on the 
ordinary life of greater Khartoum is outside the scope of this chapter. 
Introduction
Since achieving political independence in 1956, the Sudan has experienced 
a low level of stability, having witnessed two periods of civil war (1955–
1972 and 1983–2005) that have brought great suffering to the population.1 
There is a tendency to define the Sudanese conflict along religious lines, 
1 Özden, Melik, Internally Displaced Persons: An overview of the rights of internally dis-
placed persons of the Guiding Principles adopted by the United Nations, Part of a Series of the 
Human Rights Programme Of the Europe—Third World Centre (CETIM), 2007, page 7.
© Salma Mohamed Abdalla, 2014 | doi:10.1163/9789004262126_004
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as Muslims versus Christians, both within the macro politics of Sudan and 
by the international community.
The civil war brought from the South to Khartoum displaced persons 
with different faiths who settled around the capital. This chapter exam-
ines the relationship among displaced communities of different faiths and 
how they consider the issues that unite or divide them. The chapter illus-
trates the nature and processes of Christian-Muslim relations among the 
displaced persons in their daily lives and disproves the assumption that 
religion is a dividing factor inside the camps of the displaced. The chapter 
discusses the state’s attempts to impose a particular kind of behaviour 
that is problematic to social interactions in displaced communities. The 
relationships inside the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) community 
and its connections with the host community (ordinary people, groups 
and government bodies) are also addressed.
The chapter’s goal is to illustrate the behaviours and attitudes of mem-
bers of the IDP communities regarding inter-faith dialogue in their daily 
life. It also describes the political structure and the role of the current gov-
ernment in Christian-Muslim relations in the IDP Camps and compares 
individuals’ responses with those of the government. 
The findings of this chapter are mainly based on a survey conducted in 
the IDP camps around Khartoum. The survey was conducted in two of the 
largest displaced persons’ camps in Greater Khartoum, namely Mandela 
in Khartoum and Wad al-Bashīr in Omdurman. The primary data were 
collected using the methods of observation, individual interviews, group 
discussions and focus group discussion. To augment the primary data, rel-
evant secondary data are utilized in this chapter.
Internally Displaced Persons
According to the United Nation’s definition, Internally Displaced Persons 
are persons, or groups of people, who have been forced to flee or to leave 
their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of, or in order to 
avoid, in particular, the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized 
violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters 
and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.2
2 Özden, 2007, page 19. 
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Like all armed conflicts elsewhere in the world, the civil wars in the 
Sudan produced a drift of population into the large urban centres in the 
North and the South. The majority of the displaced from the South moved 
into Northern Sudan. They concentrated on the periphery of these towns, 
in the poorest areas generally known as spontaneous slum and squatter 
settlements.3
The Sudan has the largest number of IDPs worldwide,4 with about 
11.9% of the population considered to be displaced, mainly as a result 
of the wars.5 More than one half of the population of Southern Sudan is 
now either living in Northern Sudan or has fled to neighbouring countries. 
In reality, three-quarters of the Southern population can be considered 
displaced.6 Twenty-five per cent of the population in the country live in 
Khartoum and 40% of Khartoum inhabitants are IDPs.7 Of the internally 
displaced persons, the greatest number is located in Greater Khartoum 
(over 44%).8 This situation paints a poignant picture of Sudanese society, 
now made up of largely uprooted persons.
Most of the displaced population comes from a background of sub-
sistence economy, where farming, pastoral or small-scale animal hus-
bandry is the dominant mode of life. During the early stages of the war in 
Southern Sudan, the majority of the displaced Southern Sudanese came 
from amongst the Dinka ethnic group, of North Bahr al-Ghazal. Most of 
them moved northward, first to Southern Darfur and Kordufan provinces, 
where they settled and became agricultural labourers. From there, the dis-
placed moved to urban centres further North. Paul Wani Gore says “the 
Shuluk and the Nuer started to move northward, they moved to Kosti and 
Khartoum and also the Equatorial have found the way to Khartoum”.9 In 
almost all cases, these ethnic groups had lost all their cattle either before 
they moved, or during the process of flight.
3 Wani Gore, Paul, ‘The Socio-economic and demographic consequences of popula-
tion displacement in Sudan’, Current Studies on the Sudan, ed. by: Medani Mohamed M. 
Ahmed, Khartoum: Omdurman Ahlia University, 1998, page 172.
4 Assal, Munzoul A. M., ‘Displaced Persons in Khartoum: Current realities and post-war 
scenarios. A Report’, Cairo: The Population Council, 2004, page 1.
5 Wani Gore, 1998, page 182.
6 Wani Gore, 1998, page 184.
7 Assal, 2004, page 16.
8 Assal, 2004, page 15.
9 Wani Gore, 1998, page 188.
44 salma mohamed abdalla
The Government and IDPs in Khartoum
Generally and historically, displaced populations in Sudan were not 
treated well because the central government has for a very long time 
denied the existence of the phenomenon of displacement caused by civil 
war. The attitude of the government towards the displaced population 
has been marked by denial, indifference, and outright hostility. Long pro-
cedures and unstructured and uninformed interventions characterize the 
government’s decision-making style and policy implementation strategy. 
The displaced have been viewed as a threat to political stability because 
IDPs are seen as foremost a security problem, and a source of social and 
cultural tension. This attitude is evident from the location of IDP camps 
on the fringe of cities where the populations have no access to social ser-
vices. The government abdicated its responsibilities toward IDPs, leaving 
the responsibility for their welfare to Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs). One result of this policy is the dependency among IDPs on relief 
food.10 Government officials say that the IDPs, in the beginning, during 
the 1980s, were scattered in groups in forty-six different locations inside 
the capital. It was difficult for the NGOs to work on relief projects because 
of the lack of security and the deterioration of the environment when the 
IDPs were living inside Khartoum city.
In 1988 the Displaced Commission was established by the President 
of the Council of Ministries. It started working at the national level and 
was responsible for the IDPs both inside and outside Khartoum State. 
Later, after the transformation to the federal system of governance, the 
Commission of Khartoum became responsible for the IDPs in Khartoum 
State only. Government policy was divided into short term, midterm and 
long term policies. 
(1) In the short term, between 1989 and 1991, the commission work 
concentrated on shelter and housing. The strategy to carry out the task 
was through collecting together the IDPs and assimilating them in many 
Camps. The government justification of this policy was to offer them food, 
clothing and water but “the policy was criticized on the grounds that it did 
not solicit the cooperation of the displaced population and did not involve 
it in the timing and selection of relocation sites; in addition, the reloca-
tion sites were not properly equipped with shelters and other essential 
10 Assal, 2004, page 1.
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services”.11 The government’s abdication of its responsibility for the welfare 
of the IDPs has resulted in dependency among IDPs on relief food.
(2) In the midterm, between 1991 and 1994, the government established 
four major official Camps in Khartoum State. The camps were used for relo-
cation of random habitation inside the city. In 1992 the government called 
upon the International and the national NGOs to work in the IDP camps. 
The NGOs which started the work inside the camps in that period are: 
the Sudan Council of Churches (majlis al-kanāʾis al-sūdānī), Islamic Daʿwa 
Organization (munaẓẓamat al-daʿwa al-islāmiyya), CARE International, 
Red Cross, Save the Children UK, Oxfam, ACCORD and others.
(3) In 1995/1996, the commission started the long-term policy which 
aimed to integrate the IDPs into the urban structure. The commission 
started this process by counting the IDPs in Khartoum State. The task was 
done in collaboration with the Population National Council and United 
Nation’s Development Programme (UNDP) with the assistance of the 
NGOs. The purpose was to deliver land plots to IDPs.
Although the government claims it is making an adequate effort, 
research demonstrates that IDPs in Khartoum live on the margins of 
urban life; job opportunities are virtually non-existent. Significantly, how-
ever, the IDPs are exposed to a cultural milieu that is alien to them, which 
leads to socio-cultural displacement, irrespective of the attitudes of their 
host communities. Social services are non-existent in these areas. Services 
such as water, electricity, sanitation and health facilities, as well as edu-
cational opportunities, are lacking. Being unskilled and lacking the ability 
to speak Arabic, the displaced population cannot find employment. The 




Mandela camp, or Mayo Al-Mazari as it is called in the official docu-
ments, is 18 kilometres south of Khartoum centre. It was established on 
30 June 1991, when the displaced were transferred from Al-Shoak Area 
11  Eltigani, Eltigani E., War and Drought in Sudan, Essays on Population Displacement, 
University Press of Florida, 1995, page 7.
12 Wani Gore, 1998, page 189.
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inside Khartoum Town. In 1990 the displaced were moved to the pres-
ent Mandela area which is in the periphery of Jabal Awliyya locality. The 
total camp area is approximately 5 square kilometres surrounded by other 
low-cost districts and slums; it has a population of approximately 10,000 
families. 
The displaced resided in the area without the agreement of the gov-
ernment authorities. Both the locality (county) and the Khartoum State 
officials were not content. The government officials say the problems 
in Mandela are because people moved in and extended their slums and 
entered the farms’ area. The owners of these farms took their cases to 
the court and demanded their lands back, and this problem is still to 
be resolved. But the citizens insisted on inhabiting the area against the 
formal wishes of the government and named their residence Mandela 
after the great South African black leader. They looked on themselves as 
freedom fighters and defended their cause against the apartheid govern-
ment’s wishes. 
The government policy towards the area is based on the fact that 
Mandela camp is a temporary area and the residents are supposed to 
move to Sundus II (governmental camp). Mandela residents refuse to 
move because they have cleaned up the place and resided there for a long 
time, and they have the feeling that the government sold the place to 
Saudi Arabian investors. 
The study area is composed of seven settlement squares: Central Square, 
the Eastern, the Western, Kordufan, Wau squares, Ghabbush and Wadi 
squares. It is to be noted that each settlement square embodies a specific 
dominant ethnic group along with other minor ethnic groups. The major 
ethnic groups are: Dinka Bahr al-Ghazal, Dinka Farno, Shiluk, Nuer, Nuba 
Mountains’ ethnic groups, a mixture of Faratit and Equatorians, Furs and 
other Western Sudan groups.
The camp is an undefined, casual, and unplanned settlement. The area 
is an annexe of Mayo district which was an older slum; groups of immi-
grants came from the area of Dar al-Salaam and settled here. The reasons 
for displacement vary from one group to another, but the majority moved 
in because of war. Most of the people stay in the camp waiting for the 
town planning to give them plots of land for housing. They either engage 
in petty trade or are completely idle and entirely dependent on relief sup-
port and donations from NGOs.
Most of the residents I interviewed indicated that prior to coming to 
the camps they were subsistence farmers and pastoralists. Thus, given 
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their economic livelihood prior to coming to Khartoum, most of the IDPs 
were less skilled for entering the urban job market. 
I argue here that having fewer skills was a leading factor in the IDPs’ 
dependency on relief support. When the flow of relief shrank at the end 
of 2005 and early 2006, conditions were aggravated and the area faced a 
serious crisis. Public services are completely absent and unemployment 
amounts to nearly 90% of the population. The working group is mainly 
composed of women who either make liquor and other local wines, or go 
to work in domestic service outside the camp. Unemployment generates 
a sense of estrangement and grief on the part of the residents towards 
the government. There is also a general feeling of frustration towards the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). There is a grand sultan (chief) 
court in Mandela market place, besides other smaller native courts based 
on ethnicity. Chiefs settle disputes but their courts are less important at 
the present and less cared for and respected.13
Wad al-Bashīr
Wad al-Bashīr camp is 17 kilometres distant from Khartoum centre and 
was established in 1991. Administratively it is part of al-Bugaa locality 
(West Omdurman). It is bordered by Block 43 to the North, Block 42 to 
the East and Block 46, named al-Couther, to the West. To the South it is 
bordered by John Madet area, which is divided into squares 51 and 52. 
The camp was included in the residential plan which was designed to 
remedy the casual housing problem. Planning projects took place to a cer-
tain extent and about 5000 land plots of 216 square meters per piece were 
handed out to families. The vast majority of families remain outside the 
plan, waiting to receive plots. The population originates from different eth-
nic groups; the largest group is Northern Bahr al-Ghazal Dinkas (Aweil). 
The Nubas of Southern Kordofan Mountains come second in number and 
then the Nuer, Shiluk and tribes of Equatoria, mainly Azandi and Latuka. 
From Darfur came the Fur, Zaghawa, Bargo, Masaleet; and from Northern 
Kordofan the Kababish Arabs. The cause of immigration of the majority 
of the population is war. Ethnic groups from North and central Sudan are 
also present, who work as retail merchants in the settlements.
13 Field work observation coupled with a series of interviews conducted in Mandela.
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The people in the camp share similar standards of living and there are 
no variations that warrant being mentioned. Poverty is the typical state 
of affairs and unemployment is widespread. As mentioned earlier, as a 
result of lack of skills, coupled with scarcity of jobs and discrimination 
by state institutions in the North, IDPs hold no permanent jobs. The few 
that are employed are mainly engaged in unskilled labour such as build-
ing and construction, domestic chores and odd jobs. As one of the social 
mechanisms in reaction to unemployment, generation and gender-base 
social groupings have emerged. The youth pass their time in the youth 
clubs playing games such as cards and dominoes. The women gather in 
the houses and old men meet in the Sultan’s compounds or in the market 
places, drinking local liquor and chatting away their days. 
It is important to note that, unlike in Mandela, in Wad al-Bashīr camp 
there is a noticeable number of young people who have achieved some 
level of education, including Sudan School Certificate (General Secondary 
Education completion), and a few are university graduates. This category 
is more fluent in English and Arabic languages. Yet, in spite of their lin-
guistic skills and academic attainment, life has not been any better for 
them as unemployment is widespread, along with unspeakable levels of 
poverty. 
Despite all the hardships in the camps, there seems to be peaceful 
coexistence among different ethnic groups and among different religious 
groups especially between Christians and Muslims, as I will be highlight-
ing later on. 
Christian-Muslim Relations in Sudan—Overview and Background
This chapter would not be complete without re-visiting Sudan’s history 
since independence in 1956 and the state’s different approaches, policies 
and strategies in Christian-Muslim relations’ management. This analysis 
is important because there is the belief that the present phenomenon has 
its root causes in the past and the problem has developed along with the 
nation-building process. The historical background is divided into two 
phases: (1) from independence in 1956 until the coalition government in 
1989. (2) Al-injāz Government from 1989 until 2007, after the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
For some scholars, the undertaking of the programmes of Islamization 
and Arabization of the country by the central governments, while ignor-
ing its great cultural diversity, contributes negatively to Christian-Muslim 
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relations. It is a problem that started immediately after independence 
and, as Kebbede explicitly put it, “since independence all governments 
in Khartoum have totally neglected the economic, political, and cultural 
interests of the non-Muslim and non-Arab natives of southern Sudan”.14 
Others see that religion has been misused, thereby contributing to con-
flict in Sudan’s civil wars. Many factors allowed religion to be abused in 
the Sudan to serve political ends. However this misuse stretches back to 
the colonial period which designed and implemented policies that cre-
ated isolation and unequal development between people of the North and 
South to serve the avarice of the colonial power, and occasioned little 
genuine dialogue between people of the North and South. 
The Period from 1956–1989
At Sudan’s Independence in 1956, the principles of Islam were articulated 
by the head of the sharīʿa courts, Grand qāḍī Ḥasan Muddathir in a pam-
phlet entitled “A Memorandum for the Enactment of a Sudan Constitution 
Derived from the Principles of Islam”. He said, “in an Islamic country like 
the Sudan the social organization of which has been built upon Arab 
customs and Islamic ways and of which the majority are Muslims, it is 
essential that the general principles of the constitution of such a country 
should be derived from the principles of Islam, and, consequently, the 
laws governing its people should be enacted from the principles of an 
Islamic constitution and in according with Islamic ideals out of which 
such community has been shaped”.15
Also at that time, the Umma Party (UP, ḥizb al-umma) and the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP, al-ḥizb al-ittiḥādī al-dīmūqrāṭī) called 
for sharīʿa to be the main source of legislation, while the Communist Party 
(CP, ḥizb al-shuyuʿī al-waṭānī ) objected to the idea. The Southerners chal-
lenged the proposal because they expected it to result in their being treated 
as second class citizens, deprived of holding public office such as that of 
the head of the state and the chief of the judiciary. Finally they decided to 
14 Kebbede, Girma (ed.), ‘Introduction’, in Sudan’s Predicament, Civil war, displacement 
and ecological degradation, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999, page 7.
15 Tier, Akolda M., ‘Mixed Civil, Sharia and Customary Jurisdictions and laws in an eth-
nic conflict setting: the case of Sudan’, in Religion and Conflict in Sudan, Yusuf Fadl Hasan 
& Richard Gray (eds.), Paulines Publications Africa, Nairobi, 2002, page 79.
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boycott the deliberation of the National Committee for the Constitution if 
Christianity was not recognized as a state religion like Islam.
Under ʿAbbūd’s military regime, which started in 1957, the processes of 
Islamization and Arabization continued, firstly through encouraging the 
spread of Islamic education, secondly through the promotion of Arabic 
language and thirdly by hindering the activities of missionaries. 
Later, in 1966, the Premier al-Ṣādiq al-Mahdī (Umma Party President) 
saw the identity of Sudan as an Islamic and Arabic one. The DUP and 
the Islamic Charter Front (ICF, jabhat al-mithāq al-islāmī) demanded an 
Islamic constitution, while the CP and the Southern political parties called 
for complete separation between state and religion.
In 1969, al-Numayrī took power in a military coup. Peace with the 
South was achieved by ending the Civil War through the Addis Ababa 
agreement of 1972, which guaranteed freedom of religion. Then, for non-
religious reasons, al-Numayrī declared the implementation of sharīʿa law 
as the state law in September 1983. Khalil’s observed that immediately 
Numayri appointed a committee to revise the laws with a view to ensuring 
their conformity with the Shariʿa. . . . several bills were drafted and promul-
gated by presidential decree. . . . . Of these, two are of particular relevance. . . . 
The first prohibited the manufacture, possession and consumption of alco-
holic beverages. . . . The other bill was enacted as the Sources of Judicial 
Decisions Act which . . . provided that where there is no legislation govern-
ing an issue before the court, judgment shall be based on the Shariʿa. . . . A 
new penal code provided for the severe Qur’anic punishments of hudud: 
hand amputation for theft, cross amputation for armed robbery, death for 
adultery, sedition and apostasy, crucifixion for armed rebellion and flogging 
for manufacture, possession or consumption of alcohol.16 
As the above quotation illustrates, at state level Christian-Muslim rela-
tions were further strained, and southern politicians, the Church and the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) were distressed. 
It is important to mention that the Islamic laws were declared three 
months after the Anya-Nya II mutiny; this was the consequence of the 
deterioration in North-South relations, as a result of breaching the Addis 
Ababa Accord. Southerners found that the September Laws violated their 
rights and freedom and some observers found the September laws inten-
sified the second civil war. Many who initiated the peace talks that took 
16 Khalil, Mohamed Ibrahim, ‘Human Rights and Islamization of the Sudan Legal 
System’, in: Religion and Conflict in Sudan, Yusuf Fadl Hasan & Richard Gray (eds.), 
Paulines Publications Africa, Nairobi, 2002, page 60.
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place between the Sudan Government and the SPLM/SPLA realized that 
the Civil War would not stop by force of arms.17
In the coalition government, al-Ṣādiq al-Mahdī, the leader of the then 
ruling party, found sharīʿa laws to have been imposed and he rejected 
the ḥudūd. Al-Mahdī aimed at introducing a new Islamic law that would 
safeguard the interests of non-Muslims. The DUP, the second party after 
Umma, did not demand the invalidation of the September Laws, while the 
National Islamic Front (NIF, al-jabha al-islāmiyya al-qaumiyya), the third 
party, affirmed that Muslims are a majority in the Sudan so sharīʿa would 
be the general source of law. 
The Period from 1989–2007
In this period religion became graver, a source of conflict when it became 
a symbol of identity of power sharing, even of the management control 
of our resources. It was a factor when the Government of the National 
Salvation Revolution (NSR, thaurat al-inqādh al-waṭanī), which took 
power in 30 June 1989, used religion to serve its own political aims: “Some 
argue that the government’s attempt at defining Islam narrowly and forc-
ing it on the country’s non-Muslim populations is at the core of conflict”.18 
Therefore it can be demonstrated that the way that the state implemented 
Islamic sharīʿa Laws contributed to the less-than-harmonious relations 
between Christians and Muslims. There were no efforts at nation building 
to bring the population together in a national community. The policies 
were far from accepting diversity. 
As defenders of the Islamic ideal, the National Islamic Front’s pro-
gramme constituted an important development in the religious dimension 
of the Southern question and in North-South relations. The government of 
NSR remained heavily committed to the sharīʿa as a religious mission. 
Public Order Laws
In 1991 the government declared a penal code aimed at filling in ‘Islamic’ 
gaps in the September laws. The government declared Public Order laws 
which state that “a person who, in a public place, commits an act, or 
17 See for example: Kebbede 1999, Tier 2002 and Khalil 2002 among others. 
18 Sanneh, Lamin, ‘Preface. Religion and Conflict in Sudan’, in Religion and Conflict in 
Sudan, Yusuf Fadl Hasan & Richard Gray (eds.), Paulines Publications Africa, Nairobi, 2002, 
page 11.
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conducts himself in a manner, contrary to public morality or wears an 
‘immodest’ dress commits an offence punishable by flogging”. As far as 
Khartoum State is concerned, this provision was elaborated by a 1996 
Public Order Decree that penalized and provides for flogging for a wide 
range of hitherto common practices, such as . . . a women being in the 
company of a male other than a maḥram (a near relative with whom mar-
riage amounts to incest).19
Section 5 (3) of the Penal Code of 1991 makes the punishments of ḥudūd 
and qiṣāṣ (Arab.: settlement, applied after killing or wounding under 
Islamic law) inapplicable in the Southern States and exempts their inhab-
itants from the provisions relating to apostasy, adultery, manufacture, use 
and possession of alcohol and wearing ‘immodest’ dress. In view of the 
massive displacement caused by the war, the exemption is poor consola-
tion to Southerners now living in Northern towns.
It should be noted that many Christians identify disruption of socio-
religious functions as a critical factor in Christian-Muslim relationships 
in the Sudan. This is attributed to the police action against IDPs’ camps. 
This is always a volatile encounter that results in confrontations with the 
public, and is perceived by many, ironically both Christians and Muslims, 
in the IDP camps to be ‘very discriminatory’ in terms of implementing 
a dress code for the public but with Christian targets in focus. This is 
an illustration that vindicates my inference that there is a contradiction 
between the state ideology that plays the Islamic ideology card against 
non-Islamic views whereas the ordinary folk do not act, behave and think 
according to the state Muslim/non-Muslim borders. 
The Public Order Law is a law which was instituted on Islamic prin-
ciples, and the commitment to the (Islamic) public appearance is one of 
al-injāz government’s ‘achievements’. The public order law’s approach 
is to prevent the practices which are contradictory to sharīʿa and the 
‘benign customs’; the implementation of the public order and the soci-
ety’s appearance is its main goal. The ‘virtuous’ external appearance is to 
protect woman through: 
(1) Islamic dress. 
(2) Public streets’ discipline in terms of mixing of males and females. 
(3) Combating negative phenomena.
(4) Increasing religiousness (Islam) in the society. 
(5) Control of public transports, public parks and clubs. 
19 Khalil, 2002, page 61.
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(6) Media. 
(7) The educational and the cultural side. 
In 1996 the authorities activated the laws and performed many acts accom-
panied by activities such as, firstly, intensifying the control attacks in the 
streets and public places. Secondly, they obliged female (state) employees 
and students to wear ḥijāb (Islamic dress) and thirdly, re-creation of the 
muḥtasib’s (inspector of the behaviour) role.20 
Yom, a young IDP Christian girl of 23 years old, narrates her experience 
with the public order police in this respect.
At one time there were street riots in Khartoum. I was wandering the street 
wearing a short sleeved blouse, a policeman came across to me and asked 
why I was dressed in that way. “Is this your home town that you should 
dress like that [as if you were] in Juba [capital town of the South]?” I gave 
no reply. Someone explained I might be Christian. The policeman said 
“Christian or not this is not her home town. She should respect the view of 
the rest as they are all Muslims”. So I could give no answer. “This may as well 
be her own way of dressing but she should not wear this way here, let her do 
that in Juba or anywhere else”, the policeman concluded.21
The Public Order Act declared in Khartoum State was accompanied by 
special courts called Public Order Courts which implemented the pub-
lic order laws. These courts’ procedures are faster than the regular courts 
where there is indictment, lawsuit, defence, and witnesses. Usually, regu-
lar cases take time, unlike in the Public Order Courts. In the CPA it says 
that leniency and granting the accused the benefit of doubt are legal prin-
ciples of universal application, especially in the circumstances of a poor 
society like the Sudan, which is just emerging from war, characterized 
by prevalent poverty and subject to massive displacement of people. In 
contradiction to that principle, in the Public Order Courts the judges take 
a decision in a moment. According to one advocate interviewed, 60 to 
100 cases can be adjudicated in one day because of the fast procedures. In 
those cases it is often the case that there is no opportunity for defence because 
the complainants are always either policemen, security officials or even 
public order police hence the accused has no chance to mount a defence. 
20 Bashīr, Bashīr M., al-taḥawwulāt al-kubra fiʾl-Sūdān 1989–2000 (The Major 
Transformations in Sudan between 1989 and 2000), Khartoum: Future Studies Centre, 
2002, (Published in Arabic). 
21   Interview, Khartoum, March 2007.
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Jihād and Christian-Muslim Relations
As defenders of Islamic ideals, the programme of the National Islamic 
Front constituted an important development in the religious dimension 
of the Southern question and in North-South relations. The NSR govern-
ment remained committed to the sharīʿa both as a religious motto and as 
a guide to policy making. In the course of its rule it implemented many 
changes in plans, laws, programmes and policy execution. Jihād is one 
of the acts and policies with a direct effect on our field of interest, in 
particular on Muslim-Christian relations in general and especially among 
the IDPs. 
The religious dimension of the Sudan conflict became more pronounced 
when the government of the National Salvation Revolution proclaimed 
that the war in the South is a jihād war with its strong religious conno-
tations. The government advocated that jihād is being waged essentially 
in defence of the land and the Islamic faith, and that a sharīʿa state can 
only be constructed through jihād, which is the duty of every Muslim. 
The jihād 22 programme was launched over the whole of the South. As the 
government declared, the jihād was against the infidels. 
An IDP, commenting on jihād said:
Although, an infidel according to the interpretation of the Qurʾān is some-
one with no religion, but I am a Christian. In addition to that jihād is 
across homeland borders, but here they initiate jihād against the Sudanese 
Southerners.23
In 1992, the year that was officially announced as the year of jihād, General 
ʿUmar al-Bashīr was proclaimed imām al-jihād. On 27 April 1992, six pro-
government religious leaders issued a fatwā (Arab.: legal opinion) legal-
izing jihād against the SPLA rebels in the Nuba Mountains, in South 
Kordofan, to liberate it from the infidel rebels. 
. . . this kind of fatwa, a sheer product of religious manipulation has actually 
led to atrocities and indiscriminate killing that true Islam undoubtedly pre-
22 According to the entry “Djihād” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam II the etymological 
meaning of this term is “effort towards a determined objective. [. . .] In law [. . .] djihād 
consists of military action with the object of the expansion of Islam and, if need be, of its 
defence”. Thus, the concept of jihād describes at least three different types of struggles: a 
Muslim’s internal struggle to live out his faith as well as possible; to build a good Muslim 
society, and finally holy war to defend Islam, with force if necessary. 
23 Interview, Khartoum, March 2007.
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vents. This may beg an important question whether Islam orders killing of 
Christians and other non-believers except in self-defence?24 
The Popular Defence Forces (PDFs, qawāt al-difāʿ al-shaʿbī) and, under 
their auspices, the mujāhidūn (those who fight in jihād ), were established, 
and “an additional tax called “financing the jihād” was levied upon the 
citizens in Kordofan”.25 Islamist Voluntary organizations such as nidāʾ 
al-jihād (call for jihād) and munaẓẓamat al-shahīd (martyr’s organization) 
were established to advocate the cause of jihād, and salām al-ʿizza (peace 
with pride) to provide material support to mujāhidūn families and zād 
al-mujāhid (food for the holy warrior).
Gradually, fighting the war against the rebels in the South and other 
areas of Sudan became the ultimate form of the jihād. By 1993–1994 jihād 
had become the central theme in the government’s projection of its war 
efforts.
To encourage and reinforce Muslim perception of Christians as infidels, 
the government had a policy towards the martyr’s families. The govern-
ment trains the sons of these so-called martyrs to replace their father. 
According to Kafino (Dinka Christian man, living in Mandela), the govern-
ment’s policy in this respect is carried out in the following way:
When we were very little, the real meanings of things were unknown to us. 
We used to go to the martyr’s organization. There they mix politics with 
religion. They should not have called the donation which government offi-
cials gather for the cause of the jihād against Christians ‘martyr benefits’. 
They should call it war endowment . . . It is done to tempt our Christian 
kinsfolk.26
In fact, the martyr’s organization is not merely a military foundation; it is 
a religious institution too. They exploit the economic situation of a killed 
soldier’s heirs, and bestow foodstuffs on them at the end of the month 
and ask that the elder son of the deceased soldier convert to Islam. Such 
rations are given only in Ramaḍḥān (Muslim fasting month). That is in 
addition to a sheep given as a gift on the occasion of the sacrifice of ʿīd 
al-aḍḥā (Muslim yearly festival). Nothing of the sort is given at Christmas 
24 Kadouf, Hunud Abia, ‘Religion and conflict in the Nuba Mountains’, in Religion and 
Conflict in Sudan, Yusuf Fadl Hasan & Richard Gray (eds.), Paulines Publications Africa, 
Nairobi, 2002, page 109.
25 Sidahmed, Abdel Salam, ‘The Unholy War: Jihad and the Conflict in Sudan’, in Religion 
and Conflict in Sudan, Yusuf Fadl Hasan & Richard Gray (eds.), Paulines Publications 
Africa, Nairobi, 2002, page 88.
26 Interview, Mandela, March 2007.
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or any other Christian feasts to Christians who suffer the similar fate of the 
loss of a bread-winner in the cause of the conflict. As far as my Christian 
respondents are concerned, the government utilizes such material ben-
efits as enticements to proselytize Christians and subtly coerce them to 
convert to Islam in order to be able to receive such benefits.27
This material enticement is an aspect of the assimilation policy of the 
government, which aims to turn Christians into Muslims. Some Christians 
converted and the rest of them refused to convert. Christian IDPs feel 
that, partly because of their plight, they are direct targets of government 
assimilation strategies. They are directly made to suffer untold and humil-
iating experiences which will predispose them to switch to Islam in order 
to save themselves from physical annihilation. A respondent narrates his 
experience in this respect thus:
In 2004, something happened here in Mandela. There were certain elements 
that approached a group of 27 people [all Christians] and tempted them to 
switch to Islam on the grounds of their living conditions and told them that 
as they were ideal, so they wanted them to become Muslims, and in return 
jobs will be availed to them. A number of those elements were Latokas28 
who work for the government. They targeted the youth in their 20s and 
recruited them to Soba permanent camp and were subjected to orientation 
courses. All of them were Latoka. They were taught the wuḍūʾ [Muslim ablu-
tions before prayer] and ṣalāt [Muslim prayers]. Ultimately, they received 
no jobs. 
Ironically, the state has not fulfilled its side of the bargain even to those 
who have converted to Islam within the framework of the Islamization 
project. 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement CPA (2005)
The question of sharīʿa and the separation of religion and state continued 
to provoke a lot of discussion and was the main challenge in the peace 
talks between the government and the SPLM/A, despite the efforts of sev-
eral mediators in the years between the 1990s and 2003. Indeed, this issue 
is still causing much confusion and is yet to be settled, especially in rela-
tion to Khartoum, ‘the National Capital’.
27 This opinion was expressed by interviewees. 
28 The south part of Sudan is inhabited by two major ethnic groups who are divided 
into hundreds of tribes and clans—the Nilotics and the Equatorians. The Latoka group is 
among the largest Equatorian groups.
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Prior to the CPA the government introduced an Islamic system of 
government. The constitutional Decree No.13 commands magistrates to 
be guided by the sharīʿa. Custom is subordinate to sharīʿa as a source 
of legislation although the Constitution stated that sharīʿa and customs 
should be the source of legislation. Religion has contributed to the civil 
war between the Government of Sudan and the rebel movements in the 
South, a war which continued, on and off, until a cease-fire was reached 
in October 2002. 
However, religion was used during the last decade by both parties for 
the purposes of public mobilisation, seeking political and material support. 
During the last rounds of negotiations between the Government of Sudan 
and SPLM, defining the role of religion in public life was one of the thorny 
issues. The SPLM asked for a secular constitution which separates religion 
from state while the government defended the right of Muslims to imple-
ment Islamic laws. Eventually the two parties reached an agreed formula, 
which is embodied in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that 
was signed in January 2005. It included the protection of Southern Sudan 
from Islamic laws (3-2-2): “Nationally enacted legislation having effect only 
in respect of the states outside Southern Sudan shall have as its source of 
legislation sharīʿa and the consensus of the people”.29 In the CPA, respect 
for the practising of religious rites and the establishment of places for wor-
ship, the issuing and disseminating of religious material, and observing 
holidays on days of religious ceremonies appears in 6-5. 6-6 guaranteed 
that this principle is reflected in the Constitution. The laws and beliefs of 
those concerned shall govern all family matters. Citizenship shall not be 
subject to discrimination on grounds of religion or other beliefs.
The CPA includes a ‘vague’ charter about the National Capital in 
Chapter 2–4, where Khartoum shall be the capital of the Republic of the 
Sudan. The National Capital shall be a symbol of national unity that 
reflects the diversity of Sudan.
The CPA says the Administration of the National Capital shall be 
representative and, during the Interim period, the two Parties shall be 
adequately represented in the administration of the National Capital. The 
term ‘National Capital’ is vague in the CPA, because there is confusion 
as to whether the CPA talks about the Capital, which has no determined 
territory, or about Khartoum State. 
29 From the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), between the National Congress 
Party NCP and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army SPLM/A, 2005, Kenya.
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In the CPA, human rights and fundamental freedoms as specified in 
the Machakos Protocol, and in the Agreement, including respect for all 
religions, beliefs and customs, shall be guaranteed and enforced in the 
National Capital, as well as throughout the whole of Sudan and shall be 
enshrined in the National Interim Constitution. Law enforcement agen-
cies of the Capital shall be representative of the population of Sudan and 
shall be adequately trained and made sensitive to the cultural, religious 
and social diversity of all Sudanese. The criticism at this point is that the 
training for the authority agencies is not enough without the existence of 
Law to protect these rights. 
The CPA says, judges and law enforcement agents shall, in dispensing 
justice and enforcing current laws in the National Capital, follow certain 
guidelines:
1. Tolerance.
2.  Behaviours based on cultural practices and traditions, as long as not 
in flagrant disregard of the law or disturbing public order shall be 
deemed in the eyes of the law as an exercise of personal freedoms. (It 
is three years now since the signing of the CPA and still Public Order 
Police attack Southerners during their cultural festivals regardless of 
the respect due to cultural practices).30 
3.  The judicial discretion of courts to impose penalties on non-Muslims 
shall observe the long-established legal (sharīʿa) principle that non-
Muslims are not subject to prescribed penalties, and therefore remitted 
penalties shall apply. (In practice this principal is not yet implemented 
in the courts because every day many cases come to the courts and 
non-Muslims are judged according to sharīʿa law.)
4.  A special commission shall be appointed by the Presidency to insure 
that the rights of non-Muslims are protected in accordance with the 
aforementioned guidelines and not adversely affected by the applica-
tion of sharīʿa law in the Capital. The said commission shall make its 
observations and recommendations to the Presidency. Additionally, a 
system of mechanisms of guarantees shall be established to enable the 
operation of the above points, such as the establishment of special-
ized Attorney General Circuits to conduct investigations and pre-trial 
proceedings related to offences involving these principles. (This is not 
yet done.)
30 View expressed by one interviewee. 
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Presidential Decree No. (24) of the year 2006, establishing the Special 
Commission for the Rights of Non-Muslims (in view of the application 
of Islamic sharīʿa) in the National Capital, was decreed for the following 
objectives and functions:31
a)  To ensure that the National Capital is a symbol of National unity that 
reflects and enriches the religious, cultural and social diversity of the 
Country.
b)  To guarantee the Rights of Non-Muslims in the National Capital in view 
of the application of Islamic sharīʿa.
c)  To further consolidate the spirit of tolerance and peaceful co-existence 
among the residents of the National Capital.
d)  To ensure that the Rights of Non-Muslims (in view of the application of 
sharīʿa in the National Capital) are protected.
e)  To ensure that all religions, beliefs and traditions are respected and that 
the spirit of tolerance and co-existence among the different creeds and 
cultures in the National Capital is consolidated.
f )  To submit any observations and recommendations it deems fit to the 
Presidency.
The procedure of the work of the commission is to lay out policies and 
plans to initiate projects and programmes aiming at consolidating the true 
values of tolerance and co-existence in collaboration with the citizens, 
community leaders and concerned government entities. Its procedure 
requires it to take the initiative to contact any government or non-govern-
ment entity to ensure that the rights of non-Muslims are well observed in 
view of the application of Islamic sharīʿa in the National Capital. And its 
task requires it to review complaints from citizen or entities with the view 
of studying and verifying such complaints through direct contact with the 
concerned bodies in Khartoum state. 
However, the commission work cannot be implemented on the ground, 
because there is no law supporting its work to sustain the rights of non-
Muslims in Khartoum. The training and awareness initiatives put in the 
CPA for the policemen and security officials to show special treatment 
to non-Muslims are not enough and cannot grant the protection of these 
rights. The word ‘non-Muslim’ is not identified well because in its compo-
sition the membership represents Christians and Muslims and there is no 
mention of nonbelievers, Jews and followers of traditional religions. 
31 From the Constitution of the Special Commission for the Rights of Non-Muslims in 
the National Capital, Ministry of Presidency Affairs, Republic of Sudan, 2006.
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On the ground the establishment of the commission took a long time. 
Since its official start, no significant work has been done so far due to the 
slow, long and complicated procedures. Illiteracy, ignorance and mistrust 
can be obstacles for the non-Muslim IDPs to access such an institution to 
look for their rights in such forums unless the commission moves to those 
places. The commission has no office or agencies inside the camps and its 
work lacks the means of investigation and research in the IDP camps. 
Christian-Muslim Relations in the IDP Camps
This section analyses Christian-Muslim relations from the point of view of 
the IDPs. The survey revealed important findings concerning perceptions 
and relationships demonstrating how displaced Muslims and Christians 
express their interfaith perspectives. Specifically, people’s experience 
inside the camps is that there is no difference between Christians and 
Muslims. For instance, Christians find out that Islam as a religion has a 
great deal of positive things. In their daily living experience these people 
who have been lumped together by fate and not by choice, do not con-
sider the issue of religion to be a dividing factor and live side by side with 
each other, regardless of their religious belief. Different religious beliefs 
and practices have not resulted in contests, tensions and social strife. The 
populations, as diverse as they are, live in mutual respect as neighbours; 
they exchange greetings and goodwill on days of religious festivals.
There is a strong inference from my respondents that religious festivals 
provide more opportunities for interfaith solidarity among friends of dif-
ferent religious traditions. It is a common practice in both Muslim and 
Christian communities to pay visits to neighbours during religious festi-
vals and holidays. As Fardos Hamza, a 30 year old Muslim woman who 
lives in Wad al-Bashīr stated: 
We are neighbours, we exchange visits especially on ʿīds [religious festivals]. 
This is particularly so with our neighbour named al-Toma (Christian). When 
they dance [collectively] we go there to witness and participate. And so 
when they have funeral ceremonies, we as well played [danced] with them 
[that is, participated in mourning dance].32
The opinion expressed above is a clear indication that what is at the state 
level is diametrically different from people’s everyday life. 
32 Interview, Wad al-Bashīr, February 2007.
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Most exchanges among the residents of the IDP camps revolve around 
the positive things that colleagues wish for others in the immediate 
future. A substantial number of respondents considered markets, homes 
and public transport as other forums of interfaith exchanges. As a Dinka 
Christian man, Kafino Saterlino expressed: 
In Khartoum in all my activities we participate with Muslims and we have 
discussions in most cases. Yet most important and to make life easy we 
would have to respect others and apply the text of love to each other and 
so . . . Here in Mandela, I have not faced any questions about my conforming 
to a sect, or to a [particular] religion.33
In the planned areas, the lot system (Arab.: qurʿa) in the distribution of 
land plots, gives the opportunity to experience the intermixture of differ-
ent tribes and different communities together in the same place. According 
to the officials of the camps, the qurʿa system doesn’t differentiate among 
people. The recent shift in circumstances forces the IDPs to change their 
old system of traditions and behaviour. It makes people separate from 
their relatives and relocate to live with others pursuant to the lot. That 
is the reason why you find Christians and Muslims living together in one 
place in a peaceful neighbourhood, paying less attention to tribal and reli-
gious differences.
There is another level of collaboration between Christians and Muslims 
in the camps, which is in economy and trade. Many NGOs and Community 
Based Organizations, CBOs, such as, for instance, Peace and Development 
Association (PDA) in Wad al-Bashīr, work in the camps to implement 
projects that depend on investments and income generating projects such 
as a grocery business, boutiques, charcoal retail, and small stores etc., and 
chicken-raising projects in Mandela are implemented by women’s groups. 
This system functions through grouping; it divides the IDPs into groups, 
each group consisting of between 15 to 20 persons. In such projects you 
find Christians and Muslims working together; the two communities are 
members in the collective projects and have their joint accounts and com-
mon markets.
An excellent example is ‘Sawā Sawā’ (Arab.: together, together) 
Association which is another example from Wad al-Bashīr. The Christian 
and Muslim members of the association concur on the same objectives, 
and share the same questions. To a great extent the projects are jointly 
designed and jointly implemented. So far Sawā Sawā has implemented a 
33 Interview, Mandela, March 2007.
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water distribution project, adult education and many other activities. In 
partnership with other NGOs, like UNIMIS, Save the Children and CARE, 
Sawā Sawā implemented child protection projects and other important 
projects. In these projects you find Christians and Muslims are working 
together in harmony.
Catholic Relief Service (CRS) is an NGO implementing banking and 
saving projects among the women. The researcher attended one of the 
graduation ceremonies when I found Christian women and Muslim 
women together sharing the same objective of economizing. ACCORD is 
implementing projects on Domestic Gardening, Crockery Handicraft and 
other projects. These projects depend on teamwork to guarantee the seri-
ousness of the IDPs, which encourages them to get funding. The teams 
usually have Christians and Muslims working together. 
In political behaviour, it is recognized that before and after the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, some of the Christian Southerners were 
and are supporting the NCP, the leading Islamic party which is controlling 
the resources. It is known in the political game that the NCP used to pres-
ent material appeal and services to mobilize people. That is why it is not 
strange to find Southern Christians among the NCP because for some of 
the IDPs it is the party which will guarantee residence in Khartoum and 
services. But after the CPA, most of the Southerners realised that they 
have rights which can be achieved through other partners, such as the 
opposition party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Also 
among the latter party you find Muslims/Christians and Northerners/
Southerners are working together in the vision of the ‘new Sudan’ regard-
less of religion and ethnicity. 
The two parties SPLM and NCP are the most-represented parties in the 
IDP camps and in one house you can find two brothers belonging to the 
two parties with different ideologies and living together and ‘eating from 
the same plate’ regardless of the ideological differences. The point here is 
that religion does not constitute a barrier to the political behaviour of the 
IDPs in the Camps around Khartoum. 
Issues Affecting Christian-Muslim Relations
Though the research has revealed that religion is not a barrier at the grass-
roots level, it does demonstrate that issues of conflict do exist at national 
and government levels. This situation is apparent when the interviewees 
identified elements of instrumentalization of religion in the cause of polit-
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ical objectives amongst the actors in the process and in the discernible 
patterns of religious manipulation. The majority of respondents of both 
religions agree that religion is used as an instrument of political interests. 
Leadership
According to Priscilla, a Christian respondent, “there is a problem if you 
want to be a leader; it is difficult. You are marginalized and prevented to 
rule and climb the ladder, which is not open to anyone . . . discrimination 
because of religion is obvious”.34
Priscilla’s argument can be interpreted with the aid of a retrospective 
analysis of the political history of Sudan. The declaration of the Sudan as 
an Islamic Republic raises the question of whether a non-Muslim can be 
president. Al-Ṣādiq al-Mahdī, leader of Umma Party, answers the question 
negatively but hastens to say that this need not cause worry to Southern 
politicians as the Muslim majority would not vote for a non-Muslim as 
head of the state. By failing to make a distinction between constitutional 
rights, on the one hand, and the political chance of implementation of 
them on the other, al-Ṣādiq al-Mahdī misses the relevance of an impor-
tant political controversy. Ḥasan al-Turābī, the NIF’s (former) ideologue, 
however, concedes a non-Muslim’s right to be nominated for that position. 
He defends his political stance by arguing that as no Southerner can ever 
secure the necessary majority of votes, the country would always end up 
with a Muslim as a head of state. Accordingly, he maintains, to concede 
a non-Muslim’s eligibility for nomination would not, in effect, constitute 
infringement of the sharīʿa.
Education
The educational system also influences the relations between Christians 
and Muslims. One of the policies that complicated the situation was the 
Islamization of the educational system.
The current Education Curriculum and the educational system are 
Islamized. There is therefore a need to review the general curriculum so 
that it accommodates different religions in the Sudan. Criticism advanced 
against the educational system in Sudan revolves around the issue of the 
school curriculum, especially at the level of basic education. Yom Deng 
could not have framed the problem involved in this area in better terms:
34 Interview, Omdurman, May 2007.
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In the curricula of education, I came across nothing that reflects Christianity, 
not a single time. Most of the poetry illustrations are of Islamic Poems, 
Qurʾānic verses or ṣaḥāba [Prophet Muhammad’s companions] speeches. 
Inversely and at no time, not a single instance, did I come across an illustra-
tion quoting the Bible or Christian Saints’ speeches in school text books. In 
school curricula the Islamic content might not change altogether, but there 
at least should be a teacher for Christian education [in public schools]. It is 
improper for a small number of pupils to return to sit for Christian educa-
tion lessons in the afternoon three days a week. This way a pupil cannot 
assimilate what is learnt. Once school fees are paid in full, knowledge should 
be taught in full including Christian religion. Now Christian pupils have to 
pay extra fees for their religious lessons.35
In looking at the role of religion in conflict and peace, the opinions of 
members of both Islam and Christianity point to a deliberately skewed 
emphasis on the curriculum toward inculcating Islamic knowledge and 
not Christian knowledge. As should be expected, such factors and practice 
of religious discrimination in schools and in shaping of attitudes affect 
inter-faith coexistence in the educational system. It contributes towards 
religious discrimination and intolerance through structures of public 
learning and the attitude of teachers. A sizeable number of Christians find 
that attitudes of teachers are partly responsible for the discrimination in 
schools. The attitudes of teachers could also influence trends of intoler-
ance among students, as Solomon Oliha from Mandela reported: 
I was once studying in an Institute in the town. One day I was trying to leave 
the class when the Islamic education instructor was getting in. He stopped 
me at the door of the classroom and insisted that I attend. I refused and we 
argued. I reported to the director and it was solved there. That moved me 
a lot.36
The content of the curriculum affects relationships in private and in public 
schools. Christians are more concerned about the infusion of Islamic ref-
erences and illustrations in different subjects in the curriculum for basic 
schools and the complete absence of Christian references and quotations. 
As a prescription from the state ideology the curriculum is simultaneously 
structured in such a way that it shields Muslim pupils and students from 
Christian influences on one hand while exposing Christian pupils and stu-
dents to an overdose of Islamic ideas and materials on the other hand. 
35 Interview, Khartoum, March 2007.
36 Interview, Khartoum, March 2007.
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Policies were introduced where the entire syllabus was changed and the 
Islamic Qurʾānic understanding and Qurʾānic verses were in every aspect 
of the curriculum from mathematics to sciences. And that became dif-
ficult because the children were now being indoctrinated. Islamic verses 
are forced on all children; they have to learn them, otherwise they fail the 
exams. This was very difficult and meant people having to choose between 
the children going to school or having to struggle with the content of the 
curriculum. And when they go to school they have to inform the school 
that they are Christian and that Islam is a different religion from theirs.
Christian Education is not taught in government schools. There is a 
demand that Christian Education be taught in government schools, and 
Christian Education teachers be employed by the government and trained 
on the job. The public schools are open to all children although their 
rights are not wholly met. Public schools do not provide teachers for the 
subject of Christian education. It costs parents additional money to pay 
for the religious education of their children in private centres that offer 
such teaching services. 
Civil Service
Areas of concern for Christians regarding the civil service include:
1.  The rights of non-Muslims/Christians are not recognized by the gov-
ernment in national festivals and official holidays. There is a demand 
for recognition of Christian rights in religious festivals and official holi-
days under the CPA and in the Interim Constitution.
2.  Freedom of worship is not given to all Christians and civil servants on 
Sunday by some public and private sectors. There is a demand for free-
dom of worship to be granted to all as stipulated in the CPA and the 
interim national constitution and interim constitution of Khartoum 
State.
3.  Closing all eating places during the Ramadan is an infringement on the 
rights of non-Muslims in Khartoum State and therefore should not be 
continued. 
4.  Equal rights are not given to all civil servants according to their quali-
fications. There is the demand that all civil servants be treated equally 
and according to qualifications or merit. As has been pointed out ear-
lier, the absence of job opportunities is one of the crucial challenges 
facing the displaced persons in Khartoum. Unemployment is a national 
problem in Sudan and most of the people suffer from it but the migrant 
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people in Khartoum, many of whom are Christians, feel this problem 
more acutely. Because in the words of Paul Jandlo: 
. . . there are people who are discriminated [against] in the employment 
because when you go for employment you have to be asked Qurʾānic verses, 
if you do not recite them you are out of the interview.37 
Similarly, there are cases like “some young people who have had problems 
and were not able to work in al-ḍarāʾib [Tax department] because they 
refused to employ him because taxation includes the zakāt and a non-
Muslim cannot work there”.38 
There is a strongly held perception of “double” discrimination among 
the university graduates in the camps. For the graduates, they recognize 
the general unemployment problem in Sudan but they stressed that their 
situation is more complex since they are non-Muslims. In accordance with 
this argument many of the university graduates in the camps attested that 
their unemployability is attributed to the fact that they are non-Muslims. 
One actually expanded on this view by claiming that: “This is so because 
discrimination is already there in Sudan. When I presented my certificate 
to an interview board, it was sorted into whether Christian or Muslim and 
they take the latter”.39
Similar to the state departments, some companies give priority to 
employing Muslims and no Christian can win a job in such institutions. 
As a Dinka Christian man, Kafino Saterlino stated, even if one is recruited 
for the job there is always the insistence for him to become Muslim first, 
and then be given the employment only afterwards: “My father tried to 
work for al-Hijra Roads and Construction Company (reputed to belong to 
Osama bin Laden’s group of companies) but the condition to get the job 
was to be a Muslim”.40 
Lands
Churches are denied acquisition of land by the government in the North, 
because of the old missionary act of 1962, which has up to now not been 
removed from the statute books. The Christians demand to have the law 
repealed, so that the churches can apply for lands in Khartoum State and 
all other Northern States through the official channels in the land depart-
37 Interview, Khartoum, March 2007.
38 Interview, Omdurman, May 2007.
39 Interview, Wad al-Bashīr, February 2007.
40 Interview, Khartoum, March 2007.
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ments. Once the law that prohibits the acquisition of land is repealed, 
churches can also apply for lands for Christian activities in residential 
areas according to the plans of the Ministry of Housing. 
Both Christians and Muslims overwhelmingly agree on the occurrence 
of conflicts between Christians and State institutions. The reality is that 
the Church and the State are frequently at odds with each other over 
policy development, confiscation of Church properties and demolition of 
churches by the authorities of Khartoum State under the guise of town 
planning. The State has relentlessly targeted the church in demolishing 
its worship places, confiscating other property in the guise of develop-
ment projects. Churches do not accept the explanation that their centres 
are demolished because of the imperative of the government to develop 
the country. It is frequently seen that Muslim praying centres are spared 
while those belonging to Christians are demolished.
There are other important issues which came out of the series of inter-
views during this study. One significant fact that emerged is that there is a 
strong potential for inter-communal violence when a religious property is 
under the threat of destruction or confiscation. Important parish centres 
had been destroyed according to Persila:
The famous case of the church, which is now part of the [Republican] Palace, 
if you go next to the Mosque you will find another church property which 
is now a museum. It was a church, we went to pray there . . . now we can no 
longer pray there; and the government took it over and took off the tower 
and got the cross off. It is now like any other building.41 
The IDPs have problems because the churches in the IDP camps were 
destroyed; after a long time they were allow to build one church on the 
condition that it cannot have a marked cross and cannot have a tower. 
There are other things which are prohibited and against the law for 
churches to do, including the use of microphones. A number of important 
churches in the informal residential districts were demolished for munici-
pal planning. Such behaviour has given the government a negative profile 
within the IDP communities.
In addition to the government’s official dealings with the Church, 
which many non-Muslims and some straight-forward Muslims point to as 
excessively repressive, some of the interviewees point out overt religious 
discrimination in the government practices in respect of land allocation. 
There is no law against building churches, but the long procedures can 
41 Interview, Omdurman, May 2007.
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be an obstacle that the government is using to delay the issuing of new 
licences for the construction of Christian worship places. Christians deal 
with the situation in innovative ways: a license is acquired for an alter-
native purpose and then converted to a church. This is not an issue for 
the construction of a new mosque; a licence is not required for the con-
struction of a mosque and no mosque suffers the fate of demolition or 
expropriation such as that experienced for church properties. Solomon 
Oliha from Mandela cites another example of government action against 
Christians which was capable of raising social tension and souring the 
relationship between Christians and Muslims:
By the military college, there was an area called kharābāt [ruins] near the 
soldiers’ residential area. It is an hour’s drive from Khartoum. The kharābāt 
was inhabited by the displaced in 1995. They decided to build a church. The 
construction reached a good point, then it was destroyed by orders of the 
State. People living in those marginal areas receive the status of animals, 
not human beings, in the way the government treats and relates with them. 
The church was destroyed before the ʿīd prayers. That was according to 
the instructions from the commander [who is a Muslim functionary of the 
State].42
Religious Activities 
IDPs express lack of freedom for open air preaching by non-Muslims in 
Khartoum State and other northern states. The Christians demand free-
dom for open air preaching. Despite the availability of many potential 
opportunities for positive interfaith encounters, certain incidents con-
tinue to spark crises and occasional inter-communal violence. This hap-
pens between Christians and Muslims by proxy in different situations. 
This story was told by Stephen Wani:
Once in Khartoum North, two or three years ago some colleagues of mine 
tried to preach the Bible in an open space. Suddenly a number of people 
appeared carrying swords; they looked like anṣār [Muslim Fanatics]. Most 
programmes of the Christians in Khartoum do not take place in open air 
or in market place like what happens in the South. There we conduct pro-
grammes in gathering places like sūq al-ʿarabī [in Khartoum]. Here organi-
zation [of activities] must take place in Halls or Stadiums. Official security 
arrangements are necessary. The problems are the fundamentalists and they 
are there even among us, we the Christians. They are people with dogmatic 
mentality henceforth we have to restrain a little our activity so we can con-
42 Interview, Mandela, March 2007.
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tinue ahead on the line and to avoid clashes. We did not try again since that 
incident in Khartoum.43 
Ministry of Guidance and Endowment
Many Christians demand that in the ministry of Guidance and Endowment, 
the Department of Christian Affairs must be headed by a Christian. 
The Ministry must support churches in the same way as it supports the 
mosques. The Ministry of Guidance and Endowment should be called 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs, as it used to be, and have a state minister 
who is a Christian.
Judiciary 
The judiciary should maintain its independence according to the CPA 
and the interim national constitution. And it recommended the speed-
ing up of the formation of Special Courts for non-Muslims in Khartoum 
State according to article 158 of the Interim National Constitution 2005: 
“A system shall be established to guarantee the implementation of Article 
156 of Dispensing Justice in the national Capital”. There is also a demand 
for freedom of conversion from Islam to Christianity and vice-versa with 
equal treatment of converts (Christians/Muslims).
Media: Radio, News Papers & T.V.
Christian programmes and activities are not allowed on the National 
Radio and National T.V. and on Khartoum State Radio and T.V. Christians 
are not allowed to issue a Christian newspaper.
Conclusion
This chapter demonstrates that religious faith constitutes no barrier to 
mutual interaction and that in real life neither Islam nor Christianity nec-
essarily results in ideological cleavages among the IDP camps of Mandela 
and Wad al-Bashīr. The displaced people feel no differences among them-
selves along religious lines in their daily life. To the people of the camps the 
Christian-Muslim divide is an issue largely external to them and confined 
43 Interview, Khartoum, March 2007.
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to the national level and perhaps to other communities away from the 
camps. The majority of respondents, regardless of their faith, hold a per-
ception that religion is manipulated as an instrument of political interest. 
However these religions are treated very differently in formal and state 
circles and in structures such as political organization ( SPLM, NCP), edu-
cation curriculum and school structures, in the public Media (Radio, TV 
and state newspapers), in the distribution of job opportunities and access 
to land and in the implementation of public order law, to list but a few. 
Frequently, political actors instrumentalize religion for their own interests. 
The chapter showed that many Christians view the Public Order 
Laws as critical factors in Christian/Muslim relations in the camps. Both 
Christians and Muslims agree on the occurrence of conflicts between 
Christians and State institutions. The reality is that the Christian organi-
zations and the State are frequently at odds over development policy, con-
fiscation of church properties and demolition of church buildings by the 
authorities under the guise of town planning. It is also noted that there 
is a potential for inter-communal violence when a religious property is 
under the threat of destruction and/or confiscation. This was the situation 
when the authorities of Khartoum State confiscated church premises and 
when many important parish centres were destroyed inside and outside 
the IDP camps.
The chapter reveals that political attitude and behaviour run contrary 
to the popular trends in inter-faith practice in the camp communities. 
The analysis of the perceptions of Christian-Muslim relations at this 
level shows that they should be valued, promoted and introduced into the 
state institutions by political actors, namely the governments and political 
parties. 
PART TWO
NIGERIA: “RE-IMPLEMENTATION OF SHARĪʿA”
Map 3 Map of Nigeria: Showing principal places referred to in Part Two
CHAPTER FOUR
THE EVOLUTION OF THE INDEPENDENT SHARĪʿA PANEL  
IN OSUN STATE, SOUTH-WEST NIGERIA
Abdul-Fatah Kola Makinde
Introduction
Osun State is located in the tropical rain forest in the South-West of 
Nigeria and covers an estimated area of 8,602 square kilometres.1 It was 
created on 27th August, 1991, along with eight others, by the regime of 
President Ibrahim Babangida. It was carved out of the former Oyo State 
and is bounded to the east partly by Ondo State and partly by Ekiti State, 
to the west by Oyo State, to the north by Kwara State and to the south by 
Ogun State.
It is largely inhabited by the Osun, Ijesa, Ife and Igbomina communi-
ties, who are Yoruba speaking and who form part of the larger Yoruba 
nation concentrated in the south-western part of Nigeria and who are also 
found in the diaspora.2
The State is densely populated and highly urbanized. According to the 
1991 national population census, Osun State has a population of 2.2 mil-
lion inhabitants.3 However, based on the provisional results of the 2006 
census, Osun State now has a population of 3.4 million.4 Due to the demo-
graphic problems of Nigeria, it is difficult to give the actual percentage of 
Muslims in this State. It could, however, be said that Muslims are assumed 
to constitute more than 50 per cent of the population. The State, when it 
was created, had twenty-two Local Government Areas (LGAs). However, 
1 Adenaike, F. A. (ed.), The Pioneers, Ibadan: Syndicated Limited, 1991, page 6.
2 Adenaike, 1991, page 6.
3 Udo, R. K. and Mommon, A. B. (eds.), Nigeria: Giant in the tropics, Lagos: Gabumo 
Publishing Comp. Ltd., 1993, page 380.
4 The Guardian, Wednesday 10th January 2007, front page; Nigerian Tribune, Wednes-
day 10th January 2007, pages 1 and 4 and the Nation, Wednesday 10th January 2007, front 
page.
© Abdul-Fatah Kola Makinde, 2014 | doi:10.1163/9789004262126_005
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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with the creation of additional Local Government Areas in 19915 and 1997,6 
the State now has thirty Local Government Areas.
Like any other area in Yorubaland, the date when Islam was introduced 
to Osun State is very difficult to ascertain. As Gbadamosi observes, “it was 
unannounced and unplanned; and, for the most part, the first Yoruba 
Muslims had to worship privately and secretly”.7 According to him, what 
is fairly certain is that in the 17th century, mention was made of Muslims 
in Yorubaland. While Johnson suggests the date of the arrival of Islam in 
Yorubaland as 18th century,8 Doi observes that Al-Ilori suggests an earlier 
date. Al-Ilori opines that it was during the period of Mansa Musa (d. 1337) 
  5 Osun State Government, Osun State so far, Osogbo: Ministry of Information, 1992, 
page 14.
  6 Ministry of Information, Information month 2000—democracy day, Osogbo: Osun 
State Government Press, 2000, page 30.
  7 Gbadamosi, T. G. O., The growth of Islam among the Yoruba, 1841–1908, London: Long-
man Group Limited, 1978, page 4.
  8 Johnson, S., The history of the Yorubas, Lagos: CSS Bookshops, 1976, pages 38–39.
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that Islam spread to most parts of Nigeria, including Yorubaland.9 Thus, 
by the 18th century, Islam had spread to places like: Osogbo, Ede, Ikirun, 
Iwo, Ikire, Ejigbo, Ila, Inisa, Orile-Owu and many other places in the area 
now called Osun State.10 Islam received a further boost in the 19th century 
following the jihad of Usman dan Fodio, which spread to Yorubaland, Oyo 
and Ilorin in particular.
Some parts of the South-West of Nigeria applied sharīʿa as a legal sys-
tem before the arrival of the British colonialists in 1861 when Lagos was 
annexed as a British colony. There were some principal Yoruba towns 
where sharīʿa was established and applied in the domains of their obas 
(Yoruba: monarchs) during the pre-colonial era. Such towns included Ede, 
Ikirun and Iwo in the area now called Osun State.11 Sanni supports this 
view when he writes:
But once we had Muslim rulers in parts of the Yoruba Country from the 
mid-nineteenth century, for example Abibu Lagunju (1847–1900) at Ede, 
Lamuye (1847–1906) at Iwo, the scope and prominence of the sharīʿa became 
enhanced so much that aspects of its penal code, the public execution of 
robbers, was administered.12
The sharīʿa legal system had a set-back with the introduction of the colo-
nial court system. This was because, as the indigenous legal system based 
on tradition still held sway, the emergence of the British legal system 
neither removed the native system nor promoted the establishment of a 
state-sponsored Islamic legal structure. The Native Council Ordinance of 
1901 gave legal support to native courts which were required to adminis-
ter justice according to native law and customs. The Customary law, of 
course, includes Muslim law as modified by the custom of each locality. 
Therefore, before this Ordinance came into force, the colonialists’ delimi-
tation had already eroded whatever sphere of operation was available to 
sharīʿa and its operators.13
However, the Muslims found something missing in the colonial courts, 
as they did not find justice in matters concerning their religious precepts 
on issues affecting their socio-personal status such as marriage, divorce 
  9 Doi A. R. I., Islam in Nigeria, Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation Ltd, 1984, pages 109–110.
10 Gbadamosi, 1978, page 4.
11  Noibi, D. O. S., Islamic perspective, Ijebu-ode: Shebiotimo Publishers, 1998, page 52.
12 Sanni, A., ‘The sharīʿa Conundrum in Nigeria and the Zamfara Model: The Role 
of Nigerian Muslim Youth in the Historical Context’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 
Vol. 27, No. 1, 2007, page 119.
13 Sanni, 2007, page 119.
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and inheritance. Hence, in 1894 and 1923, they petitioned the colonial 
authority to institute for them a court whose adjudication on matters con-
cerning their personal status would be based on sharīʿa.14 Their request 
did not extend to penal law because the British had enacted a Penal 
Code which restricted the jurisdiction of the sharīʿa to personal status 
in Northern Nigeria where sharīʿa was in operation. In 1948, the Muslim 
Congress of Nigeria, with its headquarters at Ijebu-Ode, wrote to the Sec-
retary of the colonial administration, complaining about the application 
of laws repugnant to the faith of Southern Nigerian Muslims. Of particu-
lar concern to the Muslims was that the judge followed whatever proce-
dure he wished in the administration of inheritance, without regard to 
clear Islamic provisions in this matter.15 This complaint, however, did not 
receive the required attention from the colonial administrators.
In view of the above, the Muslims in the South-West of Nigeria contin-
ued to make requests to successive governments to establish sharīʿa courts 
for the adjudication of their personal matters. The launching of sharīʿa by 
Zamfara State in 1999 opened a new door for their request. According to 
Sanni, the pressure was not limited to the north, as the Zamfara exam-
ple had provided a strong impetus for its implementation in the south, 
specifically in Yorubaland.16 The failure of the government to yield to their 
request made them think of an alternative way of fulfilling their religious 
duties; hence, the establishment of Independent sharīʿa Panels in some 
states in the South-West. Osun State was not left out of this arrangement. 
This chapter focuses on this state with a view to examining the evolution 
of an Independent sharīʿa Panel in the state, its activities so far and its 
roles in the administration of justice to Muslims in the state.
History of sharīʿa Practice in Osun State
Although Osun State was created in 1991, as noted earlier, the history 
of the practice of sharīʿa in the state dates back to the arrival of Islam 
in the area. This is because the introduction of Islam in any part of the 
world always opens a door for the introduction of sharīʿa. According to 
14 Adetona, L. A., ‘The dynamics of Independent Shariah Panel in Lagos State, South-
West of Nigeria’, Journal of the Nigeria Association of Teachers of Arabic and Islamic Studies, 
vol. 8, 2005, page 30.
15 Sanni, 2007, page 119.
16 Sanni, 2007, page 126.
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Gbadamosi,17 a discussion of the practice of sharīʿa in any part of the Mus-
lim world must begin with the introduction of Islam into the area as a 
faith and as a way of life. Ambali18 also asserts that “wherever there are 
Muslims, it is implicitly understood that sharīʿa is already introduced”. It 
should however be noted here that the level of its application varies from 
one place to another; this is because the scope of sharīʿa encompasses all 
spheres of life of a Muslim. The legal aspect of sharīʿa is what brings about 
debates and controversies in most parts of the world. Therefore, sharīʿa 
in this context implies applying it in other aspects of life while the legal 
aspect is excluded in most cases.
In any discussion of the application of sharīʿa in Yorubaland, Osun State 
cannot be left out. This is because the State has principal Yoruba towns 
where sharīʿa was firmly established and applied. While sharīʿa could be 
said to have been applied in some towns of other Yoruba states in some 
aspects of Islamic Law, there is evidence that sharīʿa Law was applied fully 
in the domains of some obas (monarchs) in some towns in the area now 
called Osun State during the pre-colonial period. Such towns are: Iwo, Ede 
and Ikirun. Malik confirms this by mentioning Ede and Iwo, but leaving 
out Ikirun.19 However, others such as Okunola20 and Makinde21 confirmed 
Ikirun as well.
It is asserted that sharīʿa was applied in Iwo during the reign of Oba 
Memodu (Muhammad) Lamuye who was enthroned in 1860. The sharīʿa 
was applied in his domain and the town was administered in line with 
sharīʿa until he died in 1906.22 The Qadi appointed by Lamuye was 
Muhammad-Awwal Akintayo Omojiiro.23 Oba Abibu Olagunju of Ede is 
also claimed to have applied sharīʿa in his domain during the second half 
of the 19th century. He was reported to have established the sharīʿa court 
in an area called Agbeni. It was moved to another area called Agbongbe 
17 Gbadamosi, 2000, page 2.
18 Ambali, M. A., The practice of Muslim family law in Nigeria, Zaria: Tamaza Publishing 
Company Ltd., 1998.
19 Malik, S. H. A., ‘The Shari’ah in the life of a Muslim’, in Islamic tenets and the Shari’ah, 
I. A. B. Balogun (ed.), Ibadan: Sam Bookman Publishers, 2000, page 160.
20 Okunola, M. A., ‘The relevance of Shari’ah to Nigeria’, in Islam in Africa, N. Alkali, A. 
Adamu, A. Yadudu, R. Motem & H. Salihi (eds.), Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd., 1993, pages 
23–35. 
21 Makinde, A. K., ‘The Institution of Sharīʿah in Oyo and Osun States, Nigeria, 1890–
2005’, Ph.D thesis, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, 2007, pages 75–78.
22 Okunola, 1993, page 25.
23 Okunola, 1993, page 25.
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in 1914. The first Qadi was Alfa Sindiku (Siddiq).24 In Ikirun, Oba Oye-
wole was reported to have applied sharīʿa in his domain. He established 
a sharīʿa court, which was presided over by one Alfa Bako from Ilorin as 
the Qadi.
Although the presence of the British colonialists in Yorubaland led to 
the non-recognition of the sharīʿa court system in this part of the country, 
the Muslims there did not relinquish their religion nor the sharīʿa.25 This 
was true of the Muslims in the towns in Osun State. They continued to 
practice sharīʿa in their various mosques, particularly in matters relating 
to marriage, child naming and funeral ceremonies. Some of them even 
applied the sharīʿa in matters of divorce and inheritance. They however 
continued to demand the establishment of sharīʿa courts from the Gov-
ernment in the State.
Agitation and Demands for the Establishment of sharīʿa Courts
The official launching of sharīʿa in Zamfara State on 27th October, 1999 
sparked off agitation and a series of demands for the introduction of 
sharīʿa in other parts of Nigeria, including Yorubaland. As earlier noted, 
the wave of agitation was not limited to the north, as the movement for its 
implementation in the south, specifically in Yorubaland, had been given a 
strong impetus by the Zamfara example.26 Like their counterparts in the 
South-West, some Muslims in Osun State championed the demand for 
the establishment of sharīʿa Courts by the government. The demand of 
the agitators was not to have full-blown sharīʿa, as was the case with the 
Northern States, it was to have sharīʿa Courts to adjudicate on matters 
relating to Muslim marriage, inheritance, divorce and other civil matters. 
Various attempts were made by the agitators to express their desire to be 
officially allowed to use sharīʿa for the adjudication of such issues. The 
efforts of the League of Imams and Alfas (Muslim scholars) of Osun State, 
directed towards joining their colleagues in other parts of Yorubaland 
to publicly demand the establishment of sharīʿa in their states, could be 
described as one of the attempts made by the Muslims of the state.
Such a demand was contained in the memorandum submitted to Osun 
State House of Assembly in December, 1999 by the League of Imams and 
24 Okunola, 1993, page 25.
25 Okunola, 1992, page 25.
26 Sanni, 2007, page 126.
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Alfas in the State, and signed by their Chairman, Alhaji Shaykh Mustafa 
Ajisafe, the Chief Imam of Osogboland, on the review of the 1999 Consti-
tution wherein the need for the establishment of sharīʿa courts was clearly 
stated. Reference was made to the application of sharīʿa during the pre-
colonial era in Yorubaland, particularly in Ede, Iwo and Ikirun, which are 
part and parcel of Osun State, before it was abolished by the British Colo-
nialists. The request was put thus:
. . . the sharīʿa is a Constitutional right of all Nigerian Muslims, Osun State 
Muslims should not therefore be exceptional. It is as a result of this we want 
to call on the honourable members of Osun State House of Assembly to 
critically consider this with a view to establishing sharīʿa courts in Osun 
State since section 275 of the 1999 Constitution allows this.27
Different Islamic organizations or groups in the State organized a series 
of lectures, symposia and rallies to publicly demand the establishment of 
sharīʿa courts in the State. For example, the Osun State Area Unit of the 
Muslim Students’ Society of Nigeria (MSSN) on Wednesday 27th October, 
1999 held a rally at Ansar-ud-deen School, Sabo, Osogbo to demand 
sharīʿa in Osun State. After the address of the Area Unit Amir, Qamarud-
din Bello, members conducted a peaceful protest round the town to call 
for the introduction of sharīʿa in the State. In reporting the incident, The 
Punch reported inter alia:
. . . in Osun State, over 500 Muslim adherents trooped to the streets of 
Osogbo, the State capital, canvassing the introduction of sharīʿa Law in the 
State.28
The Punch reported further:
. . . the placard carrying protesters marched through Ayetoro, Oke-fia, Oja-
Oba, Old Garage and Gbongan Road, chanting Islamic songs of solidarity.29
Moreover, The Punch observed the inscriptions on the placards and 
reported thus:
27 Okunola, 1993, page 25.
28 Excerpt from the memorandum submitted to Osun State House of Assembly on 
review of the 1999 Constitution by the League of Imams and Alfas of Osun State on behalf 
of the Muslim Community of Osun State in December, 1999.
29 The Punch, Thursday 28th October, 1999, page 6. The Punch is a national widely read 
daily newspaper in Nigeria. It is published in Lagos, Nigeria. It is also on the website: www 
.punchng.com.
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. . . some placards the protesters carried had such inscriptions as ‘Give us 
sharīʿa’, ‘sharīʿa’ a blessing to all Muslims and non-Muslims.30
Some other dailies that reported the incident also made their reports 
accordingly. In the report of the Nigerian Tribune, it stated that ‘Muslim 
Youths numbering about 2,000 marched through the streets of Osogbo, 
the state capital calling for the introduction of sharīʿa Law in the State.’ It 
referred to MSSN as the Muslim Youths when it reported thus:
. . . the Youths who came out under the aegis of the Muslim Students Society 
of Nigeria (MSSN) argued that the introduction of sharīʿa in all States of the 
country would check the vices ravaging the country.31
Moreover, the National Council of Muslim Youth Organizations (NACO-
MYO), Osun State Chapter, organized a state symposium on sharīʿa titled: 
“Constitutionality of sharīʿa: Problems and Prospects in Application”. It 
was held on 30th January 2000 at the Presidential Hotel Hall, Osogbo. 
It was well-attended by some eminent Islamic scholars, legal luminaries 
and important Muslim personalities from within and outside the State.32 
Immediately after the programme, some of the notable Muslim participants 
held a meeting at NACOMYO Secretariat to review and appraise the pro-
gramme and some decisions were arrived at.33 These included, firstly, that 
the awareness raised in the State through the programme should be fol-
lowed up with some other enlightenment programmes on sharīʿa. Sec-
ondly, that a meeting of Islamic scholars and Muslim personalities who 
are indigenes of the State be called to review the programme with a view 
to actualizing the introduction of sharīʿa in the State, and thirdly, that a 
committee needed to be set up on sharīʿa actualization in the State.34
It could be said therefore that the meeting at NACOMYO Secretariat 
precipitated the formation of a committee on sharīʿa in Osun State. Since 
it was unanimously agreed that day that some Islamic scholars and Muslim 
personalities, as well as leaders of some Islamic organizations, be invited 
to a meeting on the issue of sharīʿa in the State, a follow-up was made to 
30 The Punch, 28th October, 1999.
31  The Punch, 28th October, 1999.
32 Nigerian Tribune, Thursday 28th October, 2000, page 2. This is also a daily newspaper 
in Nigeria. It is published in Ibadan, Nigeria. Website: www.tribune.com.ng.
33 The Guardian, 22nd January 2000, page 4; Saturday Tribune, 22nd January, 2000, page 
9. The Guardian is a widely read daily national newspaper published in Lagos, Nigeria. 
Website: www.ngrguardiannews.com.
34 Interview with Alh. Mustafa Olawuyi, former state co-ordinator of NACOMYO and 
member of executive of Osun State Muslim Community, on 25th December, 2006.
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that effect. Thenceforth, Osun State Committee on sharīʿa was established 
and has since been working assiduously to educate and mobilise Muslims 
of the State for an official demand for the establishment of sharīʿa courts 
in the State.35
Additionally, a series of lectures, symposia and rallies were held either 
privately or publicly demanding the establishment of sharīʿa courts in the 
State. The symposium organized by the National Council of Muslim Youth 
Organizations, (NACOMYO), Osun State Chapter, on sharīʿa, earlier men-
tioned, seemed more educational and challenging. Hence, many Muslim 
individuals became more aware of the need to demand the establishment 
of sharīʿa courts on civil matters for Muslims in the State.
However, the Muslims felt dissatisfied about the lukewarm attitude of 
successive governments to their request to establish sharīʿa Courts and 
sharīʿa Courts of Appeal in Osun State. They argued that they deserved 
to be given the opportunity for several reasons. Firstly, because Nigeria is 
a multi-religious nation where every citizen is free to practise his or her 
religion. Secondly, because the Nigerian Constitution gives room for legal 
pluralism by allowing English/Common, sharīʿa and Customary Laws; 
and because the other two laws which are allowed to operate in the state 
do not in any way make provision for Islamic civil matters. They argued 
further that the English/Common law is of Christian origin,36 taking care 
of the interests of the Christians, while the Customary law takes care of 
traditional interests, but the sharīʿa, which takes care of the Muslims’ 
interests, is not established; hence, there is injustice.37
It is as a result of the above that the Muslim Community of the state 
submitted a proposal for an amendment of the Law to incorporate the 
application of sharīʿa or Islamic Law in the proposed District Custom-
ary Court and Customary Court Law of Osun State during the consider-
ation of the District Customary and Customary Court Law Bill 2005 by 
the State House of Assembly. This was acknowledged by the Honourable 
Speaker but Muslims claim that the proposal was never properly consid-
ered despite all the efforts made by the Muslim Community.38
35 Alh. Mustafa Olawuyi, 25th December, 2006.
36 Malik, 2000, page 161 where he states: “Common Law originated from Christianity 
because it came in existence alongside the cathedrals, abbeys and parish churches which 
were built in the 11th and 12th centuries and that it was formulated by judges who were 
often prelates of the Church”.
37 Interview with Alh. Musa Raji, secretary of the Independent sharīʿa Panel, on 25th 
November, 2006.
38 Alh. Musa Raji, 25th November, 2006.
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Opposition to sharīʿa
The Zamfara State sharīʿa initiative, which generated serious debates 
in the country, did not omit Osun State. As some Muslims in the state 
were agitating and demanding from the government the establishment of 
sharīʿa Courts in the state, some Muslims and non-Muslims, particularly 
the Christians, were not favourably disposed to it.39 Although, they agreed 
that sharīʿa is meant for Muslims, their contention was that it should not 
in any way be enforced on people of other faiths.40 It was stressed that 
since sharīʿa is the way of life of Muslims, the law should not be binding 
on non-Muslims.41 It was even likened to Canon Law that is basically not 
even for all Christians but for the Catholics.42 Therefore, the Muslims are 
free to practise their faith in as much as it does not affect the religious 
rights of others. In the words of one of these Christian leaders:
sharīʿa is a way of practising their (Muslims) faith and they are free to do so 
as long as it does not encroach on other religionists’ right.43
Although the Christian leaders agreed that sharīʿa is meant for Muslims, 
they opposed the idea of the government establishing sharīʿa Courts. Their 
claim is that Nigeria is a multi-religious nation and, as a result, the gov-
ernment should not use the resources of all citizens to support the belief 
of a particular religion.44 It is their opinion that if the government gives 
legal backing to sharīʿa Courts, then the Christians will rise up to insti-
tute their own court and the government must also give it legal backing. 
According to them, the only thing the government can do is to provide an 
atmosphere that is conducive to the free practice of religion, not saying or 
proclaiming by its authority that this is established by the government.45 
It is also their claim that they have something similar to a legal court in 
Christianity where diverse cases are taken to be resolved amicably with-
39 Interviews with some Christian leaders: Rev. E. O. Adeloye of the Baptist Church 
and immediate past State Chairman of Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Osun State 
Chapter, on 28th February, 2007; Pastor A. O. Akinosun of the Christ Apostolic Church and 
current State Chairman of CAN on 9th March, 2007 and Bishop G. Leke Abegunrin of the 
Catholic Diocese, and one time State Chairman of CAN, on 23rd April, 2007.
40 Interviews with Adeloye, 28th February, 2007; Akinosun, 9th March, 2007; and Abe-
gunrin, 23rd April, 2007.
41 Interview with Rev. E. O. Adeloye, 28th February, 2007.
42 Interview with Bishop Leke Abegunrin, 23rd April, 2007.
43 Interview with Rev. E. O. Adeloye, 28th February, 2007.
44 Interviews with some Christian leaders.
45 Interview with Rev. Adeloye, 28th February, 2007.
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out the involvement of the government. This is called either a committee 
or a tribunal, depending on the church. Therefore the government should 
not be involved in the establishment of sharīʿa Courts.46
The concern of the Christians about sharīʿa, according to the Christian 
leaders interviewed, is that sharīʿa has generated a lot of controversy and 
debate resulting in crises leading to the killing of many Christians, par-
ticularly in Northern Nigeria. To them, sharīʿa seems to allow killing and 
if that is what sharīʿa is about, it is not a law that should be accepted by 
Christians.47 One of them even sees sharīʿa as a violation of human rights 
because, according to him, in any country where it is practised, nobody 
is free to choose his or her religion. He opined further that Nigeria is a 
democratic country; therefore, no religion should impose its own faith on 
others and the government should not interfere with the practice of any 
religion; and if sharīʿa is established, it will violate human rights because 
people of other faiths may be forced to abide by the sharīʿa law and this 
goes contrary to the human rights laws of the United Nations. Instances 
of cases where non-Muslims in some sharīʿa states in the north were 
punished or fined for being found with alcohol were cited to support his 
point.48
It is also the contention of a Christian leader that sharīʿa is a contro-
versial issue which is not needed in the south because Muslims in the 
south can be good Muslims without sharīʿa.49 It is the opinion of another 
Christian leader that some laws of sharīʿa are no longer needed in this era 
of civilization because they are obsolete and not relevant to our age. He 
expressed this as follows:
. . . the Law of Moses which you call Torah in Islam is more or less the same 
thing. But with age, with civilization, with education, most of these things 
are changing because what was then is no longer operating now, hence, we 
should not be judging ourselves here now with what was operating as at that 
time. . . . I studied Islam and the sharīʿa especially when I read a portion of 
the Qurʾān that talks about sharīʿa. The thing is, if most of these things are 
open to scholarly debate, we see that some of them are obsolete and are no 
longer in existence now.50
46 Interview with Pastor Akinosun, 9th March, 2007.
47 Interviews with some Christian leaders.
48 Interview with Pastor Akinosun, 9th March, 2007.
49 Interview with Pastor Akinosun, 9th March, 2007.
50 Interview with Rev. Adeloye, 28th February, 2007.
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The views expressed above seem to have been made from the antagonists’ 
points of view. The protagonists of sharīʿa never see it that way. They do 
not see sharīʿa as having a system of law that is obsolete and no longer 
relevant in the contemporary period. Rather, they see it as law that is 
relevant at all times, particularly in the area of personal status that has to 
do with marriage, divorce, inheritance etc. which the Muslims engage in 
on a daily basis.
It should be mentioned at this juncture that opposition to sharīʿa was 
not limited to the Christians. As Sanni notes, there was no lack of audible 
and, at times, loud voices of rejection from some Muslims. For example, 
the Muslim Committee for a Progressive Nigeria (MCPN) based in Lagos, 
a leftist group, supported the anti-sharīʿa campaign and described the 
legal system as “the most backward Muslim religious, legal, and custom-
ary instruments in the hands of the minority feudal emirs for keeping the 
majority of the poor and oppressed peasants and workers down”.51
There are also some Muslim individuals who are not in support of 
sharīʿa. The vice-Amir of the United Muslim Council in Lagos State, Alhaji 
Mufutau Adebayo, was reported to have warned that the implementa-
tion of sharīʿa legal system by some states may divide the country. He 
warned that care must be taken before sharīʿa can be implemented in the 
country, saying that “we cannot wake up one day and say everybody must 
go sharīʿa”.52 In a related development, the Khalifah of Ogun State UMC, 
Sheikh Salisu Adenekan, was reported to have said that the implementa-
tion of sharīʿa in some parts of the country was aimed at destabilizing the 
country.53
Moreover, the attitude and public comments of some Muslim person-
alities show lack of support for sharīʿa. For instance, a prominent Yoruba 
Muslim preacher, who lives in the north, Shaykh Muhydeen Bello, pro-
duced a record entitled ‘sharīʿa’ in 2001 in which he condemned the 
involvement of politicians in the sharīʿa, saying that its introduction in 
the north is ‘a political sharīʿa’.54 Moreover, Akintola asserts that some 
Muslim title-holders are yet to identify with sharīʿa. In his words:
51   Sanni, 2007, page 121.
52 The Punch, Friday 21st April 2000, page 32.
53 The Punch, April 2000.
54 Makinde, 2007, page 179.
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Many Muslim title holders in the south are yet to fully identify themselves 
with the protagonists of sharīʿa. Some wealthy ones among them show little 
or no concern.55
While commenting on why the issue of sharīʿa generated controversy, the 
Speaker of Osun State House of Assembly, Hon. Adejare Bello, who, inci-
dentally, is a Muslim, observed that it is simply because the practice dif-
fers from the orthodox law i.e. the one that was introduced by the Western 
world to us in Africa and that the moment people see the difference they 
tend not to believe, or they tend to disagree with it. He, however, claims 
that the most important reason is that the sharīʿa principles are very strict 
and stringent; he describes the punishment for adultery as dehumanizing. 
Here are his words:
More so, you will agree with me that sharīʿa principles are very strict and 
stringent. Like take for instance, fornication. If a woman fornicates, the 
whole body would be buried and only the head would remain outside and 
to be stoned to death. You know that punishment is very strict. Just forni-
cation, not robbery, not assassination, nothing whatsoever. So for such a 
dehumanized (sic) way of treating fornication, honestly, leaves much to be 
desired.56
The Speaker comments further on the stringent nature of sharīʿa as a fac-
tor that makes people run away from it, as follows:
Honestly, this is the reason why people are running away from sharīʿa prac-
tice, because it is always very stringent. If you say somebody steals even 
fowl and his hand has to be caught off, you have reduced that person to 
somebody that cannot make [a] livelihood for him or herself. It is difficult 
because if the person is a farmer and one hand is removed, he cannot farm 
the way he [is] supposed to and that would encourage joblessness and at the 
end of the day begging. That is why it is very common in the north where 
sharīʿa is being practised. So those are the things.57
The views expressed above by the Speaker show the level of his under-
standing of the sharīʿa criminal law. Moreover, the idea that sharīʿa is strict 
and stringent seems to be another way of condemning sharīʿa from the 
angle of its penal law. However, to the protagonists, the criminal aspect 
of any law cannot be totally absolved of strictness and stringency because 
55 Akintola, I. L., Shariah in Nigeria: an Eschatological Desideratum, Ijebu-Ode: Shebi-
otimo Publication, page 15.
56 Interview with Hon. R. A. Bello, the Speaker of Osun State House of Assembly on 
5th March, 2007.
57 Interview with Bello, 5th March, 2007.
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criminal laws are designed to inflict punishments on those found guilty 
of crimes so as to serve as a deterrent to others. Similarly, there are a lot 
of misconceptions and misinformation about sharīʿa which are held even 
by Muslims, based on their level of understanding of the subject matter 
of the sharīʿa penal law.
It is, however, apposite to remark at this juncture that just as sharīʿa 
received opposition from the Christians and some Muslims, there was 
no shortage of support from some Christians. Sanni observes that one 
Revd. Oloto from Ibadan could not see any reason for opposition. If the 
Islamic system would solve the socio-economic malaise of the country, 
he argued, why can’t we go for it? After all, it had never affected the 
Christians adversely nor was there any prospect of it affecting them when 
fully introduced all over the country. He argued that objection smacks 
of antinomian trends which have found proponents among the promot-
ers of moral and social inequities which the Zamfara model has set out 
to correct.58 A vicar in Osun State also agreed that sharīʿa is capable of 
solving certain corrupt practices in society. He argued that if all religions 
preached integrity there would be no place for corruption and social vices 
in society. He opined further as follows:
I believe wholeheartedly that sharīʿa has a lot of things to do to reduce if not 
to eradicate, and I will preach that to every religious sect, that they should 
preach the tenets of their religion so that corruption could be eradicated.59
Government Response to the sharīʿa Demand
As mentioned earlier, some Muslims in Osun State made a series of 
attempts to demand from the government the establishment of sharīʿa 
Courts and a sharīʿa Court of Appeal in the state in order to officially 
allow them the opportunity of adjudicating on issues relating to civil mat-
ters. These attempts were made through memoranda submitted to the 
House of Assembly and personal contacts with government functionaries. 
However, the controversial nature of sharīʿa made the Osun State gov-
ernment wary in considering the request of the Muslims to have sharīʿa 
Courts established in the state. The Honourable Speaker of Osun State 
House of Assembly acknowledged receipt of the proposal of the Muslims 
58 Sanni, 2007, page 124.
59 Interview with Rev. E. O. Adeloye, 28th February, 2007.
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to the House requesting that a Bill be passed into law establishing sharīʿa 
Courts in the state.60 He explained that the Bill could not be passed into 
law because the Governor was not interested in introducing anything 
that would cause a problem in the state. To the government, the issue 
of sharīʿa is a sensitive one and has generated a lot of controversy and 
misunderstanding across the country, and any attempt to consider the 
request of the Muslims in the state might spark religious misunderstand-
ing or crisis in the state. The Governor was reported as saying that as long 
as God destined him to rule the state, he would not want something that 
would bring controversy between the Muslims and Christians.61
The question of social proportion was also brought in as a factor mili-
tating against the approval by the government of the request of the Mus-
lims. The lack of information on the demography or population in Nigeria, 
meaning that it could not be categorically stated whether the most popu-
lous group of the state is the Christians or the Muslims, is a contributory 
factor. According to the Speaker, there is an argument as to whether the 
state has more Muslims than Christians or vice versa, and in a situation 
where you have it as 40/60 or 45/55 or 50/50 and you cannot determine 
which group is more populous, it will be difficult to practise sharīʿa there 
in full (including in criminal matters), unlike in some parts of the North, 
where more than 90% of the population are Muslims.62
Another factor which is militating against the passage of the Bill on 
the establishment of sharīʿa Courts and a sharīʿa Court of Appeal in the 
state, according to the Honourable Speaker, is the minority of Muslims 
in the House of Assembly. Out of the 26 members of the House, there 
were 10 Muslims.63 He confirmed receipt of the memoranda sent to the 
House by the Muslims, but asserted that even if the Bill was considered 
by the House, it will get killed because the Muslims were just 10 out of 
26 members of the House. Therefore, any attempt to introduce sharīʿa 
in the state will create a problem. What people want is peace and that 
has been the position of the government as well; hence it is wary about 
the proposal. As to the claim of some Muslims in the state that sharīʿa 
Courts were not established because the Governor is a Christian, the 
Speaker debunked the claim saying that the Governor had never discrim-
inated against the Muslims. He argued further, that the Muslims of the 
60 Interview with Bello, 5th March, 2007.
61 Interview with Bello, 5th March, 2007.
62 Interview with Bello, 5th March, 2007.
63 Interview with Bello, 5th March, 2007.
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state never had it so good, even under Muslim governors, as they had it 
with him, in view of some requests they had put before him and he had 
granted. Examples of such requests are the employment of teachers of 
Islamic Studies in some primary schools in the state, and the donation 
of N10 million (Nigerian money) to build the secretariat of the Muslim 
Community.64
Inauguration of the Independent Sharīʿa Panel (ISP)  
in Osun State
The inability of Osun State Muslim Community to achieve success in its 
request to the state government to establish sharīʿa Courts and a sharīʿa 
Court of Appeal caused it to conceive the idea of establishing an Indepen-
dent sharīʿa Panel, as had been done in Oyo State. This was decided on to 
solve the immediate needs of the Muslims of the state to have their civil 
matters determined according to the law of their religion, pending the 
time the government would accede to their request.65
However, the idea of establishing the Independent sharīʿa Panel was 
not immediately implemented, due to the fact that the Muslim Commu-
nity wanted to have a solid plan that would make the Panel acceptable to 
the majority of the Muslims in the state. A committee was then set up to 
sensitise the Muslims in the state to this plan and to strategise as to how 
the Panel would be inaugurated. Islamic bodies and Muslim organizations, 
particularly the League of Imams and Alfas, which is the umbrella body of 
all Imams and Islamic scholars in the state, were duly consulted. The lead-
ership of the latter approved the idea and gave its necessary support.66
The sensitisation and planning dragged on for more than three years 
between July 2002, when the sharīʿa Committee submitted its report to 
the Muslim Community, and April 2006, when the Independent sharīʿa 
Panel was inaugurated. This was because the Muslim Community was try-
ing to see whether the memorandum submitted to the House of Assembly 
for the establishment of sharīʿa Courts in the state might scrape through. 
64 Interview with Bello, 5th March, 2007.
65 Interview with Alh. Abdur-Rasheed Ayo Olabomi, secretary of Osun State Muslim 
Community, on 2nd October, 2006.
66 Interview with Olabomi, 2nd October, 2006.
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About two years were spent trying to mobilise and lobby the members of 
the House to pass the Bill.67
During this period, the committee also worked on the appointment of 
the members of the Panel. The list of candidates submitted for appoint-
ment was screened, in order to get qualified individuals who could effec-
tively handle sharīʿa matters. At the initial stage, only eight people, who 
were not only adjudged to possess the academic pre-requisites, but also 
as being of virtuous and impeccable character, were appointed. Two more 
were later added to make the panel number ten members. However, one 
of them subsequently died and was replaced with another person from 
his zone.68 The composition of the members of the Panel cuts across 
the geographical areas of the state. Some members are degree holders in 
Islamic Studies or Islamic Law, some are holders of a doctorate. Some 
of them studied in Nigeria, whilst others studied in the Arab world and 
hold degrees in sharīʿa (LLB Islamic Law).69 The chairman of the Panel 
is a retired naval officer, while the members are lecturers in Universities, 
teachers in secondary schools or proprietors of Arabic and Islamic Insti-
tutions. All members of the Panel are Yoruba Muslims; the litigants who 
have patronised the Panel, so far, are also Yoruba Muslims.
On Sunday 23rd April, 2006, Osun State Independent sharīʿa Panel was 
inaugurated at the Oja-Oba central mosque, Osogbo. The inauguration 
ceremony was attended by eminent Muslim personalities in the state. 
It was inaugurated by the Chief Imam of Osogbo and chairman of the 
League of Imams and Alfas in Osun State, Shaykh Mustafa Ajisafe. The 
occasion was presided over by Barrister Ola-Olu Ali (SAN) and all the vari-
ous organs of Osun State had their representatives in attendance.70
67 Interview with Olabomi, 2nd October, 2006.
68 Interview with Olabomi, 2nd October, 2006. The members of the Panel are: Alh. 
Abdur-Rahman A. Olaniyan, Chairman, Alh. Musa Raji, Secretary, Alh. Abdulfatah Mak-
inde, Alh. Muhammad Jamiu Muhibullah, Alh. Sulaiman Salahudeen, Alh. Zakariyah 
Sanusi, Alh. Yunus Ibrahim Balogun, Alh. Rabiu Salahudeen, Dr. Ibrahim Muhammad Baki 
and Alh. Abdul-Ghaniy Olagunju. Dr. Ibrahim Muhammad Baki, who died, was replaced 
by Dr. Siraj Asrau Bilal.
69 Interview with Olabomi, 2nd October, 2006.
70 Interview with Olabomi, 2nd October, 2006.
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Views of Christian Leaders on the Osun Independent  
SharĪʿa Panel (ISP)
It is appropriate to record that, although the Christian leaders interviewed 
claimed not to be aware of the establishment of an Independent sharīʿa 
Panel in the state, they saw nothing wrong with it. They opined that since 
the Panel is independent of the government and it is to handle cases 
amongst the Muslims of the state, they have nothing against it. During the 
interviews conducted with some Christian leaders in the state, in order to 
gather their feelings on the establishment of the Panel, one of them had 
this to say about it:
Why would I now say that I have [a] problem when Muslims want to settle 
problems among Muslims. What is my problem? The only problem is that, if 
you want to settle any dispute with me, let us sit down together and reason. 
Don’t bring Qurʾān into it and don’t bring sharīʿa into it.71
Another Christian leader opined as follows:
Well, I will say we cannot say it is bad because it is [an] independent some-
thing; so far the government doesn’t back it up, because if the government 
directly or indirectly gives it their backing, it may result to another thing. 
There can be no any problem, if it is independent. So, it is your own cases 
that you will be bringing there to judge. There is nothing bad about it. . . . 
But if it is now backed up by legislation, it has become a state matter and 
not [a] religious matter.72
One other Christian leader remarked about the Panel thus:
Well, I have not heard of that, I am just listening to you now. But, if it goes 
the way you have said, there is a Panel, independent of the government, 
taking care of Muslims’ legal affairs; I don’t think there is any problem. I 
wouldn’t say, just like our own is aged old, our own tribunal, canon law 
tribunal, so in the same way, and we don’t disturb anybody. And since that 
is existing, it must be that only Muslims have been feeling it that is why we 
are not aware. So, if it is working good for the Muslims, I see nothing wrong 
in that, if it is working good for them.73
In view of the above, it is shown from the interaction with some Chris-
tian leaders in the state that some Christians may have nothing against 
the establishment of the Independent sharīʿa Panel by the Muslims in the 
71  Interview with Rev. Adeloye, 28th February, 2007.
72 Interview with Pastor Akinosun, 9th March, 2007.
73 Interview with Bishop Leke Abegunrin, 23rd April, 2007.
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state, since it is relevant to the affairs of the Muslims only and, also, it is 
not backed up by the government. They claimed that they have a similar 
thing in their various churches which is either called a committee or a tri-
bunal that sees to the settlement of disputes among their members. Their 
contention is that the involvement of the government in sharīʿa matters 
shows that it tends towards a particular religion and it is partial.74
Activities of Osun State Independent Sharīʿa Panel
The activities of Osun State Independent sharīʿa Panel started immedi-
ately after its inauguration on 23rd April 2006. The Panel sits every first 
Thursday of the month at the Oja-Oba central mosque in Osogbo, the 
state capital, and adjudicates on cases voluntarily brought to it through 
formal written application on matters such as marriage, divorce, inheri-
tance, contract, custody and maintenance of children, Imamship or trade 
disputes and other personal matters where the parties concerned are 
Muslims.75
The plaintiff obtains a form from the office of Osun State Muslim Com-
munity, completes it, stating the issues to be heard, and submits the form 
to the same office. The Panel’s secretary, who serves as registrar/clerk, 
collates and presents the forms for hearing during the sitting of the Panel. 
The secretary acts as clerk and calls cases based on the submitted forms. 
He takes records of the proceedings in English.76 Each sitting of the panel 
has two sessions. The first one is for public enlightenment and educa-
tion of the audience about various issues on sharīʿa. One of the panellists 
would be asked to give a talk on a topic that falls within the activities of 
the panel and the audience would be given the opportunity to ask ques-
tions. This is done within 40–50 minutes. Then they close and arrange 
for the sitting proper which is the second session. They go into a room 
provided for the Panel and come back to occupy their seats for the hear-
ing of cases. A minimum of three and a maximum of five members are 
selected to listen to a case, the chairman or presiding judge is appointed 
from amongst them.77
74 Interview with some Christian leaders already mentioned above.
75 Interview with Raji, 25th November, 2006.
76 Interview with Raji, 25th November, 2006.
77 Interview with Raji, 25th November, 2006.
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The secretary of the panel, who also acts as the clerk, presents a case 
and calls on the plaintiff to state his or her case. The defendant is also 
invited to respond while witnesses are allowed to testify. The witnesses of 
the plaintiff are invited first to testify, before those of the defendant are 
called. The secretary and members of the panel take a record individually 
when testimonies are given. Since cases heard for the first time may not 
be dispensed with immediately, in order to allow the panellists to prepare 
their judgement,78 such cases would be adjourned until all the witnesses 
have been heard before judgements are passed.79
The judgement on each case is presented by consensus, through the 
chairman or presiding judge of the panel, who delivers it, once all mem-
bers who listened to the case are in agreement. The judgement is delivered 
in the hearing of the audience at the sitting, while the written text of the 
judgement will be presented to the litigants later. However, the judgement 
is never enforced on any of the litigants, since the Panellists have no power 
to do so. Their duty is only in an advisory capacity. They educate and advise 
litigants to take whatever judgement is given since it is based on the Qurʾān 
and sunna of the Prophet. Since Muslims, by faith, are expected to submit to 
the judgement of the Qurʾān and sunna, the litigants accept the judgement. 
The Panel does not restrict itself to a particular school of thought under 
Islamic law; rather, it explores the law of any particular school that will be 
more useful and beneficial to the matter being handled.80
Between April 2006 and October 2007, only five cases were brought 
before the panel. They were:
A case of khulʿ: divorce at the instance of a wife
A case of faskh: dissolution of marriage at the discretion of a court
Two cases of inheritance
A case of Imamship dispute
The case concerning the Imamship had earlier been scheduled to be 
taken to a conventional court, but the parties rescinded the decision and 
brought the case to the Panel.
78 The word ‘Judgement’ is used by the Panel for the decisions reached in its sittings. 
This is not peculiar to Osun State. It is the same in all the states where Independent Sharīʿa 
Panels (ISP) operate.
79 Interview with Raji, 25th November, 2006.
80 Interview with Navy Captain Abdur-Rahman Olaniyan (rtd.), chairman of the Inde-
pendent Sharīʿa Panel, on 6th October 2006.
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Out of the five cases, the three cases concerning khulʿ, faskh and 
Imamship dispute were handled and disposed of by the Panel. Out of the 
two inheritance cases, however, one was later withdrawn by the family 
involved, to be settled at the family level, and the family of the other one 
did not initially provide the necessary document for the Panel to work 
on. The document was later provided and the Panel took the necessary 
steps to ensure the distribution of the property left by the deceased to 
the heirs.81
However, between 2006 and 2011, a total of forty-three cases were handled 
by the Panel. The analysis of the cases is provided in the table as follows:














2006  1  1  1  3
2007  1   1  2
2008  4  1   1  6
2009  4   1  5
2010  11  3  1  1  3  19
2011  5  1  2  8
Total  26  6  3  3  5  43
(Source: Data supplied at the office of OSISP, Osogbo)
From the above table, it is shown that the number of cases coming to the 
Panel per year were not all that encouraging. It was in the year 2010 that 
the Panel recorded the highest number of cases, which was 19. The Panel 
recorded 3 cases in 2006; 2 in 2007; 6 in 2008; 5 in 2009 and 8 in 2011, giving 
a total of 43 cases. Out of these cases, 26 were for divorce; 6 for inheri-
tance; 3 for Imamship tussle; 3 for care of children and 5 for civil disputes. 
It is also shown from this analysis that divorce cases had the major share, 
26 out of the 43 cases recorded. What could be responsible for the low 
number of cases recorded so far? This is discussed under another sub-
heading later on in the chapter.
81 Interview with Raji, 25th November, 2006.
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Judgements on the Cases
It is appropriate to briefly examine some of the cases handled by the Panel 
and the judgements passed on them. The cases, the reasons advanced by 
the plaintiffs or petitioners, and the defence put forward by the defenders, 
as well as the judgement passed by the Panel, will be stated.
Case I: (CASE NO/OS/ISP/06/002) Case of khulʿ
This is between Adebomi Rukayat—Plaintiff, Vs Lasisi Abdul-Waheed—
Defendant, both of Ido-Osun of Egbedore Local Government of Osun 
State. The plaintiff first brought the case to the sitting of the Panel on 
6th July, 2007. She told the Panel that she fell in love with Lasisi about five 
years ago and aqdun-nikāḥ i.e. joining of hands in marriage, was done on 
13th February, 2003. The programme was conducted by the Muslim Stu-
dents’ Society, Ido-Osun branch, while her uncle, Adebomi Rauf, and her 
mother as well as the parents of her husband were in attendance. Accord-
ing to her, her husband gave a copy of the Glorious Qurʾān to her as a gift. 
She, however, accused her husband of having affairs with another lady 
whom he later impregnated. As a result of this, she could not cope with 
the situation; hence, preferred to seek for khulʿ (divorce at the instance 
of the wife). The panellists cross-examined her, before finally deciding to 
summon the husband to the next hearing.82
After the defendant failed to attend two sittings without showing cause, 
the Panel decided to invite his parents, who are the walīy (guardians 
under the sharīʿa) and they came to confirm the story. They went further 
to assert that their son was also not interested in the marriage any lon-
ger. It was on the basis of this that the Panel asked whether the plaintiff 
was ready to return the gift presented to her for the marriage and she 
answered in the affirmative. The panellists thereafter gave judgement that 
the Glorious Qurʾān given to the plaintiff by the defendant be returned 
to him; hence, the marriage was dissolved and the plaintiff was given the 
opportunity of re-marrying according to the sharīʿa.83
It needs to be noted at this juncture that it was the plaintiff that 
requested that they be divorced based on the claim that her husband 
impregnated another lady. The failure of the husband to show up did not 
82 Interview with Alh. Musa Raji, 25th November, 2006, and excerpt from the record 
of the judgement.
83 Interview with Raji, 25th November, 2006.
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give room for further probing of the allegation. Although the parents con-
firmed the story, they did not tell the Panel whether the other lady is a 
co-wife, nor did they speak on the legality or illegality of the pregnancy. 
Their declaration that their son was also not interested in the marriage 
any longer made the Panel take a decision. The divorce could have been 
granted on faskh or talaq if the defender had showed up personally. His 
failure to show up probably made the Panel to grant the divorce on khulʿ 
since there was no ambiguity about the request for divorce at the instance 
of the plaintiff (the wife). It was on the basis of this that she was asked to 
return the gift of the Qurʾān which she claimed to be the entire dowry she 
collected from her husband.
Case II: (CASE NO/OS/ISP/06/003) Imamship Tussle
This is a case of Imamship tussle at Ilu-Aro in Egbedore Local Govern-
ment. It is between Oyedeji Subair and Alh. Kazeem Abidoye—Plaintiffs 
Vs Alh. Jamiu Faleye—Defendant. The first sitting on the case came up 
on Thursday 2nd November, 2006. The plaintiffs filed an application form 
claiming that the respondent be restrained from parading himself as Chief 
Imam of Ilu-Aro for the following reasons:
•  Adultery and snatching of a member’s wife
•  Seizing of prayer mat of one of his followers for ritual purpose
•  Misappropriation of the mosque fund
•  Attempting to kidnap Qurʾānic school students
The defendant did not appear on the day and another hearing date was 
fixed for Thursday, 7th December, 2006. During the second sitting, both 
the plaintiffs and the defendant appeared before the Panel and the hear-
ing started. The defendant defended himself and tried to exonerate him-
self from the allegations. The plaintiffs called on witnesses to affirm their 
claim while the defendant also brought in his own witnesses to defend 
him. The plaintiffs even requested the assistance of a lawyer, Barrister 
Abdul-Ganiy Aminu, to serve as their solicitor.84
Regarding the first allegation, the defendant was accused of harbouring 
the wife of a member who was not seen for some time but was alleged 
to be found later in his house. It was therefore assumed that he must 
84 Interview with Raji, 25th November, 2006.
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have committed adultery with her. He denied the allegation claiming 
that he had three wives whom he married legally. He declared that the 
woman he was accused of snatching was the wife of his former driver and 
that he used to play a mediating role in their persistent quarrels before the 
woman eventually sought divorce and married another man. The woman 
was summoned by the Panel to testify and she exonerated the defendant 
from the allegation.
On the issue of mat seizure, the defendant was accused to having 
requested a praying mat with a Qiblah indicator from a member, which 
he did not return because he wanted to use it for ritual purpose. He 
confirmed the collection of the mat for the purpose of determining the 
direction of Qiblah and never for any ritual purpose. He said he did not 
return the mat to the owner because of their closeness. He showed the 
mat to the Panel to exonerate himself from the allegation of using it for 
ritual purpose. The Panel also made a critical examination of the other 
allegations and discovered that there was no convincing evidence to 
establish the allegations levelled against the defendant by the plaintiffs. 
The Panel, however, blamed the defendant for not handling the issue with 
care, as a spiritual leader, which made the case degenerate to the level of 
litigation.
Because of the nature of the case, which required a lot of patience and a 
great deal of thoroughness, the case dragged on for six months before the 
final judgement was given on 3rd May, 2007. While giving the judgement, 
the Panel analysed the allegations and gave its submission on each of the 
points; it finally submitted that the two disputants should take the course 
of reconciliation according to sharīʿa. It then recommended as follows:
1. The Imam should apologise to the members of the Muslim Community 
of Ilu-Aro.
2. The Muslim Community too should forgive, forget and reconcile, for 
Allāh says in sūrat Āl-ʿImrān of the Qurʾān 3 verse 134 thus: “Who restrain 
their anger, and pardon people—God loves those who do good”.
3. The two disputants should come together as a single community 
through amicable settlement, quoting sūrat Āl-ʿImrān of the Qurʾān 3 
verse 103, where Allāh says: “Hold fast to God’s rope all together, do not 
split into fractions”.85
85 Interview with Raji, 25th November, 2006.
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Case III: (CASE NO/OS/ISP/06/004) Case of faskh
This is a case of dissolution of marriage at the discretion of a court, between 
Hidiat Adeleke (Nee Arogundada)—Plaintiff Vs Talib A. Adeleke—
Defendant. While the plaintiff is from Irepodun Local Government, the 
defendant is from Ejigbo Local Government of Osun State, but works as 
a teacher in a school in Wukari, Taraba State. The plaintiff accused her 
husband of abandonment and neglect for over one and a half years. She 
stated further that their marriage was blessed with two children, but the 
husband abandoned her and the children. The Panel summoned the hus-
band to appear before it. On appearance, the husband put up the follow-
ing as his defence:
•   That the woman left the house he provided for her without his 
knowledge
•  She denied him sexual intercourse leading him to marry another wife
•   The initial agreement was to put her in purdah or seclusion but she just 
pulled out of it without informing him
In view of the above, and particularly because of the first reason, he would 
never go back to her unless she went back to where he provided for her 
and the children.
Having heard the two sides, the Panel examined the case critically and 
pronounced faskh,  dissolution of the marriage at the discretion of a court, 
for the following reasons:
•   The man has abandoned the woman for more than one year and under 
the sharīʿa the length of abandonment that calls for divorce is three 
months.
•  Both the husband and the wife were not ready for reconciliation.
•  The man has married another wife.86
The Panel based its judgement on the resolution of the Islamic jurists that 
when the relationship of a couple is no longer at ease, they be separated. 
The judgement states inter alia thus:
86 Interview with Raji, 25th November, 2006.
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It is a unanimous resolution of the jurists to separate a couple if their rela-
tionship is no longer at ease. Also Imam Malik and others permit separation 
of a couple for fear of persistent breach or hurt between the two so that 
relationship might not be likened to that of cat and mouse, in line with the 
tradition of the Prophet (SAW) which states: “where there is injury, there is 
no requital”. . . . If the object of the marriage is mutual understanding and 
harmonious relationship, and the investigations had proved that their civil 
contract does not guarantee harmony any longer, the best is to separate 
their union. Therefore, the Panel decided to dissolve the wedlock; hence, 
the plaintiff is free to pack her belongings at Ibadan and marry another man 
of her choice.87
Reasons for Low Attendance at Independent Sharīʿa Panel (ISP)
Based on the analysis made on the number of cases taken so far, one won-
ders why the Panel recorded a low number of cases, if Muslims are really 
interested in having sharīʿa Court and sharīʿa Court of Appeal established 
by the government. Since the government failed to yield to their request 
and, as a result of that, they established an Independent sharīʿa Panel, 
one expects that the Panel would record a considerable number of cases 
within the years of its existence. In an attempt to probe into the cause for 
this, the secretary to Osun State Muslim Community gave some reasons. 
He stated that the first reason for the low number of cases could be attrib-
uted to the general apathy of Yoruba about taking each other to court. He 
argued on this point thus:
It is true that we don’t have so many cases. It is not a new thing in this part 
of the world, especially Yorubaland, because there is a Yoruba proverb that 
says “A ki ti kootu bo ka sore” that is, you don’t take me to court and there-
after we become friends, we should be harsh enemies. Yoruba generally dis-
taste going to court. They have that general apathy. If you come to Nigeria, 
even the normal courts, the normal Common Law Courts, it is believed that 
we have fewer cases in Yorubaland than in any part of the country because 
people like settling issues within the family setting at the extended family 
level.88
It may be noted at this point that the report above of the withdrawal of 
one inheritance case by a family, in order to settle it at the family level, 
illustrates the assertion of the secretary of the Muslim Community about 
the general apathy of the Yoruba to go to court. A lot of such cases or 
87 An excerpt from the judgement of the Panel.
88 Interview with Alh. Abdur-Rasheed Ayo Olabomi on 26th August 2007.
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conflicts are settled at other levels of the community. For example, local 
Mallams or scholars are in some instances invited to handle inheritance 
and other personal matters or conflicts in an Islamic way without the 
necessity of going to the Panel. This therefore left the Panel with few cases 
to handle.
The second point raised by the secretary is the general attitude of 
human beings to change, for they naturally do not easily take to change. 
This has prompted the idea of sensitising Muslims of the state to the ben-
efits of sharīʿa. He says:
We are now at the level of sensitizing Muslims of the benefits of the sharīʿa. 
Don’t forget that we have so many years of adjudicating via Common Law 
and Customary Law Courts and human beings naturally do not easily take 
to changes. It takes time before people adapt to changes. I want to believe 
seriously that, the people, I mean the Muslims’ interests are going by the 
day, of the benefits.89
Another reason advanced for the low level of turn-out so far, is ignorance 
or misconception about sharīʿa. While expatiating this point, the secre-
tary asserted that “there is erroneous belief or misconception that sharīʿa 
is synonymous with amputation, stoning to death etc. We are trying to 
correct that impression. To tell people that sharīʿa is not mainly on ampu-
tation, and in our own case we are looking at sharīʿa from the angle of 
personal law of marriage, inheritance, personal inter-relation; civil cases 
not criminal cases. So, we believe strongly that very soon, the sensitization 
would take our people to have appreciable knowledge about that aspect”.90 
He explained further that the second aspect of this factor has to do with 
the government side. He opined that “some people have the belief that, 
may be, the Higher Courts, Customary Courts and the other Common Law 
Courts would not recognize the judgements passed by the Panel. Conse-
quently, they believe it is more or less, a dissipation of energy going to the 
Panel and it is our belief that, that too would be addressed”.91
In view of the reasons advanced, however, several questions may still 
agitate one’s mind as to the readiness of the Muslims for the establish-
ment of sharīʿa Courts by the government. One may even ask whether the 
Muslims of the State would make use of sharīʿa Courts if established or 
whether they prefer other courts to sharīʿa Courts? It seems that answers 
89 Interview with Olabomi, 26th August 2007.
90 Interview with Olabomi, 26th August 2007.
91  Interview with Olabomi, 26th August 2007.
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to these questions could not be easily arrived at, based on the simple fact 
that even though the Panel is operating privately and it does not have the 
power of enforcing judgements, some few people still patronise it. There 
is the possibility that if official recognition is given to sharīʿa Courts by the 
government, Muslims may turn to it in large numbers.
Conclusion
Although Muslims in the South-West of Nigeria, including Osun State, had 
been agitating for the establishment of sharīʿa Courts since colonial days, 
the launching of sharīʿa in Zamfara State in 1999 opened a new door for 
agitation by the Muslims in this part of the country. Having attempted 
to convince the past and present governments to establish sharīʿa Courts 
with civil jurisdiction, but having failed, the Muslim Community of the 
Osun State decided to do it on a private basis by establishing the Inde-
pendent sharīʿa Panel (ISP). Also, Christian groups in the state opposed 
the establishment of sharīʿa Courts in the state as a public institution. 
Thus, the Independent sharīʿa Panel functions purely outside the influ-
ence and machinery of government. Although few cases have come before 
the Panel, and the reasons for this have been mentioned, the ISP is mak-
ing a gradual impact in society by performing a judicial role, particularly 
for the people who patronise it. There have been instances when some 
homes that could have been broken have been amicably reconciled when 
cases of divorce were brought before the ISP. This is because the ISP 
always tries its best to reconcile a couple in dispute; it is when reconcili-
ation becomes impossible that the ISP resorts to separation. There were 
also instances where Imamship tussles and other disputes were amicably 
settled for the litigants by the ISP.
A few examples of the cases judged show the way the ISP handles mat-
ters brought before it. Excerpts are given of the judgements delivered by 
the ISP on the cases mentioned with their reference numbers and the real 
names of the litigants involved. Since the Customary or High Court does 
not have provision for sharīʿa, and sharīʿa Courts have not been estab-
lished by the government, it seems these few individual Muslims who 
patronised the ISP found it to be a place where their religious interests on 
such civil matters could be fulfilled. The ISP could therefore be described 
as an arbitration panel privately established by Muslims, to cater for the 
interest of Muslim individuals who are willing to voluntarily bring their 
civil cases before it, to be adjudicated based on sharīʿa law. While the 
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State Government has not officially recognized the ISP, it has not in any 
way hindered its operations. Also, inasmuch as it could be said that there 
is no formal relationship between the ISP and the official state courts for 
now, the role being played by the ISP could be said to have indirectly 
assisted in handling some judicial responsibilities of the official courts. 
Although the judgements of the ISP are yet to be recognized by the state 




“EDUCATION IS EDUCATION”: CONTEMPORARY MUSLIM VIEWS  
ON MUSLIM WOMEN’S EDUCATION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA
Chikas Danfulani
Introduction
The title of this chapter reflects some of the gender differences in North-
ern Nigeria’s approaches to female education, emanating from interviews 
in 2007 conducted in five states of Northern Nigeria. The starting point 
of these interviews was a discussion of the statistics from the Ministry of 
Education that indicate that the northern states of Nigeria are education-
ally disadvantaged compared to the southern or eastern states. Accord-
ing to a survey by The National Bureau for Statistics conducted in early 
2006, the adult female literacy rate in north-western Nigeria is 15.4% as 
against 31.0% for the adult male literacy rate.1 This is by far the lowest 
figure for both the adult literacy rate and the female literacy rate for the 
whole country. Among my interlocutors for the present study were two 
male scholars of Islamic Studies, responding to the questions: do you 
agree with the current statistical figure that presents Muslim women in 
northern Nigeria as the most educationally disadvantaged? They reacted: 
“What do you mean our women are educationally disadvantaged? What 
is your yardstick for measuring that?” Other responses were: “You can 
only talk about being disadvantaged . . . in relation to western education, 
otherwise our women are educated”. These responses reveal a resistance 
to statistical facts and also demonstrate widely-held opinions in Nigeria 
and even outside the country regarding educational imbalances. They also 
show the diversities and complexities involved in the conceptualizations 
of education in a society that puts a high premium on western education 
as a strategy for the contest of important state and civil resources such as 
development, employment, and so on. Above all, education is an instru-
ment that in complex ways mediates identity and value particularly in a 
1 Ketefe, Kayode, ‘Forty-seven Percent of Nigerians are illiterates’, The Punch, Tuesday 
20th June 2006, http://www.punchng.com/main/article04 (accessed 20.06.2006).
© Chikas Danfulani, 2014 | doi:10.1163/9789004262126_006
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globalizing and interlinked world. In Nigeria, education and the papers 
that back it up (qualifications) are an important avenue to the acquisition 
of social capital such as government jobs.
Implicit in the query raised by one of the professors of Islamic studies 
are more fundamental issues about the meaning of education, its gen-
eral purpose(s) and cultural determinants. In order to explore some of 
these issues, the study investigates the various views of some experts in 
Islamic education on what they think of and understand by education in 
Islam. To these experts, both male and female, the following questions 
were raised:
How do Muslims interpret the Islamic teaching on education?
Do they agree with the general impression that women in Northern 
Nigeria are educationally disadvantaged?
What are some contemporary factors responsible for such disad-
vantages?
It is in the light of the above questions that this chapter has emerged.
Method of Data Collection
This study is based on in-depth interviews conducted in Northern Nigeria 
with 20 Muslim educators, professionals and policymakers in 2007. The 
interviewees were drawn from five states in Northern Nigeria namely: 
Kano, Zamfara, Katsina, Sokoto and Niger; these states are all part of 
what is now characterized as ‘the sharīʿa states’, meaning those states that 
expanded sharīʿa, beginning with Zamfara State in 1999.2 There are twelve 
states in all which fall into this category. The choice of these five states 
was partly influenced by the re-implementation of sharīʿa and partly by 
the statistics which indicate that the standard education rate of literacy 
is lowest among women in these states. The interviewees consisted of 
11 males and 9 females. All the interviews were conducted in English, and 
most of them were recorded and fully transcribed afterwards. The study 
2 Ostien, Philip, Jamila M. Nasir & Franz Kogelmann (eds.), Comparative Perspectives 
on Shari’ah in Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2005; Danfulani, Umar H. D., The 
Sharia Issue and Christian-Muslim Relations in Contemporary Nigeria, Stockholm: Almqvist 
& Wikdsell International, 2005; and Paden, John N., Muslim Civil Cultures and Conflict Res-
olution: The Challenge of Democratic Federalism in Nigeria, Washington D.C.: Brookings 
Institute Press, 2006, pages 157–182.
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was originally designed to examine if the re-implementation of sharīʿa 
had made any appreciable difference to education in the ‘sharīʿa States’ in 
general and of women in particular since this is the category whose fate 
is most often highlighted by current statistics on education in Northern 
Nigeria.
Education in Northern Nigeria
Two types of education exist in Northern Nigeria: Islamic Education and 
Western Education.3 Islamic Education has been in existence since the 
coming of Islam to Northern Nigeria in the 11th century.4 This system began 
at a very traditional level known as Qurʾānic education, developing into 
what is referred to today as Islamic education; the latter, in content and 
practice, is a modern type of Qurʾānic education. This system adopts the 
organizational form of Nigeria’s Western Educational system with some 
fundamental differences in the promotion of a broad Islamic cultural ori-
entation and is operated in what are referred to as new Islamic schools.5 
This form of education is widely accepted by all Muslims in Northern 
Nigeria and “[it] exhibit[s] some of the varieties of educational dualism 
that have been developed in some Muslim countries”.6 Western Educa-
tion, on the other hand, is the formal system of education introduced by 
the British after the British occupation of Northern Nigeria in 1903. For a 
long time, however, this system was rejected and resisted by Muslims for 
a variety of reasons which will become clear shortly. Most importantly, 
western education was viewed by Muslims as synonymous with Christian-
ity, since it was popularized by the missionaries and it was believed that 
if allowed, it may lead to conversion of the pupils attending such schools. 
When it was eventually accepted, other regions such as the southern parts 
of the country had already made considerable progress in terms of the 
establishment of institutions of learning based on the British model as 
3 The term ‘Western Education’, as used in this article, is a popular term used in Nigeria 
to refer to the type of education brought by the British Colonial Authorities in 1900. This 
type of education differs from Islamic education both in content and curricula. It is also 
viewed by some Muslims in the north as ‘Christian Education’; this is because the same 
type of education was taught in missionary schools in Northern Nigeria, thus accounting 
for the resistance to western education by the north for a very long time. 
4 Paden, 2006, page 38.
5 Umar, ‘Profiles of New Islamic Schools in Northern Nigeria’, The Maghreb Review, Vol. 
28, 2–3, 2003, page 154.
6 Umar, 2003, page 162.
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well as in producing significant numbers of a formally-educated middle 
class. While the north generally was affected by the relative absence of 
western education, girls were even more affected as they were protected 
by their parents from attending these schools. This was mainly due to the 
general belief by most Muslim parents that girls who attended western 
schools might be exposed to western ways, thereby becoming morally 
loose and eventually unmarriageable.
The two types of education have gradually come to be accepted by 
Muslims in Northern Nigeria. However there still remains a big majority 
who reject, or rather resist, western education for various reasons. Sev-
eral of these reasons, they claim, are based on the teaching of Islam on 
education which stipulates religious education as the basic education for 
every Muslim. This is reflected in the different views expressed and dis-
seminated by various experts on education in Northern Nigeria. In order 
to contextualise these views, it is important to summarise the basic teach-
ings of the Islamic holy book, the Qurʾān, on education, as interpreted by 
some Islamic scholars.
Current Interpretations of Islamic Teaching on Education
Several interpretations have been given by scholars7 on the importance 
and place of education in Islam which they agree is made explicit in the 
Qurʾān and the sunna of the Prophet. The grounding of the role of educa-
tion in these sacred texts as interpreted by these scholars further indicates 
how the issue of education was constructed early in the history of Islam. 
Understood as acquiring and imparting of knowledge in a systematic and 
methodical fashion, through teaching and learning, they conclude that 
education is a central theme in Islam. The Qurʾān, they argue, teaches that 
Allāh is the source of all knowledge. Accordingly, 50% of our informants 
agree that the first revelation that came to the prophet was ‘read’. They 
base their argument on the sūrat al-ʿAlaq (96): 1–5 which says:
7 See Doi, A. R., Woman in Shari’ah, London: Ta Ha publishers, 1996, pages 138–144; 
Jawad, H. A., The Rights of women in Islam: An Authentic approach, London, Macmillan 
Press, 1998, pages 16–29; Khalil, Fatima, ‘Women’s Rights Under Sharia’, in A. M. Yakubu, 
A. M. Kani & M. I. Junaid (eds.), Understanding Shari’ a in Nigeria: proceedings of National 
seminar on Shari’a, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2001, page 71.
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Read! In the name of your Lord who created: He created man from a cling-
ing form. Read! Your Lord is the Most Bountiful One who taught by [means 
of ] the pen, who taught man what he did not know.
One informant, while responding to the question on what Islam regards 
as education, observes that:
Education is like human rights, because without it how do you read the 
Qurʾān, how do you know Allah, how do you know what Islam is all 
about . . . . you have to read, so the Qurʾān starts with iqrā . . . read in the 
name of Allah. So education is an integral part of Islam. Without it you are 
nobody.8
The word iqrā (read) in Arabic has been interpreted by some scholars to 
mean education.9 They also agree that the word is referring to ‘education/
knowledge’ or ‘rehearse’. According to Yusuf Ali’s commentary on sūrat 
al-ʿAlaq (96):1; “the word iqraa may mean ‘read’ or ‘recite or rehearse’ or 
‘proclaim aloud,’ the object understood being Allah’s message”. Therefore 
reading, reciting the Qurʾān and seeking for knowledge is very important 
to every Muslim. The importance of Qurʾānic recitation is evident in the 
annual Qurʾānic recitation and competition conducted for Muslim pupils 
all over Northern Nigeria.
Mahdi observes that the Qurʾān reveals, as part of the importance placed 
on education, that the educated cannot be compared with the unedu-
cated, in all the ramifications of their situation, when it pointedly asks; 
“Can those who know and those who do not know be deemed equalled?”10 
As is the case in every society, education creates qualitative differences: 
the educated and uneducated belong to different social and economic 
classes altogether. Thus, when the Qurʾān lays emphasis on education, it 
seeks that everyone in the community or society should be educated to 
be on—or almost on—the same level. Otherwise only the educated will 
be granted a “high place before Allāh” because they understand and do 
whatever Allāh enjoins them to do.11 According to Fatima Khalil, the Qurʾān 
states in sūrat al-Mujādala (58): 11 “. . . God will raise up, by many degrees, 
  8 Interview with Hjiya Amina I. Ahmed, Minna-Niger State, 2nd March, 2007.
  9 Khalil, 2001, page 71.
10 Qurʾān sūrat al-Zumar (39):9 as quoted by Saadatu Shehu Mahdi in ‘Women’s Rights 
under Sharia’ a presentation at a political briefing organized by the John D. and Catherine 
MacArthur foundation in Abuja, Nigeria, February 2002.
11  Mwinyihaji, Esha Faki, The Contribution of Islam Towards Women’s Emancipation: A 
Case Study of the Swahili Muslims in Mombasa District, unpublished MPhil Thesis, Moi 
University Eldoret, Kenya, 2001.
108 chikas danfulani
those of you who believe and those who have been given knowledge”.12 
She argues that knowledge occupies a place of pride in Islamic teachings, 
therefore the search for it is considered obligatory for both male and 
female. This shows that the educated and faithful have a higher status 
both in the society and before Allāh.13
To emphasise the importance that the prophet placed on education, a 
ḥadīth of the Prophet, as interpreted by Adeleye, states; “He who goes out 
in search of knowledge is in God’s path till he returns”.14 He concludes 
that this statement underscores that Allāh upholds education and places 
great respect and value on the person who seeks to be educated. Conse-
quently any Muslim who seeks to be educated shall be rewarded just as 
he who goes on a jihād would be rewarded. The search for education is 
likened to doing God’s will or being on the right path.
To the Muslim, the search for knowledge and education is in line with 
God’s commands. Here, the reward a Muslim is promised for seeking edu-
cation is equated with the reward a believer receives in serving Allāh. So, 
to seek education is service to Allāh which shall not go unrewarded: it is 
likened to a path that leads to paradise.15
In yet another popular ḥadīth of the Prophet, which 90% of our infor-
mants invoked to argue the importance of education, the prophet said; 
“Seek ye knowledge even if it be as far as China”. China, in this context, 
referred to the remotest part of the world which was not Islamic. One 
informant opines: “China was given as an analogy to mean that you can go 
anywhere in the world to seek for knowledge”.16 By this injunction Mus-
lims are encouraged to seek education wherever it can be found regard-
less of the difficulties such an enterprise entails. An added importance of 
this text is that it indicates that “knowledge” refers not only to religious 
education but also to secular education which may not be found in the 
immediate environment of the Muslims. Hence the use of the phrase 
“as far as China” to emphasise the importance that Islam places on both 
religious and secular education. At the time the ḥadīth was uttered, any 
“knowledge” existing in China would not have been “Islamic” knowledge 
but Chinese or secular knowledge, wisdom or philosophy. To Muslims, 
12 Qurʾān Al-Mujādala (58):11 quoted by Khalil, 2001. 
13 Yakubu, Kani and Junaid, 2001.
14 Adeleye, M. O., ‘Islam and Education’, The Islamic Quarterly, vol. XXVII, no. 1, 1983, 
pages 140–150.
15 Mwinyihaji, 2001. 
16 Interview with Amina Keri, Minna, Niger State, 2nd March 2007.
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therefore, all knowledge is one and springs from Allāh, the lord of the 
universe; distance should neither limit, nor deter the Muslims’ quest for 
knowledge. Consequently, education is an integral part of Islam, a pre-
requisite to a proper relationship with Allāh, for without it a Muslim is 
nobody; without education she or he would not know Allāh, would not 
know how to pray to Him, would not know how to serve Him or how to 
serve his/her self and serve others adequately.17
Education is also obligatory upon every Muslim. The ḥadīth of the 
Prophet, as quoted by several of our informants and which agrees with 
the interpretation given by several other scholars, is clear that both male 
and female should seek education when it says; “seeking knowledge is 
obligatory upon every male and female Muslim”.18 It is an obligation upon 
every Muslim, regardless of gender, to seek and acquire education. In this 
understanding, knowledge is gender-blind; hence education is open to all, 
irrespective of sex. According to one informant:
Islam regards education as a tool and basis for everything in life and [the] 
basis for development, survival in this world and the hereafter. Islam places 
very high importance on education, the first revelation of the prophet 
Muhammad is on education . . . so it lays the foundation for everything in 
life. And it is obligatory for male and female, there is no discrimination. The 
prophet also says you can go as far as China to seek knowledge, this means 
also circular knowledge.19
By direct implication, therefore, there should be no discrimination 
between the sexes by Muslims in matters relating to the pursuit of any 
form of education. This is because the same rewards attached to the pur-
suit of education apply to both sexes seeking education, which is likened 
to walking in the path of Allāh. It is in regard to education that gender 
equality in Islam is most graphically framed. Above all, equality between 
the sexes is most evident in terms of the obligation or the imperatives of 
education.
To further bolster this fact, the Prophet Muḥammad did not only teach 
that both men and women should be educated but exemplified it by 
teaching both men and women of his day. This was reflected in the lives of 
his followers and also of his wife, Aisha, who was said to be well-educated 
17 Interview with Amina Keri, Minna, Niger State, 2nd March 2007.
18 da Costa, Yusuf, The Honor of Women in Islam, Washington: The Supreme Council 
of America, 2002, pages 20–26. da Costa quotes the ḥadīth as recorded by Al-Bayhaqi and 
quoted by Badawi.
19 Interview with Mrs. Sadiya Umar Bello, Sokoto, Sokoto State, 6th March 2007.
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in religious matters, such that the followers of the Prophet were asked to 
seek half of their knowledge from Aisha.20
Agreeing with the rights bestowed on women by the Qurʾān,21 Yakubu, 
Kani and Junaid are of the view that women are expected to seek educa-
tion just as their male counterparts, when they state:
Knowledge occupies a place of pride in Islamic teachings. The order to read 
was given in the very first verse of the Qurʾān. The search for knowledge was 
considered an obligation as much for men as for women . . . the prophet rein-
forced this by making it a duty when he said “the search for knowledge is a 
duty for every Muslim male or female” Qurʾān sūrat al-Mujādala (58): 1.
From the foregoing, the Qurʾān does not specify which education a 
women should pursue, and which she should refrain from, but stresses 
they must seek education just like their male counterparts would.22 Doi 
notes several women in the history of Islam who excelled in education. 
Starting from the wives of the Prophet, Aisha and Safiyah, several other 
women were said to have been well-versed not only in Islamic education, 
but also in other aspects of knowledge including poetry, history and lit-
erature. Expanding on this point, he writes:
This list of women of the early days of Islam shows that women were not 
kept illiterate and ignorant, but rather were fully encouraged to participate 
in the process of learning and scholarship. They also knew their rights and 
responsibilities very well. There were instances to show that some women 
even challenged great scholars of their times if they said something which 
was against the rights granted to women by the Qurʾān and the Sunnah.23
Doi is in agreement with the fact that both Islamic knowledge and other 
branches of knowledge are obligatory upon every Muslim both male and 
female. Women, much like their male counterparts, have the right to seek 
for any form of education as long as such education does not distort the 
moral values inculcated in them by religious education. Jawad also notes 
that education is strongly encouraged in Islam for both men and women. 
Giving examples of how women in the early days of Islam excelled in the 
field of education, she notes: “Early Islamic history is replete with exam-
ples of women who showed a remarkable ability to compete with men 
20 Interview with Dr. (Mrs) Aisha Lemu, Minna, Niger State, 2nd March 2007.
21 Yakubu, Kani and Junaid, 2001.
22 Doi, 1996, page 144.
23 Doi, 1996, page 144.
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and excelled on many occasions”.24 She goes on to list the various fields of 
knowledge which women have ventured into and excelled at as religious 
studies, literature, medicine and military services. Thus, Muslims accept 
that education is compulsory for every Muslim, and Islamic scholars have 
interpreted that to mean that both men and women have the right to 
be educated, that is, to acquire any form of knowledge. While there is 
general agreement on the imperatives, based on Qurʾānic teaching and 
the ḥadīths, laid upon every Muslim to acquire education both religious 
and secular, the cultural applications and implementation of these sacred 
injunctions vary from one place to another, as is the case in Northern 
Nigeria, which is the focus of the next section.
Views on Female Education in Northern Nigeria
In many contemporary Islamic cultures, the basic Islamic teaching that 
education is obligatory for all Muslims seems to be fading away, as women 
are relegated to the background as far as education is concerned. In com-
paring contemporary Islamic society with the practice in the early days 
of Islam, one wonders where most Islamic societies missed the point 
of enforcing equal educational opportunity for both men and women. 
Expressing her opinion on the reason for the decline in the general edu-
cational status of women, and their status in relation to other rights 
accorded them by the Qurʾān, Jawad notes that:
Firstly, certain pre-Islamic customs reappeared, especially during the 
Abbasid period; secondly, various social attitudes infiltrated Islamic culture 
from conquered peoples, and were assimilated as norms and then identi-
fied with Islam. Hence the status of Muslim women started to deteriorate. 
This was accelerated by catastrophic historical events such as the Mongol 
and the Turkish invasions and the ensuing decline of the Islamic civiliza-
tion. The ambience generated by these conditions served to undermine the 
position of Muslim women who became less and less part of social life in 
general.25
The deterioration in the educational status of women and in the sta-
tus of women in general has relegated women to the background, and 
their roles now are mostly those which culture and society define or 
prescribe. These roles are shaped by customs and traditions, giving the 
24 Jawad, 1998, page 25.
25 Jawad, 1998, page 25.
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women a subjugated position in the society. Thus women are seen as 
mothers and their status in the society becomes that of wives and home-
makers (or household managers). In the light of the above situation, 
women’s education was, and still is, seen as secondary since their basic 
duty is to raise children and become good wives to their husbands. Bio-
logical reproduction has taken precedence over social production and 
reproduction of knowledge for women. In addition to this culturally 
defined responsibility, women who excelled in education were, and still 
are, seen as threats to their husbands. Again, according to Jawad:
Female education was viewed as a threat to the traditional customs and 
the way of life of these societies. Indeed educated women were feared and 
mistrusted as they could communicate potentially destructive or innova-
tive ideas. Educated women were considered to be obtrusive. They did not 
appeal to men who expected them to serve them obediently.26
The assumption that educated women are to be distrusted as potentially 
dangerous, audacious, recalcitrant and incapable of making good wives 
and mothers resurfaced in the interviews conducted among male infor-
mants in Northern Nigeria. While all informants agreed that education is 
obligatory for every Muslim, the men disagreed that western education is 
compulsory on the women. According to them, women have certain roles 
such as managing the home, looking after the children and being good 
wives to their husbands. By ‘good wives,’ these male interviewees mean 
obedient, submissive, unquestioning and co-operative with the husband’s 
agenda and decisions. They argue that the basic education the women 
should have is religious education, which is compulsory for every Muslim 
and for the woman in particular because she has to play the role of first 
teacher to her children. The woman being the first teacher means giving 
the children the basic Islamic education before they leave the home to 
attend school. As a result of this conceptualisation, some men in North-
ern Nigeria encourage or prefer women with Islamic education, rather 
than any other form of education, as wives and companions. The idea 
that western education corrupts women by inculcating in them the spirit 
of rebelliousness, intractability and obstinacy is deeply entrenched in the 
Northern Nigerian Muslim male psyche. Women with university educa-
tion or degrees are believed to be and perceived to be very disrespectful 
and impetuous toward their husbands and kinsmen. University educa-
tion, for example, is believed to predispose the women to speak ‘too much 
26 Jawad, 1998, page 25.
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grammar’; they would challenge their husbands on the basic issues of life 
and living. Apart from being disrespectful and insubordinate to their hus-
bands, women with higher degrees seem to know their rights as women 
and as Muslims. Such knowledge, it is assumed by men in Northern Nige-
ria, will make the women more assertive and more self-confident in the 
home, which will not augur well for the sort of male dominance which 
prevails in Hausa culture. According to one informant:
Those [educated] women seem to know their rights. You can tame an illit-
erate girl but it is difficult to tame an educated girl, don’t you think so? 
Yes, when you go to the village and pick an illiterate girl who doesn’t know 
anything, whatever you say, she says “yes sir”; anything you ask her to do, 
she does not question you. But an educated mind is an enquiring mind; 
sometimes she may ask you “Is that what Islam says?” When you are going 
out of point an educated girl will question you “you ask me to do this, is that 
what Islam says we should do?” Only education will make somebody think 
like that and begin to ask questions.27
This is a succinct framing of the reasons why educated women are viewed 
with suspicion. Illiteracy is culturally functional in this context. Explicit 
from the above view is the male conception of educated women as being 
‘wild’ and ‘untameable’ and therefore unmanageable. The educated 
woman resists, questions and challenges subjugation and domination 
and it is this tendency that men resent most, it seems. The fear of the 
possibility of female defiance has gradually been factored into social and 
political policy-making in respect of the education of women in Northern 
Nigeria. While some of our informants acknowledge that women should 
be educated and must attain any level of education, some, however, feel 
that women should seek to be educated in courses that are related to their 
primary responsibilities which are strongly configured to be domestic and 
household management. In this vein, women should be teachers, nurses, 
caterers and engage in such professions as depict similar roles in the 
home. These are essentially ‘service roles’ with less power, authority, vis-
ibility and remuneration than other professionals such as lawyers, medi-
cal practitioners, engineers and so on. They are also viewed as ‘weak’, so 
there is a certain educational level a woman is not expected to attain due 
to the weakness associated with her physiology. For example, a woman 
27 Interview with Alhaji Husseini Mohammed, Director, Inspectorate Services, Sokoto 
State Ministry of Education, Sokoto, 5th March 2007.
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cannot be a judge in a sharīʿa court because her primary role, which is in 
the home, cannot permit her to play both roles and succeed.28
However, the overall argument of most Muslim men in Northern Nige-
ria is that ‘education is education’, whether it is Islamic (religious) educa-
tion, or any form of education. While it is obligatory for a Muslim to have 
religious education, it is only optional for an individual to acquire western 
education. Nevertheless, it is compulsory for a Muslim umma (Arab.: com-
munity) to acquire any other education, not only an Islamic education. 
Accordingly, in a Muslim umma there should be lawyers, teachers, doc-
tors, engineers etc.29 It is a collective responsibility to acquire this category 
of knowledge but an individual must have religious education in order to 
fulfil the obligations of worshipping Allāh adequately. Religious education 
is the foundation of the Islamic umma and it is incumbent upon every 
Muslim to acquire this foundational knowledge: but western knowledge 
or education is optional and complementary, sufficient but not necessary 
for an individual Muslim.
In the light of the above, Muslim women in Northern Nigeria are 
regarded as educated, despite the overall statistics that present them as 
educationally disadvantaged, in comparison to women in other regions 
of the country. Islamic education, they argue, is a necessary foundation of 
all forms of education and knowledge acquisition, and since these women 
have acquired this sort of education, they are to be regarded as educated. 
Accordingly, these women do not need western education in addition to 
what they already have in order to creditably perform their basic duties 
to the society and to the Muslim umma. Using Nana Asma’u (1793–1864), 
the daughter of Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio, as a role model, Muslims in 
Northern Nigeria believe that a woman can attain the highest level of reli-
gious education without any secular education and still be recognized as 
educated. Nana Asma’u was said to be well-educated in the norms and 
values of Islam such that she became a renowned scholar without west-
ern education and today her achievement is still recognized worldwide. 
Therefore women in Northern Nigeria cannot be said to be disadvantaged 
educationally, because more than 80% of them have some form of Islamic 
education. This includes Qurʾānic education, which the average Muslim 
has and every Muslim in Northern Nigeria is encouraged to acquire. Aside 
28 Interview with the Director, Shari’ah Research and Development Commission, 
Gusau, Zamfara State, 5th March 2007.
29 Interview with Mohammad Sani, Zamfara State, 8th March 2007.
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from such an argument lacking in merit because of the difference in time 
between when Nana Asma’u lived and the contemporary situation, pro-
ponents still insist that what was good for the early 19th century Hausa 
woman should be good for the women of the 21st century.
Given the above scenario, which presents Muslim women in the north 
as educated, the facts still remain incontrovertible that the educational 
status of women in the north is the lowest as compared to women in other 
regions of the country. Islamic education is education indeed, however, 
it is important to consider the functions and requirements of contempo-
rary society because such a brand of education falls short of meeting the 
needs of women in the society in which they live. Islamic education is self-
limiting because it cannot meet the requirements of an informational or 
jet age when knowledge in technology and science almost doubles every 
ten years. The acquisition of knowledge in informational technology is 
an enviable human capital that drives the motor of social and economic 
development, as is evident in the fast-developing countries of Asia such 
as Singapore, India, Thailand and China. While many women aspire to 
develop themselves and participate in a broadly-conceived public sphere 
comprising political, social, economic, religious and popular cultural 
enterprises and experiences, they are however hindered by the male 
voices that present them as ‘educated’ even when they cannot access a 
wider horizon of expression and experience. They cannot take up posi-
tions in the management of society, in government and in the production 
and reproduction of social knowledge. Such rationalisation thereby blocks 
their chances and possibilities of exploring better opportunities through 
western education.
All the women involved in this study admitted that Islamic education 
has played a dominant role in their lives and has given them respected 
status as Muslim women. They were, however, of the view that western 
education has added more to their status as Muslim women and women 
in the society. To them, western education has made them better Mus-
lims, grounded and enlightened enough to face challenges as women 
both at home and outside the home.30 Women strongly recognize their 
potential to contribute to the welfare of society through accessing west-
ern education. This position is in direct opposition to the views of men 
30 These views were shared by Aisha Lemu, Amina Ahmed and Sadiyah Umar Bello. 
All three women were top ranking officials in the civil service and are now educationists 
and a lecturer respectively.
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who insist that Islamic education should be sufficient for women in car-
rying out their domestic and wifely duties. This indicates that the women 
share different views from men in terms of defining what education really 
means. To the men, a woman who has religious education has got it all, 
and western education is secondary in her life, while the women see it 
differently. They know the value of western education and would ordinar-
ily desire to acquire this, in addition to Islamic education. It is western 
knowledge that would enable a woman to reposition her life and experi-
ence in a wider context of human development and advancement. It is 
this that would give her the enabling tool to access a rapidly-changing 
social, economic, cultural, religious and political sphere where her skills 
and potentials would be put to use for the service of the Muslim umma.
Contemporary Factors Hindering the Education of Women
Quoting Byoma, Marg Csapo captures the factors hindering the educa-
tion of women in Northern Nigeria. According to her, women in Northern 
Nigeria are considered as secondary citizens and as such the education 
of girls does not receive the same priority as that of the boys.31 Fewer 
girls than boys are found in conventional schools. Outlining further the 
factors which have hindered female education in the north, Csapo enu-
merates the following: traditional antagonism against western-type edu-
cation, marriage customs and seclusion of women, fear of moral laxity in 
the schools, paucity of post-primary institutions and lukewarm attitudes 
of political leaders. The condition of education in Northern Nigeria in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s when Csapo conducted her research seem not to 
have changed much, as the same factors militating against the education 
of women still hold sway.32
An analysis of the responses of informants for this study, on the various 
factors that are still hindering the education of women in the north, reveals 
that while these factors are not far from those enumerated by Csapo, 
there are, however, several additional factors that continue to perpetuate 
differences in women’s educational status compared to men’s. As revealed 
31 Csapo, M., ‘Religious, Social and Economic Factors Hindering the Education of Girls 
in Northern Nigeria’, Comparative Education, vol. 17, no. 3, 1981, pages 311–319, page 311.
32 Although current data show that more women are getting educated than was the 
case in the 1980s, similar problems that hampered women’s education then, still exist and 
contribute to the wide gender disparity between males and females in the north today.
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by our interview interlocutors, these include: unfavourable atmosphere, 
poverty, polygyny, government policy and fear of moral laxity.33
Dress code is a very important norm in Islam. A woman is expected to 
dress in accordance with the prescription of the sharīʿa, found in sūrat 
al-Nūr (24): 31 which states:
And tell believing women that they should lower their glances, guard their 
private parts, and not display their charms beyond what [it is acceptable] 
to reveal; they should let their headscarves fall to cover their necklines and 
not reveal their charms except to their husbands . . . they should not stamp 
their feet so as to draw attention to any hidden charms. Believers, all of you, 
turn to God so that you may prosper.
The sharīʿa requires women to dress in a way that does not expose their 
bodily appearance or ornament. Instead, women must be modest in their 
appearance. The issue of dress code is taken seriously in most Islamic 
societies. However, many Muslims in Northern Nigeria believe that the 
atmosphere western education presents has itself been inimical to the 
total moral well-being of women. With religious education it is differ-
ent, because women must dress according to the norms of Islamic dress 
code, as interpreted by Hausa cultural practice. However, in conventional 
schools, women are not given the opportunity to dress the way Islam pre-
scribes for them. When what is perceived as normative in Islam comes 
in conflict with the practices of western educational institutions, western 
education is quickly sacrificed rather than compromise religious norms. 
Female dress has been a strong flash-point in the argument against west-
ern education in the north of Nigeria and this has had its impact in keep-
ing women from western-type educational institutions.
Another point of disagreement and resentment is co-education, the 
practice of educating both sexes together in the same school. While 
Islamic education allows women to study alone, without mingling with 
men, western education on the other hand encourages co-education. To 
many Muslims, this is not advisable because it is perceived as the seed-
bed of cultivating immoral thoughts and actions, practices contrary to 
the proper observance of Islamic moral codes and conduct. Co-education 
is viewed among Northern Nigerian Muslims, particularly males, as one 
33 These factors emanated from the interviews conducted in five states of northern 
Nigeria. They still form the factors hindering the education of women in northern Nigeria 
today, giving an impression that there isn’t much difference between the past and the 
present in terms of Muslim female education.
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of the systems that most strongly encourages immoral behaviour among 
female students.34
It is against this backdrop that some states in Nigeria, such as Zam-
fara, have decided to separate the sexes by having separate schools for 
boys and girls, right from the primary level, with the hope that Muslim 
parents will be encouraged to allow their girls to acquire education. The 
enforcement of the use of the ḥijāb on all female pupils and students from 
primary to tertiary institutions is also an indication that the atmosphere 
has been very unfavourable to Muslims in the north before now. The per-
ceived unfavourable atmosphere presented by western education, which 
some Muslims see as ‘un-Islamic’, makes western education unappealing 
to most Muslims in the north.
Fear of moral laxity has always been one of the strongest reasons that 
has hindered the education of women in Northern Nigeria. Western edu-
cation encourages co-education and the fear of many Muslims in the past 
has been that if girls were allowed to co-educate with boys they would 
become morally loose. Co-education, it is believed, is the enabling condi-
tion for breeding sexual immorality among the pupils and students. Doi 
also shares this view and pointedly argues against the system when he 
states:
Whatever trumpets the proponents of coeducation may blow in praise of 
the system, the sad fact still remains that a majority of girl students in the 
secondary schools in Europe and America spend more time in picking up 
illicit sexual techniques from their class mates than in collecting useful 
knowledge from their teachers . . . therefore we should dispense with the 
system of coeducation and should open primary schools, secondary schools, 
colleges and universities exclusively for women where the teachers as well 
as the students are women. The uniform for all female students should sat-
isfy the requirements laid down by the Sharīʿah for proper dress.35
The Islamic injunctions on women, they believe, are stricter than what 
is expected of men.36 That a woman is not expected to mingle with the 
opposite sex is strongly advocated. She is expected to always ‘lower her 
gaze’, and most of all appear before men in the appropriate dress that 
conforms to the sharīʿa norms or injunction. However, women who 
attend western schools are generally absolved from conforming to these 
injunctions. Some Muslim men would rather have their wives educated 
34 Doi, 1996, page 144.
35 Doi, 1996, pages 144–45.
36 Interview with Mohammed Suraju.
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according to the prescriptions of Islam than allow them to attend western 
schools. The primary reason for this is the fear of these women becom-
ing morally loose. Western schools, it is generally feared among Muslims, 
produce secular human beings and this inexorably leads to secularization 
of personal conduct and life as well as worldview. The Muslim is at odds 
with such a possibility, as his view is that the Muslim umma is based on 
the injunctions of Allāh as made explicit in the Qurʾān, expanded in the 
sunna and interpreted by many Islamic scholars.
Poverty is another major factor that has denied women access to edu-
cation. Marriage customs in this part of the country allow for men to 
marry up to four wives. In many situations the breadwinner of the home 
is unable to provide for the basic necessities of the home due to the large 
number of children as a result of polygyny. In such cases, Islamic educa-
tion is preferred because it is not expensive. As an informant notes:
. . . Islamic education is imparted cheaply. If I have four wives and have 
twenty-five children and I send them to be taught by Mallams, it may not 
cost me much. But if I send them to western schools they will say bring 
text books, bring uniforms, etc. Islamic education takes cognizance of our 
traditional way of life . . .37
There are instances of polygynists having more than 25 children, so the 
figure cited by the informant above is not wide of the mark or strictly 
hypothetical. In such a situation the most affected in the family are the 
female children. The girl child is seen by most parents as an expend-
able ‘item’ that should quickly be married away in order to prevent the 
shame of premarital pregnancy and, more importantly, create space for 
the development of the male children. Boys are seen as assets and the 
pain of investing in them is not felt by parents. The situation is different 
for a girl who may eventually be married off and remain in seclusion for 
the rest of her life. The practice of keeping females in seclusion precludes 
investing in them educationally because they would not be required to 
utilise such investments in working in the public sphere. The practice of 
early marriage, which ensures that girls are married off between the ages 
12 and 15, precludes these girls from remaining long enough in school to 
acquire adequate education which would be useful in social governance 
or public organizations.
Another issue at variance with Northern Nigerian Muslim communi-
ties is the official educational policy of the state. Government policies on 
37 Interview with Mohammed Husseini, 5th March 2007.
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education have been unacceptable to many Muslims in the north. The 
Universal Primary Education (UPE) of the 1970s was meant to bridge the 
gap between males and females, and the most recent Universal Basic Edu-
cation (UBE) introduced by the regime of Olusegun Obasanjo (1976–1979) 
has the improvement of girls’ education as one of its aims. However, the 
UPE recorded very little success.38 The schools constructed under the UPE 
programme have received very poor funding by the federal and state gov-
ernments. They lacked adequate classrooms to accommodate the students 
and the facilities in these schools were not adequate to meet the needs 
of the students. Lack of adequate funding and misappropriation of funds 
subverted official government policy on education. According to the gov-
ernment’s National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy 
(NEEDS) document, “The goals of wealth creation, employment genera-
tion, poverty reduction, and value reorientation can be effectively pursued, 
attained, and sustained only through an efficient, relevant and functional 
education system”.39 The UBE programme of the Obasanjo regime, like 
its predecessor, falls short of proper implementation. The mechanism and 
infrastructure needed to achieve the identified noble objectives have not 
been adequately addressed. The result has been poorly-staffed schools, 
poorly-equipped schools, poorly-motivated teachers and general lack of 
academic infrastructure resulting in poor performance by students in 
many of these schools. This has made parents apprehensive of allowing 
their girls to attend any form of education apart from religious education. 
Parents reasoned that since the schools are not producing good results 
with quality products, why waste money and time on them. To many, this 
is an attractive, if not inescapable conclusion.40
Although these factors seem convincing to many Muslims in North-
ern Nigeria, they are, however, not without problems. It may be the case 
that ‘education is education’, as argued by some informants, and Islamic 
education is an alternative to western education. It is pertinent to ask: 
how do women who possess Islamic education alone compete effectively 
with those who have a combination of western and Islamic education? 
38 Clarke, P. B., ‘Islam, Education and the Development Process in Nigeria’, Compara-
tive Education, vol. 14, no. 2, 1978, page 133.
39 Nigerian National Planning Commission, Meeting Everyone’s Needs: National Eco-
nomic Empowerment and Development Strategy, Abuja: Nigerian National Planning Com-
mission, 2004, page 35.
40 Interview with Dr. Aisha Lemu, 2nd March 2007.
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All the women interviewed during this study, when asked which educa-
tion they preferred, recognised the importance of having both Islamic and 
western education: the need to balance the two is all the more obvious 
in their open agitation to improve the educational state-of-affairs among 
women. Women who have had the opportunity to excel in both Islamic 
and western education said they would not have excelled in the public 
sphere without having access to western education. It is incontrovertible 
that these women have had the opportunity to become teachers in public 
schools, principals, professors in renowned universities, directors and per-
manent secretaries in the civil service because of the acquisition of west-
ern education. One articulates the value of western education this way:
The problem with those who have only Islamic education is that they can’t 
relate what they know to anything in the world around them. We have 
lots of teachers in the course of time in our schools that went through the 
Islamic studies courses in the colleges of Islamic studies and universities. 
But the sad thing is that they can hardly relate their knowledge to modern 
knowledge . . . So to me it is important that anybody going for Islamic studies 
must have also broad general knowledge . . .41
This is an evident indication that insofar as Islamic education is educa-
tion and it is obligatory upon every Muslim, yet it is not sufficient educa-
tion if women are to be favourably positioned and equipped to compete 
for social, economic and political resources with other members of the 
society, both male and female alike. One such Muslim woman who has 
excelled in both systems of education has this to say “. . . I am happy to 
be a Muslim woman, a fortunate Muslim woman who has been able to 
benefit from both Islamic and western education”. Another said, “Praise 
God! I am glad to be one of those who have excelled in the education 
sector”. Views like these, shared by women, show that women who have 
excelled in both systems of education are able to differentiate between 
the two. While they accept Islamic education as important, they accept 
much more the need for western education as they believe that without 
both they would not have been where they are today.
The improvement of women’s education and the development of Mus-
lim women-folk cannot be a top priority for educational policy-makers 
in Northern Nigeria if Muslims are yet to come to terms with the reality 
and demands of modern life. Part of the reality of life in contemporary 
41 Interview with Dr. Aisha Lemu, 2nd March 2007.
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Northern Nigeria is the underdevelopment of women generally. In no 
place is this underdevelopment as clear as in the educational sector. 
While women recognise their need for both Islamic and western forms of 
education, Muslim men, who are the policy makers and implementers of 
such educational structure, impose their ideas and preferences on their 
women. Such preferences insist on the sufficiency of Islamic education 
for women while men have access to both forms of knowledge. While jus-
tifying and rationalising their position by co-opting religiously-informed 
ideas, the consequence of tenaciously-defended, culturally-defined pos-
turing is to keep women on the lower rungs of society, ‘good’ only because 
they do not complain about, or challenge, their plight; ‘good’ insofar as 
they fulfil their reproductive and domestic responsibilities. As women are 
viewed as submissive and subjugated, so is western education viewed as 
a secondary and non-obligatory form or source of knowledge for women. 
So, women in Northern Nigeria are presented with the limited roles and 
status tradition and society define for them and accept them as duties 
prescribed by Islam. These roles are diverse and they include domestic 
roles that tend to relegate women to the background and present them 
as subordinates to men, not only in Northern Nigeria but also in some 
other Muslim societies. Women are ideologically constructed as home-
makers and are expected to pursue religious education which will help 
them bring up their children in the Islamic way. For women in Northern 
Nigeria to come to terms with their educational status as prescribed by 
the sharīʿa and to compete alongside men in contemporary society, they 
need to be given the opportunity to explore these rights, grounded in the 
Qurʾān and in the Constitution of Nigeria, without intrusion by any cul-
tural norms that present a different picture to the non-educated women 
in the society.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the historical teaching of Islam on education 
and women’s education seems to be different from the way it is practised 
in Northern Nigeria. While sharīʿa prescribes the right to acquire any form 
of education, irrespective of gender, the views shared by our Muslim infor-
mants in Northern Nigeria seem to differ from the interpretations given 
by Muslim scholars on the teaching of Islam on education, especially as 
it applies to women in sharīʿa. Statistics on education present women in 
the north as the most educationally disadvantaged in the whole country, 
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as regards western education. While various reasons have been adduced 
as to the causes of such a socially regressive state of affairs, an appreciable 
number of both policy makers and lay male Muslim informants in this 
study seem to disagree with the statistics; according to them, such statis-
tics are one-sided and present western education as the sole indicator of 
education, which to them is not obligatory for individual Muslims.
However, for most Muslim women interviewed for this study, inas-
much as Islamic education is important, western education is much more 
important in the way modern Nigerian society is organized. They argue 
that it is this type of education that has brought several women to the 
limelight in the public sphere and given them respected status in the soci-
ety. Women who are educated in both Islamic and western knowledge, 
and work in the public sphere, have achieved higher standards of living 
than their counterparts with only Islamic education. They are more self-
actualized than other women who lack such comprehensive educational 
attainment. This fact makes a huge difference to the quality of life of these 
women. This is evident in some of their views on western and Islamic edu-
cation. For them, they argue that the question of whether or not to choose 
between western or Islamic education does not arise.42 The incorporation 
of both systems is more acceptable to these women and thus they cannot 
be satisfied with only religious education. This is also revealed in the form 
of education these educated women have prescribed for their daughters, 
that is, all the women informants in this study who have western educa-
tion have given their daughters the opportunity to acquire both systems 
of education and, in some cases, they acquire only the western system. 
This is countervailing evidence to that of male informants who insist that 
Islamic education is enough for women.
For the non-educated women, inasmuch as Islamic education is impor-
tant, they still want to be recognized in the wider society and the only 
way for them to achieve this is to acquire both forms of education as their 
legitimate right and desire. For this reason, women who could not con-
tinue with their education because of marriage are aspiring to go back to 
school, get educated and become like their female counterparts who are 
experts in various fields of endeavour.
Even male informants, who insist that Islamic education is enough 
for Muslim women, do not deny the importance of western education, 
42 This view was unanimously shared by all our female informants in five states of 
Northern Nigeria. 
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because women, with a combination of Islamic and western education 
work in the public sphere and they live a better standard of life. Many 
who do not have that opportunity envy those who have had it and crave 
a balanced education which is useful and relevant in present-day soci-
ety. It is the plea and hope of women who do not have both Islamic and 
western education that their spouses, as well as society, will give them 
the opportunity to acquire this, for only then will they be able to become 
better wives and mothers to their husbands and children. Some insist that 
this is, perhaps, the only way open to them to produce a better society for 
the future.
CHAPTER SIX
‘WE INTRODUCED SHARĪʿA’—THE IZALA MOVEMENT IN NIGERIA  
AS INITIATOR OF SHARĪʿA-REIMPLEMENTATION IN THE NORTH  
OF THE COUNTRY: SOME REFLECTIONS
Ramzi Ben Amara
Introduction1
During the Fourth Nigerian Republic (since 1999), no other topic has been 
discussed as all-pervasively as the case of the so-called re-implementation 
of sharīʿa. This topic has appeared in the media, in public discussions, and 
in academia2 everywhere in the federation. Even in western countries, the 
sharīʿa re-implementation in Nigeria which was initiated by the governor 
of Zamfara State, Ahmad Sani Yeriman Bakura, is well-known. Many west-
ern reports have described the sharīʿa as inhuman and against human 
rights and in many cases it is confused with the Islamic criminal law. 
Many questions have been raised relating to sharīʿa, especially concern-
ing its constitutionality, its effect on the relationship between Muslims 
and Christians,3 on freedom of religion and on the democratic process in 
the West African country.
After the ‘success’ of the sharīʿa-reimplementation, many Muslims, 
both as individuals and as organizations or institutions (including Sufis 
1 This chapter is based on the preliminary findings of my research in Nigeria (Decem-
ber 2006–February 2007 and February–April 2008). I am grateful to the junior and senior 
scholars of the VW-sharīʿa-Project, to Prof. Danfulani, Prof. Gaiya and the staff of the 
Department of Religious Studies of the University of Jos, Prof. Fwatshak, to Dr. Ostien, to 
Mallam Dawood, Mallam Sani, Dr. Umar Adam, and to all my informants for their kind 
assistance in all directions. Many thanks to Maren Milligan for her comments and correc-
tions of the first draft of this chapter.
2 Two examples of such discussions in academia are the following conferences: ‘The 
sharīʿa Debate and the Shaping of Muslim and Christian Identities in Northern Nigeria 
since 1999’, 11th–12th July 2003, University of Bayreuth, Germany; and ‘Comparative per-
spectives on Shari’ah in Nigeria’, 15th–17th January, 2004, University of Jos, Nigeria. Schol-
ars from different countries and disciplines presented their findings and discussed the 
sharīʿa from various perspectives. Of course, there are many other platforms in and outside 
Nigeria where sharīʿa was debated. 
3 On the sharīʿa-discussion between Muslims and Christians see Danfulani, Umar 
H. D., The sharīʿa issue and Christian-Muslim relations in contemporary Africa, Stockholm: 
Almqvist & Wiskel International, 2005. 
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and non-Sufis), identified themselves with the new sharīʿa-project.4 
One aspect of this identification is the question “who is the real initia-
tor of sharīʿa’ behind Ahmad Sani Yeriman Bakura?” The present chapter 
attempts to answer this question from the perspective of The Jama ʾatu 
Izalatil Bidʿa Wa Ikamatis Sunnah (JIBWIS) (Society for the Removal of 
Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition)5 known as Izala.
The Izala movement—also known under its Hausa acronym ʾYan 
Izala—was established as an anti-Sufi association appealing to Muslims 
to follow the ‘right’ path of Islam based on the Qurʾān, sunna (Arab.: tradi-
tions of the Prophet), and as-salaf as-ṣāliḥ (Arab.: pious predecessors). Its 
recent development shows a reorientation with a new agenda of ‘no direct 
confrontation’. As there has been an absence (or decrease) in both verbal 
and physical violence between adherents of the Izala association and of 
the Sufi brotherhoods,6 the conflict with the Sufis is not as strong as it was 
in the 1970s and mid-1980s. Instead, we presume that Izala abandoned 
one of its main doctrines, which was to fight the Sufis, and switched to 
peaceful co-existence.
After an overview of Izala’s establishment, its main figures, goals and 
institutions, we will examine its relationship with the Sufis in the past and 
present. Finally, we will consider its involvement in the re-implementation 
of sharīʿa in Nigeria and the consequences for Izala.
Historical Context of the Establishment of Izala
The launching of the Izala association took place in Jos in 1978. This time 
is known as a period of turbulence and political instability in the West 
African country. Nigeria’s transition7 from a military regime to the Second 
4 With the exception of the Ikhwān Brothers headed by Ibrahim al-Zakzaky who 
refused the sharīʿa-project, all other groups accepted it. There are other Muslims or Mus-
lim organizations that may have opposed the re-implementation, but they did not declare 
it openly.
5 See Kane, Ousmane, Muslim modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria. A Study of the Society 
for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition, Leiden: Brill, 2003; the Society 
is known in Nigeria by its abbreviated names Yan Izala or Izala; the abbreviation JIBWIS 
is also common.
6 To use Kane’s words (2003) a kind of ‘domestication of the Izala’ took place after a 
long period of struggle against Sufis and Sufism, pp. 207–26.
7 For an overview of the political and social changes during the period from the 
independence of Nigeria in 1960, through the First Republic (1960–66), and the Military 
Government from 1970 to 1979, especially concerning the establishment of the different 
Islamic associations and the development of the sharīʿa question, see Marjomaa, Risto, ‘The 
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Republic (1979–1983) was facilitated by the new constitution of 1979 which 
had been debated throughout the end of the 1970s. One of the issues 
debated at that time was the question of a Federal Sharīʿa Court of Appeal 
(FSCA).8 When the Chairman of the Constituent Assembly declared the 
‘sharīʿa-debate’ as finished and there was even a suggestion to delete 
Section 180 (1) C—the so called sharīʿa paragraph—from the constitution, 
Muslim deputies left the Assembly on the 10th April 1978. General Olusegun 
Obasanjo, the then head of state, requested those who left the Constitu-
ent Assembly to come back and continue with the negotiations. After two 
weeks of boycott the Assembly proceeded with its work on April 24th 
1978.9 The new constitution was presented on 29th August 1978 to the 
president without the FSCA-section and was enacted on 1st October 1979. 
However, the new version § 240 (1) allows ‘any state [of the federation] 
that requires it’ to establish a State Sharia Court of Appeal.10
Such was the political climate into which Izala was born. At that time, 
the Muslim community saw the growing influence of Sheikh Abubakar 
Mahmud Gumi (1922–1992),11 who repudiated the Sufi brotherhoods. Not 
only in his published articles in Hausa, but also in his tafsīr-sessions (Arab.: 
exegesis of the Qurʾān) on Radio Kaduna between 1970 and 1974, Gumi 
‘raised many emotions and [much] unrest in Northern Nigeria’.12 His anti-
ṭarīqa book al-ʿaqīda aṣ-ṣaḥīḥa bi muwafaqāt ash-sharīʿa (Arab.: The Right 
Belief in Accordance with sharīʿa) in 1972 initiated a ‘war’ against all bidʿa 
(Arab.; un-Islamic innovation) and, as such, against many Tijāniyya and 
Qādiriyya practices. Sheikh Nasiru Kabara (1925–1996), the leading figure 
Long struggle for the Shari’a in Northern Nigeria’, Studia Orientalia (Helsinki) 103, 2006, pages 
39–66.
  8 Latin, David, ‘The Sharia Debate and the origins of Nigeria’s Second Republic’, The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1982, pages 411–430, page 411; Ostien, Phil, 
‘An opportunity missed by Nigerian Christians’, in Muslim Christian Encounters in Africa, 
Soares, Benjamin, (ed.), Leiden: Brill, 2006, pages 234–243.
  9 Hock, Klaus, Der Islam Komplex. Zur Christlichen Wahrnehmung des Islams und der 
christlich-islamischen Beziehungen in Nordnigeria während der Militärherrschaft Babangi-
das, Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 1996, page 194; also Abun-Nasr, Jamil, ‘Islamisches Recht im nige-
rianischen Rechtssystem’, in Muslime in Nigeria: Religion und Gesellschaft im politischen 
Wandel seit den 1950er Jahren, Abun-Nasr, Jamil (ed.), Münster-Hamburg: Lit-Verlag, 1993, 
page 221. 
10 Ostien, 2006, p. 240.
11  For a detailed account of Sheikh Gumi’s life, education and political influence see 
Loimeier, Roman, Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria, Evanston-Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 1997, pages 148–171; also his autobiography: Sheikh Abuba-
kar Gumi with Ismaila A. Tsiga, Where I stand, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 1992. 
12 Loimeier, 1997, page 163.
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of the Qādiriyya in Nigeria—later he became the leader of the Qādiriyya 
for the whole of Africa13—answered with his publication kitāb al-nāṣiḥa 
al-ṣaḥīḥa fiʾl–radd ʿalā al-ʿaqīda al-ṣaḥīḥa (Arab.: The Frank Advice in 
Reply to ʿal-Aqida as-Sahiha ʾ) the same year. Among the Tijāniyya14 came 
Sani Kafanga’s (d. 1989) response ʿal-Minaḥ al-ḥamīda fil-radd ʿalā fāsid 
al-ʿaqīda ʾ (Arab.: The Praiseworthy Gifts in the Reply to the One Who is 
Corrupted in His Faith).15
Sheikh Gumi conceded that his book “had not been written for general 
reading”16 and preferred at first not to make it available in Hausa-language 
because “it was premature to translate it at that time”.17 When his stu-
dent Mallam Ismaila Idris (1937–2000), then a school teacher, preached 
in Kaduna’s Sultan Bello Mosque quoting openly from Gumi’s book and 
attacking Sufi-brotherhoods, a debate started in many parts of Nigeria on 
Islamic practices.18 Going public with Gumi’s ideas has had a heavy influ-
ence on the subsequent life of Ismaila Idris.
One important difference between Sheikh Abubakar Gumi and Sheikh 
Ismaila Idris was that the former, although fierce in his criticism, offered 
it indirectly and without naming individuals or groups, while the latter 
was quite outspoken:
With the coming of Sheikh Ismaila Idris things changed. Sheikh Idris was a 
student of Sheikh Abubakar Gumi, but he [I. Idris] was more open to say: 
‘this is ḥaram (forbidden) and this is against the sunna, the one who do[es] 
that is a kāfir (unbeliever)’. This is the way how Sheikh Ismaila Idris came 
out, not like Sheikh Abubakar Gumi who was indirect.19
13 Loimeier, Roman, ‘The Writings of Nasiru Kabara (Muḥammad al-Nāṣir al-Kabarī)’, 
Sudanic Africa, vol. 2, 1991, pages 165–174.
14 For the history of the Tijāniyya see Abun-Nasr, Jamil M., The Tijaniyya—a Sufi Order 
in the Modern World, London: Oxford University Press, 1965.
15 I took Loimeier’s (1997) translations of the Arabic titles of the three books; Loimeier 
gives an analysis of Gumi’s critique towards Sufism and the counter-arguments of Nasiru 
Kabara and Sani Kafanga, see pages 197–206; concerning the theology and the doctrinal 
background of Abubakar Gumi and Nasiru Kabara, see the comparative study of Briga-
glia, Andrea, ‘Two Published Hausa Translations of the Qurʾān and Their Doctrinal Back-
ground’, Journal of Religion in Africa, 35 (4), 2005, pages 424–449.
16 Gumi and Tsiga, 1992, page 145.
17 Gumi and Tsiga, 1992, page 145.
18 Gumi and Tsiga, 1992, pages 145–146; Gumi narrated that he was in Saudi Arabia 
during the controversy and when he came back to Kaduna, the controversy was still going 
on and Mallam Idris was forced to resign his job as a teacher, but continued to preach 
al-ʿaqīda al-ṣaḥīḥa.
19 Interview in Arabic language with Sheikh Abdurrahman Lawal Adam, JNI murshid 
(adviser) and Ex-Izala member in his Office, Jos Central Mosque, 27th December 2006; 
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Sheikh Ismaila Idris: Founder and Architect of the JIBWIS20
Sheikh Ismaila Idris Ibn Zakariyya is the founding father of the Izala- 
Society in Jos. He was born in 1937 in a village called Goskorom in Plateau 
State. Ismaila Idris was taught by his father until the age of fifteen and 
then he moved to Bauchi where he received his education in Islamic Reli-
gion and Arabic Studies from a number of Mallams, among whom were 
Sheikh Magaji, Sheikh Kansurawa and the Imam of the Central mosque 
in Bauchi, Sheikh Mahmud Bello. (This kind of education is known as 
Karatun Zaure.) After teaching there himself, Ismaila Idris moved to Kano 
for a degree in Arabic Studies and came later to Bauchi where he worked 
in a primary school. Starting in 1969, Sheikh Ismaila Idris spent five years 
in Kaduna where he worked as murshid (Arab.: adviser, instructor) for the 
Jamāʿat Naṣr al-Islām (Arab.: Society for the Victory of Islam; JNI)21 and 
preached against Sufi practices.22 The provocative style of his speeches led 
to the withdrawal of his position and he moved to preaching in Kakurdi 
Prison Yard in Kaduna. Later on, he applied to the Nigerian Army, where 
he was appointed as an Imam after leaving the JNI in 1974.23 While in the 
army, he continued to agitate. His preaching resulted in wahala (Hausa: 
problem) and he was transferred to Ibadan in 1974, where he only stayed 
three months and, after a problem with the Divisional Imam/Lt. Colo-
nel on the issue of zakāt (Arab.: almsgiving), the Mallam was transferred 
to Kontagora.24 In Kontagora, many people started moving to the Army 
Mosque to pray on Friday since the Imam of the Central Mosque was a Sufi. 
After yet another controversy about the preaching of Sheikh Ismaila Idris, 
he was again transferred to his last Army station: Jos. Sheikh Ismaila Idris 
was appointed as an Imam of the Division and continued with his harsh 
criticism of Sufi practices. Many people were attracted by the Sheikh and 
see also Sani Umar, ‘Sufism and Anti-Sufism in Nigeria’, MA-thesis (unpublished), 1988, 
page 204.
20 The term ‘architect’ was adapted from M. Sani Umar’s unpublished BA Thesis ‘Islamic 
Revivalism Today: the case of Jama’atu Izalat Al-Bidah Wa-Iqamat Al-Sunna’, Islamic Stud-
ies, University of Jos, 1983, page 48.
21 Founded in the early 1960s as an umbrella organization for all Muslims in Nigeria; it 
was an idea of Abubakar Gumi, realised by the Sardauna Ahmadu Bello (1910–1966) with 
sponsorship from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. For more details see Loimeier, 1997, pages 
135–148.
22 Alhassan, Idris Abdullahi, ‘The role of the School of High Islamic Studies Sarkin 
Mangu Jos in advancing the spread of Islamic culture and Arabic language for the years 
1989 to 2001’, BA Thesis, Arabic Studies, University of Jos, 2003, pages 61–67, in Arabic.
23 Sani Umar, 1983, page 49.
24 Alhassan, 2003, page 50.
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they attended his lectures and invited him to preach in the town. The Sufi 
Brotherhoods, on the other hand, complained about Sheikh Idris to the 
Ministry of Defence. Although he was supported by one Major Alhassan, 
Sheikh Idris was requested to stop his preaching. Because of his refusal, 
he was arrested several times and finally discharged from the Army in 
1978.25
Sheikh Idris succeeded in attracting many people in Jos, especially from 
among the Tijāniyya followers,26 and this success was the basis for estab-
lishing an organization. On 8th February 1978, the launch of Jama⁠ʾatu Iza-
latil Bidʾa Wa Ikamatis Sunnah (JIBWIS) took place in Jos, and numerous 
scholars from all over Nigeria were invited. Sheikh Gumi was invited, but 
as he could not attend personally, he sent a delegation in the person of 
Sheikh Lawal Abubakar who succeeded Gumi after his death.27 The Society 
was formally set up on 25th May 1978 and on that occasion the first mass 
rally was held in the Stadium of Jos.28 Most of the followers at this first 
stage were young people. Many of Gumi’s students founded local branches 
in different parts of Northern Nigeria. The society also gave politicians the 
opportunity to ‘engage themselves in religious organizations’.29
Sheikh Muhammad Sanusi Gumbi, Kaduna, saw the establishment of 
Izala as being the result of the long struggle between Abubakar Gumi and 
Sufi brotherhoods that had started during the 1960s and continued to the 
end of the 1970s. The absence of an institution or organization that pro-
tected Gumi was the reason for the establishment of Izala.30 This point of 
view was confirmed by M. Sani Umar who identifies Muhammad Sanusi 
Gumbi as well as Sheik Ismaila Idris who:
. . . soon after the ill-fated debate, the close disciples of Gumi began to realise 
the imperative need for a new mode of operation in the campaign against 
Sufism.31
25 Alhassan, 2003, pages 51–54.
26 According to Loimeier 1997, in Plateau State the Tijāniyya was stronger than the 
Qādiriyya, see page 213. 
27 Sheikh Muhammad Lawal Abubakar and Sheikh Ibrahim Arab represented Abuba-
kar Gumi who added Wa Ikamatis Sunnah to the name of the Society; interview in Arabic 
with Ustadh Nasir Abdulmuhyi, director of the Diploma Section at the School of Islamic 
Studies, Sarkin Mangu, Jos, 5th December 2006 in his office.
28 Loimeier, 1997, page 214. Many Izala followers mentioned during my fieldwork 
(February 2008) that the launching day of the Society in Jos took place on Sunday, 12th 
March 1978.
29 Loimeier, 1997, page 214.
30 Personal Interview with Sheikh Sanusi Gumbi, Kaduna, 17th January 2007. 
31  Umar, 1988, page 198.
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The Doctrine of Izala
Loimeier observes that through the establishment of Izala, Gumi’s plan 
to establish a mass-movement was put into practice. He had failed as an 
individual, according to Loimeier, to realise his program of tajdīd (Arab.: 
revival, reformation) in the JNI which is dominated by Sufis, although he 
was financially supported by Saudi-Arabia. Since the death of the Sardauna 
of Sokoto Ahmadu Bello in 1966, Gumi had lost political support and his 
prestige as Grand Qadi (1962–1975) of Nigeria had been affected. Gumi’s 
strategy was to change from a ‘struggle between the malamai [leaders, 
intellectuals] to a struggle at grassroots level’.32
Sheikh Gumi himself presented eight points summarising the main 
objectives of Izala. Essentially the society promotes Islam on the basis of 
the Qurʾān and the sunna, it reminds Muslims about their duties to Allāh, 
denies any revelation after the death of the Prophet and rejects any opin-
ion claiming that the Prophet left something secret that will be revealed 
after centuries. The teaching of the society insists that the Prophetic mis-
sion has been accomplished in the Qurʾān, refuses any idea that someone 
can communicate with the Prophet or that the Prophet visited him physi-
cally, it contradicts any addition to the five basic pillars of Islam, promotes 
a better relationship and understanding among Muslims and insists that 
it is ‘determined to guard these principles at all costs without any options 
for compromise’.33
Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jingre, the current leader of the Izala in Jos and dis-
ciple of Sheikh Ismaila Idris, recapitulates the programme of the founder 
of the JIBWIS as follows:
He addressed his preaching first to soldiers and after that he invited com-
mon people to the oneness of Allah (Arab.: tawhīd) following the path of 
pious predecessors (Arab.: al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ).34
The dissemination of Idris’ doctrine was facilitated by the distribution 
of tape recordings of his preaching all over the country. In addition to that, 
the mobility of the Society in organizing preaching sessions everywhere 
led to its expansion. The Izala introduced the so-called wazin kasa (Hausa: 
Preaching across the whole State). Sani Umar counted about seven hun-
dred preaching-sessions held in the country at national level between the 
32 Loimeier, 1997, page 208.
33 Gumi and Tsiga, 1992, pages 156–157.
34 Personal interview in Arabic with Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jingre, his office at the Izala 
Headquarters, Jos, 28th February 2007. 
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launching of the Society, in 1978, and 1988. Concerning the local context, 
he was not able to give an exact number.35 This powerful combination led 
to the Izala’s expansion. This strategy is the same today and Izala preach-
ers travel to the furthest places in Nigeria and outside the country.
The main aim of the Izala is a ‘purification’ of Islam from any addi-
tional constituents that are not mentioned in the Qurʾān or sanctioned 
by the Prophet or by one of his successors. The bidʿa (Arab.: innovation)- 
repudiated practices include: mawlid, celebrating of the Prophet’s birth-
day; ṣalāt al-fātiḥ Tijāniyya, a special prayer that according to the Tijāniyya 
sufi-brotherhood is supposedly 6000 times better than reciting the Qurʾān; 
dhikr, congregational remembering, a Sufi custom; and many more:
Ismaila Idris as well criticised the ṣadaqa (Arab.: voluntary alms) practised 
by Sufis after someone’s death. He rejected the so called ṣadaqat al yawm 
al-thālith (Arab.: alms of the third day). Furthermore, Mallam Idris criticised 
the Sufi-habit that when someone dies, they come and supplicate Allāh for 
him in congregation and do the same thing after seven, then forty days from 
the death. Moreover, having the so called lāzim (Arab.: binding, obligatory 
custom) practised especially by the Tijāniyya and which means that some-
one obliges himself to do it every day [a] hundred or thousand times (prais-
ing the Prophet for [example]). Also visiting tombs of a known saint and ask 
for assistance was also refused by Sheikh Idris. Seeking the baraka (Arab.: 
benediction, blessing) by a Sheikh and practising khalwa (Arab.: isolation; 
being alone with God) for a particular time were also confronted.36
Furthermore, the Izala confirms that only Allāh knows the ghaib (Arab.: 
the hidden), nobody except the Prophet himself can perform miracles, all 
Muslims are equal, Sufism is a form of shirk (Arab.: polytheism), seeing 
Allāh in dreams or visions is impossible.37
The argument of Izala is that any addition to the religion of Islam is 
not allowed. Certainly, the doors of ʿilm (Arab.: knowledge) and ijtihād 
(Arab.: effort of interpretation of existing rules) are open but should rely 
on proof. Apart from the Qurʾān and the tradition of the Prophet, which 
both constitute the basic source of Izala doctrine, there are other impor-
tant sources used by Izala. Ousmane Kane points out that Izala used kitāb 
al-tawḥīd (Arab.: Treatise of the Oneness of God) by Muḥammad b. ʿAbd 
al-Wahhāb (1703–1792) as an important source of its theology but also 
35 Umar, 1988, page 202.
36 Interview with Abdurrahman Lawal Adam, Jos, 27th December 2006.
37 Loimeier, 1997, pages 230–231.
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several other commentaries of that same work.38 ʿAbd al-Wahhāb is the 
founding father of the state doctrine of modern Saudi Arabia. It is based 
on a historical alliance between his religious authority and the political 
power represented by Ibn Saʿūd (d. 1765). Theologically the oneness of 
God is emphasized and the condemnation of Sufism with its veneration 
of saints and visitation of shrines and tombs excludes mediators between 
the believer and God. Kane sees this theology as a source of justification 
of the Izala:
The two concepts—associationism (shirk) and proclaiming others as unbe-
lievers (takfīr)—provided the Izala religious entrepreneurs and their sym-
pathizers a religious justification of the traditional order by which they felt 
oppressed.39
The writings of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb are not the only source of the Izala 
doctrine. The Society also relies on other books such as those of Ibn al-
Qayyim, Ibn Kathīr, Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī and many 
other writings of the scholars of sunna. The Izala follows the path of the 
mālikī school of law—as explained by Alhaji Adamu Girbo Muhammad, 
an Izala leader in Gombe. He added that “Izala is not wahhābiyya because 
the Society doesn’t call for revolution in Islam, but to shūra ʾ (Arab.: 
council)—unlike the wahhābiyya that revolted against the Saudi State. 
Some wahhābis rely on the ḥanbalī school of law and deny the others. The 
Izala follows the mālikī school of law”.40
In order to realise its objectives and goals the Izala established a struc-
ture that would facilitate its work. In the following, an idea about this 
structure and the bodies of the Society will be given. Here of special sig-
nificance are any changes that have happened since the establishment 
until today.
38 Kane, 2003, pages 123–124.
39 Kane, 2003, page 125. 
40 Interview with Alhaji Adamu Girbo Muhammad, Gombe, 20th February 2008; the 
connotation “Wahhabiyya” was given to the sympathizers of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s teach-
ings. The movement is puritan and the oneness of God (tawhīd) belongs to its central 
doctrines. In the mid-18th century and the Wahhabi State in Saudi Arabia, the Wahhabiyya 
proclaimed jihād against all opponents of its understanding of tawhīd. For more details on 
that movement see Algar, Hamid, Wahhabism: A critical Essay. Oneonta, New York: Islamic 
Publications International, 2002.
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The Structure and Institutions of Izala-society
The Izala’s formal institution did not take place until 1978. Until its regis-
tration on 11th December 1985, the Society remained under the umbrella of 
the JNI. The reason for this delay was that the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
did not immediately approve the Izala. According to the law, any Society 
that needs this approval should be advertised in national newspapers and 
this was done by the Izala. After that, time is allowed by the Ministry for 
any objection. Thousands of letters were written opposing the registra-
tion of the Izala. It became official seven years after its launch through 
an Izala member, Saidu Badawa, who was formal Permanent Secretary 
at the Ministry of International Affairs in the administration of President 
Babangida (1985–1993).41
Before the official registration of the JIBWIS, no clear structure can be 
identified. There were two bodies/committees dealing with administra-
tive and religious affairs respectively. Alhaji Musa Muhammad Mai Gandu 
led the Council of Administration, also called ‘political leaders of the move-
ment’. We find here an office of chairman, a secretary, and treasurer. His 
most important duties were to provide for permissions to preach and to 
organize the preachers’ tours (transport, etc.). Sheikh Ismaila Idris himself 
chaired the Council of Ulama or ‘Preacher’s Committee’ which was essen-
tially a majlis (Arab.: council, committee) of religious scholars.
Eventually, a third body came into being: the so-called Aid Groups. The 
Society recognised the necessity of having people to prepare the preach-
ing sessions (microphones, place of preaching etc.). Voluntary youths 
could undertake the task that had been done by JNI aid groups before. 
The problem was that among the JNI there were anti-Izala people and also 
Sufis. The idea was considered and finally the Society decided to institute 
its own groups.42 The first principal of the aid group was the late Alhaji 
Shehu.43
41 Interview with Mallam Sani Mudibbo, who took several positions in the Izala admin-
istration until 1987, his office in Jos, 28th February 2007; my interviewee confesses that not 
only Sufis opposed the registration, but also other individuals and even non-Muslims.
42 Interview with Mallam Sani Mudibbo, Jos, 28th February 2007.
43 Interview with Abdurrahman Lawal Adam, Jos, 27th December 2006; according to 
Alhaji Isa Waziri who is now the National Director of First Aid Groups (Izala Jos) since 
1984, his predecessor was Muhammad Rabiu Bukur; interview with him on 20th February 
2008 in Gombe. 
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As confirmed by several Izala leaders, the structure of the Izala today 
remains the same. In a booklet written in Arabic, Hausa and English, pub-
lished by the headquarters of the JIBWIS in Jos,44 the structure is described 
as consisting of the above mentioned three councils that, although having 
different duties, share the same objectives:
The teaching and practice of Islam as strictly provided by the Qurʾān and 
the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.) through public preaching 
and teachings by organizing yearly seminars, symposium, lectures, vocation, 
courses, write ups and the like.45
The later split of the Izala at the level of leadership led to a division of 
the institutions (schools, mosques, hospitals, etc.). The constitution and 
the threefold structure (local, state, national level) were kept. At each of 
these levels the three-council system still exists (ʿulamāʾ, administration 
and first aid groups). During my fieldwork in February 2008 I found out 
that the constitution had been amended in 2004 by the Jos faction. There 
is also a version introduced by the Kaduna faction of Izala in the mid-
1990s. Both versions are not officially recognized.
Since its inception, the Izala’s concern was to establish institutions 
that would propagate its message. An important component therefore 
was education. The construction of mosques is also crucial to the Izala. 
In order to work efficiently, a committee was created for each sector that 
the Izala got involved with: education, finances, health, preaching, per-
sonal and discipline, and elders’ committee.46 The JIBWIS runs schools 
from nursery to diploma level. There are regular primary and secondary 
schools, schools for Islamic Studies both for junior and senior students, 
schools for Qurʾānic recitation, and several other types. The duration of 
attendance varies between three and six years and examinations are con-
trolled either by the Izala itself, by the Ministry of Education or by the 
Institute of Education ABU Zaria.47
44 When I talk about the Society, I mean the Izala as a whole before the division in the 
mid-1980s and after that time I refer mainly to the Izala Jos; I am grateful to the actual 
head of the Council of Ulama and Izala-Jos leader Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jingir for provid-
ing me with a copy of this publication: JIBWIS-Headquarters-Jos-Nigeria al-Jamāc fī Suṭūr 
(the Society in a few sentences), JIBWIS-Headquarters-Jos-Nigeria, nd, (in Arabic).
45 JIBWIS, nd, page 53.
46 JIBWIS, nd, pages 53–56.
47 JIBWIS, nd, pages 63–64.
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To give an idea about the Izala institutions, in the year 2000 the society 
stated that every Local Government in Nigeria that has Izala followers 
should have at least two Primary Schools, one Arabic School, and one 
Western education school. Also every state of the federation should have 
at least one taḥfīẓ school (Arab.: memorisation school), one Secondary 
School and one Higher Islamic Studies School.48 Currently, the headquar-
ters of Izala Jos is in charge of an Advanced Diploma and Islamic Studies 
School in Jos, eighteen schools for Higher Islamic Studies in eight differ-
ent states of the North, four Schools of Higher Islamic Studies (secondary 
level) in Plateau, Taraba and Gombe states, ninety-seven Saturday and 
Sunday Schools, fifty-two Tahfizul Qurʾān Schools, and four Muʾassasa 
Qurʾānic Schools.49 In addition to that, the Izala A50 established branches 
(of schools) in neighbouring countries like Ghana, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, 
and even in Sudan Republic. The Izala in Kaduna seems to run only a few 
schools, although no statistics were available at the time the research was 
being carried out.
One goal of the Izala strategy is the education of women and especially 
of married women. During my stay in Nigeria I was able to attend the 
School for Higher Islamic Studies, Sarkin Mangu, Jos and observed several 
classes teaching women. This philosophy is at the basis of the esteem in 
which the Izala is held all over Nigeria—as is proudly mentioned. Mem-
bers of Izala are asked to ensure education of their wives. Learning mate-
rial such as cassettes/books is provided by preachers of the Society in 
order to facilitate this undertaking and fill this gap.51
Mosques are as important as schools and the Izala is keen to establish 
new ones everywhere. The Society either constructs them by means of 
donations or people build mosques and then endow them to the Izala. A 
committee that arranges the selection of Imams, muʾadhdhin (Arab.: offi-
cial of a mosque who summons the faithful to prayer), and appoints care-
takers oversees the mosques. Mosques are not solely places for prayers, 
but also for preaching and educating people about their religion. Preach-
ing is also hierarchical in the Society and starts from the District, to the 
local, then the State, to the national and, forth-coming, to attending the 
international level.52
48 JIBWIS, nd, page 64.
49 JIBWIS, nd, pages 65–67.
50 Izala A can be identified as a break away group from the original Izala.
51  JIBWIS, Izala Constitution, Section. 6, part. 2 §8a, nd.
52 JIBWIS, nd, page 61.
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The Division of the Izala and Attempts of Reconciliation
There are a number of explanations accounting for the Izala’s split into 
two major groups. While the Izala in Jos recognises problems of leader-
ship, the influence of foreign ideas, the intervention of politicians and, 
finally, the passivity of Sheikh Ismaila, as his opponents argue, to gain sup-
port from Muslim countries, the Izala in Kaduna highlights the person of 
Sheikh Idris and his severe character, monetary issues and his selflessness 
as the reasons for the division. Although the two major Izala factions are 
Izala Jos and Izala Kaduna, I identified a third category: those who left the 
Izala and see themselves as neutral. They are not organized in any group 
and act individually.
To show the different perspectives on the split we will examine the 
explanations offered by Kaduna and Jos representatives, and by a former 
Izala member.
Sheikh Alhassan Said from Jos, who was initially the ḥāfiẓ (Arab.: reciter 
of the Qurʾān) of Sheikh Ismaila Idris, and who is now affiliated with the 
Kaduna faction of the Izala, identified the years 1985–87 as the first period 
of division. The year 1989 is the time in which the crisis in the Society 
reached its peak. In the beginning, according to Sheikh Said, the Society 
had been based on nothing but the Qurʾān and the sunna, along with the 
traditions of pious predecessors. After that, leaders were attached to this 
life and dealt with money, so that followers of the Society doubted its 
authority. Also, Sheikh Ismaila Idris had a harsh character and sometimes 
went so far as to call members of Izala juhhāl (Arab.: ignorant). Mem-
bers started talking about him. Committees against him were organized 
and Sheikh Ismaila Idris was asked to reduce his duty to being a normal 
preacher. The other faction established their daʿwa (Arab.: invitation, mis-
sion) in 1992 in Kaduna. Sheikh Alhassan Said was not involved in the 
debate at that time and preferred to stay neutral. According to him the 
division happened at that time because of leadership, the personality of 
Sheikh Idris and his impatience.53
The current leader of the Izala Jos, Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jingir, sees the 
influence of some members of the movement by Shiite ideas as one rea-
son for the division of the Society:
53 Interview with Sheikh Alhassan Said, Jos, 12th December 2006.
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The involvement of some preachers in political affairs caused further dis-
pute. Furthermore the members who broke away blamed Sheikh Idris’ 
inflexibility and passivity to look for assistance from Islamic countries. In 
addition to that they blame the Sheikh of embezzling the Society’s money, 
which is not true. They held 25 meetings to show people the reasons of their 
division and any possibility of solving the issue was in vain.54
Mallam Sani Mudibbo, who held several positions in the Izala from its 
establishment until the mid-1980s, observes that one issue in the Society 
was that Sheikh Idris considered the Council of Ulama as being higher 
than any other body. To him the ʿulamāʾ were more important than any 
other executive. There was also a discussion in the Society concerning 
donations, as to whether they were addressed to Sheikh Idris or to the 
Society as a whole. Another issue was over the executive’s decision that 
whoever committed a mistake and broke the rule of the Society should 
be punished. When they suggested that Sheikh Idris should also be pun-
ished, then he was able to mobilize his followers in the Society, which 
became divided into those who supported Sheikh Idris and those who 
were against him.55
In summary, leadership and power struggles, money, involvement with 
politics, and the personality of Sheikh Idris were causes for the division. 
My impression is that the division is still there, since the Jos faction con-
tinues to protect Sheikh Idris and his leadership, in contradistinction to 
those who split away and preferred either to join the Kaduna faction of 
Izala or to leave the Society.
There were several attempts to reconcile the factions. When Sheikh 
Abubakar Gumi was alive, there was an effort of reconciliation, but with-
out success. During Babangida’s rule (1985–1993), General Mamman tried 
to bring the Izala factions together, but failed. In 2005, Dr. Ahmad Gumi, 
Sheikh Abubakar Gumi’s son, who lives in Saudi Arabia, came to Nigeria 
and invited Izala to unite, but was not successful.56 Recently, an attempt 
at reconciliation was begun by the jamāʿat ahl al-sunna fī gharb ifrīqiyya 
(Society of Ahl al-Sunna in West Africa), a young Association from Ghana. 
54 Interview with Sheikh Sani Yahya Jingre, his office at the Izala headquarter, Jos, 
28th February 2007. 
55 Interview with Malam Sani Muddibbo in his office, University of Jos, 28th February 
2007.
56 Interview with Sheikh Sanusi Gumbi, Kaduna, 17th January 2007. 
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They contacted the current leaders in 2006 to mediate between them, but 
they also failed.57
The Relationship between Izala and Sufis Past and Present
In a nutshell, the relationship between Izala and Sufis was characterised 
by a theological dispute on key doctrines and a struggle for hegemony in 
the Nigerian Muslim community. This conflict has to be seen in the light 
of the immense political, economic and social changes in post-Indepen-
dence Nigeria.
The relationship between Izala and Sufis in Nigeria has been exten-
sively studied by several scholars, notably Loimeier (1993 & 1997), Umar 
(1983 & 1988) and Kane (2003). A number of dissertations and theses have 
been written in the departments of Islamic, Arabic or Religious Studies 
in Nigeria that deal with the Izala and its relationship to the Tijāniyya 
and Qādiriyya brotherhoods.58 In fact, looking back in history, we observe 
a long-standing conflict among the Sufis. Loimeier describes how the 
Tijāniyya and Qādiriyya struggled for hegemony, especially during the 
1950/60s because of a religious, economic and political concurrence 
between the two.59 This situation changed dramatically at the beginning 
of the 1970s when the Sufis joined forces to fight against Abubakar Gumi. 
Since 1978, the opposing parties have been Sufis vs. Izala. Without going 
into detail on the doctrinal differences (see above) I want to give an idea 
about the beginning of the conflict and then compare it to the present 
situation as seen by the leaders of both Sufis and Izala.
The situation between Izala and Sufis was aggravated when Abubakar 
Gumi, whilst preaching in the Sultan Bello Mosque, declared that every 
person who recited ṣalāt al-fātiḥ Tijāniyya (a tijānī prayer) was an unbe-
liever and could be killed. He added that any marriage to such a person 
was invalid until this person abandoned his affiliation with the Tijāniyya. 
In reaction to Gumi, seventy Sufi scholars published a manifesto in which 
they sharply criticised Gumi. They accused him of practising arbitrary tafsīr 
(Arab.: exegesis), endangering the peaceful coexistence between Muslims 
57 Interview with Sheikh Dalha Abubakar Abdallah, leader of Izala in Lagos, Agege, 
18th February 2007.
58 During my fieldwork in Nigeria, I collected several B.A. and M.A. dissertations, and 
PhD theses at the Department of Religious Studies of the University of Jos and Bayero 
University, Kano. 
59 Loimeier, 1993, pages 129–137.
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and non-Muslims, monopolising the media, and falsifying ḥadīths. The 
two Sufi brotherhoods invited Gumi to a public debate and suggested a 
list of forty-two possible subjects for the discussion. In 1978, a common 
initiative of Tijāniyya and Qādiriyya met in Illorin and subsequently pub-
lished a document explaining their position. They also pointed at Gumi’s 
contacts with Saudi Arabia. Instead of triggering friction within the Mus-
lim community they suggested that the Izala had better concentrate on 
the debate with the Christians. According to the Sufis, the Izala followers 
had lost their faith due to Western education.60
According to Loimeier, after 1978, the attacks on the Izala were limited 
to the more powerful Tijāniyya. Only once, in 1987, did the Izala criticise 
the Qādiriyya explicitly, when referring to a work by ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jilānī 
(founder of the Qādiriyya, d. 1166) in which he claims to have seen God. 
Nasiru Kabara (1925–1996), then leader of the Qādiriyya, answered that 
any person who insults ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jilānī attacked the Prophet him-
self. He explained that the Sufi idiom which is not easily accessible could 
be the cause of misunderstanding.61
The conflict between Izala and Sufis did not remain simply verbal but 
extended sometimes to an intra-Muslim conflict and, from 1978 to 1980, 
the physical violence escalated. Following these events, the Izala concen-
trated on educational activities and the conflict subsided throughout the 
1980s, turning into a clash between Muslims and Christians.62 Interest-
ingly, more internal problems surfaced in the Izala at the same time, even-
tually leading to their division (see above).
Today the situation differs radically from the past decades. In conver-
sation, Izala and Sufi leaders still speak of doctrinal differences but the 
conflict is reduced. Several factors explain the change. Firstly, the death 
of almost all the main antagonists: Sheikh Gumi and Sheikh Idris on the 
Izala side and Sheikh N. Kabara on ṭarīqa side. Secondly, the division of 
the Izala movement and its ‘domestication’.63 Thirdly, the emergence of a 
conflict between Muslims and Christians which resulted in a new union 
within the ‘house of Islam’. When the sharīʿa debate started in 1999, most 
Muslims in Nigeria saw the need for unity against what they perceived 
as a common ‘enemy’: that is all sharīʿa opponents, especially Christians, 
who heavily opposed the sharīʿa project.
60 Loimeier, 1993, pages 152–154.
61 Loimeier, 1993, pages 156–157.
62 Loimeier, 1993, pages 216–221.
63 Kane, 2003, pages 207–297.
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What is the Izala perspective on the re-implementation of sharīʿa? 
Did they contribute to the project? How do they view their role in 
retrospect?
The sharīʿa Re-Implementation: Izala as Initiator?
The first to implement Sharia Penal Code was Zamfara State, in January 
2000. Ahmad Sani Yeriman Bakura was the governor who initially passed 
the sharīʿa law that he had promised during his election campaign in 
1999. Speculation about his motives are widespread. Some claimed this 
measure was pure propaganda and others took advantage of this unique 
opportunity to promote Islamic law in the North of the federation:
What . . . at first glance looked like the clever gambit of a single governor . . . to 
gain popular support and to secure his own political survival developed into 
a chain reaction throughout the predominantly Muslim-inhabited northern 
states of Nigeria.64
Eleven other northern states followed Zamfara’s model and also intro-
duced sharīʿa Penal Codes.65 The new sharīʿa law does not only change 
matters of jurisdiction but also involves certain social and moral values. 
Societal control increased and several programmes for purifying Muslims 
from social vices, such as drinking alcohol and sexual impropriety, have 
been introduced. There were campaigns to fight against prostitution and 
gambling. In public the segregation between male and female Muslims 
should be respected. During my stay in Nigeria, several people whom I 
talked to assured me of this aspect of change, although they confessed 
that it has been minimal. The sharīʿa was welcomed and seen as a solu-
tion to the problems of the country.
It appears that most Muslim groups openly welcomed the sharīʿa re-
implementation, apart from the Shiites, under the leadership of Ibraheem 
al-Zakzaky.66 Al-Zakzaky and his group—known as Muslim Brothers and 
called Yan Shiʿa (Shiite people) by the majority of Muslims—opposed 
64 Kogelmann, Franz, ‘The “Sharia factor” in Nigeria’s 2003 Elections’, in Soares, Benja-
min F. (ed.): Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa, Leiden: Brill, 2006, pages 257–258. 
65 For further information on the process of reimplementation of sharīʿa see, Peters, 
Ruud, Islamic Criminal Law in Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2003; these states 
are Sokoto, Niger, Kebbi, Bauchi, Borno, Katsina, Kano, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna and Yobe.
66 See Suleiman, G. Ibrahim, ‘Mallam Ibrahim El-Zakzaky and the Question of Shiʿism’, 
B.A. Dissertation in Islamic Studies, University of Jos, 2005. 
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the reimplementation. The movement of al-Zakzaky is influenced by the 
Iranian revolution of 1979. This influence developed to a full Shiite ori-
entation. The movement calls itself “The Islamic Movement”. The rise of 
Shiite doctrine originated in Nigeria’s social, economic and political chal-
lenges during the colonial era and especially throughout the post-inde-
pendence period.67 Inspired by the success of the Revolution in Iran, and 
as a result of the turmoil of Nigeria in many directions, Sheikh Ibraheem 
al-Zakzaky started introducing Shiite ideas to the West African country. 
Sheikh al-Zakzaky was born in Zaria in 1950 and has studied at Ahmadu 
Bello University in the same city. He was among the active members of 
the Muslim Students Society (MSS) before he broke with it. He was among 
the students who demonstrated against the state. He visited Iran in the 
1980s and came back to recruit new members of his “Islamic Movement”. 
He regards Islam as a solution to the country’s problems and propagated 
these ideas through lectures and public gatherings in Northern Nigeria. 
He opposed the nation-state with all its symbols and defined it as a ṭāghūt 
(Arab.: symbol of idolatry, evil). In many cases, demonstrations by al-
Zakzaky’s followers turned to violent contest with the police. al-Zakzaky 
himself was imprisoned several times because of his ideas and opposition 
to the federal state.68
In a lecture given at Bayero University, Kano in December 1999, al-
Zakzaky tried to clarify his position towards sharīʿa. After defining the 
word ‘sharīʿa,’ he classified Islamic countries applying sharīʿa into three 
major categories:
1. Traditional ones that applied the sharīʿa for a long time and that were 
hardly colonised by western colonialists.
2. Countries that applied sharīʿa partially: these countries have been colo-
nised and after independence they started practising a ‘post-colonial 
system of democracy’.
3. Finally, countries where the sharīʿa is total and where an Islamic revo-
lution took place.69
67 Suleiman, 2005, pages 5–8.
68 Suleiman, 2005, pages 8–10.
69 al-Zakzaky, Ibraheem, ‘Application of Shari’ah in the contemporary world: Lessons 
from some Muslim countries’, a Paper presented to the national Conference on the Appli-
cation of Shari’ah organized by the Department of Islamic Law, Faculty of Law, Bayero 
University and RAMNAN Law Consult, Kano, Bayero University, 1st to 3rd December 1999, 
page 8. 
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After giving the examples of Pakistan, Sudan and finally of Iran, al-Zakzaky 
came to the conclusion that sharīʿa was successful only in Iran because 
it is under an Islamic state. He sees the success of a full sharīʿa imple-
mentation only within a system of government which is ‘purely Islamic’. 
Concerning Nigeria, al-Zakzaky predicts two conflicts when the sharīʿa is 
applied:
One conflict will be with the constitution which will claim superiority over 
the Shariʿah and will, therefore, place the Shariʿah under its control and 
regulations. The Other conflict will be with the Shariʿah itself which, as the 
Law of Almighty God, claims superiority over all laws and therefore cannot 
accept the supremacy of the Nigerian constitution.70
Al-Zakzaky concludes by saying that the application of sharīʿa under a 
government system which is not Islamic will subject it (sharīʿa) to ‘restric-
tions, manipulations and possible abuse’.71
Unlike al-Zakzaky, the Izala movement was one of the groups that dem-
onstrated its support of sharīʿa re-implementation. This is not surprising 
since the project conforms to the Izala doctrine of calling people back to 
Islam and islamisation of the society. This is obvious in its concern with 
Islamic education and daʿwa, and with the Qurʾān and sunna. The Izala 
also encourages women to wear ḥijāb. The Izala criticises social injus-
tices and opposes corruption. But are they the initiators of the sharīʿa- 
Re-implementation-project?
Ustadh Nasir Abdelmuhyi, director of the School of Higher Islamic 
Studies, Izala headquarters in Jos, claimed that:
The Society was among the first who called for the implementation of 
sharīʿa and thank God, the Governor of Zamfara, was the first who listened 
to the call of Izala and practiced sharīʿa. This is one of the good things done 
by the Jamāʿa [Izala].72
Sheikh Dalha Abubakar, the Izala leader in Lagos State added that the 
sharīʿa in Nigeria was re-implemented so fast because of Izala. The 
sheikhs were preaching and doing da‛wa in Zamfara after an invitation 
from Ahmad Sani Yeriman Bakura, who was not yet governor but cam-
paigning. On this occasion he gave a lecture saying:
70 al-Zakzaky, 1999, page 13. 
71  al-Zakzaky, 1999, page 15.
72 Interview with Ustadh Nasir Abdulmuhyi, Jos, 5th December 2006 in his office.
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I promise you—my Society; our Society—that if you elect me as governor, 
then I will implement the Islamic sharīʿa. I will do that because this Society 
taught and linked us to what is useful for us and through it we understood 
that the religion is Islam and sharīʿa is the best thing in life that a human 
being can reach. sharīʿa is the way of satisfaction of Allah. If you elect me 
now as Zamfara Governor, I will apply sharīʿa!73
After he had been elected as governor of Zamfara State, Sheikh Ismaila 
Idris reminded him about his promise in a letter:
I thank Allah for you, but I want to remind you that you promised Allah to 
apply his sharīʿa and since you have the opportunity to do it, then hurry up. 
It is a wealth that should not be delayed.74
Ismaila Idris also requested all Izala leaders to support Ahmad Sani at this 
crucial time: “Go to him, support his project, assist him with what you can, 
and tell him that you are on his side. I am also with you!”75
A number of Izala leaders claim to be behind Sani’s sharīʿa project. 
It is impossible to prove such a statement, as many Muslims in Nigeria 
saw the sharīʿa project as being supported by the majority of Muslims in 
the country and not only the Izala. The leader of Jamāʿat Tajdīd al-Islām 
‘Society of Revival of Islam’ (JTI), Sheikh Abubakar Mujahid, pointed out 
that the re-implementation of sharīʿa in Nigeria was achieved through the 
contribution of many groups: Izala, Sufis, JTI and others:
. . . the tariqa and Izala played the role of sensitizing people. People of the 
Umma did the legal aspect, and JTI tried to find answers to the issues like 
corruption; the Zakat of course it was in our (task) and look how to collect 
Zakat.76  
Sani Mudibbo, former Izala National secretary, confirms that implement-
ing sharīʿa or transforming Nigeria into an Islamic state was not the initial 
agenda of the Izala. Instead, the movement was determined to fight bidʿa 
and Sufism more than any other thing.
This point of view is backed up by O’Brien in her article on sharīʿa in 
Nigeria. She writes that the Izala was neither the first group that called peo-
ple to apply Islamic Law nor the one that monopolised its application:
73 Interview with Dalha Abubakar Abdallah, Lagos, 18th February 2007.
74 Interview with Dalha Abubakar Abdallah, Lagos, 18th February 2007.
75 Interview with Dalha Abubakar Abdallah, Lagos, 18th February 2007.
76 Interview with Sheikh Abubakar Mujahid, Zaria, 5th January 2007.
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Les réformistes d’inspiration wahhabite connu sous le nom d’Izala et leurs 
nombreuses branches, dont certaines reçoivent des financements Saou-
diens, n’ont pas été les premiers a réclamer la charia, pas plus qu’ils n’ont 
monopolisé son application, au profit des principales confréries soufis, la 
Qadiriyya et la Tijaniyya.77
Sharīʿa is not simply the result of an anti-Sufi reform. Rather the Izala 
adapted several times to the political conditions. Therefore O’Brien sees 
Izala as ‘reformist’ but not as ‘islamist revolutionist’.78
Conclusion
The objective of this chapter was to situate the Izala within the project 
of re-implementing sharīʿa in Northern Nigeria and to examine whether 
or not the movement initiated the project. The re-implementation of 
sharīʿa, although initiated as part of a political campaign, was seen as a 
solution to the problems of Nigerian Muslims. The whole project offered 
Izala a unique opportunity to confirm its own doctrine of establishing 
the sunna and Islamising society. Sharīʿa and Izala can go side by side 
and the movement that concentrated for decades on education and fight-
ing bidʿa became an active member of the project of the umma. In fact, 
opposing sharīʿa means opposing Islam and that can be related to social 
isolation. Sharīʿa was an identity marker of Muslims in northern Nigeria. 
It was seen as a chance to undo years of repression of Islamic law. Sharīʿa 
was related to change and the reform of society. Sharīʿa became a unify-
ing issue despite the heterogeneity of the Nigerian society and existence 
of other religious groups in the sharīʿa states.
Izala understood the rules of the game. Since the conflict with the Sufis 
had ceased and the Izala was divided and ‘domesticated’, the movement 
was threatened with passing into oblivion. The hypothesis is that Izala 
changed its strategy and supported the re-implementation of sharīʿa. One 
set of Izala leaders insist that the movement initiated Islamic law; on the 
other hand many voices disagree with this statement, so the supposition 
is difficult to prove. What can be said is that the resurgence of the Izala 
in the public sphere conspicuously occurred at the same time as the re-
implementation of sharīʿa in Nigeria.
77 O’Brien, Susan M. ‘La Charia contestée: Démocratie, débat et diversité musulmane 
dans les ‘état Charia’ du Nigeria’, Politique Africaine 106, 2007, page 48.
78 O’Brien, 2007, page 52.
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Map 5 Map of Kenya: Showing principal places referred to in Part Three
CHAPTER SEVEN
DEBATES ON KADHI’S COURTS AND CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS 
IN ISIOLO TOWN: THEMATIC ISSUES AND EMERGENT TRENDS
Halkano Abdi Wario
Introduction
Since 1992, Kenya has been characterised by demands for new consti-
tutional dispensations. It has also seen heightened competing interests 
emerge in which religion and politicised ethnicity have played a pivotal 
role in the political game of the day. The same scenario has been replicated 
at a grass roots level. Elsewhere, as in the Kenyan case, the increased calls 
for recognition and empowerment of courts applying aspects of sharīʿa 
almost instantly elicit strong negative responses from Christian communi-
ties. One of the contentious issues in the referendum on a draft constitu-
tion was the issue of Kadhi’s courts. Should they be empowered, or left to 
stay as in the current Constitution? The resultant debates are the concern 
of this chapter. The findings of the research have strong implications for 
Christian-Muslim relations. The chapter examines how different views 
evolved in Isiolo, a small Northern Kenyan town. The town has a his-
tory of strained Christian-Muslim relations. Contests over resources and 
ownership of the town feature highly in every new conflict. The chapter 
explores the role of ethno-religious ascriptions and elite mobilization in 
the increasing misunderstandings about Kadhi’s courts. It also illustrates 
that, despite efforts by concerned civic educators to teach the residents, 
the resultant decisions were informed by insufficient knowledge about 
courts’ functions.
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. Firstly, it problematises the 
two main concepts used herein, Kadhi’s courts and Christian-Muslim rela-
tions, by outlining their conceptual and practical frameworks. Secondly, 
it analyses the seven main thematic issues arising out of debates, as per-
ceived by Muslims and Christians of Isiolo Town in Kenya. This involves 
exploring the complex issues that came to be part of the debate, despite 
being explicitly unrelated to the operations of the Kadhi’s courts, and how 
the debate shaped the resultant skewed understanding of the constitu-
tional debates during the Referendum campaigns in Kenya during 2005. 
© Halkano Abdi Wario, 2014 | doi:10.1163/9789004262126_008
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Finally, the chapter concludes by examining emergent trends that arose as 
a result of the debates on Kadhi’s courts and Christian-Muslim relations.
Isiolo Town,1 considered to be the gateway to Northern Kenya, is a 
melting pot of peoples and different cultures of Northeast Africa. The 
town developed in the early 20th century as a colonial administrative out-
post and a centre for the then Northern Frontier District (NFD), which 
was separately administered from the rest of the country, as well as being 
the staging-post for long-distance trade and hunting expeditions during 
its early years.2 Following Independence in 1963, the shifta3 conflicts in 
Northern Kenya during the mid to late 1960s and the collapse of the pas-
toral economy, the greater population of the destitute were drawn to the 
town by the demands for services, labour, farm and livestock products 
and petty trade. From early days, Asian and Somali traders provided the 
economic activities in the form of small retail shops (Swah.: duka), while 
the Turkana, Waso Borana4 and Samburu herders served as their main 
customers. Since then the Igembe and Tigania Meru subgroups, who had 
been displaced from the Meru region due to population pressure and scar-
city of farm land, have moved into the town to set up consumer business. 
Apart from engaging in keeping livestock, the former pastoralists are also 
involved in small scale subsistence farming through irrigation.
Religious communities in the town include Muslims and Christians of 
the following denominations: Roman Catholics, Methodists, Presbyterians 
and Anglicans, as well as a host of Pentecostal churches. Ethnic and reli-
gious identities more often than not overlap, providing the actors with mul-
tiple identities. Ethnically and culturally, the population divides into what 
is colloquially referred to as the Bantu speakers, represented by the Meru; 
1 According to Isiolo District Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper: Consultative Report for 
the Period 2001–2004, Ministry of Finance and Planning, page 3, the estimated population 
of the Isiolo Central division, of which the town is the centre, was 52,588 persons as at 
1999. 
2 Hjort, Anders, Savanna town: Rural Ties and Urban Opportunities in Northern Kenya, 
Stockholm: Stockholm Studies of Social Anthropology, 1979. 
3 Shifta wars refer to the secessionist conflicts waged from 1963 to 1969 by the Somali 
and a section of, largely Muslim, Waso Borana in order to join their culturally and religious 
brethren in the Republic of Somalia. The term Shifta has its origin in an Amharic word, 
meaning bandit.
4 Waso Borana refers to the Borana group which emigrated from Ethiopia due to 
expansionist wars of Menelik in the late 19th century. According to Mario I. Aguilar’s 
Being Oromo in Kenya, Trenton: Africa World Press, 1998, these Borana groups who occupy 
Merti, Garba Tulla, Isiolo Town, and Sericho were separated from their kinsmen in the 
homelands in Ethiopia in early 20th century due to colonial rule and, as a result, religious 
diversification is a common feature.
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the Cushitic communities of the Borana5 and the Somali; and the Nilotic 
speakers of Turkana and Samburu. These, however, are not self-identifying 
cultural categories. Rather, the communities divide themselves into their 
ethnic groups, where self-identity is stronger within groups than across 
groups. While the Meru, a significant minority in the town, are predomi-
nantly Christian, the Borana and Somali are largely Muslim. In essence, 
the national perception of a Muslim minority in a predominantly Chris-
tian majority state is negated in the town’s demographic balance as the 
majority-minority dynamics are reversed. However, it should be noted 
that in each religious community there exists a high ethnic conscious-
ness, which often translates itself in the form of, for instance, the Borana, 
the Somali, the Meru, the Turkana and Samburu. This is also reflected in 
the settlement patterns of different communities, with each of the groups 
occupying different areas of the town. Besides this, the more pastoral 
groups frequently clash over scarce resources, such as grazing lands and 
water.6 Conflicts in the area have a great propensity to depict the fluid 
and volatile identities of ethno-religious crises, as the division between 
the two is often blurred.
The Conceptual and Practical Contours of Kadhi’s Courts
Post-1990, Africa has been characterised by the (re)introduction of politi-
cal pluralism, the liberation of airwaves and enhanced adherence to 
human rights and freedoms. The period has also witnessed agitation to 
put in place constitutional dispensations that reflect the will of the citi-
zenry, to replace the irredeemably amended independence constitution. 
Since the fall of the Soviet bloc, in most African countries, ideologies that 
had gained currency due to Cold War rivalry ran out of  ammunition. 
5 Different spellings have been used by researchers to refer to Borana, a branch of 
Oromo found in Isiolo, Marsabit and Moyale Districts of Northern Kenya and Southern 
Ethiopia. They include Boran, Booran, Boorana and Borana. Booran(a) is considered by 
Aguilar (1998) as closer to the phonetic sound of the word. The long ‘o’ is a long vowel 
while the second vowel ‘a’ is accented and the terminal vowel ‘a’ is optional and is usually 
dropped in phonetically restricted environments. Legesse, Asmarom, Oromo Democracy: 
An Indigenous African Political System, Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea Press, 2006. For uni-
formity I use ‘Borana’ in the chapter, as no standard format has been accepted and all the 
variants are considered legitimate. 
6 See Ruto, P., M. Adan & I. Masinde, Conflicts in Northern Kenya: A Focus on the Inter-
nally Displaced conflict victims in Northern Kenya, Nairobi: ITGA-EA & DTP Martin Karimi 
Publishers, 2003, for further reading on conflicts in Northern Kenya.
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Ethnicity and other forms of identities took the centre-stage as the ral-
lying ground for political, economic, and social and cultural bargains 
and negotiations.7
In Kenya, members of different religious communities face similar 
socio-economic and political predicaments; however, the drive for the 
new rules of the game has often led to divergent, if not incompatible, 
views on constitutional matters regarding issues such as the status of 
Kadhi’s courts. Although the calls for their empowerment and expansion 
were largely expressed to the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission 
(CKRC) when it collated and collected the views from Kenyans of all walks 
of life in the early 2000s, such calls cannot be divorced from the opening 
up of the democratic space in 1992 and the subsequent opportunity it 
offered to members and elites of the different faiths to add their input to 
the tools of governance in the spirit of a ‘people-driven’ process. In the 
following section, the chapter examines the constitutional development 
of Kadhi’s courts from an historical perspective.
Kadhi’s Courts: An Historical Continuum
Along the East African coast, the institution of Kadhi’s courts existed 
much earlier than the period of establishment of British colonization. 
The weak Sultanate of Zanzibar ceded to the British the Coastal Strip as 
a protectorate, with the guarantee that certain issues be given protection. 
An 1895 agreement between the two powers made a resolution that the 
new administrators will respect and protect all mosques and religious 
festivals, and that Kadhis and ʿulamāʾ shall continue to receive all hon-
ours, among other issues. The agreement explicitly stated that “Moham-
medan religion will remain the public and established creed in all Sultan’s 
territories, and all cases and law suits between natives will continue 
to be decided according to Sheria”.8 The colonial administration set up a 
7 Oloo, A. G. R., ‘The Contemporary Opposition in Kenya: Between Internal Traits and 
Manipulation’, in Kenya: The Struggle for Democracy, G. R. Murunga & S. W. Nasong’o 
(eds.), Dakar: Codesria Books, 2007, pages 90–128; Omolo, Ken, ‘Political Ethnicity in 
Democratisation Process in Kenya’, African Studies, 61:2, 2002, pages 209–221; Ajulu, Rok, 
‘Politicized Ethnicity, Competitive Politics and Conflicts in Kenya: A Historical Perspec-
tive’, African Studies, 61:2, 2002, pages 251–268; Nasong’o, S. W., Contending Political Para-
digms in Africa: Rationality and Politics of Democratization in Kenya and Zambia, New York 
and London: Routledge, 2005.
8 Mungeam, G. H., Kenya: Select Historical Documents 1884–1961, Nairobi: EAEP, 1978, 
page 68.
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tri-partite legal system: Common law (Colonial) courts, Kadhi’s courts and 
Customary courts. The last two had no jurisdiction over criminal cases 
and they remained subordinate courts, mandated to handle personal law 
for their adherents under strict supervision of the High Court. The colo-
nial administration co-opted local ʿulamāʾ as civil servants to serve in the 
Kadhi’s courts; such officials often hailed from leading coastal families.9
The status of the Kadhi’s courts in the colony was different from that 
of the Protectorate. Muslims in other parts of the colony such as Mumias, 
and the Northern Frontier District, were not subject to the rule of the 
Sultanate of Zanzibar, nor were they part of the Coastal Strip. There were 
no legally binding agreements that endorsed establishment of such courts 
in the colony. On the eventual establishment of similar courts outside the 
Protectorate, Hassan Mwakimako observes that:
The difference between a protectorate and a colony in terms of the appli-
cability of Islamic laws and in particular the appointment of Muslim offi-
cials designated as Kadhi was a dilemma facing immigrant and indigenous 
Muslim communities who while domiciled in the colony still demanded to 
have special legal interactions with colonial authorities as it was the prac-
tice at the Coast. The practicability of such demands manifested in Mumias 
as Muslims failed to appreciate the colonial governments’ preference for a 
geographical categorization of spheres of influences as far as the establish-
ment of Kadhi courts and an application of Sharia laws demanding instead 
a universalistic religious-based establishment of legal structures and appli-
cation of rules.10
The colonial administrators appointed a few learned individuals, deemed 
to possess adequate knowledge of Muslim personal law, as registrars of 
Muslim marriages and divorces, on a semi-official basis. Nonetheless, they 
were referred to as kadhis by the colony’s Muslim subjects. Isiolo was the 
headquarters of the then ‘closed’ Northern Frontier District (NFD). Colo-
nial archival sources indicate that there were no Native courts or courts 
with jurisdiction over Muslim personal law until the mid-1940s. Before 
then, among such communities as the Somali, local sheikhs and clan 
elders often presided over cases of civil, and sometimes criminal, nature. 
By the mid-1940s there was a registrar of Muslim marriages and divorces 
(‘kadhi’) based in the NFD. Sheikh Abdulla bin Ali, a Somali resident of 
  9 Bang, A., ‘Intellectuals and Civil Servants: Early 20th Century Zanzibar Ulama and 
the Colonial State’, Islam in East Africa: New Sources, Biancamaria Scarcia Amoretti (ed.), 
Rome: Herder, 2001, page 59.
10 Hassan Mwakimako, ‘Kadhi Court and Appointment of Kadhi in Kenya Colony’, 
Religion Compass 2/4, 2008, page 427.
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Wajir, served as the first ‘kadhi’. He frequently travelled between Isiolo, 
Wajir and other towns to hear scheduled Muslim personal law cases. 
These duties were carried out in co-ordination with the District Com-
missioners of all the six districts in the NFD, namely: Garba Tulla, Wajir, 
Garissa, Mandera, Moyale and Isiolo. During this period most of the dis-
putants were urbanized Somali and a few Borana. Outside the towns, an 
admixture of customary and Islamic law were popularly applied. J. N. D. 
Anderson aptly observes that:
Most disputes are settled by ad hoc arbitration ‘tribunals’, which apparently 
apply an admixture of tribal and Islamic law as they see fit. There is only one 
official Qadi at Isiolo, the headquarters of the Province; but there are regis-
trars of marriages (who act as unofficial Qadis) at Wajir, Moyale, Garissa, etc. 
There are also a few ‘holy men’—i.e. local leaders of dervish [Sufi] orders—
who sometimes act in a semi-judicial capacity.11
The early 1960s was a period of intense constitutional negotiation in East 
Africa. The 1895 Agreement between the British and the Sultanate was 
revisited by the soon-to-be independent African governments. The Sul-
tan of Zanzibar gave up his sovereignty over the Coastal Strip (10-Mile 
Strip) in exchange for a constitutional guarantee for a number of issues 
pertinent to the welfare of the coastal Muslims. This included, among oth-
ers, the continued existence and recognition of the institution of Kadhi’s 
courts in Independent Kenya.
The courts were, hence, enshrined in the Constitution. Through a 
number of Acts, the parliament outlined the functions of the subordinate 
courts to determine matters of Muslim law on personal status, marriage, 
divorce, and inheritance, in proceedings in which all parties involved pro-
fess the Islamic faith. Kadhis, strictly speaking, are Muslim judges who 
preside over these courts and they are employees of the Judicial Service 
Commission, having proved to have adequate knowledge of Islamic law. 
Currently there are about 17 such courts dotted all over the country to 
serve Muslim clients. There is a Kadhi’s chamber at Isiolo Law Courts.
The post-1992 period in Kenya was marked by increased demands for 
a new constitution as the Independence Constitution was seen to have 
been manipulated severally to create an ‘imperial’ presidency and to 
entrench bad governance. The national constitutional conferences, held 
at the Bomas of Kenya in the early 2000s, were the apex of such public 
11 Anderson, J. N. D., ‘Kenya’, in Islamic Law in Africa, London: Cass, 1970, page 113. 
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demands. The Draft Constitution of 2004 (Bomas Draft),12 had provision 
for devolution of power, equitable distribution of national resources, 
affirmative action, the redress of historical injustice, solutions to peren-
nial land questions and provided for the empowerment of Kadhi’s courts, 
among other issues.
The radical recommendations of constitutional changes were strongly 
opposed by the government. In place of the Bomas Draft, the government 
presented a new draft constitution, entitled the Proposed New Constitu-
tion of Kenya and known as the ‘Wako Draft’,13 for public discussion; this 
was taken to a vote by means of a referendum which was held on 21st 
November 2005. The position of Kadhi’s courts was argued to have been 
weakened in this draft, unlike the situation in the Bomas draft. We shall 
return to these documents in our discussion of thematic issues.
Christian-Muslim Relations: What Is It All About?
Going by the number of publications dedicated to its study, Christian-
Muslim relations remains a popular academic discourse.14 It can be 
argued that the very term ‘Christian-Muslim relations’, devoid of deter-
minism, may at first appear to suggest uniformity of intent and practice, 
although it is grounded in the assumption of variability and change.15 
The foci of this subject in Africa range from scriptural implications of 
the various religious texts on the relations and instances of co-operation 
and co-existence, to political and social challenges arising out of strained 
relations. The subject further considers the roles played by education and 
other forms of socialization on relations between religions. It also covers 
the effects of globalization on the relations, and the impact of increased 
12 The Draft Constitution of Kenya 2004, (CKRC) adopted by the National Constitutional 
Conference on the 15th March 2004, known as the ‘Bomas Draft’. The conference was held 
at a venue called Bomas of Kenya. 
13 This draft constitution was popularly referred to as the Wako Draft; it was named 
after the Attorney General, Mr. Amos Wako, whose office was responsible for the for-
mulation of the Draft from earlier draft bills and the current Constitution. The Proposed 
New Constitution of Kenya. Special Issue Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 63, Nairobi, 22nd 
August 2005, known as the ‘Wako Draft’. 
14 A search of the Bibliography of Islam in Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa, by Paul 
Schrijver (ed.), Leiden: African Studies Centre, 2006, revealed almost 100 articles that 
included the words ‘Christian-Muslim’. 
15 Mwakimako, H., ‘Christian-Muslim Relations in Kenya: A Catalogue of Events 
and Meanings’, Islam and Christian Muslim Relations, Vol. 18, No. 2, 287–307, April 2007, 
page 288. 
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demands for observance of religious laws in post-colonial secular states in 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies, amongst others.
The popularity of the subject has also been motivated by the need 
to understand the growing tension between Muslims and Christians in 
a globalized world, faced with uncertainty over competition for scarce 
resources and opportunities, increased calls for application and recogni-
tion of religious laws by religious groups, and protection of their rights 
as minorities. The sustained campaigns of prejudice, suspicions and ste-
reotyping through media and other public forums by members of rival 
religions are raising much concern, as well as interest, in academic 
researches. While the study of Christian-Muslim relations may signal the 
urge to understand the tensions and dissonance between and among 
religious communities, more often than not, the relations are character-
ized by cordial co-existence in every day interactions in the social arena. 
In most parts of Africa, there is a strong movement to encourage good 
Christian-Muslim relations through seminars, workshops, visits, and open 
discussions. Although such efforts are often elitist in nature, they never-
theless represent the primary basis for dialogue and interfaith approaches 
to solve conflicts.
Competition over socio-economic and political goods such as land, per-
ceived marginalization of one’s group by a ruling class associated with 
a rival religious community, and fear of the other have been identified 
as fuelling strained Christian-Muslim relations.16 Hence, “when perceived 
imbalance in distribution of resources with identity differences exists, we 
have potential for conflicts”.17 It must be borne in mind that “religious 
beliefs create boundaries between people not only when distorted or mis-
used; for, religion binds persons into . . . communities of those who believe 
in Jesus, Allah or Krishna”.18
16 Njozi, H. M., Mwembechai Killings and the Political Future of Tanzania, Ottawa: 
Globalink Communications, 2000; Hashim, Abdulkadir, ‘Muslim State Relations in Kenya 
after the Referendum on the Constitution’, in AASR Bulletin 24, November 2005, pages 
21–27; Kubai, A., ‘Christian-Muslim Relations in Kenya since Independence’, Interface 
between Research and Dialogue: Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa, Klaus Hock (ed.), 
Münster: LIT, 2004, pages 32–65.
17 Yusuf, H. B., ‘Managing Muslim-Christian Conflicts in Northern Nigeria: A Case 
Study of Kaduna State’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 18, No. 2, April 2007, 
page 241.
18 Gecaga, M. G., ‘Religious Movements and Democratization in Kenya: Between 
the Sacred and the Profane’, Kenya: The Struggle for Democracy, G. R. Murunga & S. W. 
Nasong’o (eds.), Dakar: Codesria Books, 2007, page 63.
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Discourse on Christian-Muslim relations can best be studied by focus-
ing not on general issues, but rather on specific contextual situations that 
show how conflict, or the lack of it, is usually shaped by historical and 
socio-economic circumstances. The best approach is therefore ‘contextu-
alization from below’, so as to appreciate the authenticity and unique-
ness of people’s experience.19 In this chapter the author has reconsidered 
contextualization in terms of themes that formed the Muslim-Christian 
debates in Isiolo over the constitutional position of Kadhi’s court. While 
the first two themes reflect the debates as articulated by Muslims and 
Christians in the national arena and in Isiolo, the remaining themes are 
mainly specific to this town.
Thematic Issues from the Debates on Kadhi’s Courts  
in Isiolo Town
These themes are based on interviews and observations conducted 
between August 2006 and April 2007. The analysis of the data does not 
necessarily suggest homogeneity and consensus among members of one 
religious or ethnic group, but rather represents the dominant perspectives. 
The terms ‘Christians’ and ‘Muslims’, as used here, are loosely defined 
without denying the diversities of voices and persuasions in each group. 
This is because the respondents identify themselves as such. In total, 32 
interviews were conducted.
Purposive sampling technique was used to identify key informants, 
with care being taken to ensure that the sample groups were not affected 
by religious, ethnic, gender and educational biases. The sample popula-
tion was categorized into 6 clusters to capture different segments of the 
society, namely: religious leaders, civil society officials, ordinary men and 
women, youth groups, community leaders and former officials of the Con-
stitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC). Semi-structured ques-
tions were administered during individual and group interviews. Official 
and unofficial social forums, in which debates about constitutional mat-
ters were discussed, were also attended. These included civic awareness 
programmes, sermons in places of worship such as mosques, and informal 
afternoon public discussions, which were common along the main streets 
of Isiolo. Included among the interviewees were local representatives 
19 Mwakimako, 2007, page 95.
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of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) and the National 
Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), religious leaders from the Jamia 
and Rahma Mosques, Roman Catholic Church, the Methodist Church and 
Redeemed Gospel Churches and the Kadhi of Isiolo. Secondary materials 
consulted included various documents from the CKRC, the Constitution 
of Kenya, various draft constitutions such as Kilifi, Bomas and Ufunga-
mano drafts, publications and press statements from national and local 
religious organizations and instructional materials used by various civic 
education providers. The textual analyses of the data were done using the 
grounded theory approach that entailed identifying categories, concepts 
and themes. Recurrent ideas were then regrouped under the seven the-
matic issues as set out below.
Theme One: Views about Kadhi’s Courts by Muslims and Christians
There is a consensus about the historical existence of the courts in Kenya. 
The existence of Kadhi’s courts in Kenya might, however, mean different 
things to different religions. For a majority of the Muslims in the area, it 
is an historical validation of the courts’ continued existence and improve-
ment; whereas, for the Christians, the government of Kenya entered into 
agreements with other regional states at the time of independence with-
out much thought and without wider consultation. Such agreements, 
which resulted in the entrenchment of Kadhi’s courts, therefore should 
be abrogated. The sentiment expressed by one informant captures the 
argument this way:
Yes, my feeling is that in the first place the courts should not have been 
there and now that we are rewriting the constitution it should go. Because, 
if we go back to the origin of it all, it started along the Coast only. There was 
an agreement which was made in the colonial period. But now we are say-
ing because now we want to write a good constitution, some of the things 
which bring problems should be done away with, or be removed. So that has 
been a big question all through. Why should this one recognize one religious 
system while others should not be recognized?20
For the Muslims, the court has come to symbolize the only institution in 
the Constitution that protects their interests as members of a minority 
religion in a country where Christian belief dominates. The Courts have 
20 Personal interview with Pastor Geoffrey, 11th December 2006, at Deliverance Church, 
Isiolo.
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therefore become “a symbol of both Muslim governance and its vulner-
ability in the post-colonial era”.21 Because the Kadhis are weaving a role 
between the secular and religious legal structures, negotiating for a place 
for their non-secular judicial system, Muslims in general believe that they 
cannot envisage the rightful enjoyment of their freedoms and rights in 
the absence of these courts in Kenya. The respondents in Isiolo air similar 
concerns about the importance of the courts in their daily lives. Sheikh 
Harun, echoing the symbolic status of the courts for the Muslims, local 
and national, opines that:
Kadhi’s Courts are the only body that exists in the Constitution that Mus-
lims can truly claim to be theirs and be proud of. If a new constitution is 
constructed, it must take into account the opinions and interests of the 
Muslim community into the new laws. This is what we are after. Interests 
of the Muslims must be guaranteed generally by the Constitution and not 
partially by it.22
The fact that these courts have always catered exclusively for parties pro-
fessing Islam elicited negative responses from the majority of Christians, 
who subscribe to the idea of ‘one country, one legal system’. The entrench-
ment of these courts into the Constitution of Kenya was interpreted as 
state recognition and favouritism of Islam. To the Muslims, such reactions 
are motivated by envy, suspicion and propaganda, because the courts only 
handle matters of personal law for Muslims. In the view of the Muslims, 
the constitutional role that the Kadhi’s Courts play should not concern 
non-Muslims who are not affected by their decisions.
The proposed changes in the Bomas Draft that became part of the Ref-
erendum debates include the granting of appellate jurisdiction to Kadhi’s 
courts, and reforms aimed at enhancing their functional capacities as 
corridors of justice. Muslim rejection of the Wako Draft arose out of the 
fear that such changes were removed and the status of the courts fur-
ther weakened. In practice, the courts lack such jurisdiction, as appeals 
lie ultimately with the High Court and the Court of Appeal, where the 
application of secular laws takes precedence over Muslim personal law. 
The decisions made in such cases are subject to contest on the basis of 
Islamic jurisprudence. Though appeals are rare, and appellate decisions 
21 Hirsch, S. F., Pronouncing and Persevering: Gender and Discourses of Disputing in Afri-
can Islamic Court, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1998, page 136.
22 Personal interview with Sheikh Harun on 11th December 2006, at Bomen Hotel, 
Isiolo. 
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even rarer, the possibility of such a process has been noted to challenge 
the authority and legitimacy of these courts in post-colonial Kenya.23 
These views were largely expressed by the Muslim religious and commu-
nity leaders in the town.
The call in earlier draft bills for appellate jurisdiction for the courts and 
their enhanced status was largely viewed by Christians as being a calcu-
lated and gradual move to introduce Islamic sharīʿa in a fuller form, just 
like in Nigeria or the Sudan. Examples from these countries were often 
voiced to show opposition to the courts. Such moves were also seen as 
costly to the economy, as two parallel systems of law will be enforced, and 
it was considered that conflicts between the two systems will be inevi-
table. Furthermore, the very existence of non-secular legal structures in 
a secular state was often cited as contradictory to the Constitution and 
Article 10 of the Wako Draft that “the state and religion shall be separate, 
there is no state religion and the state shall treat all religions equally”. For 
the majority of the local Muslim respondents, these courts are not reli-
gious courts and they should be seen in the context of judiciary; Kadhis 
are only civil servants presiding over matters of personal laws.
Theme Two: Majority-Minority Dichotomy
Prior to the 21st November 2005 referendum, the issue of Kadhi’s courts 
was interpreted in terms of a demographic struggle over political issues. 
Each religious community blamed the other for amassing their followers 
to sway the results to their side.
Christian-Muslim relations in Kenya have often been seen through 
the lens of a majority-minority spectrum. And “considering the fact that 
Muslims in Kenya consider themselves to be living in the shadow of [a] 
dominant Christian population (estimated at 75%) the social, political 
and economic issues of conflicts become implicitly religious”.24
The suggestion that the courts should be established as an act of parlia-
ment, instead of being entrenched into the Constitution, was also opposed 
on the grounds that because the numbers of Muslim parliamentarians 
are relatively small, there were fears that the dominant Christian pres-
ence in parliament could easily throw out the courts’ provision from the 
laws. Isiolo being in an area considered as underdeveloped in terms of 
infrastructure, poverty levels, representation in national leadership, and 
23 Hirsch, 1998.
24 Kubai, 2004, page 39.
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general insecurity, discourse about marginalization gained greater cur-
rency there. The blame was not just put on the government but also on 
the religious persuasion of the ruling elite.
There was a tendency to look at the state and the religious commu-
nity from which the ruling elite hails, as being one and the same and 
hence in pursuit of similar objectives. Media portrayal of president and 
cabinet ministers’ attendance at church services, national prayer meet-
ings and fund-raising for church activities helped to reinforce the above 
association.
When the Wako Draft left out some crucial reforms such as appellate 
jurisdiction, which had been suggested by the Bomas Draft on Kadhi’s 
courts, the local Muslims viewed the action as being carried out by a Chris-
tian regime bent on trampling on their religious freedoms for religious 
and ethnic reasons. The Wako Draft was also said to have been changed 
to remove the clauses that proposed some sort of ‘Marshall Plan’ to help 
Northern Kenya catch up with the rest of the country. Other contentious 
issues such as the devolution of power and equitable resource distribution 
consolidated the stance of each group.
The experience of the Secessionist (shifta) wars of the 1960s also had 
the effect of inculcating fear and a feeling of indifference among the domi-
nant local Cushitic populace towards the state and its machineries.25 This 
is the region that Negley Farson, an American author writing in the 1940s, 
captured in his narrative as “. . . [The] one half of Kenya about which the 
other half knows nothing and seems to care even less”.26 Each religious 
community has a perception that their demographic strength in the coun-
try is larger than it actually is, while no census data of religious affiliation 
exist. Christians estimate their percentage to be from 75% to 90%, while 
Muslims put their percentage as being from 10% to 30%. It is not uncom-
mon for adherents to cite the higher percentages. In such an atmosphere 
of religious rivalry one may conclude that the Kenya experience is “that 
of a Muslim minority living with a Christian majority who did not lose the 
opportunity of turning a numerical majority into a religious advantage”.27
25 Aguilar, 1998; M’Inoti, Kathurima, ‘Beyond the “Emergency” in the North Eastern 
Province: The Legal Regime under the N. E. Province and Contiguous Districts Regula-
tions, 1966’, in Constitutional law and politics in Africa: A Case Study of Kenya, K. Kibwana 
(ed.), Nairobi: Claripress, 1998, pages 315–338.
26 Words of American Negley Farson in Last Chance in Africa (1949) quoted in 
K. M’Inoti, 1998, page 320. 
27 Mwakimako, 2007, page 95. 
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It must be noted that a number of Christians voted against the Wako 
Draft due to mobilization by the Orange Democratic Movement in western 
parts of the country. This is because this is an opposition zone, and ethnic 
and not religious reasons accounted for this move.28 The communities 
from Mount Kenya area, which include co-ethnics of the local Meru, over-
whelmingly voted for the Wako Draft. In fact Central Province was the only 
Province to vote in favour; all other provinces rejected the Wako Draft.29 
The overlap of religious and ethnic ascriptions reinforced the rivalry and 
suspicion between religions with ethnic rivalry and suspicions.
As mentioned earlier, the national majority-minority dichotomy is 
reversed in Isiolo town. Muslims form the majority while Christians 
form a significant minority. The demographic balance has implications 
on how things are debated in town. The majority believe that because of 
their numerical strength and the historical ties of the town’s origin, they 
have the upper hand on how issues are dealt with. They are most likely 
to interpret divergent opinions that touch their religion and culture as a 
direct challenge to their ‘hegemonic’ control over the town. Such a pic-
ture of a majority-minority struggle was reflected in the thoughts of one 
informant:
On the existence of Kadhi’s Courts in the Constitution, the Christians took 
it up with a different perception. They considered that the government was 
favouring the Muslims a lot. So the Christians said that because “we are the 
majority, let us use this fact for us to be recognized by the state”. It was just 
by the blessing of God that politics crept in and distorted their unity. They 
opposed it because of the existence of Kadhi’s Court. You see Margaret Wan-
jiru and the likes said that if Kadhi’s Courts is there, they shall reject it.30
Theme Three: Influence from without on the Debate
The national debates, fears, suspicions and inspirations of co-religionists 
and co-ethnics were localized and integrated into the body of local dis-
courses about Kadhi’s courts. Religious leaders, local politicians and civil 
28 Muturi puts the point this way: ‘What I see is that during the Referendum, distinctly 
there has not been any friction along religious lines. Of course Muslims were fighting for 
their rights, they felt that rights have [been] violated and therefore they must have to fight 
against the Draft, but Christians for those who are politically inclined to the ODM, they 
were also fighting against the Draft. It is not an issue of religion now.’ Personal interview 
with C. Muturi on 20th November 2006, at Isiolo Market, Isiolo.
29 See Daily Nation 23rd November 2005 for results by province.
30 Personal interview with Mama Amina on 4th December 2006, at Bomen Hotel, 
Isiolo. 
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society officials acted as the bridge between the national and local con-
cerns for their groups. Press statements, radio and television debates and 
publications from religious organizations such as the National Council of 
Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the Supreme Council of Kenya (SUPKEM), 
the National Muslim Leadership Forum (NAMLEF) and the Kenya Episco-
pal Council (KEC) shaped the course of the debate. For instance, Nairobi 
Jamia Mosque’s Friday Bulletin, a weekly Muslim news update, had an 
important role. These bulletins were regularly dispatched by the ʿulamāʾ 
to keep the faithful informed of the current concerns and challenges fac-
ing Islam in Kenya.
Global discourse about sharīʿa application in Africa and the world 
entered the debate. Some informants associate the current proposals to 
improve the working of the court with the hidden urgency to implement 
criminal law. Arguments about amputation of hands for theft and ston-
ing to death for adultery epitomize these fears. A number of local Mus-
lim respondents see the hand of the United States of America behind the 
concerted efforts of Pentecostal churches in their opposition to Kadhi’s 
Courts.31 These churches, through an umbrella body called the Kenya 
Church, called for the removal of Kadhi’s Courts or any other religious 
courts from the Constitution and the draft bills. However, the presence 
of these churches is not very pronounced in Isiolo. The effects of their 
arguments on the Christians of other denominations in the area are not 
very clear.
The call for the removal of the courts was also interpreted by Muslims 
as a part of the global efforts to check the growth of ‘Islamism’, in the 
‘war against terror’ campaigns, in Sub-Saharan Africa. To the local Muslim 
population, there is an implicit connection between the call to curb the 
courts’ improvement and the reduction of their status in the Wako Draft. 
The state is perceived as being party to such moves. Fresh in the minds 
of the informants were the proposed Terrorism Bill and the closing down 
31 H. Ismail, who was suspicious of the vocal role of the Kenya Church, observes that: 
‘What many Muslims believe is that there is an external influence fighting against the 
Kadhi’s courts. Muslims and Muslim solidarity and Islam as an institution are being fought 
by other factors, particularly American interests. This is what it is. They are ones who are 
trying to use these evangelical churches to weaken the Muslim stand, which they call 
actually conservativeness, or it is we who are being influenced to be like them. You know, 
Muslims do their things in their own way not in their Western ways. I think most of these 
churches were paid groups. These are the ones shouting loudest, not even the Catholics 
and others.’ Personal interview with H. Ismail, on 14th December 2006, at Green Lodge, 
Isiolo.
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of some Muslim Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)32 for alleged 
connections to terrorist groups, and the rapid and indiscriminate manner 
in which the government then accused Muslims of complicity in the 1998 
US embassy bombings. The NGOs provided social services, such as educa-
tion and health in addition to daʿwa activities. The wider inference drawn 
from the closure of Muslim-oriented groups was that a Christian-led gov-
ernment was facilitating the hindrance of the propagation of Islam.33
Theme Four: Linking Past Conflicts to the Present Concerns
The debates about the courts became embroiled in discussing earlier 
protracted clashes over resources such as land, economic opportunities, 
political leadership, and conflicts over control of educational institutions 
and boundary disputes. Every new potential conflict was viewed as an 
extension of the past ones or an opportunity to settle scores with a rival 
religious or ethnic group. The fact that the majority of local Muslims 
opposed the Wako Draft and many Christians supported it, was a clear 
indication to each group that the others’ stand is motivated by the wars of 
supremacy in the town. This reduced the referendum debate to some sort 
of ‘do or die’ event. One informant argued that where a rival ethnic group 
was supporting the Draft, they must have vested interests. He says “when 
the constitutional debate came to town, people observed that where these 
Meru are pushing strongly the way they are doing, they must have vested 
interests. So we said: Let us deny them!”34 Recalling earlier boundary dis-
putes and the resultant carry-over of old conflicts, one informant narrates 
that:
There was a time when Kuti (the local Member of Parliament) came and 
spoke about the issues of boundaries. It happened that the boundaries have 
been brought even closer to Kiwanja cha Ndege (the area close to Isiolo air-
strip). We were even told that soon it will come as close as Isiolo Girls’ and 
then it is redrawn behind Lobos (a hotel in Kulamawe area of Isiolo town). 
So now you see the Borana community feels that these people, because they 
are leading in the government now, they have embarked on oppressing us 
32 See Mohamed Salih’s ‘Islamic NGOs in Africa: Promise and Peril of Islamic Voluntar-
ism’ in Alex de Vaal (ed.), Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, London: Hurst & 
Company, 2004, pages 146–181. Salih notes that five Muslim NGOs were thrown out of the 
country for alleged links with terrorism. Most of them had offices in Isiolo; they include 
Mercy International, Al Haramain Foundation, Help Africa People, IIRO and Ibrahim al 
Ibrahim (page 175). 
33 Mwakimako, 2007, page 293.
34 Group interview with IYAP, 22nd March 2007.
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and grabbing our land. One day we even heard that Isiolo town itself is in 
Meru. Now, one is left wondering how Isiolo town can be in Meru. Now we 
cannot side with them and they cannot side with us.35
It should be noted that the “land question, its ownership, access and use, 
has come to occupy a central place in public policy and political discourse 
in Kenya. This is because land has been the crux of cultural, economic and 
socio-political change”.36 In Isiolo, almost all past conflicts relate in one 
way or another to the land question. It defines who is an outsider, and 
therefore not part of the decision making and voting process, and who is 
an insider, with full rights on how issues are run in town. The town is near 
the border of Meru and Isiolo Districts and hence it is more cosmopolitan 
than other divisions in the District. In Isiolo, land is legally considered as 
trust land and the Isiolo County Council holds it on behalf of the local 
communities. Being on the border with Meru District, current concerns 
among the Borana and other pastoral residents are the ‘ever shrinking’ 
physical boundaries of their District and the encroachment of Meru Dis-
trict, and the implied symbolic loss to a rival ethno-religious group. The 
clauses concerning land ownership as proposed in the Wako Draft did 
not satisfy the dominant groups in the town. Abdulla Dima, citing errors 
in Wako Draft, avers that:
Now later what happened was that in the Wako’s Draft . . . they still called 
[it] community land but to define it, it sort of diluted the definition that 
was done by the Boma [drafts] but still call it community land of some kind. 
But it even stated that in the implementation, the land is going to be held 
by a commission on behalf of the community for three to four years before 
the rightful owners are going to be defined. But people know who owns the 
land, they know who the rightful owners are, it really became an issue.37
The town has attracted peoples of diverse origins. Population growth and 
pressure on grazing lands, transformation of property rights from com-
munal to private tenure, political instability and economic insecurity have 
pushed pastoral groups in the area to abandon their lands and concen-
trate around settlements and towns.38 In addition, individualization of 
35 Group interview with IYAP, 22nd March 2007.
36 CKRC, The Final Report of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, Nairobi: 
CKRC, 10th February 2005, page 271.
37 Personal interview with Abdulla Dima, on 8th December 2006, Isiolo. 
38 Fratkin, E., ‘The Problems of Pastoral Land Tenure System in Kenya: Demographic, 
Economic and Political Process among Maasai, Samburu, Boran and Rendille, 1950–1990’, 
Working Paper in African Studies, No. 177, Boston Africa Studies Center, 1994.
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lands for settlement is often unregulated. For some communities, the loss 
of communal lands to persons labelled as ‘outsiders’ is unfair. Corruption 
in land allocation procedures by the very Council entrusted with its care 
is considered as rife by the majority of residents.39
Ultimately the debate ignites the old wounds of struggle for suprem-
acy over the town’s political, socio-economic and religious space. Such 
clashes were common features before 2002; they often involved members 
of different ethnic groups, or pitted one religion against the other, with 
each group imputing religious motives to the opponents’ actions. Nothing 
more than electoral exercises, such as voting for preferred candidates in 
general elections, and the highly charged Referendum option of ‘Yes’ or 
‘No’, makes the rivalry emerge. The majority ethnic groups and religions 
contest the labelling of the town as cosmopolitan and hence free for all. 
Each group is observed to rush to history to validate their claims of own-
ership of the town and its implied benefits. The ultimate question, as one 
informant puts it,40 is ‘who owns Isiolo?’ The answer to this question is 
emotively contested.
Theme Five: The Ethnic Factor in the Debate
Group solidarity, whether religious or ethnic, is very strong in Isiolo and 
it is ‘strengthened when actors see their ethnic group as a means of gain-
ing access to valued resources, but this relationship is contingent on the 
availability of these resources to the individual outside the ethnic group’.41 
The dominant Cushitic groups considered themselves as being outside the 
group who are in receipt of state benefits and identify the largely Chris-
tian Meru as one of the chief beneficiaries of government support in their 
home districts.
The support given to the Wako Draft by communities from Mount 
Kenya region was perceived as being motivated by the need to keep their 
co-ethnics in power. During the Referendum campaigns, while Central 
39 Isiolo District Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2001.
40 In a personal interview with Bonaya Bankare, 27th March 2007, who says this: “Most 
of the communities feel that Isiolo is theirs; if you ask the Somali right now, they will say 
that Isiolo is ours, as we were here since World War I. You ask the Borana, they will say 
it is ours, because we are the majority. You ask the Turkana, they will say it is ours, as we 
were among the first people. You ask the Meru, they will say we are the first merchants, 
we were here before others, check even the buildings are ours”.
41 Hempel, Lynn, ‘What’s it worth to you? The Questionable Value of Instrumentalist 
Approaches to Ethnic Identification’, in Ethnicity, Ethnic Conflict and Peace Process: Com-
parative Perspectives, E. A. Tirykian (ed.), London: Sage, 2004, page 141. 
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Province and its environs backed the government, the Nyanza and West-
ern Kenya provinces opposed the Draft and “analyses of the referendum, 
which dominated public and private debate, immediately acquired an ‘eth-
nic logic’, as ethnic groups were labelled ‘orange’, ‘banana’ or ‘divided” ’.42 
The promotion of ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ raised the stakes in the referendum 
debate and eliminated the chances of compromise or even understanding 
of opponents’ points of views.
Those in opposition wanted to show the government their dissatisfac-
tion at being left out from being beneficiaries of the ‘national cake’, as 
“having political power opens up the opportunity to gain access to and 
distribute state resources . . . hence, the frequent reference in African poli-
tics to ethnic groups asserting that it is ‘our turn to eat’ ”.43 Discourses 
on inequality and the perceived lack of concern from the state formed 
the rallying points for political mobilization and strengthened the resolve 
to oppose the draft and all its contents. Put differently, “when economic 
inequality in incomes, wealth and access to services or political power 
coincides with group differences, ethnicity may assume importance in 
shaping and mobilizing individuals for collective actions”.44
Theme Six: The Christian Courts Saga
Article 195 of the Wako Draft established religious courts, which were to 
include Christian courts, Kadhi’s courts and Hindu courts. The jurisdictions 
of these courts were to determine cases of personal law of their respec-
tive faith in which the parties involved profess that faith. The inclusion of 
the Christian and Hindu courts, previously not in the Constitution, elic-
ited varied responses from the local Muslims and Christians. It also had 
implications for the debates on Kadhi’s courts. Reverend Munywa of the 
Methodist Church of Kenya, Isiolo, points out that each church has what 
he calls ‘Standing Orders’45 that guide the conduct of members. Raising 
the issue of cases arising out of marriages, given the diversity of denomi-
nations in Kenya, consensus would be hard to reach, particularly as to 
42 Lynch, Gabrielle, ‘The Fruits of Perception: “Ethnic Politics” and the case of Kenya’s 
Constitutional Referendum,’ African Studies, 65, 2, December 2006, pages 233–268. The 
Electoral Commission of Kenya gave fruit symbols to the Yes and No vote in the referen-
dum. Banana stood for the positive vote while Orange symbolized the negative vote. As a 
result of the campaigns, these fruits got a whole new meaning during this period.
43 Steeves, J., ‘Beyond Democratic Consolidation in Kenya: Ethnicity, Leadership and 
“unbounded” politics’, African Identities, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 195–211, 2006, page 197.
44 Hempel, 2004, page 128.
45 In some Christian denominations Standing Orders are called Canon Law.
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what the Christian personal law would look like, and who should preside 
over its sessions. He attributes the inclusion of the Christian courts to a 
misconception about Kadhi’s courts:
Christians thought that Muslims want separate courts for themselves, so 
that if they do anything they would be taken to Kadhi’s Courts and they, as 
Christians, would be taken to the usual courts. And that the person in charge 
is the Chief Kadhi. When people were discussing this issue, it emerged as 
if Muslims were being favoured. Then the Christians argued that now that 
Muslims have been given these courts, let us also be given Christian Courts. 
Then some Christians and some government officials went ahead and 
requested the religious courts without discussing how they shall operate, 
what it will consist of, who will be included, the hierarchy of the officials, as 
to who is the highest and the lowest.46
For the sake of some Christians, the Attorney General wanted to insert the 
clauses on Christian courts so as to silence them from opposing the draft, 
and hence ensure its success. It was also argued that it had been put in 
place in order to create equal ground for each religion to run its own per-
sonal law in a constitutionally-recognized manner; this is because the sole 
inclusion of Kadhi’s courts could be interpreted as favouritism of Islam 
by the state. The diversity of Christian denominations was cited as an 
impediment to operability of these courts. Some raised the problem of a 
lack of consensus on how the officials will be selected. They also doubted 
how the various churches will agree on a common law for the handling 
of issues on a common personal law, and matters consequential to them, 
when each church has its own standing orders for the same.
The majority of local Muslims voiced similar sentiments as above, but 
also commented that the courts were added as a gradual step towards the 
total removal of all religious courts, including Kadhi’s courts, once one 
of the courts proved unworkable. The draft was also accused of water-
ing down the gains made under the Bomas Draft that involved contribu-
tions and negotiations of all stakeholders. The proposed changes raised at 
the Bomas Conference for the enhancement of Kadhi’s courts were also 
cited as the reasons behind the inclusion of Christian courts. Evangeli-
cal churches under the auspices of the Kenya Church were nonetheless 
opposed to the inclusion of the Christian, Hindu and Kadhi’s courts.
46 Personal interview with Reverend Munywa, on 9th October, 2006, at Isiolo’s Method-
ist Church of Kenya. 
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The fact that the one of the principal sources of laws of Kenya is the 
English Common Law gained prominence in Kadhi’s courts’ debates. Eng-
lish Common Law, it is argued by Muslims, is based on Judeo-Christian 
traditions which imply that there was actually no basis for Christian 
courts as their laws form the backbone of the legal system in the country. 
Abdulla Dima recalls that it was only during the formulation of the Kilifi 
draft constitution that the clauses on the Christian and Hindu courts were 
added. He further points out that:
Kenya’s current judicial system, established by the British colonial admin-
istration, was almost synonymous with Christian culture. Therefore there 
was no need for separate courts for Christians and this was understood, and 
even during the process of collecting views, there is nowhere at any time 
when actually Christians either as individual or as a group have raised the 
issue of the Christian courts.47
Theme Seven: Civic Education for the Referendum and Choices Made
Prior to the Referendum, the CKRC selected national, provincial, district 
and constituency civic education providers (CEPs). CKRC Source Book for 
Civic Education48 identifies the objective of the exercise as being to provide 
Kenyans with information, knowledge, and skills on the content of the 
Proposed New Constitution, to ensure that they make informed decisions 
whether to accept or reject it through a referendum. A ‘win-win’ approach 
was encouraged by the CKRC to ensure that the referendum remains a 
bargaining process and not a weapon to settle differences or even nar-
row antagonisms and prejudices. Apart from the officially approved CEPs, 
in Isiolo, unofficial civic educators played an instrumental role in raising 
civic consciousness and mobilization.
The CKRC educators approved, trained and funded for both Isiolo 
North and Isiolo South Constituencies included: Women’s Access Pro-
gramme (Isiolo District), Garba Tulla Development Organization (Garba 
Tulla), Lobby and Advocacy Service Team, Global Child Hope, Friends 
of Nomad’s International (Northern Kenya), Northern Mosques and 
Madrassa Network (Isiolo Town, Merti, Garba Tulla, Sericho and Kinna), 
Ndugu Sangu Christian Community Development (Isiolo Town and 
47 Personal interview with Abdulla Dima, on 8th December 2006, Isiolo.
48 CKRC, Source Book for Civic Education: Referendum 2005, Nairobi, CKRC, September 
2005.
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surrounding areas), Sericho Community Consortium (Sericho), Ngare 
Mara Development Consortium (Ngare Mara), and Oldo Nyiro Based 
Community Consortium (Oldo Nyiro).49 Despite the geographical distri-
bution of the chosen organizations, the civic education exercises were 
observed not to have reached the people well, especially those on the 
fringes of the town and the far-flung corners of the District. Inadequacy 
of time, personnel and resources were cited as the reasons behind the 
ineffectiveness of the programme. Unofficial civic educators included the 
local imams, youth leaders, priests and pastors of both Catholic and Prot-
estant churches, and politicians. Through local initiatives, Majlis ʿulamāʾ 
and organizations such as the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya 
and representatives of SUPKEM and NCCK played an immense role in 
shaping the decisions of their faithful.
To “fully operationalise civic education, society must have a degree of 
tranquillity, enabling infrastructure to facilitate the movement of civic 
educators, and, a general will of the state to allow the exercise to take 
place”.50 However, most of the CEPs were led by personalities, who, to 
a great extent served as opinion leaders for their respective ethnic and 
religious constituencies and hence were highly-interested parties as to the 
kind of choices the voters made at the end of the day.51 Sheikh Harun 
notes that:
People, in some areas, turned away the educators and even insulted them. 
People, in such areas, said that they did not want what the educators were 
teaching them, saying that they are supporting Orange and so they did not 
want anything to do with new opinions. And that they did not want any-
thing to do with such new ideas. Simply they had made [up] their mind 
about the things in the draft constitution.52
It has been suggested that the residents had made their choices before 
the official commencement of the referendum campaigns in October of 
2005, based on unofficial civic educators, such as the religious institutions, 
49 CKRC List of District CEPs, CBOs as approved by Plenary on the 19th September 
2005. Source www.kenyaconstitution.org (accessed 21.03.2006).
50 Bellucci, S., Katumanga, M. & Otenyo, E., ‘ “Political” education versus “Civic” Educa-
tion in colonial and Independent Kenya’, Africa: Rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazi-
one Dell’Instituto italiano per I’Africa e I’Oriente, 62.1, 2007, page 2.
51 Personal interview with Father Mathenge on 8th December 2006, at Kiwanjani Cath-
olic Church, Isiolo.
52 Personal interview with Sheikh Harun on 11th December 2006, at Bomen Hotel, 
Isiolo.
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and informal talks.53 While the CEPs were expected to educate the citi-
zens about varieties of pertinent issues in the draft bill, the majority of 
the local residents were more interested in what affected them most. 
They frequently asked about what would happen to their land and the 
status of the Kadhi’s courts.54 Low literacy, poor political consciousness 
and rivalry between the Banana and Orange camps also affected the exer-
cise. Poverty, unemployment, drought and famine in the first quarter of 
2005 were observed to have reduced local people’s bargaining powers 
and made them vulnerable to political manipulation. State patronage and 
use of incentives by those for and against the Wako Draft complicated 
the decision-making for the referendum. On the presence of threats and 
coercion of local leaders to campaign for the Wako Draft, Ahmed Hussein 
observes that:
Of course threats were there. But many were not directed to the people, but 
to their leaders. There are cases where leaders come out and say to the peo-
ple “look, this one is going to amount to my [being] sacked as an assistant 
minister and the government will never recognize me and give us develop-
ment projects again if we are not going to take sides with the government”. 
These were the issues that were not only coercive but also intimidating. Yes 
this can amount to force. 55
It is a common practice in Isiolo for the approved CEPs to ‘sublet’ or ‘out-
source’ their services at a lesser fee to organizations affiliated to them and 
to consume the bulk of the funding for their own use. The draft and the 
current constitutions presented to the CEPs are written in ‘legalese’ and 
were often not only voluminous but also incomprehensible to even the 
elite in the local civil society. This had the effect of reducing the whole 
of the constitutional debates to parochial issues related to the everyday 
concerns of the local Isiolo residents.
The perceptions of the youth, both Christian and Muslim, demon-
strated greater coherence and accommodation of Kadhi’s courts debates 
than those of the older respondents. However they have also expressed 
similar sentiments on their attitude towards members of the rival reli-
gion. Muslim women have higher levels of understanding of the need for 
empowerment of the courts than do ordinary men of the same religion. 
53 Personal interview with Sheikh Harun on 11th December 2006, at Bomen Hotel, 
Isiolo. 
54 Personal interview with Adan Jirma on 9th December 2006, at his Tulu Roba home, 
Isiolo.
55 Personal interview with Ahmed Hussein, 20th December 2006, Safi Estate, Isiolo. 
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Christian women, on the other hand, demonstrate little awareness of the 
workings of the courts but do not have such a strong opposition as their 
co-religionist men. Youth of both religions express the need for the urgent 
redress of the social ills that afflict them most, such as unemployment, 
inequality and drug abuse, compared to the older respondents. It must 
be noted that in the events of strained relations between Muslims and 
Christians, it is the youth that becomes actively involved in skirmishes 
due to mobilization.
Emergent Trends from the Debates on Kadhi’s Courts
Consultation at Kadhi’s courts is relatively low; this is partly due to the 
existence of alternative, and to some extent complementary, mechanisms 
for conflict resolution for domestic matters that include marriage, divorce 
and inheritance. Local Muslims mix the customary and Islamic laws ami-
cably for their daily needs. For instance among the Borana, the role of 
clan elders (Borana: jarole) is crucial in solving marital conflicts and, more 
often than not, matters of inheritance are decided not according to Islamic 
jurisprudence but through aada sera Borana (Borana customary law).56 
The elders function as a court with broad and flexible powers to interpret 
evidence, impose judgements, and manage the process of reconciliation.57 
The jarole or other local religious mediators use their judgement and posi-
tion of moral ascendancy to find an acceptable solution. Traditionally, the 
parties involved in the conflict are likely to accept the decision and rec-
oncile their differences.58 The decisions of the elders do not involve loss 
of face and are backed by social pressures. For instance, the role of elders 
in mediation is often extended to minor criminal cases in places such as 
Merti and Garba Tulla. The underlying belief is that taking someone to 
judicial courts means handing over someone to ‘foreigners’ (Borana: nyap) 
whose decision may be regretted later. It is common to hear “dubi affan 
borannat debissa” meaning, let us take the mediation process back to the 
56 See Mario Aguilar’s Being Oromo In Kenya, 1998, for understanding of Nagaa Borana 
(peace of Borana) and how the Waso Borana maintain harmony in their domestic and 
socio-economic and political sphere, pages 19–22. Aada Sera Borana means the customary 
traditions of the Borana.
57 Ruto P., M. Adan & I. Masinde, Indigenous Democracy: Traditional Conflict Resolution 
Mechanisms—Pokot, Turkana, Samburu and Marakwet, Nairobi: ITDG-East Africa, 2004, 
page 4. 
58 Ruto et al., 2004, page 5.
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local conflict resolution mechanism. Imams of local mosques conduct 
marriages and mediate in marital disputes and it is only for the issuance 
of marriage certificates and other forms of legal documents that the Kadhi 
is consulted. The infrequent consultation of the courts can be attributed 
to lack of adequate awareness about them and also the influence they 
have, because of their relatively short history in Isiolo Town, in compari-
son with the coastal region of Kenya.
Despite the above challenges, the majority of Muslims in the area 
showed great support for the expansion and improvement of the courts. 
This is largely due to the effects of elite mobilization, opposition from 
rival local and national ethnic and religious groups towards them, and 
the conviction that supporting them will have the greater benefit for the 
general Muslim populace in Kenya. Hirsch makes a similar observation 
among the Swahili, as follows: “though Muslim men have been harsh 
critics of kadhis who have historically been viewed as collaborators with 
the state, they join with kadhis to oppose the state in order to protect and 
promote Islamic legal practices”.59
For the majority of the Christians in the town, the existence of Kadhi’s 
courts in the constitution of Kenya is a recent discovery and, due to that, 
little if anything is known of their function and efficacy in dispensing jus-
tice in marital matters. Such specialized knowledge was observed to be 
available to the clergy. Misinformation and stereotyping of other faiths is 
common in Isiolo.
Muslim men in Isiolo town were observed to be very critical of the local 
kadhi. Their condemnation points to an accusation of being pro-women 
and being hasty in decision-making. Youthful Muslims question why a 
kadhi who understands Islamic, secular and local customary laws (Arab.: 
ʿurf ), cannot be appointed despite the availability of such qualified per-
sons who studied in the Sudan and the Middle East. Susan Hirsch sums 
up the predicament facing the kadhis in this way:
The Kadhis are, for most part, ethnically Swahili . . . Kadhis are generally 
assigned to courts outside their communities of origin. Frequent transfers 
mean that Kadhis are relatively unable to establish strong ties in their own 
towns of appointment and are uninterested in doing so.60
59 Hirsch, 1998, page 136.
60 Hirsch, 1998, page 122.
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A number of Muslims in the area view the Kadhi as someone who should 
be more than just a judicial officer. He is expected to perform other 
duties such as preaching at mosques or other religious forums from time 
to time, interacting and co-operating with local ʿulamāʾ and sheikhs in 
Islamic activities, and generally adhering to Islamic codes of conduct in 
his everyday life. If all the above are not evident in a Kadhi, then con-
tempt and indifference toward the institution and the person increases. 
This often happens in Isiolo. The complexity of this issue is heightened 
by the multiplicity of roles and functions that the Chief Kadhi performs 
at the national level.
In a sense, the debates on Kadhi’s courts and the general participation 
of Muslims in the Referendum campaigns consolidated their votes and 
strengthened their bargaining power in the political future of the country. 
The resounding defeat that the government suffered at the hands of the 
Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) in the referendum was argued to 
have been impossible without the Muslims’ minority vote. In all subse-
quent campaigns, there has been a concerted effort by the government 
and presidential candidates from the opposition parties to garner the 
community’s support. All manners of promises have been made, com-
missions to address their grievances such as marginalization and harass-
ment have recently been formed, and talks about signing of memoranda 
of understanding between national Muslim leadership and presidential 
candidates have become the norm. More than ever before, the future of 
Christian-Muslim relations and Muslim-State relations seem to be head-
ing for a brighter future.
The Isiolo Interfaith Committee proved ineffective in curbing the reli-
gious divisions created by the Referendum debates. This committee had 
been instrumental in the past in diffusing tension between religions. 
Members include Muslim sheikhs and imams and Christian priests and 
pastors from Roman Catholic and Protestant churches. Christian-Muslim 
relations have been observed to be cordial after the Referendum, as life 
continued as normal and people put aside constitutional matters for 
some time. The interfaith committee mainly meets through seminars and 
workshops sponsored by donor agencies. Resolutions arrived at are often 
grandiose and far removed from the challenges that people of different 
religions and ethnic groups face in Isiolo.
Despite the failure of the Law of Succession Act (CAP 160) in the 1980s 
in formulating unified laws of succession for all the religions in Kenya, 
and its subsequent repeal in 1991 to exempt Muslims, there are signs 
of its revival, such as the Act of Parliament under the title of Marriage 
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Bill 2007.61 Already its negative implications on the functions of Kadhi’s 
courts have been mentioned as unwarranted. NAMLEF and other Muslim 
organizations have voiced strong criticism against it, on the basis that it 
contradicts the understanding of marriage, divorce, paternity, inheritance, 
custodianship and women’s rights in Islamic jurisprudence. Should such a 
bill pass in Parliament, the crisis of Islamic law under Kadhi’s courts will 
be far from over.
On 4th August 2010, another constitutional referendum was held on 
whether to adopt a proposed new constitution passed by the national 
assembly on 1st April 2010. The proposed draft was approved by 66.9% 
of the total votes cast. Among the issues that the ‘no/red’ leaders cited as 
anomalies that warranted its rejection were the retention of the Kadhi’s 
courts, fears that the draft may allow for abortion on demand, and that 
its proposed clauses on land were discriminatory. The majority of main-
stream and evangelical churches campaigned against the draft. The ‘yes/
green’ team was led by President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila 
Odinga, as well as by a host of other senior politicians, while the ‘no/red’ 
team was led by William Ruto. On 27th August 2010, the new constitution 
was officially promulgated, replacing the independence constitution. The 
new constitution proposes devolved forms of government, greater and 
equitable resource distribution, better gender representation and redress 
of pertinent issues such as corruption, abuse of human rights and histori-
cal injustices. The status of the Kadhi’s courts, however, remains relatively 
unchanged from that within the old constitution.
Conclusion
It is imperative to note that the debate on Kadhi’s courts in Isiolo is a 
complex one. The past history and present concerns are reinforced by the 
lack of consensus on the issues that surround the courts. The referendum 
campaigns also moved from the discussions of constitutional matters to 
political struggle at the national levels and the struggle for supremacy at 
the local level such as at Isiolo. Lack of adequate understanding of the 
61 In the month of August 2007, SUPKEM, in a paid-for press statement in the leading 
local dailies, expressed dissatisfaction with the government over four impending parlia-
mentary bills for being rushed through the national assembly without wider consulta-
tion, their incompatibility with Islamic laws and the implications for the already existing 
statutes. The bills are: The Marriage Bill, 2007; The Matrimonial Property Bill, 2007; The 
Domestic Violence (Family Protection) Bill, 2007; and the Equal Opportunities Bill, 2007. 
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workings of the courts did not deter the actors across the religious lines 
from misconceiving the opinions of their rival ethno-religious grouping 
within the town. The regime in power has failed to do so within their 
time-span. It is hoped that the question of Kadhi’s Courts will, in future, 
be discussed in an atmosphere of trust and co-operation, more so for the 
benefit of residents of such areas as Isiolo where Christian-Muslim rela-
tions and inter-ethnic relations have been soured.
CHAPTER EIGHT
“NECESSITY REMOVES RESTRICTIONS”: SWAHILI MUSLIM WOMEN’S 
PERSPECTIVES ON THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE
Esha Faki Mwinyihaji
Introduction
This chapter examines factors that facilitate the increased participation 
of Swahili Muslim women in the public sphere, specifically in politi-
cal leadership, in Mombasa, Kenya. The quest to make an entrance 
into leadership in the public sphere requires a thorough questioning of 
the ‘truth’ claims, by which the Swahili community functions. This chapter 
gives a brief background of the Swahili in general and their involvement 
in the politics of Mombasa. It focuses on the means that Swahili Muslim 
women have used in order to reclaim their opportunity of participating 
in the public sphere, especially in Mombasa. Like elsewhere in the world, 
the public sphere is not a neutral arena for social actors; it is a highly 
contested terrain, demanding the deployment of strategies and tactics of 
involvement in political competition.
The prospects of empowering Swahili Muslim women are being ques-
tioned along Islamic doctrinal and cultural grounds. Muslim women 
amongst the Swahili are forced by necessity to confront and contest 
interpretations of religious texts deemed responsible for reinforcing 
patriarchal structures and male-dominated religious forms of authority. 
Because of entrenched unequal forms of education, most Swahili Muslim 
women lack resources on how to debate, mobilize and lobby their way 
into leadership positions outside the home. Most significantly, they are 
few in political leadership. Recently, in a few instances, Swahili Muslim 
women have been visible in higher managerial ranks in large corporations 
and women’s organizations.1 However, to a large extent, the aspirations 
1 Examples include a former Coast Provincial Medical Director who was a Swahili 
Muslim woman; others include senior managers in co-operative organizations such as 
banks and parastatals.
© Esha Faki Mwinyihaji, 2014 | doi:10.1163/9789004262126_009
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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and potentials of Swahili Muslim women to engage in what comprises 
leadership in the public sphere, notably the wielding of political power 
and authority, have yet to be realized. 
Conceptual Theorization and Key Terms
The notion of a ‘public sphere’ has been a subject of debate for many schol-
ars since the eighteenth century.2 Implicit in the concept ‘public sphere’ 
is the separation of formal structures of religious and political authority 
from the space of household and kin, especially in European societies. 
More appropriate to the present discussion, which is centred in a Muslim 
society, is the approach of Eisenstadt and Schluchter.3 According to these 
scholars, the ‘public sphere’ is conceptualized as an arena where culture 
is created, contested and in flux for both traditional and modern societies. 
Furthermore, societies and civilizations do not develop autonomously 
but through a continuous interaction between the cultural codes of these 
societies and their exposure to new internal and external challenges.
In the context of this discussion, the phrase ‘public sphere’ refers to 
an arena or social space where meanings of social issues are articulated, 
shared and negotiated: that which takes place in the public sphere may 
possibly influence political action. The public sphere, here, will serve as 
a general social horizon of experience in which everything that is actu-
ally or seemingly relevant for all members of society is integrated. This 
chapter is concerned only with political leadership as a visible marker of 
Swahili Muslim women’s participation in the wider public sphere.
Swahili Muslims have been continuously exposed to new internal 
and external challenges and have developed rich cultural interpreta-
tions and practices. The participation of Swahili women has not always 
been confined to domestic life. Swahili Muslim women have actively par-
ticipated in political leadership in their cultural milieu. However, during 
the last century, Swahili Muslim women’s visibility in political leadership 
has been declining.
We hold that Swahili Muslim women are venturing into the public 
sphere out of necessity. The concept of ‘necessity’ is generated by Swahili 
2 Hoexter M., S. N. Eisenstadt & N. Levtzion (eds.), The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies, 
Albany: State University of New York, 2002, page 2. 
3 Eisenstadt, S. N. & W. Schluchter, ‘Introduction: Paths to Modernities—A Comparative 
View’, Daedalus 127:3, 1998, pages 1–18.
 “necessity removes restrictions” 179
Muslim women’s narratives during the course of this research. It is derived 
from Islamic legal precepts (al-Qawāʿid al-Fiqhiyya). According to sharīʿa 
principles, necessity dictates exceptions. Islam is not oblivious to the exi-
gencies of life, to their magnitude, nor to human weakness and capacity 
to face them. It permits the Muslim, under the compulsion of necessity, 
to eat a prohibited food in quantities sufficient to remove the necessity 
and save himself from death; the context is after listing the prohibited 
foods in the form of dead animals, blood, and pork (sūrat al-Baqara (2): 
173). Moreover, this is repeated four times in the Qurʾān after each men-
tion of the prohibited foods.4 On the basis of these and similar verses in 
the Qurʾān, Islamic jurists formulated an important principle, namely, that 
‘necessity removes restrictions’ (Arab.: al-dharūrāt tubīḥ al-maḥẓūrāt). 
The title of this chapter is derived from this legal precept. This principle 
allows Muslims who are having trouble to engage in things that are ini-
tially forbidden.
Al-Qaradawi demonstrates that necessity allows the use of ḥarām, in 
cases wider than the food laws:
In permitting the use of ḥarām under necessity, Islam is true to its spirit and 
general principles. This spirit, which we find permeating its laws, is to make 
life easy and less oppressive for human beings, and to lift the burdens and 
yokes imposed by earlier systems and religions.5
This precept is adopted as a defence mechanism for Swahili Muslim 
women to counter the assertions of modern clerical teachings that are 
geared towards enforcing seclusion and exclusion of women from politi-
cal leadership. It is highly recommended that a Muslim woman’s best 
place is the home (sūrat al-Nūr (24): 31).
Some Swahili consider the idea of women remaining at home to be true 
to Islamic spirit. In as far as Islam recommends a woman to stay at home, 
she may also go out for her needs, be it prayers, studies and other lawful 
needs, both religious and secular.6 Hence, the Swahili Muslim women are 
seeking to liberate themselves from such patriarchal and religious restric-
tions that hinder them from active engagement in public sphere. They 
are seeking to unshackle themselves due to necessities incurred in the 
modern ways of living. 
4 Al-Qaradawi, Y., 1960, The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam (Al-Halal Wal Haram Fil 
Islam), New Dehli: Millat Book Centre, pages 36–37.
5 Al-Qaradawi, 1960, page 37.
6 Al-Qaradawi, 1960, page 167. 
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Mombasa: A Geographical and Historical Background
Mombasa is a cosmopolitan city, inhabited by many communities. It covers 
an area of 275 square kilometres.7 Administratively, Mombasa is divided 
into four divisions: Changamwe, Island, Kisauni and Likoni. Kisauni divi-
sion occupies the north coast, while Likoni covers the south coast. Island 
division mostly covers the Main Island. Changamwe occupies the Western 
mainland. The Swahili mainly live in Island and Changamwe divisions, 
among Arabs and Indians. A small portion of the Swahili are found in 
Kisauni and Likoni divisions. 
Mombasa, like the rest of the East African Coast, has had contact with 
the outside world for millennia. In particular, there has been contact 
with the maritime states of the Indian Ocean such as the Persian Gulf, 
Arabia, India and China. The anonymous Greek traveller who wrote the 
Periplus of the Erythrean Sea visited the East Coast in the first century and 
saw trade being carried out between the merchants from Arabia and the 
local inhabitants.8 When travellers like al-Masʿūdī (10th century), al-Idrīsī 
(12th century) and Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (14th century) visited the coast, towns like 
Zanzibar and Malindi were already in existence. The advent of Islam and 
subsequently its establishment in the coastal settlements led to an endur-
ing influence on the cultural history of the Swahili city-states and village 
settlements.9 
The identity of the Swahili is a paradox for many scholars. This is due 
to the Swahili community’s dynamic capacity to absorb external features 
and influences through gradual integration of a multiplicity of outsiders 
into their society.10 It is imperative to ask ourselves ‘who are the Swahili?’ 
This question has often prompted a quest for ‘origins’, a search for that 
historical moment at which, as well as the historical process by which, 
the Swahili can be said to have come into being.11 Some scholars do not 
believe that the Swahili exist as an ethnic group; to them, the Swahili 
 7 Mombasa District Development Plan, 1989–1993, page 1.
 8 Abdulaziz, M. H., Muyaka: 19th century Swahili Popular Poetry, Nairobi: Kenya 
Literature Bureau, 1979, page 7.
 9 Horton, M. and J. Middleton, The Swahili: the social landscape of a mercantile society, 
Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, pages 16, 47.
10 Kresse, Kai, Philosophising in Mombasa: Knowledge, Islam and Intellectual Practice on 
the Swahili Coast, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd, 2007, pages 36–37; Loimeier, 
Roman and Rüdiger Seesemann (editors), The Global Worlds of the Swahili, Hamburg: LIT 
Verlag, 2006, pages 55–66.
11 Mazrui, Alamin M. & Ibrahim Noor Shariff, The Swahili: Idiom and Identity of an 
African People, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1994, page 17. 
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are a mixture of Arabic and African races.12 On the contrary, others rec-
ognise that the Swahili are an ethnic group that is distinct from other 
African ethnic communities and definitely very different from the Arabs.13 
The Swahili are an urban Muslim Community that emerged on the East 
African coast around 800.14 One very striking characteristic trait of the 
Swahili is their assimilation of newcomers.15
The participation of Swahili Muslims generally in the Kenyan public 
sphere has neither been constant nor has it progressed since colonial 
times. The Swahili ruled the coastal city states for many centuries prior 
to European colonial rule. They controlled the power and wealth in these 
city states. The Swahili were mainly fishermen and farmers, as well as 
being engaged in trade both overseas and with the hinterland of Kenya.16 
This peaceful trade was disrupted by the coming of the Portuguese in 
the late 15th century. At the end of the 17th century, the Omanis took 
over control of the East African coast, ruling the various towns as well as 
dominating trade. In the 19th century, Omani Arabs, ruling from a sultan-
ate established on Zanzibar Island, attained control of political and social 
dominion on the coast in addition to running an active shipping trade. 
This period saw the emphasis on the Arabic elements of Swahili culture. 
Zanzibar served as a nexus for the Swahili with new fashions in cloth-
ing, religion and governance. The advent of British imperialism in the late 
nineteenth century disrupted the Omani influence and also brought an 
end to the slave trade. The slaves had been depended upon to provide 
labour on the farms owned by Swahili as well as Arabs.
The public sphere in Mombasa has always been a contested space 
and Mombasa did not belong to the Swahili alone but also to their 
closest allies, the Mijikenda,17 as well as to Arabs and Indians who were 
12 Maxon, Robert M., East Africa: Introductory History, Nairobi: EAE Publishers, 1986, 
page 40.
13 Kim, C. C., Islam Among the Swahili in East Africa, Nairobi: Acton Publishers, 2004, 
page 10. 
14 Horton, M. and John Middleton, 2000, pages 46ff. 
15 Askew, Kelly Michelle, ‘Female Circles and Male Lines: Gender Dynamics on the 
Swahili Coast’, Africa Today, Volume 46, Number 3/4, Summer/Autumn 1999, pages 
67–102
16 Cruise O’Brien, Donal, ‘Coping with the Christians: The Muslim predicament in 
Kenya’, in Religion and Politics in East Africa, Bernt Hansen & Michael Twaddle (eds.), 
Oxford: James Currey, 1995, 200–219, page 212; Middleton, John, The World of the Swahili, 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.
17 Mijikenda: nine closely related but distinct peoples who share a common linguistic 
and cultural heritage. The Nine are: Kauma, Giriama, Chonyi, Jibana, Kambe, Ribe, Rabai, 
182 esha faki mwinyihaji
engaged in trade. Mombasa has maintained its cosmopolitan state with 
many people from the hinterland of Kenya. The Swahili no longer have 
the command and control of the coast in the way they did during the 
al-Mazrūʿī and Āl Bū Saʿīd periods.18 They have been adversely affected 
from an administrative point of view as well as over the question of land 
ownership. 
They lost control of considerable areas of land, partly due to a mis-
understanding by the Kenya Land Commission to whom they put their 
case for land ownership in 1932. Some of the Swahili homelands were 
taken over by the government as Crown Land. For example, the land cur-
rently occupied by Wa-Jomvu on the Maunguja channel is still considered 
Crown Land and the people who have lived there for years are considered 
to be squatters. It was reported in an interview that currently squatters 
are demanding land from the government that belongs to absentee prop-
erty owners, especially in Kisauni areas.19 
Hence, there is stiff competition for political control from all the forces 
involved, be they up-country people who have settled in Mombasa, Arabs, 
Indians or the Swahili. The Mwambao movement failed because of dis-
unity of the interested parties.20 There are many rivalries between the 
Swahili families in the support of a male electoral candidate. This makes 
the entrance of women into the political public sphere even more com-
plicated. However, this is not to say that Swahili Muslim women are not 
making progress in the arena. 
The initiatives and the obstacles to Swahili Muslim women’s entrance 
into the public sphere during the years since independence are now exam-
ined. Interviews and observations were carried out between May 2007 and 
April 2008 in order to identify the factors which are seen as necessitating 
Swahili Muslim women’s participation. The analysis of the data does not 
necessarily suggest homogeneity and consensus among Swahili Muslim 
women, rather it represents the dominant perspectives that were found 
in the course of the research. 
Duruma and Digo; Spear, Thomas, The Kaya Complex, Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 
1978, page 4. 
18 Jewel, J. H. A., Mombasa: The Friendly town, Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 
1976; Kresse, 2007, pages 52–53.
19 Interview with Mishi Abdul, at Kisauni, on 15th May 2007.
20 Mwambao was a separatist movement of the people of Coast Region following 
Independence. Salim, Ahmed Idha, Swahili Speaking Peoples of Kenya’s Coast, 1895–1945, 
Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House, 1973. 
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Necessity and the Idiom of Leadership amongst Swahili Muslim Women
When traced back in history, it is possible to argue for the existence of 
cultural idioms and religious nuances which Swahili Muslim women have 
used to distinguish themselves and to seek leadership prowess in the pub-
lic sphere. In the histories of the Swahili there are motivational stories 
of heroines like Mwanamkisi who ruled Kongowea.21 It was harder for 
Swahili Muslim women to have active political participation in Mombasa 
in the 1960s and 1970s. The women who have been active political leaders, 
like Shamsa Muhashamy, have had the support of their husbands. Shamsa 
explains that she got a lot of support from her second husband, Ali Salim 
Jeneby, who was a man of politics; so, with his support she began work-
ing in the public sphere.22 Shamsa represents the first attempt by Swahili 
Muslim women after independence to take an active role in the public 
sphere. Prior to this, many women from patrician families never made a 
public display of themselves. It was considered shameful and improper 
to go out in public.23 For instance, Swahili Muslim women hardly ever 
visited butcheries and fish shops, which were considered areas where 
men visited and sat down to talk. One informant, in particular, insisted 
that although she was married for forty years, in all these years she never 
visited the butchery to buy meat or went to a fish shop. She contrasted 
this with her current status as a widow; her husband is no longer there to 
run the errand for her. She said that she hates going to these two places 
because the men there continuously stare, or often initiate gossip about 
women. However, circumstances have forced her to change with time. 
In politics today, looking through the local government lists in the 
Mombasa municipality, the participation of Swahili Muslim women has 
been minimal. There have been only four Swahili Muslim women coun-
cillors since independence, all of whom initially were nominated mem-
bers. These women are Aisha Busaidy, Bijuma Bwajuma, Somoe Abdallah 
Amour and Shuweikha Rashid. 
Of the four women, Aisha Busaidy, now deceased, was a favourite of 
many women, always appearing in Maendeleo Ya Wanawake (Women’s 
Development) programmes within Mombasa. She was known to many 
21  Jewel, 1976, page 17.
22 Mirza, S. & M. Strobel (eds. and trans.), Three Swahili Women: Life histories from 
Mombasa, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989, page 110. 
23 Kresse, 2007, page 53.
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as Ashuu. Aisha was initially a nominated member but was later elected as 
a councillor for Kibokoni ward. 
Bijuma Bwajuma, now deceased, was nominated during the tenure of 
her relative, Mayor Ahmed Shahame Mwidani. She campaigned for him, 
so some saw this as one way the former mayor was repaying the efforts 
of his strong supporters. Bijuma Bwajuma had no formal education, and 
mostly used Swahili as the language to address people at public rallies. She 
was a very charismatic leader and could mobilise many Swahili women 
into voting for the candidate she was campaigning for.
Somoe Abdallah Amour, after her period in office as a nominated mem-
ber, subsequently migrated to the United Kingdom.
Shuweikha Rashid is also a well-known woman, who, when she was 
interviewed, had just participated in the opening of the Mombasa 
Agricultural Show. She boasted of having shared the dais with the presi-
dent as being something which some men are still very jealous about. 
Concerning her involvement in politics, she observed:
For a woman to be involved in and gain entrance into the political arena 
she has to be at least twenty times better than a man. It was not for me 
to gain access but I fought my competitors hard and was able to succeed. 
People like the late Sharriff Nassir were not very happy to see me brushing 
shoulders with the people in government at that time.24
The sentiments of Shuweikha support our argument that the public sphere 
is a contested space that is not freely available for women to take, espe-
cially in the political field. They have to compete with the other contes-
tants who are men, rather than with other Swahili Muslim women, and, 
if they are to succeed, have to use the same tools as the men to advance 
their campaigns. Shuweikha’s sentiments also imply that Swahili Muslim 
women are well involved in the political arena. They are slowly breaking 
the boundaries of custom and religion in order to fully participate in the 
public sphere. The 2007 Kenyan elections saw the entry of three Swahili 
Muslim women into politics in Mombasa Municipality. They owe their 
entry to the popularity of the party ticket, namely the Orange Democratic 
Movement (ODM) as well as to their earlier involvement in Women’s 
Groups.25 They initially worked with women’s groups in various projects 
24 Shuweikha Rashid, Kibokoni, Mombasa, 31st August 2007.
25 Maimuna Salim, Shanzu, 20th March 2008; Maimuna Omar Waziri, Junda, 19th 
March 2008.
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such as dealing with HIV/AIDS victims, youth programmes and starting 
funding initiatives for women. 
These women’s groups deserve a special mention because they are the 
genesis of Swahili Muslim women’s breakthrough to the public sphere. 
All the politically active Swahili Muslim women were initially involved in 
women’s activities in their localities. They also served as important cam-
paigners with prominent political leaders in their constituencies. They 
provided potential voters to male politicians. Afye Rama, an unsuccessful 
Parliamentary candidate in the 2007 general elections, asserted: “If I could 
be able to mobilise supporters to all these previous male politicians, why 
can’t I become a candidate myself ”.26 These sentiments were also echoed 
by most Swahili Muslim women who contested the 2007 general election 
in Kenya. Swahili Muslim women’s groups served as important areas for 
these women’s participation in the public sphere. In fact, they serve as 
informal venues for Swahili Muslim women’s entrance and participation 
in the public sphere. These Swahili Muslims women’s groups are legiti-
mated by the notion that they are women-only groups and there are no 
avenues for mixed gender activities. Politically, they serve to empower 
prospective contestants with a valid record of accomplishment in terms of 
achievements. The Swahili Muslim women contend that they may be able 
to make more progress in their communities if they are given a formal 
type of leadership.27 It should be acknowledged that some male politi-
cians make many pledges to garner the support of these women and then 
normally ‘drop them’ when they have achieved their objectives. 
It was observed that single women, or women who are unattached, 
seem to be seen more in the public sphere. These are women who are 
widows, divorcées, or who are unmarried. In addition, women who 
are married as second wives, or even those who are marrying for the sec-
ond time, seem to have greater involvement in activities in the public 
sphere. Women with supportive spouses also participate more in the pub-
lic sphere.28 This can be seen as a bid to better their family life and the 
community at large.
26 Afye Rama, Fort Jesus, 17th March 2008.
27 Maimuna Salim, Shanzu, 20th March 2008; Maimuna Omar Waziri, Junda, 19th 
March 2008.
28 Maimuna Salim, Shanzu, 20th March 2008; Maimuna Omar Waziri, Junda, 19th 
March 2008. 
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Some Swahili Muslim men view it as despicable for a married woman 
to stand on a public platform and deliver a speech.29 Swahili Muslim men 
with a strong religious inclination see it as provocative for a woman to 
sit on a dais. At times, a public appearance is associated with making a 
public display of a woman’s beauty. Today’s Swahili Muslim women par-
liamentary aspirants appear in public without veils. This seems to support 
the sentiments of religious theologians that the appearance by women in 
the public sphere is a source of fitna (Arab.: civil strife) and, because of 
that, women should only appear when absolutely necessary.30 In the past, 
as noted by both older Swahili Muslim women and some scholars,31 there 
was separation of men and women in public gatherings such as weddings 
and funerals. Especially at weddings, the women’s quarters were shielded 
from the public. Today, at most weddings of the Swahili, men and women 
tend to mix freely, especially if there is a musician at the wedding. Where 
there are Taarab Music32 performances in town, men and women mix and 
at times dance together. In these gatherings, there is no regard for seclu-
sion or veiling; there seems to be a laxity of observation of Islamic rules 
such as the prohibition of music and the free mixing of men and women. 
This trend shows that there are factors other than sharīʿa that legitimise 
women’s entrance into the public sphere. Modernity has exposed the 
Swahili to new kinds of lifestyles that are castigated by Islam. 
However, this ideal seems to be theoretical for the majority of Swahili 
Muslim women. Many have ventured into the public sphere due to neces-
sity, especially because of economic needs. The structures that were there 
to safeguard their comfortable life-styles in their homes have crumbled. 
They no longer own land and farms in order to have enough money to 
maintain their standard of living. The British colonial period marked the 
decline of Swahili economic and political structures.33 The two pillars of 
economic resources along the coast, land and labour, have been dimin-
ished. The move from the old harbour in Mombasa to the modern port 
of Kilindini led to a further decline in their trading prowess.34 Very few 
29 Amina Zuberi, Fort Jesus, 25th March 2008.
30 Fatma Sufi, Munawarah, 26th March 2007.
31 Mirza & Strobel, 1976.
32 Taarab music, a blend of Arab and Indian styles which developed in the 19th century, 
is very popular in Kenya and Tanzania.
33 Janmohamed, K. K., A history of Mombasa c. 1895–1939; some aspects of economic 
and social life in an East African port town during colonial rule, unpublished PhD thesis, 
Northwestern University, 1978, page 161. 
34 Kresse, 2007, page 48.
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Swahili families were able to prevent their farms from being appropriated 
by the colonial government, leaving many Swahili in economic need.
Another necessity that is driving the Swahili Muslim women into 
the public sphere is the influx of ‘up-country’ people to the coast.35 The 
coast belongs even less to the Swahili and they now form a minority in 
their own homeland. With the fall of economic and political structures, 
Mombasa was transformed into an urban centre dependent on up-country 
people for leadership. The up-country people share Mombasa with the 
Swahili and are very enterprising and, at times, are seen to be aggressive 
in economic circles. 
The Swahili were initially reluctant to send their children to secular 
schools for fear of conversion to Christianity. This contributed to their 
being disadvantaged in education, allowing people from the hinterland in 
Kenya to take up many positions of leadership in co-operative organiza-
tions. This has forced Swahili Muslim women to develop similar strate-
gies to effectively compete with them. Hence, they are now present in the 
public sphere, seeking economic sustenance. In the past, a woman from 
one of the patrician families (Waungwana) wielded power, whereby she 
at least owned the house which she lived in. However, her affairs outside 
the house were taken care of by her male relatives as she was seen to not 
have enough experience in matters outside the house. A Swahili Muslim 
woman acted as a silent owner while male relatives managed her affairs 
and estates. Due to illiteracy, many women lost their properties by sign-
ing documents that they knew little about.36 The sense of trust that used 
to exist between members of the same family has been lost. Times have 
changed and siblings rarely trust each other with their property.
Due to the loss of property, some Swahili Muslim women whose par-
ents owned resources in the past, are now living a destitute life. For 
instance, in an area like Mikindani on the mainland, some have sold their 
dilapidated houses for a very low price and moved to live on the fringes 
of estates owned by up-country people. It should be noted that there are 
many Swahili in some regions in Mombasa district who may fall under the 
category of internally displaced people due to the Land Ordinance Acts 
35 ‘up-country’ is used to describe people who come from beyond the coastal hinter-
land.
36 Mwinyihaji, Esha F., ‘The Contribution of Islam toward Women’s Emancipation: 
A case study of the Swahili Muslims in Mombasa District, Kenya’, Unpublished M.Phil 
Thesis, Moi University, 2001, pages 142–143.
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of 1932.37 Many Swahili were displaced from their original homelands at 
that time, or pawned their lands and estates at very low prices to Indian 
entrepreneurs. Many Swahili became squatters, especially those who were 
illiterate. Today, the women who lead a secluded lifestyle are now work-
ing out strategies to survive in the public sphere. 
Swahili Muslim women were also involved in petty trading. However, 
this was done within the confines of their homes. They sold cooked food-
stuffs, which were cooked within the homes, and buyers went to their 
homes. Some Swahili Muslim women employed domestic helpers who 
hawked the foodstuffs for them in the streets, or sold them at the mar-
ket places. Though these businesses appeared to be petty, some Swahili 
Muslim women were able to accrue enough wealth to purchase prop-
erty, such as houses with rental premises, or to buy jewellery and kangas 
(Swah.: ladies’ printed cotton wrap). The jewellery and kangas are still 
considered important for they can be pawned or sold at times of difficulty. 
Swahili people who were living in town, and were involved in selling food-
stuffs, cooked the foodstuffs at home while their men established stalls to 
sell what their wives cooked. 
The trend is changing for Swahili Muslim women living in the villages. 
These women no longer cook all of the foodstuffs at home, but cook 
outside their homes, especially by the roadside where there are many 
passers-by who are potential buyers. The selling of foodstuffs is no longer 
solely in their own hands; up-country people have also learnt the busi-
ness and have forced these women to move out in order to sell their stuff. 
Therefore, one of the necessities for moving into the public sphere is to 
compete with their more enterprising up-country neighbours involved in 
the same businesses. 
Another reason necessitating the appearance of Swahili Muslim 
women in the public sphere is to ensure enough income to supplement 
what their husbands earn. In some of the households observed, women 
are the sole breadwinners. Other Swahili Muslim women are engaged in 
these businesses in order to get enough money to buy what their hus-
bands cannot buy for them, or to make their lives more comfortable. The 
Swahili Muslim women have opined that if they wait every day for what 
their husbands bring home, life will be very uncomfortable. This is the 
opinion of the uneducated women who live in the villages and also 
37 Kindy, Hyder, Life and Politics in Mombasa, Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 
1972, page 190. 
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the opinion of the educated women who work in offices in town. Some 
women argue that they need to live in a good neighbourhood, have pre-
sentable furniture, be able to take their children to good schools and not 
to municipal schools where there is little teaching going on. 
The other necessity for entrance into the public sphere is in order to get 
security from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Swahili Muslim 
women, like other women, have had difficulties securing loans from 
banks to start worthwhile business ventures. The role of NGOs such as 
Tototo Home Industries and Bamako Initiative was crucial. Microfinance 
through NGOs came to the rescue of women by encouraging them to 
work in groups.38 For instance, Tototo Home Industries gave them train-
ing about different ways to advance women financially, such as poultry 
keeping and owning rental property. They also gave them credit facilities 
to set-up economic activities. This training has gone a long way to expose 
Swahili Muslim women to the public sphere. It has empowered them to 
take charge of their economic lives. Apart from starting saving schemes 
for different women’s groups, these NGOs have also encouraged literacy 
programmes for elderly illiterate women. The major setback in these ini-
tiatives is the lack of repayment of loans by some of the women. Many 
women take loans, not to start a business, but to repay old debts. Whereas 
some women have managed to educate their children through such pro-
grammes, others have simply utilised the loans for daily needs like food.
Swahili Muslim women have shown an amazing capacity for mobi-
lization in their various women’s groups. For example, they are usually 
the majority at political rallies organized by male candidates, especially 
where Taarab musicians are entertaining at such events. In the past, these 
women have not tried to be candidates, but have simply voted for men, 
taking into account the favourite candidate of the family patriarch.39 This 
shows that Swahili Muslim women have been used as steps by men to 
climb up to political leadership. 
Challenges Facing Swahili Muslim Women
One of the challenges facing Swahili Muslim women’s entry into the public 
sphere is that of contestation. The study, conducted in Mombasa, reveals 
that the public sphere is not just there for women to take. There is com-
petition with the men who are already there. The Swahili Muslim women 
38 Kambua, Changamwe, 13th May 2007.
39 Munira Abeid, Spaki, 15th May 2007; Mishi Abdul, Kisauni, 15th May 2007.
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also have to struggle to get a place using the means that are in vogue, for 
instance, the requirement of parliamentary contestants in Kisauni con-
stituency to have policies touching on the squatter problem, regardless 
of whether they are male or female.40 Through a series of workshops that 
took place in Nairobi, women were equipped with such resources as to 
how to formulate policies, state their visions and what they can accom-
plish. The aspiring Swahili Muslim women contestants were among those 
who attended. These workshops served as venues of political enlighten-
ment, but were not sufficient by themselves to propel Swahili Muslim 
women into political positions. The women expressed a lot of zeal in the 
initial stages of campaigning but lost momentum as more powerful politi-
cians gained popularity with the public.
Religion is another challenge. On religion, there are several reasons 
advanced as to why sharīʿa is against Muslim women’s participation in 
the public sphere. That is the way sharīʿa has been revealed and people 
are to follow it.41 The following reasons are advanced:
• Women lack the necessary knowledge about public life
•  Female participation leads to the mixing of the sexes (ikhtilāf and 
khalwa)42
• Female biological cycle and life cycle will cloud their judgement
• Women can never be heads of state
• Females need to travel with a maḥram43
There is always the quotation of sūrat al-Nisāʾ (4): 34 that men are pro-
tectors of women. Different scholars have different interpretations of the 
verse. This is a verse that is quoted whenever the issue of leadership arises 
and it is meant to put women in their rightful position of submission to 
men. There is also the verse on ḥijāb (sūrat al-Aḥzāb (33): 33). 
To further support the point is the ḥadīth on Persia: that a society led 
by women will never prosper.44 This ḥadīth is the subject of debate in 
Islamic public discourses as a weak ḥadīth, following its chain of transmis-
sion. These are scriptural matters that are given to the masses who take 
40 Mishi Abdul, Kisauni, 15th May 2007.
41   Fatma Sufi, Munawarah, 26th May 2007; Amina Zuberi, Fort Jesus, 25th March 
2008.
42 ikhtilāf Arab.: controversial questions; khalwa Arab.: seclusion.
43 maḥram Arab.: close kin with whom marriage is forbidden.
44 Bukhari: Volume 9:219. 
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them as being absolute whilst not being given an understanding of the 
issues. Both ordinary and professional women among the Swahili tend 
to group activities into categories as ḥalāl (lawful) or ḥarām (unlawful) 
questions. Some of the religious teachings reinforce the already-existing 
customs such as male leadership and early marriages. There is a ḥadīth 
that three things should not be delayed: prayers, burying a dead person 
and for a maiden to get married. Amina Zuberi sought an official position 
from the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya on Muslim women 
and leadership; however she got no response from them.45 
There is a lot of ambiguity concerning the political leadership of Swahili 
Muslim women, centred on Islam. Yet there is no direct or implicit ref-
erence to it in sharīʿa. The current Swahili Muslim women’s activism is 
based on the need for the collaboration of both men and women in the 
public sphere in order to achieve development. 
Customs are also cited as being a restraint to public participation. I have 
grouped the two together because Islam has been associated with Swahili 
culture for a long time. The recent presence of Muslim reformists and 
their classification of certain things as bidʿa (Arab.: innovation) has led to 
attempts to distinguish between religion and culture.46 Swahili Muslim 
women cannot lead men, or women cannot make good leaders according 
to local custom. Leadership is something reserved for men, according to 
Swahili customs. Another aspect of customs is early marriage, where the 
person getting married is not consulted. Men talk and finalize the affairs 
of women in an absolute manner. Educated women may have a say in the 
choice of a husband; what about those who do not go beyond primary 
school in their education?
There seems to be a division among women at various levels. Firstly 
there are urban and rural Swahili Muslim women. The urban women con-
sider themselves to be more modernized and this can be seen in the type 
of houses they live in and also in the fuel used for cooking, namely gas, 
electricity and charcoal. Rural dwellers live in simple Swahili houses with-
out proper demarcation of rooms in the house, as sitting room or dining 
room; a house of nine rooms may have only one bathroom and one toilet. 
They mostly use firewood and charcoal as fuel for cooking. 
45 Amina Zuberi, Fort Jesus, 20th March 2008.
46 Munira Abeid, Spaki, 15th May 2007; Mishi Abdul, Kisauni, 15th May 2007; Maimuna 
Salim, Shanzu, 20th March 2008; Maimuna Omar Waziri, Junda, 19th March 2008.
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Then there is another distinction based on educational status. The more 
educated tend to move to urban centres, and if they have a high income, 
they live in affluent areas, guarded by security guards and dogs. They 
hardly mix with village women, unless they are relatives, and then only 
on special occasions. Visits by relatives from the village to the town are 
always interpreted in terms of “what do they want from ‘us’ ’’, not just to 
enquire about their well-being. The world of the educated women revolves 
around home-work-school-home. If they make visits to the village, it is to 
their immediate parents. We can say that economic achievement among 
women further reinforces the barrier of dialogue among Swahili Muslim 
women. They lose touch with reality and tend to judge other people’s lack 
of similar achievement as laziness, without reflecting on the whole pic-
ture. Changes in the Kenyan economy as a whole have had an impact 
on whether Swahili Muslim women remain in the private sphere or are 
forced to participate in the public sphere in order to survive.47 
Wariness concerning secular education as a whole has its roots in the 
fact that it was initially offered by missionaries. This led to the fear that 
if a Swahili Muslim woman attended a mission school, she would be con-
verted to Christianity and would marry a Christian. So parents thought 
that it was safer to only send their boys to school, as the risk was greater 
with girls. The issue of education has been perceived by Muslims in gen-
eral as marginalizing since 1907 when the seat of government was moved 
from Mombasa to up-country Nairobi. Prior to that, literacy existed at the 
coast for a long time. Girls have inherited secular education marginality 
three times over: from ‘traditions’ in parents’ preference to educate boys 
rather than girls; from ‘religion’ because secular education was perceived 
as bad due to the mixing of boys and girls in schools, plus the notion that 
girls should be ‘protected’; and from the ‘colonial’ one which affects all 
Muslims, both male and female.
Alliances are formed, and a dependency culture develops, among the 
Swahili Muslim women, either in groups, or individually, with aspiring 
contestants of a parliamentary seat. The politicians expect to get votes 
from them by promising either to help them in their projects or by giving 
bribes. However, it is also noted that these bribes are short-lived and come 
once every five years. 2007 was an election year in Kenya, and Swahili 
Muslim women in the study area were very excited about the ‘boon’ to 
47 Kresse, 2007, page 56.
 “necessity removes restrictions” 193
come in the election months. They eagerly waited for politicians to arrive 
so that they could ‘harvest’ their bribes. Some informants expressed the 
opinion that Swahili Muslim women are losers in the end as those who 
benefit a lot are those seen in the politicians’ homes throughout the year. 
Again, Swahili Muslim women form their own alliances to assist them 
in their day-to-day affairs; the women’s groups are examples of these. 
The rurally based include Mwangaza, Kisauni, Likoni and Mikindani, 
among others. We also have religious Women’s organizations such as 
Muslim Women’s Action Group and the women’s wing of Changamwe 
Muslim Youth. The religious groups lack able leadership and apt manage-
ment, as observed in one informal talk. An example was given of Malindi 
Educational Development Association (MEDA), a group in Malindi, north 
coast of Kenya, that received 36 million shillings. This is because they 
have set targets for their manager, whose work is to formulate policies, 
initiate projects and maintain them by soliciting for funds. Such activities 
are not found in these women’s religious organizations. They lack long-
term goals and ways to achieve them. 
Money is an important factor as to whether women can mobilize peo-
ple to become public leaders, especially in politics. It is a requirement 
that you spend money in order to get returns. Swahili Muslim women are 
known to like receiving small handouts during the election process, so 
they are targeted. Then Swahili Muslim women contestants have to have 
money as a resource to buy their way in. As well as efforts by Kenya Anti-
corruption Commission to do away with a bribe culture, there are many 
placards condemning the practice. The effort still has a long way to go. 
People engage in politics to become rich quickly because parliamentar-
ians raise their salaries whenever they like.
Conclusion
The entry of Swahili Muslim women into the public sphere is multi-
faceted. In order for them to make meaningful lives for themselves and 
their families, Swahili Muslim women have to adapt to the changes that 
face them. Economic needs have overshadowed the cultural and reli-
gious restrictions affecting them. They are gradually carving out a place 
in the public sphere. Most Swahili Muslim women’s supremacy as heads 
of their households is silently acknowledged. Their major entrance into 
political leadership remains a future objective that they are determined 
to achieve. The 2007 elections provided the civic candidacy of Swahili 
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Muslim women with three seats. The parliamentary contestants did not 
succeed, but they made a mark showing that they are ready to take up the 
responsibility. These women are optimistic that the future looks bright 
for them, and their initial venture served as a lesson for them. They 
have learnt that sharīʿa provides room for their active engagement in 
leadership. They have already been successful in sensitizing their commu-
nity to the current pandemic of HIV/AIDS. In the non-political leadership 
ranks, Swahili Muslim women have made significant progress. They need 
proper guidance on governance and effective ways to propel them into 
the public sphere.
CHAPTER NINE
WOMEN’S VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF KADHI’S COURTS:  
A CASE STUDY OF KENDU BAY, KENYA 
Rebecca Osiro 
Introduction
At the start of the 20th century, during the early years of the British colo-
nial era in East Africa, Muslims began to move to more rural settings in 
the interior, with the development of trading centres away from the rail-
way line. This led to the need for appropriate leadership. This chapter 
examines how Muslim women in one such remote rural community on 
the shores of Lake Victoria have interacted with Kadhi’s Courts. 
The existence of Kadhi’s courts in the coastal strip of Kenya had been 
ensured under the agreement between the Sultan of Zanzibar and the 
British to “preserve an Islamic way of life”.1 However, during the British 
colonial period, beyond the coastal strip, Kadhi’s courts were only estab-
lished in areas with a significant Muslim presence such as Isiolo in Eastern 
Province and Mumias in Western Kenya.2 The British developed a triple 
court system, with Native courts and Islamic courts as well a legal system 
modelled on British common law.
In the run-up to independence in 1963, an agreement was drawn up 
between the Sultan of Zanzibar, the Prime Minister of Kenya and the 
British Secretary of State which ensured that Kadhi’s courts should con-
tinue on the coastal strip “to the determination of questions of Muslim 
law relating to personal status (for example, marriage, divorce and inheri-
tance) in proceedings in which all parties profess the Muslim religion”.3
1 An-Na’im, A. A. (ed.), Islamic Family Law In A Changing World: A Global Resource 
Resource Book, London: Zed Books, 2002, page 40.
2 Chesworth, John A., ‘Kadhi’s Courts in Kenya: Reactions and Responses’, in Tayob A., 
and J. Wandera (eds.), Constitutional Review in Kenya and Kadhis Courts, Cape Town: 
Centre for Contemporary Islam, 2011, pages 3–17, page 5.
3 Clause two of the exchange of letters between the Prime Ministers of Kenya and 
Zanzibar dated 8th October 1963. See Chesworth 2011, page 5.
© Rebecca Osiro, 2014 | doi:10.1163/9789004262126_010
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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In addition, the triple court system was codified in 1963. However, in 
1967, Kenya abolished formal traditional courts, whilst retaining the com-
mon law courts and Islamic courts. The Islamic courts carried out their 
administrative functions only for Muslims, dispensing decisions on family 
issues such as personal status, marriage, divorce, property inheritance and 
succession. As the need arose for the Muslims to have legal and religious 
leadership, the constitution was amended to allow Kadhis to operate 
beyond the initially stipulated Ten Mile Strip along the coast, to urban 
centres in the country’s interior.4
The area under study, Kendu Bay, is a small rural town situated on 
the shores of Lake Victoria in the western part of Kenya. It is about one 
hundred and twenty kilometres south of Kisumu, the administrative 
headquarters of Nyanza, one of the eight provinces in the country. The 
Kadhi’s court is located in Kisumu and the poor infrastructure of Nyanza 
province makes it relatively inaccessible. It is partly for this reason that 
the Muslims in Kenya feel marginalized on a religious basis.5 
Previous studies have examined women’s use of Kadhi’s courts on the 
coast, notably Susan F. Hirsch and E. E. Stiles’ 1998 study,6 which observed 
that women frequented the courts more than men. This chapter, by study-
ing women from a remote rural location, seeks to discover whether these 
women are able to access Kadhi’s courts and to benefit from them. This 
research was carried out as the place of Kadhi’s courts in the Constitution 
of Kenya was being hotly debated throughout the nation.
The research was conducted through a series of in-depth interviews 
in Kendu Bay and environs as well as in Kisumu. Those who were inter-
viewed for the research are identified by initials; the location and the 
month of the interview is also given, together with the sequential number 
of the interview.
4 Anderson, J. N. D., Islamic Law in Africa, London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1970, pages 
81, 107. 
5 Said, A. S., ‘An outline history of Islam in Nyanza Province’, in M. Bakari & S. S. Ahmed 
(eds.), Islam in Kenya: proceedings of the National Seminar on Contemporary Islam in Kenya, 
Nairobi: MEWA, 1995, pages 19–27.
6 Hirsch, Susan F., Pronouncing and Preserving: Gender and the Discourses of Disputing 
in African Islamic Court, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998; Stiles, E. E., ‘A Kadhi 
and His Court: Marriage, Divorce, and Zanzibar’s Islamic Legal Tradition’ (A doctoral 
disserta tion), St. Louis, Missouri, UMI, 2002.
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The Community and Origins of Kendu Bay town
Today Kendu Bay is a cosmopolitan town. The Luo are the dominant eth-
nic group followed by a significant minority, the Gwe,7 who have been 
assimilated by the Luo. Swahili culture prevails, due to intermarriage and 
trade between the coastal and the local communities. The western part of 
Kendu Bay town, towards Lake Victoria (the old town), where most of the 
Muslim population live, is a mixture of small huts of corrugated iron and 
grass thatched roofs served by a dusty road and paths. 
Islam arrived in the community with the coming of an Arab trader, 
Nyasoro, who arrived by boat in the bay in 1902 and built a house on the 
shore. In 1904 a mosque was built in the town where the Islamic court 
was established, at a strategic point close to the shore.8 It was there that 
a group of eight elders, referred to as Kamba Nane (Swah: eight strings), 
volunteered their leadership to the Muslim community, led by Nyasoro 
and his Gwe counterpart, Kherala Madoro, who were the first Muslims 
in the area. 
In 1906, the first Christian missionary, Arthur Carscallen, a missionary 
from the British Adventist Mission,9 arrived in Kendu Bay, staying with 
Nyasoro for the first few days after his arrival. Once he was settled he 
joined the locals in their courts from where he disseminated Christian 
teaching. He was still remembered by the local people in Kendu Bay, who 
knew him as Bwana Kaskal.10 Carscallen’s missionary work was carried 
out along the shores of Lake Victoria. He established a training centre at 
Gendia, about four kilometres south of Kendu Bay town, and also several 
schools. He was involved in the translation of parts of the New Testament 
(St. Matthew’s Gospel) into the Luo language, teaching and converting 
local people to Christianity.11 Carscallen is depicted as ‘a missionary, an 
 7 The Gwe are a sub group of the Luhya.
 8 Initially, a grass thatched Mosque was erected at Miti Mbili, about twenty kilometres 
south of Kendu Bay town. The building served for prayers as well as a court.
 9 Mahon, J., ‘What Happened in 1906?’, Souvenir Special 100 Years of Mission 1906–
2006, Messenger: Journal of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in the United Kingdom and 
Ireland Volume 111.17, 2006, pages 3–11. Arthur Asa Carscallen (1879–1964) was a Canadian 
and a Seventh Day Adventist who had gone to Britain as a colporteur and was then chosen 
as the first missionary to be sent abroad by the new British Adventist Mission.
10 Osiro, R. A., ‘Polygamy Among Muslim Women in Kendu Bay and Kiboswa, Nyanza 
Province, Kenya’, MA Dissertation, St. Paul’s United Theological College, Limuru (unpub-
lished), 2006, page 9.
11 Neufeld, D., Seventh Day Adventist Encyclopedia, Washington: Review and Herald 
Publishers Association, 1976, pages 731–732.
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administrator and linguist’.12 The fact that his missionary and administra-
tive roles are mentioned separately might fit well with the oral literature 
that a kind of ‘Christian law’ existed alongside the natives’ family law. 
With Carscallen’s arrival, three types of legal system became opera-
tional in the area, that is, customary, Islamic and Christian forms that 
regulated issues that pertained to family life.13 
Mixed Identity
The women who were interviewed for the research identified themselves 
as being members of the larger Muslim community. Phrases such as 
‘we Muslims . . .’ or ‘in Islam . . .we . . .’ pointed out to their being part of 
a whole. They were members of a socially recognised group. The iden-
tity was either by birth or by incorporation through marriages that took 
place within an inter-religious context. The Muslim men mostly married 
women from Christian backgrounds. Out of eleven women interviewed, 
nine had converted to Islam at the time of their marriages. The incorpo-
rated women were perceived as ‘the other’, being seen as having a lack of 
knowledge in matters of dini (Swah: religion). 
The feeling was strongly shared among different categories of women. 
One who was a Muslim by birth commented: 
. . . There are some who do not know dini but claim to be Muslims. Just like 
the family where my daughter is married.14
One from a Christian background lamented:
. . . Muslim men do not marry their Muslim girls. They go for women from 
mission families who do not know the law of dini. I came from a mission 
background because my father was a Catholic. It is the women of my calibre 
who are married by Muslim men, brought here and dumped like imbeciles 
who cannot articulate issues. Their fellow Muslims would not allow them to 
do that because they know the law. . . . Muslim men should be stopped from 
marrying girls from mission homes . . .15
Identity also crossed socio-ethnic lines; Islamic cultural identity mani-
fested itself in matters of dress, such as the wearing of veils and head-
scarves within the town, while those on the outskirts of the town applied 
12 Neufeld, 1976, page 239.
13 Osiro, 2006, pages 8–9.
14 NS, Kendu Bay, April 07, 2007 (The daughter was married to a family that lived on 
the periphery of the town). 
15 MW, Kosele, April 09, 2007. 
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simple head scarves or moved within their homesteads without covering 
their heads. The variation in dress-code was influenced by the type of 
daily chores the women engaged in. Muslim women in the towns were 
basically involved in petty businesses while their counterparts on the 
periphery of the town were actively engaged in farming in addition to 
household duties that were defined along cultural lines. Women from 
non-Muslim backgrounds were ill-prepared in matters of Islamic legal 
duties and rights prior to marriage. Even after marriage, the women were 
more concerned with raising their families and making a living than 
understanding prescriptions provided in Muslim Family Law. These sen-
timents were shared strongly by women from the outskirts of Kendu Bay 
town who are part of the Kendu Bay Muslim community. 
A middle-aged woman was more specific in her concern, and poured 
out feelings that were held by her fellow women as well: 
Although I had been in Islam for long, I did not know exactly what mahr 
[Arab.: dower; Swah.: mahari—bridewealth] meant because no one 
explained it to me. Once you are married here, you don’t get to know things 
because there is no time for it. You saw us come from the fields to prepare 
lunch after which we go back until five or six in the evening. After that, you 
are busy with the kitchen work.16
Consequently, their integration into the wider Islamic community was 
not fully realised. The availability and willingness of teachers in matters 
of religion did not seem to suit the women’s busy daily schedules even 
though they desired to attain or realise the religious set norms. The quali-
fications of the teachers could also be questioned, taking into account the 
observation of one of the informants that anyone could be approached 
to solemnise marriage as long as he could read the Qurʾān.17 An elderly 
informant emphasized the need to educate the women in Islamic legal 
provisions in order to establish stable families. In her words: 
It is said that you should seek ʿilm [Arab.: knowledge] up to China. How can 
they know Islam if they do not learn?18
Examples were manifested in the way women born in Muslim fami-
lies abhorred the lifestyle on the periphery of the town. Owing to the 
immense responsibility that rested on her shoulders, an informant born 
16 ASA, Kosele, April 06, 2007.
17 AST, Kosele, April 08, 2007.
18 MW, Kendu Bay, April 10, 2007.
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and brought up among a majority-Muslim population until the time of her 
marriage commented: 
If as a mother-in-law you do not have any source of income, how would 
you take care of your daughter-in-law? It is hard. Both of you end up work-
ing throughout the day, and that is why the women do not have time for 
madrasa [Swah.: Qurʾānic school]. If you are a kibarua [Swah.: casual worker], 
you use what you have earned to feed your entire household. Whatever you 
bring home, you give to your daughter-in-law to prepare.19
In contrast, the women born in non-Muslim families easily adapted to 
the lifestyle that was highly esteemed in town. Of the seven women inter-
viewed within the town setting, only one was born in a Muslim family. Yet 
a feeling of social elevation could be deduced from their detestation of the 
kind of religious life their counterparts on the periphery of the town led. 
This was illustrated by comments such as: 
If you observed our fellow Muslims who live on the town’s periphery  
. . . closely, you will find that they do not know ways of dini well . . . They 
marry without contracting nikāḥ [Arab.: marriage contract with two 
witnesses]. . . If you go to their homes, you will find that sisters are married 
to one husband.20 
Although what was considered rural and less religious was only eleven 
kilometres away from the town setting, the town embodies a clear picture 
of ‘high culture’ as described by Kurt Beck with reference to Muslims in 
the Nile Valley and small market towns of Sudan.21 There were, however, 
mixed thoughts from those considered to belong to the ‘low culture’ as to 
whether they were lacking in ways of religion. 
Clifford Geertz observed cultural diversity in two different countries i.e. 
Morocco and Indonesia,22 yet in Kendu Bay, the sharp variation existed 
within a short distance of less than eleven kilometres. One informant23 
portrayed a kind of filtering of aspects of religion that were acceptable 
to her, as opposed to other aspects where she held to the cultural norms. 
19 MW, Kosele, April 08, 2007.
20 MW, Kendu Bay, April 10, 2007.
21 Beck, K., ‘Tribesmen, Townsmen and the Struggle over a Proper Lifestyle in Northern 
Kordofan’, in Kordofan Invaded, Stiansen, Endre U. & Michael Kevane (eds.), Leiden: Brill, 
1998, pages 255–264.
22 Geertz, C., Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1968, pages 1–22.
23 ASH, Kendu Bay, April 04, 2007.
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For example, she commended religious laws that she generalised as 
being positive to women but abhorred the practical realities that negated 
the same. 
Issues Affecting Marriages 
Mahr 
Mahr [Arab.: dower; Swah.: mahari—bridewealth] was one of the aspects 
in the contracting of marriage which was least observed in a practical 
sense. It was found that only a few women who were made aware of their 
rights asked for it, but only at the time of divorce. This could have been 
an overstatement, but a cross-section of informants24 had had their mahr 
given in part or received nothing. It was absurd that despite the clarity in 
remittance of mahr in the Qurʾān and sharīʿa, it hardly came into realisa-
tion. This was true even in cases involving mahr al-mithl25 where future 
payment is postulated. In accord with other women interviewed, an infor-
mant was categorical in her statement:
First of all, mahr is never given, it is only pronounced so that things can go 
on. Once you are joined nikāḥ (marriage has been solemnized), that is the 
end of it. The few women who are enlightened about nikāḥ can ask for it 
and be given but only in cases of ṭalāq. There is no mahr in marriages that 
do not break up.26
Such strong statements on practical realities negate what Doi states of 
mahr as being the Muslim woman’s economic right.27 Far from the non-
realisation of economic right, the irony was that women who married on 
the periphery of the town were bound by cultural constrictions to per-
severe in their marriages and rarely divorced. When their marital status 
24 MJ, Kendu Bay, April 02, 2007 (did not receive mahr); ASH, April 05, 2007; MW, 
Kosele, April 08, 2007 and MW, Kosele, April 09, 2007 (received their mahr in part) while 
ASH, Kendu Bay, 04, 2007; MW, Kosele, April 08, 2007; ASH, Kendu Bay, 04, 2007; ASH, 
Kendu Bay, 05, 2007; NSH, Kendu Bay, 07, 2007 and MW, Kosele, April 09, 2007 testify of 
women who were never given any mahr. 
25 Mahr al-mithl: “mahr of the like”, i.e. unspecified dower, in which the amount is not 
exactly laid down, but the bridegroom gives a bridal gift befitting the wealth, family and 
qualities of the bride. It also applied in all cases in which nothing definite about the mahr 
was agreed upon in the contract, Gibb, H. A. R. & Kramers, J. H., Shorter Encyclopaedia of 
Islam, Leiden: Brill, 1953, page 315. 
26 MW, Kosele, April 09, 2007.
27 Doi, A. R. I., Women in Shari’ah, London: Ta-Ha Publishers Ltd., 1996, pages 154–162.
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became too difficult for them to bear, they separated informally (not as 
stipulated in Islamic Law) but later re-united with their husbands without 
observance of any religious laws. It was in this regard that an informant 
exclaimed: 
Here women do not go to the Kadhi for help. When the situation gets too 
difficult for them, they take off to their places of birth. They stay for some 
time then they decide to come back hoping that the situation will have 
improved.28 
Since the Muslim community in Kenya and, by extension, East Africa, 
mostly applied Shāfiʿi madhhab, a woman who had not been given mahr 
had the right to refuse consummation of the marriage and the marriage 
could be annulled.29 Nevertheless, Muslim women were restricted, either 
by ignorance, or through strong cultural norms that were still cherished 
by people. Hisae Nakanishi’s article30 similarly portrays women’s igno-
rance of Islamic law in the post-revolutionary Iran. She quotes a woman 
lawyer who emphasized that ‘only women who are knowledgeable about 
women’s rights and prenuptial agreements are able to stipulate various 
conditions for their marriage . . .’31 
Within Luo culture, the bride price was paid to the bride’s parents, 
and was regarded as a form of recompense for raising their daughter. 
Culturally it was regarded as inappropriate for a woman to ‘extort’ money 
from a man who was not related to her by blood. Where it did occur it was 
construed as a form of prostitution and such a woman was viewed with 
contempt by society. It is possible that the cultural view of bride price 
instilled an aspect of shame into the women so that even the few who 
had the opportunity to state their requests in the contract, refrained from 
asking for a befitting mahr. 
28 ASA, Kosele, April 06, 2007.
29 Doi, 1996, page 161.
30 Nakanishi, H., ‘Power, Ideology, and Women’s Consciousness in Post-revolutionary 
Iran’, in Women in Muslim Societies: Diversity Within Unity, Bodman, H. L. and N. Tobidi 
(eds.), London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, pages 83–100.
31  Nakanishi, 1998, page 93. 
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Bāṭil (Invalid) Marriages
Traditionally, sūrat al-Nisāʾ (4): 332 has been perceived as giving Muslim 
men freedom to marry up to four wives. Amina Wadud-Muhsin33 and 
Asma Barlas,34 among other scholars, echoed reformist Muḥammad 
ʿAbdu’s sentiments on the subject35 in view of sūrat al-Nisāʾ (4): 129.36 In 
Kendu Bay, marriage to more than four wives was a common occurrence, 
partly due to Luo culture, which does not restrict the number of wives.37 
One of the women interviewed38 was a fifth wife and had obtained a valid 
document for the marriage. She noted that there were eight more wives 
after her and implied that she would not be surprised if another had been 
added the night before. One might be excused if one questioned the valid-
ity or authenticity of such a document. Was the religious law bent to suit 
the socio-cultural context? Anthropologist Talal Asad offers a solution in 
his view of Islam as a discursive tradition. The discourses on the ground 
seek to instruct practitioners as to the correct form and purpose of given 
practice that has a history.39 Where histories exist, for example the Islamic 
history from the formative period in the light of the ancestral history of 
the local people, whatever seems more appealing takes precedence over 
the other. The locals’ concerns and practices (local features) then become 
part of the discourse. 
Wadud argues against the limitation of justice on the man’s ability to 
provide material support equally among the wives. She questions justice 
in terms of quality of time, affection, spiritual, moral and intellectual 
32 If you fear that you will not deal fairly with the orphan girls, you may marry which-
ever [other] women seem good to you, two, three, or four. If you fear that you cannot be 
equitable [to them], then marry only one, or your slave(s): that is more likely to make you 
avoid bias. 
33 Wadud, M. A., Qurʾān and Woman. Reading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s 
Perspective, Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Faraj Bakti, 1994, pages 82–84. 
34 Barlas, S., Believing Women in Islam: Understanding Patriarchal Interpretations of the 
Qur’an, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002, pages 189–192.
35 Esposito, L. J. &, N. J. Delong, Marriage in Muslim Family Law: (Second Edition), New 
York: Syracuse University Press, 2001, page 48.
36 ‘You will never be able to treat your wives with equal fairness, however much you 
desire to do so, . . .’ 
37 Brett Shadle has conducted extensive research on marriage disputes in Gusiiland, 
which is in South Nyanza, not very distant from Kendu Bay. However as it mainly concerns 
the Gusii people and their cultural practices it is less relevant to the cultural issues facing 
Luos in Kendu Bay. Shadle, Brett L., ‘Bridewealth and Female Consent: Marriage Disputes 
in African Courts, Gusiiland, Kenya’, Journal of African History 44, 2003, pages 241–262.
38 MW, Kosele, April 09, 2007.
39 Asad, T., The Idea of an anthropology of Islam, Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1986. 
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support.40 In the area of research, however, justice is not even based on 
material support to the wives, but primarily on the man’s ability to pay 
dower to her parents. Among families who lived in the outskirts of the 
rural market town, the men apportioned pieces of land to their wives 
who in turn toiled on farms for sustainability. The workload was so much 
that the women hardly found time to attend madrasa classes instituted 
for an introduction to, or for advancement in religious instruction. An 
informant41 noted that the women seldom found time even to learn how 
to say ṣalāt (Swah.: prayer) correctly, following the rakʿa (Arab.: unit of 
prayer) because of the lack of training. Wadud could have had in mind 
the time that the man spent with each of the wives but, in the area of 
research, spouses who spent time together in public were viewed nega-
tively. The issue of ‘quality’ was almost out of the question. Asma and 
Wadud rejected control or fulfilment of sexual desire by the men and 
women respectively as being reasons for polygynous marriages but these 
reasons were aired by some of the informants in the area of research. One 
stated categorically that polygynous marriage was actually derivative of 
perverse pleasure. Such sentiments bring to the fore the factors or per-
sonalities that influence the local concerns and practices that pervade 
the religious discourse. They also raise the question as to whether these 
concerns and practices cut across the gender divide. 
Consanguine Relations
History holds Caliph ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān as having earned the nickname 
‛Master of the Two Lights’ for marrying the Prophet’s two daughters, 
Ruqayya and Umm Kulthūm, but he never had both sisters as wives at 
the same time. His marriage to Umm Kulthūm took place after the death 
of Ruqayya.42 The marriage to uterine sisters therefore adhered to the pro-
hibition in sūrat al-Nisāʾ (4): 23,43 that forbids marriage to two sisters at 
the same time. 
The inclusion of a wife’s aunt and niece probably would not exclude a 
wife’s half sister, just as one of my informants explained. Another infor-
mant, however, justified her position in that the sister with whom she 
40 Wadud, 1994, page 83.
41 MW, Kosele, April 08, 2007
42 Fry, George C. & J. R. King, A Survey of the Muslim Faith, Michigan, Grand Rapids: 
Baker Book House, 1980, page 131.
43 ‘You are forbidden to take as wives . . . two sisters simultaneously, . . . .’ 
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shared a marriage was not related to her by a uterine but by a consan-
guine relationship. Even though they were daughters of the same father 
they belonged to different mothers as their mothers were co-wives. This 
justification appears wanting in the light of Qurʾānic exposition; the guid-
ing principle can be summarised as: 
It is prohibited to have as wives two women who, if one of them were a 
male, would be prohibited to each other.44
However, she could be excused for being content as to the legality of her 
marriage taking into account that uterine sisters were in wedlock ‘at one 
and the same time’ within the neighbourhood. Sixteen out of the seven-
teen informants shared similar sentiments, with some being more spe-
cific. For example:
My fourth co-wife is the one who came to greet you before I came here to 
talk to you. She is my younger sister.45
 . . . But here you can find sisters married by one husband and all the chil-
dren are given equal treatment.46
 Almost all the younger sisters who came to baby sit their elder sisters’ 
children are married by the fathers of those children.47 
Inasmuch as the office of the Kadhi was central to the Muslim faithful in 
the area of research, one would understand that such instances would 
drive the informants to develop ambivalent feeling towards the office, par-
ticularly when such arrangements were backed up by documents which 
were generally considered as legal.
What might be the driving force behind these marriages? The infor-
mant who shared with her half-sister in marriage narrated how her sis-
ter coerced her into the marriage. She managed to convince their father, 
who reluctantly gave permission for the proposed marriage of his younger 
daughter. His older daughter had only one son in her marriage which, 
according to her, was tantamount to being childless. According to the tra-
dition of the people in Kendu Bay, a barren wife would look for a co-wife 
from her area of birth who would bear children in her stead. The older 
sister and second wife in the marriage applied a cultural practice that 
compelled her younger sister to join her in the marriage. In her narration 
she said:
44 Footnote 27, Tahfhīm al-Qurʾān, A. A. Mawdūdī, p. 157.
45 ASA, Kosele, April 06, 2007.
46 AST, Kosele, April 08, 2007.
47 MW, Kosele, April 09, 2007.
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After her request was turned down and she knew that she had no way out, 
she came home one evening, wailing from a distance as if someone had 
died. 
 She wailed so much that the villagers converged at her home . . . She was 
crying until tears rolled down her cheeks because she had been denied her 
request. She implied that her own family had abandoned her by refusing 
her status where she was married. The family knew that she did not have 
a child, but refused to let her husband take her sister (myself) who would 
dignify her. My father however stood his ground but his elder brother soft-
ened his stance [and] told my father that it was a taboo for me to marry 
elsewhere. That I had no option but to be married by my sister’s husband. 
That my sister had already blocked my way by her wails and I ended up 
being married here against my will.48 
Joining her sister in marriage was the only option for the younger sister’s 
future stability and well being in the society. Her elder sister had colluded 
with her elderly husband in the scheme. Farther from cultural claims, one 
wonders whether lust could have been one of the factors behind such 
marriages. The young woman had been living with her elder sister when 
she acted as ‛nanny’ to the children, whenever her school sessions were 
over. Moreover, she stated that now after many years of marriage and 
having entered into marriage contracts with other women, the man was 
making advances to her young niece, who was living with her. She had to 
send the primary school girl back to her parents’ home, in order to avoid 
a possible repeat of history. During one of the heated arguments that she 
engaged in with her husband on the issue, he retorted that she could not 
bar him from marrying her niece.49 
Clear and specific sentiments came from the informant who shared 
with her uterine sister in a marriage. She recalled, “I was not aware that 
as she grew up, Jaduon’g50 got interested in her and I only realised that 
when she was heavy with child”. The husband had voluntarily spoken of 
his intention to marry the younger sister. In an interview with him, the 
man was aware that sororal polygamy was against religious as well as cul-
tural norms but he had been driven by lust into a romantic relationship 
with his sister-in-law. He however concluded that the issue was between 
him and God for he had made his decision and no one could reverse the 
48 MW, Kosele, April 09, 2007.
49 MW, Kosele, April 09, 2007.
50 Jaduon’g: A Luo word for elders, also as a term of respect. The second meaning 
applies in the text. 
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process or nullify the marriage. Lust might be the driving force behind 
most, if not all, marriages but it would not be the only or main rationale 
given for a marriage. 
Sentiments from the area of research, however, point out that mar-
riage to the uterine sisters was precipitated through cultural demeanour 
or lust. In as much as culture did not allow for marriage to uterine sisters, 
it definitely provided a fertile ground for its enactment. That the act of 
the wailing of an older sister surpassed religious stipulations as well as 
social implications51 indicates how flexible the society was to a cultural 
disposition.
According to the narration of Athar Ḥusain, Caliph ʿUthmān agonised 
at the death of Ruqaiyya not only because he had lost a beloved wife, but 
because his connection with the Prophet’s family had been severed. He 
had therefore received a tripartite consolation from the Prophet. Apart 
from being treated as one of the victors of the Badr52 war even though he 
did not participate in it, he was given part of the spoils and offered mar-
riage to the Prophet’s second daughter, Umm Kulthūm.53
With functionalist Emile Durkheim’s characterisation of social facts in 
mind, although the contracting of a marriage on the premise that a sister 
wailed did not appear to be a common social fact, it was made compulsory 
by being transmitted amidst protests by the other party.54 It surpassed 
religious stipulation and endured both time and space. Culture surpassed 
the borders of gender here as the ‘balancing wheel’ depicted male and 
female on either side of the tussle. Culture and religion become inter-
twined when social facts that are common cross each other. An example 
of a social fact that seemed to strongly inform the cultural context was 
manifested in marriage contracts that involved widows. 
51 The younger sister was asthmatic, a second reason for which her father was not willing 
to let her be married in a polygamous family. The father’s first reason was the manner in 
which Muslim men married many wives for this meant that his daughter would not have a 
spouse who would give her the undivided attention which she needed in her situation. 
52 Badr: The Battle of Badr (625) is significant for the victory that Muhammad and his 
followers attained against those who were considered as wanting in faith. It is one of the 
most significant events in history among Muslims. Hughes, 1978, page 30.
53 Husain, S. A., The Glorious Caliphate, Lucknow-India: Islamic Research and 
Publications—Series No. 73, 1974, pages 93–94.
54 Shorter, Aylward, African Culture—An Overview: Social-Cultural Anthropology, 
Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 1998, pages 9–14.
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Re-Marriages
Ideally, a re-marriage, specifically in widowhood, was neither the preserve 
of the Muslim faithful in the area of research nor of the universal Muslim 
community but was also permissible among most Christian communities. 
To the Muslims, a woman is free to marry another man upon completion 
of the ʿidda (Arab.: period of retreat); in divorce this is a period of three 
months; in widowhood, the woman’s confinement for three months and 
ten days is required.55 The woman is expected to engage in a new mar-
riage contract with the fulfilment of all legal requirements. The cultural 
heritage of the local people56 in Kendu Bay, however, upholds the prac-
tice of widow inheritance, where the widow is re-married to her brother-
in-law, similar to levirate57 marriages in the Old Testament. The practice 
was so deeply rooted in the community that re-marriages upon the death 
of male spouses are usually contracted along cultural lines, with care for 
the widows and continuation of lineage not being the central objectives. 
One of the women interviewed had been re-married by her brother-in-
law,58 while another’s husband had married his sister-in-law59 upon the 
death of his brother. A third widow’s marriage was like an intricate puzzle 
that could not be solved. She had been re-married to either her brother-
in-law or to a young man who worked on the farm of her father-in-law. 
Family members volunteered contradicting information in regard to her 
marriage. It was clear that the husband passed away leaving her with 
their first born daughter, still a baby. As the young farm man was compli-
mented for agreeing to marry the widow, the other party was proud of a 
brother-in-law with whom the widow bore a son and another daughter. 
Giving her case as an example, a third family member offered informa-
tion that introduced another element concerning the paternity of the two 
younger children.60 
55 sūrat al-Baqara (2): 228, 229, 230 and 340.
56 There are also communities from other parts of the country such as the coastal 
region. There are notable individuals from Tanzania and Uganda who also form part of 
the Muslim community in Kendu Bay. 
57 Levirate marriage: A form of marriage prescribed by the Law of Moses in which a 
man was required to marry the widow of a brother who died with no male heir. The term 
levirate means “husband’s brother”. The purpose of the law was to provide an heir for 
the dead brother, thereby preserving his name and estate. The law also was designed to 
provide for the welfare of the widows (Deuteronomy 25:5–10).
58 MW, Kendu Bay, April 10, 2007.
59 ASH, Kendu Bay, April 05, 2007.
60 MW, Kosele, April 09, 2007.
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What was commonly relayed by the three was that nikāḥ was followed. 
It meant that the re-marriage was considered as legal according to reli-
gious stipulations. The three also concurred that neither was mahr given 
to the young woman nor was dowry paid to her parents, in relation to the 
re-marriage, because the formalities could not be repeated. It was a clear 
indication of cultural practice enduring to inform the religious discourse. 
In this area, the representative of the Kadhi solemnized marriages either 
upon the completion of payment of mahr and dowry, or promise from 
the bridegroom to pay the same. Such promises would be written down 
and signed by the bridegroom and his father, guardian or representative 
of the father. The widow stayed within her late husband’s homestead and 
carried out chores within the family. 
Some of the informants who had been separated from their spouses 
were faced with the difficulty of suing for divorce because of the irregular-
ities that surrounded the contract of the marriage. Even though apostasy 
was a strong reason for divorce, the nature of marriage at the time it was 
contracted dictated the nature of its dissolution. Not even the estranged 
wife who still professed Islamic faith could approach the representative 
office of the Kadhi for assistance, since the marriage was not solemnized 
through the office. “We could not even talk of talaka (Swah.: divorce) 
because we were not married according to the laws of dini (Swah.: reli-
gion)”, she said.61 Other informants echoed similar sentiments which ran 
in consonance with Islamic values, as Abdelhamid Chirane and Manazir 
Ahsan state that faith is the determining factor for the recognition of 
Islamic marriages.62 It appeared as though the marriage contract was sub-
jected to more scrutiny at the time of divorce. The process could have also 
been made more difficult by the parties’ failure to contact religious lead-
ers at the beginning of their marital life. One informant apportioned the 
blame by stating, “I blame the office of the Kadhi for not being pro active. 
Even when it was known that someone was suffering, the office kept quiet 
until it was prompted”.63
The informants noted that it was not easy for women to enter into ṣāḥiḥ 
marriages (Arab.: valid, or completely lawful) upon divorce or widowhood 
due to cultural and social expectations from the community. The few 
women who pressed for their religious rights were perceived negatively by 
those who integrated culture into their religious practices. On the other 
61 FA, Kendu Bay, April 02, 2007.
62 King, M. (ed.), God’s Law versus State Law: Construction of an Islamic Identity in 
Western Europe, London: Grey Seal Books, 1995, pages 16–18, 25–26.
63 ANK, April 04, 2007.
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hand, if the women entered into marriage contracts that were either bāṭil 
(invalid) or fāsid (irregular), they were viewed with contempt by religious 
leaders and the few who were informed about religious stipulations.
Abdelhamid Chirane, Manazir Ahsan, Shabbir Akhtar, Haleh Afshar 
and Zaki Badawi, among other scholars, note the difficulty in the process 
of integrating religious values in a non-Muslim society.64 Although they 
write of Muslim families in Europe, the difficulties are similar to those 
that affect Muslims in Kendu Bay. The latter are equally a minority group 
with varied cultural virtues and a social setting whose obligations at times 
stand against Islamic rules. Such norms included leviratic and sororal mar-
riages. The latter case, however, took place upon the death or a substitute 
for an older sister if she could not bear children or did not bring forth a 
son.65 It was not unusual, however, to come across consanguine marriages 
which were not necessarily due to the demise of, or as a substitute for, 
but in addition to an older sister. A Muslim elder and former government 
official concurs with Kyewalyanga that “Luo rules of exogamy prohibit any 
Luo to marry a person who is a wat i.e. who is a cognate relative”.66
Retaining Kadhi’s Courts in the Constitution
The call for a review of the Constitution is therefore both real and rel-
evant to the people if such details were to be taken care of. It would be in 
consonance with the proposed constitutional principles which, according 
to Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) Draft Constitution 
of 2002, were to cater for the marginalised communities of which the 
Muslims claim to be one. However, the draft constitution was not spe-
cific about the various social and cultural intricacies that were real and 
practical issues to the diversity within which the faith community exists. 
Ahmed Issack Hassan, Commissioner, CKRC 2002, noted the recognition 
of the Shīʿa Muslims in the proposed appointment of Kadhis. The positive 
gesture, however, would cater for sectarian divide but not the differences 
embedded in their socio-cultural settings. 
Under the tentative recommendations of the CKRC Draft Constitution, 
there is a provision for a ‘female assistant to the Kadhi’s Court to assist 
64 King, 1995.
65 Kyewalyanga, F-X. S., Marriage customs in East Africa: With special reference to 
selected tribes of Kenya: Akamba, Bantu Kavirondo, Gusii, Kipsigis, Luo, Nandi, and Teita, 
Hohenschäftlarn: Renner Publication, 1978, pages 19–26.
66 Kyewalyanga, 1978, pages 20–34.
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in dealing with the more delicate and intimate issues affecting women 
litigants in the court’. The provision would still limit such a woman for 
she would be holding administrative but not judicial authority. It is cat-
egorically stated in the Draft that she would ‘not deputise for or act in 
the place of the Kadhi’. Nevertheless it should be welcomed as a positive 
move directed towards enacting justice for the female gender in the cor-
ridors of law. It would also help the office of the Kadhi, to some extent, in 
getting to the bottom of the issues that affect Muslim women. The Muslim 
women in Kendu Bay, however, would have wished to have women in the 
representative units of the office of the Kadhi, at the grass-roots level. An 
informant clearly spelled out her desire: 
I wish we had a woman representative to work closely with the muʿallim (Arab.: 
teacher) here. She could offer more assistance to the women because there are 
issues that you cannot share with the muʿallim because he is a man.67 
Such female representatives would function at the level of Area Magistrate 
where the said-muʿallim dispensed his duties. 
The commissioner for the CKRC Draft Constitution also alluded to the 
codification of Muslim Family Law into legislation in Kenya, an appeal 
that he put across as one of the indicators that showed the Muslims as 
a marginalised community.68 The proposed legislation would impact on 
the people’s lives if the proposed codification took into consideration the 
intra-Muslim contexts. A Senior Resident Magistrate at the Kisumu Law 
Courts aired similar views to those of the commissioner. He felt that an 
Islamic Judge should be assigned judicial duties at the High Court instead 
of having a Kadhi, which to him meant a religious leader rather than a 
judge. He qualified his sentiments by proposing that Islamic law be intro-
duced into the public universities as electives so that there would be 
judges who were conversant with Islamic laws and who could dispense 
their duties inclusive of issues that concerned Muslims. It pointed to 
judges who could discharge their duties regardless of their religious affili-
ations, even in cases where both parties professed Islam. “Cases should 
come from Kadhi’s Courts to the High Court and not to the Chief Kadhi”, 
he said. “Kadhis should have minimal intervention in judicial cases, only 
at Lower Court levels, but equality should be maintained at high levels of 
legal jurisdiction”.69 The Magistrate agreed with women informants that 
67 LA, Kosele, October 14, 2007.
68 CKRC, 2002.
69 MB, Kisumu, October 16, 2007.
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women representatives be deployed at the community level where the 
Muslim Community, or muʿallim, operated.
Conclusion 
Despite the complex cultural and social issues that surround the contract-
ing of marriages among Muslims in Kendu Bay, the women aired strong 
feelings that Kadhi’s Courts should remain in the constitution. It was evi-
dent from the research findings that women acknowledged the importance 
of having their marriages solemnized by Kadhis or their representatives, 
hence the significance of Kadhi’s Courts. As one of the informants stated: 
“The office of the Kadhi is essential to the Muslim community here in 
Kendu Bay specifically in their marriage contracts”. Out of the seventeen 
women interviewed, only three had stayed in marriages that had not been 
solemnized by the office of the Kadhi or its representative. 
The new Constitution was approved in August 2010 with the Kadhi’s 
Courts clauses retained in much the same form as previously. The new 
clause 170. (5) states:
The jurisdiction of a Kadhi’s court shall be limited to the determination of 
questions of Muslim law relating to personal status, marriage, divorce or 
inheritance in proceedings in which all the parties profess the Muslim reli-
gion and submit to the jurisdiction of the Kadhi’s courts. 
Through this research we have seen that the Muslim women interviewed 
in Kendu Bay and its environs have found themselves disempowered due 
to a number of reasons. Many of the women coming from a non-Muslim 
background have not understood their rights within a Muslim marriage, 
leaving them disadvantaged, with their marriages not being recognised 
by the Kadhi’s Courts. Cultural practices have been followed which are 
at odds with Islamic practices, leaving the women in a difficult position, 
with many marriages being considered as invalid, again leaving women 
with a loss of rights. The physical distance of the Muslim community in 
Kendu Bay from the Kadhi’s Court in Kisumu, together with the uncer-
tainty of the availability of the Kadhi’s representative, again reduces the 
opportunities for the women to gain their rights.
PART FOUR
TANZANIA: “CALLS FOR THE RE-INTRODUCTION OF SHARĪʿA”
Map 6 Map of Tanzania: Showing principal places referred to  
in Part Four
CHAPTER TEN
DEMAND FOR THE RE-INTRODUCTION OF KADHI’S  
COURTS ON THE TANZANIAN MAINLAND: A RELIGIOUS,  
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 
William Andrew Kopwe
Introduction
The demand for sharīʿa implementation on the Tanzanian mainland is a 
social reality.1 This chapter is part of ongoing doctoral research on sharīʿa 
implementation in the country. Sharīʿa debates in the country revolve 
around the issue of Kadhi’s courts.2 Currently, Islamic personal law is in 
operation in the country, dispensed by the Magistrates’ courts. However, 
for several reasons, Muslims in general are not satisfied with the current 
practice of the administration of Islamic law by secular courts. Hence, 
Muslims are demanding a separate system of Kadhi’s courts, as was the 
case during colonial times when the courts were not only recognized, but 
also funded by the Government.3 
1 When Tanganyika united with Zanzibar in 1964 some matters were agreed to be 
non-union matters. This included judicial systems, allowing for the continued existence 
of Kadhi’s courts in Zanzibar. Therefore, the debate on Kadhi’s courts is found mainly on 
the Tanzanian mainland.
2 There has been a debate among Tanzanians as to whether Kadhi’s courts are tan-
tamount to sharīʿa or not. However, Lodhi and Westerlund are of the opinion that “The 
proposals of Bakwata [Baraza Kuu la Waislam Tanzania (The Supreme Council of Muslims 
in Tanzania)] in 1987 to reinstate separate Islamic courts is only one example which 
dem onstrates that the question of the position of sharīʿa in Tanzania is still a burning 
issue”, Lodhi, Abdulaziz & David Westerlund, ‘Tanzania’, in Islam Outside the Arab World, 
D. Westerlund & I. Svanberg (eds.), Richmond: Curzon, 1999, pages 97–110, page 104. This 
shows that demand for Kadhi’s courts is more or less the demand for sharīʿa implementa-
tion in the country, in particular for personal law. On the other hand our interviews with 
sheikhs in Tanga, Dodoma and Arusha confirmed that Kadhi’s courts are part of sharīʿa 
since they adjudicate cases in accordance with sharīʿa. However, they insisted that their 
demand for their re-introduction does not mean that they need total sharīʿa implementa-
tion in the country, rather they need these independent courts for personal cases only.
3 Interview with: Sheikh Mataka, 31st January 2007, Dar-es-Salaam and Sheikh Zuberi, 
14th February 2008, Dodoma. Both of these sheikhs are members of the Muslim council 
of scholars (ʿulamā’).
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Meanwhile, Christians feel that re-introducing Kadhi’s courts as a 
Government institution would introduce sharīʿa into the domain of the 
overall administration of justice. This would infringe the constitution and 
obliterate the state’s secularity. Furthermore, in general, Christians feel 
that running the courts at the Government’s cost will cause taxpayers’ 
money to be used by one religious group.4 This situation challenges both 
the secular nature of the state and the religio-socio-political sphere of the 
country. This chapter analyses the challenges posed by the demand for a 
separate system of Kadhi’s courts, and the relations of Kadhi’s courts to 
sharīʿa debates in the country.5 
The research for this chapter was carried out between April 2006 and 
July 2008. In-depth interviews were conducted with key actors in various 
parts of the country. Additional information was found through research 
in the Tanzania National Archives and contemporary media reports.
History of Kadhi’s Courts in the Country
The concept and practice of Kadhi’s courts is not new on the Tanzanian 
mainland. Although there is no precise date when the courts were offi-
cially established in the country, Muslim scholars state that the history 
of Kadhi’s courts in Tanzania goes back as far as the coming of Islam 
into the country.6 This is supported by the account of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (1304– 
c. 1370) when he travelled to East Africa. Visiting the states along the coast, 
Mogadishu (Somalia), Mombasa (Kenya) and Kilwa (Tanzania), he found 
that the Muslims were followers of the Shāfiʿī madhhab (Arab.: School of 
Law) and that there were qāḍī (Arab.: judge) and faqīh (Arab.: one who 
can give legal judgement) present in all the city states he visited.7
In a television broadcast,8 Sheikh Ali Basalehe, who is a spokesperson 
for a coalition of Muslim communities in Tanzania, referred to the use 
of the term Kadhi in the Swahili Bible to show that the concept and the 
4 Daily News (Tanzanian daily newspaper, in English.), Wednesday, 30th August 2006.
5 Because of the sensitivity of the debate, some of the interviewees’ names are either 
withheld or they are given pseudonyms.
6 Interview with Sheikh Mataka, 30th January 2007, Dar-es-Salaam.
7 S. Hamdun & N. King Ibn Battuta in Black Africa, Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 
2003, pages 17–25.
8 This was in a television interview carried out by the Channel Ten TV station in the 
‘Je tutafika’ (Swah.: Will we arrive?) programme which was discussing the issue of Kadhi’s 
courts’ re-introduction in the country. In this programme, the Sheikhs were called as 
Muslim scholars, for expert opinions.
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word Kadhi were present in Tanzania before European colonialism in the 
country. Missionaries used the existing indigenous concepts and Swahili 
words, like Kadhi, in translating the Bible into Swahili. Thus, in Matthew 
5:25 the Swahili 1952 Union Version of the Bible9 says: 
Patana na mshitaki wako upesi, wakati uwapo pamoja naye njiani; yule mshi-
taki asije akakupeleka kwa kadhi, na kadhi akakupeleka kwa askari, ukatupwa 
gerezani. 
(Come to terms quickly with your accuser while you are on the way to court 
with him, or your accuser may hand you over to the judge [kadhi], and the 
judge [kadhi] to the guard, and you will be thrown into prison.)10
The term Kadhi in the Swahili Bible is a translation of the New Testament 
Greek kritēs and of the English word Judge. Kadhi appears 27 times in the 
Swahili Union Version Bible. In every instance it has been used to depict 
approximately the same meaning as Matthew 5:25.11 
Apart from that, during the period of German colonialism (1890–1918) 
there was a double-tier system of courts: Islamic religious courts and 
secular courts.12 The German Colonial Government took the existence 
of Kadhi’s courts for granted. In 1919 Tanganyika became a League of 
Nations Mandated Territory; because of the nature of British Indirect 
rule, it was important for the British to establish laws which would help 
the indigenous people to rule more effectively. Therefore, the British 
Colonial Government officially recognized the native courts by insti-
tuting the ‘Courts Ordinance’, enacted by H. Byatt, the Governor of 
the Tanganyika Territory, on 14th December 1920.13 By this, the British 
Colonial Government legally recognized the operation of Kadhi’s courts in 
the coastal area. Hence, Kadhi’s courts were treated as one of the Native 
 9 The Union Version was the first Bible in Swahili with a text agreed by all Christian 
denominations. Earlier Bibles in Swahili include those in Zanzibar Swahili by Universities’ 
Mission to Central Africa (1895), in Mombasa Swahili by Church Missionary Society (1914) 
and Röhl (1937), who avoided words with an Arabic root, Chesworth, John A., The Use 
of Scripture in Swahili Tracts by Muslims and Christians in East Africa, doctoral thesis 
University of Birmingham, 2008, http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/150/. It is worth noting that 
Röhl uses mwenye hukumu [the one who gives judgement] rather than kadhi.
10 The English translation is from the New Revised Standard Version, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995.
11 Itifaki ya Biblia: Orodha ya maneno yote ya Agano la Kale na Agano Jipya na Madondoo 
Yake, Dodoma: Central Tanganyika Press (Swahili Bible Concordance), 1990. 
12 Shivji, Issa. G. (ed.), Constitutional and Legal System of Tanzania: A Civics Sourcebook, 
Dar-es-Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers Ltd, 2004, page 19.
13 Tanzania National Archives Acc. AB 2587: Native law and Customs 1919–1922.
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Courts just like other tribal courts, but limited to Muslims’ personal cases 
only.
When Tanganyika gained independence in 1961, the country was full of 
factions due to ethnicity, religion, political parties, economic imbalance 
and educational differences among Tanganyikans. Therefore, the great 
task ahead for the Government leaders was to create unity in the coun-
try. Mpangala comments that one of methods used to unite the country 
was the abolition of native courts.14 During its 1963 session, from the 11th– 
26th June, the National Assembly abolished the Law of Native Courts. 
Since Kadhi’s courts were amongst the native courts, they were abolished 
and their duties were subsumed into the Magistrates’ court. However, 
section 7(3) of the Magistrates’ Court Act of 1963, which was revised in 
1984, ensured that the magistrates who presided over cases pertaining to 
native laws judged justly, with the assistance of court assessors. 
Muslims in the country were strongly disturbed by this merger. From 
1967 to 1970 there were strong debates in the Parliament about it, resulting 
in the 1971 Marriage Act which officially recognized several types of mar-
riage, including religious marriage. Furthermore, the Government ordered 
magistrates to be instructed in Islamic laws to ensure that they would be 
able to dispense justice in accordance with Islamic law.15 
The Current Debate on the Re-Introduction  
of Kadhi’s Courts
The current sharīʿa debate in Tanzania is about Kadhi’s courts. Muslims 
want the Government, through an act of Parliament, to institute Kadhi’s 
courts as a court distinct from the magistrates’ court. Shivji gives a reason 
for this, that “The decisions of these [magistrates’] courts deviate to some 
degree from the strict rules of traditional Islamic law in matters such as 
marriage, divorce, succession, inheritance, guardianship, and waqf ”(Arab.: 
inalienable religious endowment).16 The debate is mainly fuelled by two 
factors: firstly, that many Muslims want Kadhi’s courts to be a Government 
institution, and secondly, that Muslims want Kadhi’s courts to be funded 
by the Government. They want it to be like it was during colonial times 
14 Mpangala, Gaudens, Peace, Conflicts, and Democratization Process in the Great Lakes 
Region: The Experience of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, 1999, page 3. http://www.fiuc.org/iaup/
esap/publications/dar/mpangala1.pdf, 
15 See also An-Naʾim, A. A. (ed), Islamic Family Law In A Changing World: A Global 
Resource Book, London: Zed Books, 2002, pages 39–53; 57–61.
16 Shivji, 2004, page 20.
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and similar to what is currently done in some other East African countries 
such as Kenya and Zanzibar.17 If this were the case, Kadhi’s courts would 
be acting on behalf of the Government by settling issues pertaining to 
Muslims, who are citizens of this country.18
Demand for Kadhi’s courts was given impetus by the Union of Muslim 
Youth (UMY) who published a ten-year development plan in 1984. Sigvard 
von Sicard comments that “It was their [the UMY’s] insistence which made 
BAKWATA request the re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts in 1987”.19
The agenda again came into the public sphere in 1998, when Augustine 
Lyatonga Mrema,20 an opposition party Member of Parliament (MP), 
brought the agenda to Parliament for the creation of a Kadhi’s Courts 
Law. The demand was revitalized by Thomas Ngawaiya,21 an MP from an 
opposition party, who was supported by Mohammed Ramiya, a Chama 
cha Mapinduzi (CCM) MP. This support made the House seriously con-
sider the issue by appointing a Committee to deal with it. It is interesting 
to note here that those people who introduced the demand in the House 
were all Christians, apart from Ramiya, who joined them later. 
The debate gained impetus from the ruling party’s (CCM) 2005 election 
manifesto. CCM pledged that its Government would follow up measures 
already introduced to improve the judicial system, including finding a 
solution to the issue of re-establishing Kadhi’s courts in Tanzania main-
land.22 However, today, many Tanzanians are suspicious of the promise, 
considering that it was merely political propaganda, because the CCM 
statement is vague. The manifesto does not elucidate how the issue would 
be dealt with. It is perceived that CCM used it to attract Muslims to the 
party, in order to get their votes. 
It was because of this that when the debate between Christians 
and Muslims on this issue heated up, creating a volatile situation, the 
17 Though Zanzibar is part of the United Republic of Tanzania, there are some matters, 
like Kadhi’s courts, where Zanzibar has its own policies.
18 Interview with a member of BAKWATA executive council, 31st January 2007, Dar- 
es-Salaam (name withheld). 
19 Sicard, von S., ‘Tanzania’, In Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition, P. Bearman, T. 
Bilquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W. P. Heinrichs (eds.), Volume 10 Fas. 165–166, 
Leiden: Brill, 1998, pages 194–196.
20 Augustine Mrema left CCM in 1995 and in 1998 he was a member of the National 
Convention for Construction and Reform-Mageuzi (NCCR-Mageuzi); subsequently he 
joined the Tanzania Labour Party (TLP).
21 Ngawaiya is no longer a member of an opposition party; subsequently he returned 
to the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Chama cha Mapinduzi can literally be 
translated as the ‘revolutionary party’.
22 CCM ‘Election Manifesto’, Dodoma, 2005, page 132.
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minister for legal and constitutional affairs offered the Government’s 
stand on the issue. The minister addressed a press conference on 4th 
August 2006. She was quoted as saying that, in the Manifesto, CCM did 
not articulate how the issue of Kadhi’s courts was going to be resolved. 
Hence she urged people to be calm while the Government finds appropri-
ate means of resolving the problem.23 
The above statement by the CCM minister indicates the politicization 
of the issue. CCM was aware that some of the opposition parties, such as 
the Tanzania Labour Party (TLP), capitalized on the Muslim demand in 
order to win people’s support in the election. Therefore, the inclusion of 
such an abstract statement can be seen as a counter-attack to the opposi-
tion parties. 
Aside from the issue of Kadhi’s courts re-introduction being hijacked by 
politicians, numerous reasons have been given by Muslims in the country 
for their demand to be met. Here the major arguments are presented: 
A Sufi Sheikh in Arusha argues that if the Government allows the Hindus 
to cremate their deceased loved ones in accordance with their beliefs, why 
shouldn’t the Government allow Muslims to exercise their religious rites 
through Kadhi’s courts. He argues that if the constitution grants freedom of 
worship and religious practices to its citizens, it should do so equally to all 
religious groups.24 
The interview with Sheikh Mataka, the chairman of BAKWATA Executive 
Council, revealed that, although Islamic law is currently dispensed by the 
Magistrates’ courts, there are still several deficiencies noted. The most sig-
nificant one is that those magistrates do not have authority to adjudicate 
cases by Islamic law. For one to be a judge who judges according to Islamic 
laws, one has first and foremost to be a devoted Muslim. However, there 
are a lot of magistrates who are not Muslims. According to Sheikh Mataka, 
those people who are not Muslims dispense Islamic law without commit-
ment and conviction for the sanctity of the law. On the other hand, in 
order for one to be an accepted judge in Islamic law, one has to be a man 
of integrity. He went on to say that, in the Magistrates’ courts, some magis-
trates are women, others fornicators, others are alcoholics, and some even 
take bribes; these are characters who are against Islam.25
23 Mwananchi (Tanzanian daily newspaper, in Swahili.), 5th August 2006. 
24 An interview carried out on 27th August 2007 in Arusha.
25 In the discussion Mataka emphasized that a Kadhi is supposed to be a man and not 
a woman, and that women are not allowed to be judges in an Islamic court (Interview 
carried out on 31st January 2007, Dar-es-Salaam).
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Apart from that, there are several magistrates who do not have a mas-
tery of Islamic laws. Therefore, often, when it comes to the issue of inher-
itance, these magistrates send their clients to sheikhs who arrange the 
inheritance for them. Then they go back to the magistrate for an official 
judgement to be made by the court.26 A discussion with an advocate in 
Arusha revealed that at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, where most of 
the lawyers in Tanzania study, Islamic law is taught as an elective course. 
Therefore not all of the lawyers have knowledge of Islamic law.27 This 
argument is supported by a lawyer who says that he knows many mag-
istrates who are not well-versed in Islamic law. He also says that since 
not all of the Islamic laws are written in the books of law it sometimes 
becomes difficult for one to judge rightly according to Islamic law.28
Various Responses to Kadhi’s Courts’ Re-Introduction
The agenda for the re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts in the country was 
received with a diversity of perceptions. There have been inter- and intra- 
religious heterogeneous views from within and without Islam and Chris-
tianity regarding the attitude of the Government toward re-introduction of 
Kadhi’s courts. The theory of religious economy is relevant to this study.29
The current demand for the re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts has been 
so strong because of religious resurgence which is a result of religious glo-
balization. Muslims in the country are undergoing a strong revival, which 
calls people back to a pristine form of Islam. Various Muslim groups in 
the country feel that they have an obligation to find ways to rightly mani-
fest their religion. Moreover, there are several Muslim discourses regard-
ing their status concerning participation in the socio-political domain, 
and opportunities for appointment as civil servants in the country. This 
has been made explicit in the numerous grievances presented to the 
26 Interview with Sheikh Mataka, 31st January 2007, Dar-es-Salaam.
27 Discussion with Advocate Ezra Mwaluko on 8th March 2007, Arusha.
28 Interview with Kenny, 15th June 2007, Bayreuth, Germany. This lawyer is a Tanzanian 
who was doing his PhD in the University of Bayreuth, where we were able to conduct an 
interview with him, during his summer school.
29 This theory was coined by Peter Berger (1963). Berger used the model of ‘market 
place’ to explain the relationship between religious groups in a secular state. Berger, P., 
Invitation to Sociology, New York: Doubleday, 1963, page 79. 
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Government by scholars who are Muslims, Islamic religious scholars, 
Muslim-owned media, and official Muslim umbrella bodies.30
Politicians have also hijacked the agenda of Kadhi’s courts and want 
to manipulate it for their own political ends. Meanwhile, there is a strong 
religious market (society) competition in this country; different religious 
groups strive for influence in society. As a result, every move in the public 
sphere which seems to be religious is looked at with suspicion. Sometimes 
the doubts posed by different religious groups are genuine and sometimes 
they are just suspicions and prejudices.
However, Tanzania’s Constitution, in Article 19 stipulates that:
19.—(1)  Every person has the right to the freedom to have conscience, or 
faith, and choice in matters of religion, including the freedom to 
change his religion or faith. 
 (2)  Protection of rights referred to in this Article shall be in accor-
dance with the provisions prescribed by the laws which are of 
importance to a democratic society for security and peace in the 
society, integrity of the society and the national coercion [sic]. 
 (3)  In this Article reference to the term “religion” shall be construed 
as including reference to religious denominations, and cognate 
expressions shall be construed accordingly.31
This can be seen as allowing this kind of religious market i.e. a free 
market, in the sense that people are free to follow the religion of their 
choice and are also free to disseminate their beliefs. This text causes a 
lot of complications and challenges in the religious arena of the country 
because, all the time, religious groups and the Government take refuge in 
the Constitution to defend their agendas. This is what is expressed in the 
following responses to Kadhi’s courts by different groups in the country.
30 The Dar-es-Salaam University Muslim Trusteeship (DUMT) is a good example. See 
also BAKWATA’s letter to President Benjamin William Mkapa (www.igs.net/~kassim/
nyaraka/barua_halmashauri.htm accessed on 23.05.2008). 
31 Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1997, Right of freedom of religion 
Act No. 1 of 1984 Art. 6; Act No. 4 of 1992 Art. 9; Act No. 1 of 2005 Art. 6. Note Section 2 
previous to 2005 read “Without prejudice to the relevant laws of the United Republic the 
profes sion of religion, worship and propagation of religion shall be free and a private affair 
of an individual; and the affairs and management of religious bodies shall not be part of 
the activities of the State authority”. (http://www.judiciary.go.tz/downloads/constitution 
.pdf accessed on 20.03.2012)
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Response of the National Muslim Council  
of Tanzania (BAKWATA)
As for BAKWATA, which is at the forefront of the demand, its stand is 
openly expressed by the Mufti. The Mufti of Tanzania, who is the offi-
cial spokesman of BAKWATA, expressed his sentiments by accusing non- 
Muslims in the country, saying that those who dispute the re-introduction 
of Kadhi’s courts have bad intentions towards Islam. 
Furthermore, Sheikh Mataka commented that the resistance of 
Christians to the re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts is due to their intoler-
ance of Muslim affairs and activities in the country. The chairman said 
that:
Muslims in the country have been very tolerant of the extra privileges that 
Christians get from the Government. Among such privileges are, for exam-
ple, people resting on Saturdays and Sundays. This allows a Christian to pray 
in his or her church. Meanwhile, work continues for Muslims except for a 
few hours on Fridays which Muslims utilize for their prayers. Another privi-
lege is that 1st January is a public holiday, based on the Christian calendar; 
however, the first day of the Muslim year, is not a public holiday. These are 
some of the many privileges which Christians enjoy in the country, while 
Muslims are forced to tolerate such a situation.32 
Sheikh Mataka urges Christians in the country to be tolerant of the issue 
of the re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts, because that is what Muslims do 
concerning many privileges that Christians get from the Government.
In an interview with Sheikh Mubaraka of the Shīʿa, Bilal Muslim Agency 
of Tanzania, Tanga branch, he revealed that Kadhi’s courts are an impor-
tant alternative for sharīʿa implementation in the country. For him, sharīʿa 
implementation in the country is supposed to be a gradual process. His 
argument is that when Muslims are trained to abide by Muslims’ personal 
laws, they will be able to live by the will of God, which automatically 
helps them not to commit other crimes. That is because the same fear of 
God in the personal law will spontaneously exert a fear of breaking other 
laws. Hence in a secular country like Tanzania, Kadhi’s courts may be an 
alternative for the whole sharīʿa.33
32 Interview with Sheikh Mataka, 31st January 2007, Dar-es-Salaam.
33 Interview carried out on 8th February 2008, Tanga. Sheikh Mubaraka is an experi-
enced person in the issue of Kadhi’s courts, because he worked as a secretary to the Chief 
Kadhi in Kenya for several years.
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The Government’s Response 
The history of the demand for Kadhi’s courts’ re-introduction in the coun-
try shows that the Government had started to act upon the issue ever 
since its genesis in the Parliament in 1998. Following this agenda, the 
Parliament delegated the issue to its Committee for Constitutional, Legal 
and Administration Affairs. According to the report of the Committee, the 
job was not finished during the Parliamentary session in 1998. However in 
2002 the issue was carefully dealt with by the Committee.
The Parliamentary Committee met from 4th to 6th August 2004 in 
Dodoma to discuss the findings of their research on the issue of the re- 
introduction of Kadhi’s courts in the country. The report, which was 
published in October 2004, Taarifa ya Kamati ya Katiba, sheria na 
utawala kuhusu uanzishwaji wa Mfumo wa Mahakama/taasisi ya Kadhi 
Tanzania Bara (Report of the Committee for Constitutional, Legal and 
Administration Affairs concerning the introduction of System of Courts/ 
the institution of Kadhis in Tanzania Mainland), shows that the majority 
of Muslims in the country are in favour. Therefore, the Committee sug-
gested that the Government should explore the possibilities for re-intro-
ducing Kadhi’s courts. However, the Committee cautioned that the matter 
should be administered carefully and in such a way that it does not divide 
people along religious lines. In order to successfully put this institution 
in place, the Committee gave several suggestions. Selected suggestions 
drawn from the report of the Committee are:
•  The court should deal only with personal issues of Muslims which 
would include marriage, inheritance, divorce, Islamic foundations 
[Arab.: waqf; Swah.: wakfu] and the interpretation of Islamic laws such 
as giving statements on the timing of Ramadan and reconciliation of 
disputes between Muslims. 
•  The Government should establish Departments of Islamic Law in the 
law schools in the country.
•  Citizens should be educated on the structure and functions of Kadhi’s 
courts, so as to remove the fear which is believed to result from the 
feeling that instituting Kadhi’s courts is tantamount to the full imple-
mentation of sharīʿa, including penal law, which would turn Tanzania 
into a Muslim state. 
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•  The structure of the court should follow a descending order of: Court 
of Appeal, High Court, Grand Kadhi’s court, Regional Kadhi’s courts, 
District Kadhi’s courts and Primary Kadhi’s courts.34
The current Government’s position was given by the Minister for Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs. According to the minister, the Government is 
of the opinion that Kadhi’s courts are an important institution for Muslim 
affairs in the country. That is why CCM included the issue in its election 
manifesto, in order to find a way forward to achieve the improvement of 
Muslims’ well-being in the country. Also, according to the minister, the 
Government is still gathering evidence from the experiences of countries 
where Kadhi’s courts are in operation and from those countries where 
Kadhi’s courts are not in operation. The minister further said that in order 
for the Government to resolve the issue correctly, it will seek the views of 
the majority in different institutions, while also taking into consideration 
the constitution, the different operating laws in the country and various 
customs of Tanzania. 
The Government’s decision to gather evidence of the experience of 
Kadhi’s courts from countries outside Tanzania surprised many Muslims 
in the country. Sheikhs Basalehe and Mataka, for instance, do not see any 
reason for the Government to do other research on the issue, considering 
that the Committee appointed by the Parliament had finished its job and 
given its suggestions. According to Basalehe and Mataka, Muslims in the 
country were waiting for the implementation of the suggestions by the 
Committee.35 The report given by the Parliamentary Committee shows 
that the members of the Committee made enquiries about the operation 
of Kadhi’s courts in selected African countries with the intention of find-
ing out whether those countries have Kadhi’s courts system and how they 
operate. The countries visited included Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique and 
South Africa.36 
34 The report was originally in Swahili, the English translation is by the author.
35 This was in a television interview carried out by the Channel Ten TV station in the 
‘Je tutafika’ programme which was discussing the issue of Kadhi’s courts’ re-introduction 
in the country. 
36 Channel Ten TV interview with Sheikhs Basalehe and Mataka.
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The Response of Muslims Outside BAKWATA
The response of Muslims outside BAKWATA shows that there is no united 
view on the issue, causing suspicions and the accusations of the CCM 
Government, BAKWATA and Christians in the country. Though there is 
no official statement from these Muslims, because they lack a legally reg-
istered umbrella body for their representation, their voice should not be 
taken as insignificant, since they are part of the greater Muslim umma 
(Swah.: community) in Tanzania. 
This group of Muslims has mainly two views. Either, that the Kadhi’s 
courts should be there and be managed by the Muslim community, or, 
that they should not be there at all. Two important reasons are given by 
these Muslims. Firstly, they have fears that, if Kadhis are financially sup-
ported by the Government, they will not be independent. Hence they 
will not make decisions for the good of the Muslims in the country. Most 
of the decisions will be dictated by the Government. To use a common 
saying, “He who pays the piper chooses the tune”. Hence it will be the 
Government, which pays the Kadhis, which will impose the decisions of 
the Kadhi and Kadhi’s courts in general. As a result, Muslim matters will 
be decided by the secular, non-religious, Government, a situation which 
Muslims deem as disempowering Muslims in the country, because the 
Kadhis will implement the Government’s policies.37
Also, these Muslims suspect that the idea of the re-introduction 
of Kadhi’s courts in the country is a plan by the CCM Government to 
control Muslims. They say that the Government has failed to control 
Muslims through BAKWATA, because many Muslims nowadays do not 
trust BAKWATA, an instrument which they regard as being used by the 
Government to control Muslims. For them, Kadhi’s courts, which will be 
controlled by the Government, are of no help to the Muslims. They give 
the example of Zanzibar, where Kadhi’s courts are in operation. They 
say the Kadhis in Zanzibar do not have any significance to the Muslims, 
because they are controlled by the Government.
On the other hand, a Muslim organization called Khidmat Dawaat 
L’Islamiyat Center (Center for the Service of Islamic Daʿwa (Arab.: calling 
people to Islam)) wrote a letter to the CCM national leadership to express 
its views concerning the re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts in the  country. 
37 An-Nuur (Tanzanian weekly newspaper, in Swahili.) no. 997, 22nd–28th September 
2006.
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The unsigned letter is ascribed to a person identifying himself as the sec-
retary general of the organization, Ustadh A.S. Mkambaku. The views 
expressed in the letter reflect those of Anṣār al-Sunna Muslims. The letter 
indicates that those Muslims who are represented by this organization 
categorically denounce the idea of the re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts in 
the country, because the court will be under the auspices of BAKWATA, 
an organization that they are against, because they regard it as a pup-
pet of CCM. The letter also indirectly shows that, since the Kadhi’s courts 
will be limited to only personal cases, they are of no importance, because 
other issues like adultery, theft and other crimes are not to be judged 
according to Islamic law. The group represented by this organization says 
that the Kadhi’s courts are not their most pressing demand. Their actual 
demand is the equal division of power in the country between Muslims 
and Christians. Analysis of the reasons given by the organization, that 
Kadhi’s courts will not be important for Muslims since they will not have 
control over non-personal cases, may lead to a conclusion that the orga-
nization is ‘for’ the implementation of total sharīʿa. 
According to the letter, BAKWATA insists on the re-introduction of 
Kadhi’s courts, because BAKWATA Sheikhs will then have an assurance of 
employment. Surprisingly enough, the letter supports the Christians’ stance 
of rejecting the re-introduction of the courts because the court will be 
financed by taxpayers, using money paid by both Christians and Muslims.
In a TV interview with Channel Ten television, Sheikh Yahya Hussein, 
founder and leader of Baraza la Kujisomea Qur’an Tanzania (BALUKTA, 
Tanzania Council of Qurʾān Reading) said that the abolition of Kadhi’s 
courts had been an idea instigated by the then Minister for Legal Affairs. 
This Minister was from the Ahmadiyya community, which is considered 
by Sunni Muslims to be a non-authentic Muslim group. Hence, for him, 
Kadhi’s courts were not an important thing, because they do not recog-
nize the Ahmadiyya community. 
In a similar vein, Sheikh Hussein commented that, currently, arbitra-
tion of marriage problems and other fatāwā (legal statements by a muftī) 
are offered by BAKWATA, which is an umbrella organization representing 
Muslim organizations; however, not all Muslims in the country recognize 
BAKWATA as representing them. Therefore Kadhi’s courts, for him, are 
important because their introduction is a way by which Muslims can get 
rid of BAKWATA hegemony.
There is yet another Muslim perspective. Our interview with a repre-
sentative of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community in Tanga shows that they 
are categorically against Kadhi’s courts. They say that they are not ‘for’ 
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Kadhi’s courts because other mainline Muslims do not recognize them as 
real Muslims. It is only because of Government secularism and the con-
stitutional provision of the freedom of worship in the country that they 
can sustain their presence in the country. Therefore, they know that if 
Kadhi’s courts are instituted, most of the fatāwā which a Kadhi offers will 
be against them. Also, they fear that the Kadhi’s courts will intensify the 
existing discrimination which they suffer from ‘mainline’ Muslims.38 
All of the above views from Muslims of different affiliations show that 
there is little uniformity in the stance among Muslims regarding Kadhi’s 
courts.
Christians’ Response to the Re-Introduction of Kadhi’s Courts
Generally, Christians, as individuals, are not against the re-introduction 
of Kadhi’s courts in the country, on condition that Kadhi’s courts should 
not to be managed and funded by the Government. Their concern is that 
if the Kadhi’s courts are governmentally instituted, other religious groups 
in the country may demand similar special favours from the Government. 
According to these Christians, it would be better for the Government to 
abstain from the issue of re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts in the country. 
Rather, the issue should be left in the hands of the Muslim community.39
The Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Anglican and Pentecostal churches in 
Tanzania categorically denounce the re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts 
in the country. These churches, at different times, have offered their 
statements on the issue. They all reject the idea of bringing the issue of 
Kadhi’s courts as a bill of law to the Parliament for discussion. Objections 
to the infringement of the country’s Constitution and the issue of the 
Government’s financial support of Kadhi’s courts have been a common 
denominator in all statements.
During the period of research the Roman Catholic Church did not 
make an official statement on the issue. A telephone interview with a 
University teacher, who is also a Roman Catholic priest, provided me 
with information that the church has yet to publish: their suggestions to 
38 Interview with Abdallah Ramadhani, 11th February 2008, Tanga. 
39 Interview with Habakkuk, 28th May 2007, Arusha (A theologian who teaches in 
the Christian university, Tumaini University College, owned by the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in Tanzania).
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the Government about the issue of Kadhi’s courts.40 However, the Roman 
Catholic Church expressed their doubts on the issue when they invited 
President Kikwete to the Tanzania Episcopal Conference meeting on 27th 
June 2006. In their speech to the President, the bishops said that they had 
carefully scrutinized the CCM manifesto for the 2005 election and saw 
that there are some areas in which the Government should be very careful 
in their implementation, so as to avoid endangering the nation’s unity. For 
these bishops, the issue of Kadhi’s courts should be resolved while taking 
the nation’s constitution and legal system into consideration. Unlike other 
churches, the Roman Catholic Church suggested that the Government 
should incorporate the views of the majority in the country.
The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania summarizes their stance 
by saying that re-introduction of the Kadhi’s courts in the country is a 
dangerous undertaking for peace, unity and solidarity of the nation. 
Furthermore, the entrenchment of the court would weaken the country’s 
constitution, which explicitly shows that religion and politics should not 
be mixed. Therefore, the church says, Parliament should refute the idea 
of reintroducing Kadhi’s courts in the country.
The Anglican Church’s stance is set out in their statement of August 
2006.The Anglican Church says that, in order to avoid an infringement 
of the nation’s constitution, the re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts should 
be left to the Muslim community to decide on their own. However, they 
insist that the court should not interfere with the national legal system. If 
that court is to be established, it should be under the Muslim community 
and its institutions.41
Our interview with Mwaki, a bishop in the Tanzania Assemblies 
of God (TAG), one of the Pentecostal Churches in Tanzania, showed 
that the Pentecostal churches do not support the re-introduction of 
Kadhi’s courts. According to him, the Church wants Muslims to institute 
Kadhi’s courts as their own institution and considers that the Government 
should not be involved.42 
40 Telephone interview carried out with the lecturer in January 2008 (name with held).
41 See the Anglican statement on the issue of Kadhi’s courts, Kanisa la Anglikana 
Tanzania Agosti 2006, Tamko la Maaskofu wa Kanisa Anglikana Tanzania Kuhusu Hoja ya 
Mahakama ya Kadhi Tanzania Bara (Anglican Church of Tanzania August 2006, Statement 
of the Bishops of the Anglican Church of Tanzania concerning the proposal for Kadhi’s 
Courts in mainland Tanzania), pages 2, 4 (Unpublished document).
42 Interview with Mwaki, 22nd May 2007, Tanga (the Bishop of the Tanzania Assemblies 
of God church in Tanga).
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The General Secretary of the Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT) felt 
that Christians do not object to the operation of Kadhi’s courts in the 
country, as long as the Government does not become involved in their 
operation.43
Christian-Muslim Mistrust over the Issue  
of Kadhi’s Courts 
Colonialism in Tanzania left a legacy which resulted in great socio- 
political disparity between Christians and Muslims in the country. This 
state of affairs is seen clearly in the levels of education among people 
of the two religions. Muslims feel that the Christians were favoured by 
the colonial Governments, especially in education.44 This more-or-less 
shaped Christian-Muslim socio-political positions in the post-colonial 
Governments. In post-colonial Governments the number of Muslims 
with Government portfolios has been relatively smaller than that of their 
Christian counterparts. This disparity has been a Muslim grievance for 
several decades now and some Muslims condemn Christians in post- 
colonial Governments for conspiring to keep Muslims’ education levels 
low. The late Kighoma Ali Malima, who was Minister of education dur-
ing part of Ali Hassan Mwinyi’s regime (1985–1995), can be seen as an 
example of this attitude.45
On the other hand, Christians reciprocate Muslim grievances with 
remarks that Muslims are striving for power in order to transform 
Tanzania into an Islamic state. Hence, Christians have become so cau-
tious that they scrutinize Muslims who become national leaders. This 
results in more suspicion and accusations between the two communities. 
It was because of such a context that the re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts 
was allegedly attributed to the current president, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, 
43 Interview with Leonard Mtaita, 16th February 2008, Dar-es-Salaam (General Secretary 
of the Christian Council of Tanzania).
44 See Mohamed Said ‘Intricacies and Intrigues in Tanzania: The Question of Muslim 
Stagnation in Education’, Change 1993. http://www.igs.net/~kassim/nyaraka/Elimu2.html.
45 Kighoma Malima was the first Muslim Minister of Education in the country after 
inde pendence. Malima wrote a secret letter to President Mwinyi, which by chance fell 
into the hands of the media, saying that, after he assumed the position as the Minister 
of Education, he realized that his predecessors, who were Christians, purposely barred 
Muslim children from joining higher education in the country. The letter by Malima 
caused a lot of debate among Christians and Muslims. But the issue was quietly settled by 
the Government, and it also resulted in Malima losing his position. 
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who is a Muslim. One of the interviewees asserted that Muslims’ demands 
and grievances usually surface strongly every time a Muslim president is 
in power.46 Other interviewees related several incidents which occurred 
during the regime of Ali Hassan Mwinyi (who was the first Muslim presi-
dent) and compared them with what is happening with the incumbent 
president. Some of the things that happened during Mwinyi’s presidency 
included: the Government’s attempt to join the Organization of Islamic 
Conferences (OIC); the wrecking of pork shops in Dar-es-Salaam in 1993; 
and the rapid increase of mosque building along main roads all over the 
country. Also during this time, the country witnessed growing Islamic 
fundamentalism and public polemical preaching, which created hostility 
between Christians and Muslims. These events were regarded, by some, as 
indicators that Muslims were on their way to make Tanzania an Islamic 
state.47
Now, with the demand for the re-establishment of Kadhi’s courts, some 
Christians accuse Kikwete of masterminding the move to make Tanzania 
an Islamic state. However, nobody can substantiate this allegation. The 
history of Kadhi’s courts shows that this demand has been a latent issue 
ever since their abolition in 1963.48 Some measures have been taken by 
the Government to appease Muslims following their agitations. A good 
example of such measures is the Marriage Law amendment of 1971 which 
gives provision for religious marriage.
After a long period of silence, President Kikwete addressed the issue on 
11th November 2007, during the installation of the Head of the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church in Tanzania (ELCT). In this address, which was covered 
by almost all the media in Tanzania, Kikwete publicly made it clear that 
the Kadhi’s courts agenda, found in the CCM 2005 general election mani-
festo, was not initiated by him. He defended himself, saying that the argu-
ment was brought to Parliament by a member from an opposition party. 
He insisted that the agenda was not even a CCM agenda. 
Kikwete, in the same address, said that the Kadhi’s courts agenda 
was put into the CCM 2005 general election manifesto during Benjamin 
Mkapa’s regime, a whole year ahead of the elections. This was prepared 
when Kikwete had not even been nominated as a CCM presidential can-
didate. President Kikwete said, according to the principles, guidelines and 
46 An interview conducted on 27th August 2007 in Arusha (name withheld).
47 Interview with Bukuzi, 30th May 2007, Arusha.
48 Interview with Sheikh Mataka, 30th January 2007, Dar-es-Salaam.
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regulations of CCM, no presidential candidate is involved in the prepara-
tion of the party’s election manifesto on an individual basis.
Kikwete also said that, as a presidential candidate, he adopted a mani-
festo in which Kadhi’s courts was one of the agenda items. The manifesto 
was prepared by a special commission and was handed over to him by 
William Mkapa, the then president and national chairman of CCM.49
Therefore, Kikwete concluded, he did not in any way try to inveigle 
the issue into the party’s agenda; neither did he engineer the issue into 
his Government. However, he said, since his party’s election manifesto 
has Kadhi’s courts as one of its agenda items, his Government will find 
amicable ways to resolve the issue. He promised that the Government will 
offer a solution without infringing the country’s constitution and without 
being biased to any religious group.
During his response, Kikwete admitted that there is growing hostility 
among Christians and Muslims in the country following the debate on 
the re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts in the country. Kikwete’s confession 
of the present fragile situation, and his defence of not being the master-
mind of the issue of Kadhi’s courts, shows that Christians and Muslims 
in Tanzania look at each other with suspicion and mistrust. This results 
from the debate about the re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts, especially 
concerning the Government’s involvement in the issue.
The President’s statement was strongly criticized by Augustine Lyatonga 
Mrema, the chairman of the Tanzania Labour Party, who, whilst a Member 
of Parliament, had brought the issue to the House.50 Mrema criticized the 
president as having ‘jumped on the bandwagon’ although he did not know 
its direction. He said that the Government should have sought his advice 
before it indulged itself in resolving the issue because he was the one who 
initiated the agenda. He further said that “the fact that President Jakaya 
Kikwete approved the 2005 CCM election manifesto, which brought him 
to power, means there is no way he can distance himself from it and 
equally from the Kadhi’s courts”.51
An analysis of Kikwete’s defence against the allegations of him being 
the mastermind of the demand for Kadhi’s courts in the country reveals 
that he was not only defending himself, but also answering Christians 
who allege his involvement. Two things indicate this, firstly, his choice to 
49 The Guardian, Tanzanian Newspaper of 13th November 2007.
50 Mrema said this during a press conference on 12th November 2007, just one day after 
Kikwete’s statement. 
51   The Guardian, Newspaper of 13th November 2007.
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address the issue during the installation of the head of ELCT. He could have 
done this on any other day, but his choice of this day might be because he 
knew that many Christians would be listening carefully. Hence, his mes-
sage could reach a larger Christian audience in the country.52
Secondly, Kikwete attributed the issue of Kadhi’s courts to Christian 
politicians. He reminded people that the genesis of the issue can be traced 
back to a Christian, Augustine Mrema. He can be seen as further confirm-
ing this by attributing the origin of the issue in the CCM general election 
manifesto to another Christian, William Mkapa, the then president and 
party chairman. 
Although Kikwete did not openly defend himself by claiming that his 
religious affiliation does not influence the philosophy of his politics, his 
speech seemed to address the accusation. He did this by referring to the 
on-going allegations that he played a part in engineering the demand for 
Kadhi’s courts through his party, because he is a Muslim.
As was stated earlier, suspicions and accusations between Christians 
and Muslims on the issue of Kadhi’s courts go beyond the involvement of 
a Muslim President. In fact, the underlying issue here is the whole attitude 
of Christians toward the issue. Our research revealed that most people 
think that the re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts is a covert plan of Muslims 
towards fully-fledged sharīʿa implementation in the country. On the other 
hand, most of the Church leaders who were interviewed expressed their 
sentiments that Muslims want to use the country’s resources in disguise, 
using the issue of Kadhi’s courts. Hence, they insisted that the Kadhi’s 
courts issue should be left to the Muslim community for its implementa-
tion and management.
Meanwhile, some Muslims, especially some of the leaders like the Mufti, 
suspect that Christians have a hidden motive which aims to impinge on 
Muslims’ freedom of worship. To some Muslims, this state of affairs is just 
a perpetuation of the perceived conspiracy by the post-colonial Christian-
oriented Government to hinder Muslims’ rights in the country. It was 
because of such attitudes that the Mufti of Tanzania publicly condemned 
those who questioned the re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts in the country. 
According to the Mufti, opponents of the re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts 
are those people who do not have good will toward Islam in Tanzania.
52 The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania is the second largest denomination in 
the country after the Roman Catholic Church. ELCT has significant influence in the coun-
try because there are many Government officials who are members of this church. 
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Therefore, as has been stated by President Kikwete, accusations, 
suspicions, and prejudices characterize the issue of Kadhi’s courts’ 
re-introduction. This condition needs the Government’s special attention. 
The Government has to properly address it to avoid misunderstandings 
and conflicts among Christians and Muslims. Since the two communities 
are not homogeneous, the Government has to be as careful as possible 
in its decisions on this case, since the issue has already proved to have 
provoked a wide variety of views from both within and outside religious 
groups in the country.
Challenges of Kadhi’s Courts’ Re-Introduction
Several socio-political challenges are posed by the demand for the re- 
introduction of Kadhi’s courts in the country. Some challenges are from 
within Islam and others are from outside. The most serious challenge is 
posed to the Government. Though Tanzania has a secular Government, 
it has the responsibility to protect the rights of its people. Muslims in 
this country form a very important group of citizens. It would be very 
unwise decision-making if the Government fails to take into account the 
demands and grievances of its constituents.53 This does not imply that the 
Government should infringe the constitution. However, the Government 
should find every possible way to solve the problems facing different 
groups, both for the sake of peace and tranquillity of the country, and for 
its future. 
This state of affairs puts CCM in a predicament. On the one hand, the 
Muslims in the country demand fulfilment of what they were promised by 
CCM in the manifesto; on the other hand, the country’s legal and religious 
pluralism makes Christians and other non-Muslims hang on to the consti-
tution to denounce the establishment of Kadhi’s courts in the country as 
a Governmental institution. 
However, the Government is not responsible to its Muslim constituency 
alone. The Government has equal responsibility to all religious groups in 
the country. Christians’ and other non-Muslims’ complaints about Kadhi’s 
courts should not be taken lightly. This is a challenge which calls for 
the Government to clear all doubts about Kadhi’s courts’ entrenchment 
from among non-Muslims in the country. Non-Muslims should be given 
53 Interview with Mpemba, 22nd May 2007, Tanga. 
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convincing reasons as to why their money should be used for running what 
is regarded by them as a religious institution, which caters for one religious 
group only. Also, the Government should give enough reasons why Kadhi’s 
courts are not going to be a religious institution but a Governmental insti-
tution. The Government should not forget that Christians, non-Muslims 
and Muslims outside BAKWATA also constitute very critical, influential 
and powerful groups of voters who have the potential to affect elections. 
The great challenge ahead of the Government is how to satisfy all religious 
groups on this issue, while remaining neutral.
Constitutionalism is another serious challenge to Kadhi’s courts. Article 
19 of the Constitution of the country states that: 
[Section 1] Every person has the right to freedom of thought or conscience, 
belief or faith, and choice in matters of religion, including the freedom to 
change his religion or faith. 
Citizens are at liberty to follow beliefs of their choice as long as they do 
not impinge on the country’s laws. This is a challenge to the Kadhi’s courts 
project. The first challenge is that section one of article 19 of the consti-
tution stipulates that people are allowed to follow the religion of their 
choice; hence Muslims have constitutional rights to exercise their religion 
de jure. This is enough reason for the Government to grant Kadhi’s courts 
to Muslims. Doing so will allow Muslims in the country to practise their 
religious duties rightly. Hindering Kadhi’s courts is tantamount to barring 
Muslims from fulfilling their religious duties. Prior to 2005, section two of 
the same article stipulated: 
Without prejudice to the relevant laws of the United Republic the profession 
of religion, worship and propagation of religion shall be free and a private 
affair of an individual; and the affairs and management of religious bodies 
shall not be part of the activities of the State authority.
This could be seen as being a major hindrance to Kadhi’s courts being a 
Government institution. However, this section was deleted by Act No. 1 of 
2005 Art. 6. and the present Section 2 was substituted, which states: 
Protection of rights referred to in this Article shall be in accordance with the 
provisions prescribed by the laws which are of importance to a democratic 
society for security and peace in the society, integrity of the society and the 
national coercion [sic].
The new section cannot be regarded as being a bar to Kadhi’s courts 
becoming a Government institution in as far as they are “in accordance 
with the provisions prescribed by the laws . . .”.
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State secularism challenges instituting Kadhi’s courts as a Governmental 
organization, because to do so means bringing religion into the public 
sphere. Doing so would contravene the country’s constitution which stip-
ulates that religion is a private matter. Apart from that, to do so opens 
doors for other religious groups to demand that their religious issues and 
practices also be given special positions or to be institutionalized in the 
Government. This could result in anarchy in the country. 
Furthermore, in the October 2004 report by the Parliamentary 
Committee, it says that some of Muslims’ personal issues like marriage, 
inheritance, divorce and wakfu are not administered correctly in accor-
dance with the Qurʾān. Hence Kadhi’s courts should be instituted to cater 
for these needs. However, these needs are not the only things which are 
mentioned in the Qurʾān. If the Government creates a court to cater for 
those things, it means that the Government could be forced into the posi-
tion of having to create a court for other things which are mentioned in 
the Qurʾān. But what about the many things which are mentioned in the 
religious scriptures of other religions? Will it be possible for the state to 
create courts to cater for things mentioned in other religious scriptures 
and their ethical codes? 
The above challenges raise various concerns. Firstly, the issue of the 
re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts should be solved by prudence and not 
through legal ways. In this country, we have witnessed several issues being 
resolved by prudence. We can cite the issue of the Presidential position 
whereby Christian and Muslim presidents have alternated. This is neither 
a constitutional nor a legal requirement, but it is prudently done so as 
to create harmony and tranquillity in the country.54 Also, we have many 
things in Christian-Muslim relations which are done not because of law 
but because of amicability and good relations between the two commu-
nities. One example is the popular tradition of some Christians asking 
Muslims to slaughter their animals for meat; Christians do so because they 
want their Muslim brothers and sisters not to be offended when they are 
invited by Christians for a meal.55 Also, Christians do not want to offend 
Muslims when they go to buy meat in shops. Therefore the Kadhi’s courts 
issue can be resolved by using that kind of philosophy. 
54 Interview with Tumaini University Lecturer, 3rd March 2007 (name withheld).
55 Most butchers throughout Tanzania are Muslims; during the 1990s the Anglican 
Bishop of the Diocese of Central Tanganyika (Dodoma Region) attempted to run a 
‘Christian Butchery’ but this lost money and was soon discontinued.
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Secondly, the argument calls for a review of the constitution. The con-
stitution should be amended to incorporate new challenges in the country. 
The Government should be very careful in doing so, because incorporating 
religious issues in the constitution is very dangerous since the Government 
cannot satisfy all the religious groups in the country. 
Furthermore, one of the lawyers interviewed commented that religious 
following is emotional. It is dangerous to build your laws on emotions, 
because emotions change constantly. A person can suggest one religious 
thing today and deny it tomorrow. Therefore that state of affairs may lead 
to instability in the country.56
Another solution is for people to abide by the constitution and leave 
religious matters to the private sphere. Muslims in the country should insti-
tute and manage Kadhi’s courts within their religious circles. Alternatively, 
the Government should find more ways than are presently being followed 
in our Law Schools to enhance magistrates’ understanding of Islamic laws, 
in order to rightly adjudicate Muslim personal issues.
Another challenge to Kadhi’s courts is the issue of factionalism in Islam. 
Re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts in the country is challenged not only 
by factors outside Islam but also from within Islam. Denominationalism 
and factionalism within Islam have proved to be big drawbacks for the 
institution of Kadhi’s courts in the country. Some groups, such as Anṣār 
al-Sunna Muslims, do not support Kadhi’s courts. As we have seen earlier, 
for them, Kadhi’s courts are part of BAKWATA’s covert agenda to create 
job opportunities for their Sheikhs, and as a mechanism to control other 
Muslims who do not recognize BAKWATA. According to them, this has 
been facilitated by the CCM Government, which is regarded as a Christian 
dominated Government, whose aim is to inhibit the development of Islam 
in the country. Their main argument here is that if BAKWATA was serious 
in fulfilling Allāh’s will, it would have agitated for full sharīʿa implemen-
tation in the country. For them, sharīʿa is not only for personal cases in 
Muslims’ lives, but for the totality of Muslim life. Hence, to only demand 
Kadhi’s courts, is to reduce sharīʿa to personal issues only. Though these 
groups do not mention what sort of sharīʿa may best fit the country, their 
historical background shows that they are for the salafiyya57 understand-
ing of sharīʿa, which identifies itself with the pristine Islam that advocates 
strict sharīʿa law. 
56 Interview with Kenny, 15th June 2007, Bayreuth, Germany.
57 Salafiyya movement advocating a return to the ways of the early generations of 
Muslims.
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Disloyalty to BAKWATA also poses a great challenge to Kadhi’s courts’ 
implementation. This is the reason behind BAKWATA’s need of Government 
backing in the re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts. BAKWATA wants the 
Government to enforce the power and authority of the Kadhis, and the courts 
at large, over all Muslim denominations and factions. But, if the Government 
agrees with this move, the Government will have become biased to one Muslim 
faction in the country. This may cause intra-Muslim conflict in Tanzania.
The challenge becomes more intense due to the fact that BAKWATA 
has been alleged, by Muslims who are not under its patronage, to be an 
appendage of the CCM Government.58 For them, BAKWATA was founded 
by the Government in order to control and contain Muslims who were 
regarded as rebels. So, for them, there is no doubt that the CCM adopted 
the Kadhi’s courts agenda in its 2005 general election manifesto in order 
to help BAKWATA to continue to control Muslims in the country. This 
was possible because some of the CCM Executive Committee members 
are active BAKWATA members as well. Therefore, the denial of Kadhi’s 
courts by Muslims outside BAKWATA is a denial of both CCM and 
BAKWATA.59
Simultaneously, the above argument, regarding loyalty to BAKWATA, 
projects further difficulties as to the pragmatism of re-introducing Kadhi’s 
courts. Several Muslims interviewed, especially young Muslim women,60 
expressed the sentiments that they prefer a magistrate’s court to a Kadhi’s 
court. Women want equal rights in marriage and inheritance, just like 
non-Muslim women. Their views should not be taken for granted because 
such views challenge the practicality of the Kadhi’s court.61 Such responses 
58 For a description of the origins of BAKWATA and its links with TANU, see: ‘Islam 
and Politics in Tanzania’, Mohamed Said, http://www.igs.net/~kassim/nyaraka/islam_and_
politics_in_tz.html.
59 For Kassim, BAKWATA has been a big stumbling block to Muslims’ development in 
the country (Interview with Kassim, Dar-es-Salaam). 
60 A group interview of five women was conducted in Tanga city during late 2007. One 
of the interviewees was a woman of about sixty years. To her, Kadhi’s courts and Islamic 
law in general are crucial for Muslim women’s justice. But this was different from the view 
of young women who took Islamic law as a law which cannot fit the current Tanzanian 
context. Although they did not deny it, because it is the law of God, they said they would 
not opt for it because to them it is difficult to abide by, especially at this time when living 
expenses are so high, which compels them to find different means of earning their daily 
livelihood. 
61 This view is not different from that of the late chairwoman of Umoja wa Wanawake 
wa Tanzania (UWT, The Union of Women of Tanzania), Mrs. Sophia Kawawa, who in 1988 
came under fire after having publicly criticized Islamic rules that she felt were oppressive 
to women. Kawawa said that polygyny should be forbidden and women should have the 
same rights of inheritance as men. 
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pose the question as to how many Muslims in Tanzania actually want 
their cases to be adjudicated according to Muslim personal law. Moreover, 
the distribution of Kadhi’s courts in the country poses another serious 
challenge to the issue. Historically, the court was considered to be a native 
court which had a geographical limitation, the ‘coastal-strip’, which, in an 
agreement of 1890, the Sultan of Zanzibar allowed the Germans to hold, 
with the understanding that Islamic Law should continue to be upheld. 
Now, given the fact that Muslims are distributed all over Tanzania, the 
court should also be distributed to satisfactorily cater for all Muslims in 
the country. The Parliamentary Committee proposed that Kadhi’s courts 
should be placed in all areas where there is a magistrate’s primary court. 
This means that the Government is creating another court system which 
will need to be financed, by almost the same amount, as the present court 
system. 
Apart from the financial challenges facing Kadhi’s courts, our discus-
sion with a BAKWATA Executive Committee member showed that even 
if the Government re-introduces Kadhi’s courts today, it won’t be easy for 
the Muslim community to immediately implement their re-introduction 
because, currently, there are not enough Muslim jurists in the country. 
Therefore it will take time for the Muslims to educate sufficient jurists.62
Conclusion
We have seen that the demand for sharīʿa implementation is a social 
reality in mainland Tanzania. This reality is expressed by the current 
demand for the re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts in the country. Kadhi’s 
courts were in place before independence and in early post-independent 
Tanganyika, and Muslims have been demanding their re-instatement ever 
since their abolition by Parliament in 1963. 
The issue has surfaced strongly following a religious resurgence among 
Muslim youths. The demand gained impetus from some political par-
ties, including CCM, which mentioned Kadhi’s courts in their election 
manifesto, giving the impression that the issue had been manipulated for 
political popularity. Nevertheless, CCM seems to be in a predicament as to 
how to resolve the issue, which has caused a volatile atmosphere among 
Christians and Muslims in the country.
62 Informal talks with Sheikh Mataka in January 2007, Dar-es-Salaam. 
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This research discovered that, since Christians and Muslims are not 
homogeneous societies, there have been a variety of views on the issue 
in inter- and intra-denominational domains and inter- and intra-religious 
domains both in Christianity and Islam.
Christians suspect that the demand for Kadhi’s courts is just a ploy 
of Muslims towards gaining full sharīʿa implementation in the country. 
They view the demand as an infringement of the country’s constitu-
tion and object to the use of taxpayers’ money on one religious group. 
Hence, Christians, under their umbrella organizations, have exhorted the 
Government to abstain from taking Kadhi’s courts’ re-introduction as a 
national issue, but rather to view it is as a Muslim undertaking which 
should be resolved by Muslims themselves. 
While Muslims, under BAKWATA’s auspices, insist on the re-introduc-
tion of Kadhi’s courts in Tanzania as something distinct from total sharīʿa 
implementation, it appears that some Muslims outside BAKWATA want 
total sharīʿa application in the country. It is because of this that those 
Muslims oppose the idea of re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts in the coun-
try, since the judicial limit of the court implies that not all Islamic laws will 
be implemented by the court. These Muslims put more emphasis on equal 
opportunities for both Muslims and Christians in the socio-political arena, 
placing blame on BAKWATA for its failure to fight for the Muslims in this 
country.
This study has found that most Tanzanians are ignorant of the concepts 
of Kadhi and Kadhi’s courts. It has discovered that there is a lot of confu-
sion among Tanzanians in the Swahili use of the term Kadhi. Hence, there 
is a need for the study of the term in Swahili and in Arabic and of its legal 
use in a Tanzanian context. 
It is our conviction that the demand for Kadhi’s courts is not the sole 
cause of suspicions and accusations between Muslims and Christians in 
the country. Historically, there have been ambivalent relations between 
them, since the days of colonial rule. Muslims in the country have 
many grievances, including backwardness in education as compared to 
Christians, and they demand equal representation in the Government and 
civil services in the country. 
The Muslims’ demand for Kadhi’s courts in the country is a genuine 
one. The Government should take it seriously, and should stop using the 
issue of Kadhi’s courts as a political tool and start finding new avenues 
toward a solution of the issue. 
Finally, this chapter poses one critical challenge: if the Government 
allows Kadhi’s courts to be implemented in the country, would this be a 
panacea for the Muslims’ grievances in the country? This is a challenge 
which requires further research.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
“CHAOS WILL NEVER HAVE A CHANCE”: SHARĪʿA DEBATES  
AND TOLERANCE IN A PROVINCIAL TANZANIAN TOWN
Bernardin Mfumbusa
Introduction
Tanzania emerged from three decades of single party rule in 1992. Until 
then, two slogans: zidumu fikra za mwenyekiti wa chama cha mapinduzi 
(Swah.: long live ideas of the chairman of the ruling party) and chama 
kushika hatamu (Swah.: the ruling party is supreme), marked the limits of 
the acceptable discourses. Only discourses that agreed with the ruling party 
ideology were allowed to filter into the public sphere. The former Vice-
President of the United Republic, Alhaj Aboud Jumbe, suggested that the 
doctrine of the ‘supremacy of the ruling party’ silenced alternative voices.1 
People were reduced to singing praises in favour of the ruling elite, 
thus creating a spurious sense of national consensus. As a result, the 
democratic opening-up in the early 1990s released pent-up ethnic, reli-
gious, and racial tensions. Indians, who came to Tanzania originally as 
indentured labourers at the end of the 19th century, became overnight 
gabacholi (Swah.: thieves) in the eyes of some nationalists espousing a 
philosophy of indigenization (Swah.: uzawa).2 For decades the Indians 
had enjoyed a monopoly over the urban commercial sector. The Supreme 
Muslim Council of Tanzania (known by its Swahili acronym BAKWATA), 
the sole custodian of the Muslims’ interests, became ‘a word of insult’ 
in some Muslim quarters.3 A plethora of organizations emerged claiming 
to be true representatives of the Muslims. Nestor Luanda estimated the 
1 Jumbe, Aboud, The Partnership: Tanganyika—Zanzibar Union: 30 Turbulent Years, Dar 
es Salaam: Amana Publishers, 1994.
2 Wijsen, Frans & Bernadin Mfumbusa, Seeds of Conflict: Religious Tensions in Tanzania, 
Nairobi: Paulines Publications, 2004.
3 Said, Mohammed, The Life and Times of Abdulwahid Sykes (1924–1968): The Untold 
Story of the Muslim Struggle against British Colonialism in Tanganyika, London: Minerva 
Press, 1998, page 303.
© Bernardin Mfumbusa, 2014 | doi:10.1163/9789004262126_012
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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existence of more than one hundred Muslim organizations in the coun-
try in the mid-1990s.4 Muslims in Tanzania nurse a number of grievances 
and demands. The grievances include the small number of Muslims in 
universities and the large number of Muslims among criminals and loiter-
ers. The demands include the re-establishment of Kadhi’s Courts, which 
had been abolished in 1963, and for Tanzania to join the Organization of 
Islamic Conferences (OIC). The grievances and demands were outlined in 
a letter to the President of the United Republic in 1999 which represented 
a rhetorical escalation, in a country where differences and disagreements 
were usually smothered by what Maddox and Giblin call “rhetoric about 
peace and unity”.5
Evolution of the Sharīʿa Debate
The banning of the East African Muslim Welfare Society (EAMWS) in 1968 
was a watershed in the sharīʿa debates in Tanzania. The ban is still seen 
as the government’s attempt to undermine Islam in Tanzania.6 Forty years 
after its creation, BAKWATA, which replaced EAMWS, is yet to receive 
total acceptance among Muslims. Said has suggested that referring to 
a Muslim as BAKWATA is ‘like calling a Christian a disciple of Judas 
Iscariot’.7 The publication of a ‘White Paper on Marriage’ in 1969, result-
ing in the Marriage Act, 1970, is another factor in the debates. The Act 
incorporates aspects of Islamic personal law, namely, matters of inheri-
tance and divorce, as part of the jurisdiction of the primary court sys-
tem. Other rather violent moments in the sharīʿa debates include the 1993 
pork butchers’ shops’ crisis and the Mwembechai crisis of 1998. The rul-
ing party, Chama cha Mapinduzi’s (CCM) 2005 election manifesto, which 
sought to re-introduce Kadhi’s Courts into the country, introduced a new 
twist to the contemporary debates. 
4 Luanda, N. Nestor, ‘Christianity and Islam Contending for the Throne on the Tanzanian 
Mainland’, in Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa, O. Olukoshi Adebayo & Liisa Laakso 
(eds), Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1996, page 172.
5 Maddox, Gregory H. & Giblin, James L. (eds), In Search of a Nation: Histories of 
Authority and Dissidence in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam: Kapsal Educational Publisher, 2005, 
page 1. 
6 Imtiyaz, S. Yusuf, ‘Islam and African Socialism: A Study of the Interactions between 
Islam and Ujamaa in Tanzania’, (Unpublished dissertation), University Microfilms 
International (UMI), Ann Arbor, Michigan 1990; Said, 1998; Jumbe, 1994.
7 Said, 1998.
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Sharīʿa debates in Tanzania have followed three trends. Before 1985 the 
discourses focused on the interplay between religion, ujamaa policy and 
the state. These discourses occurred at an academic level and were largely 
dominated by foreign scholars intrigued by the relationship between uja-
maa policy, on the one hand, and religion on the other.8 The post-1985 
discourses revolve around Muslim sectarian grievances and demands.9 And 
there are discourses addressing issues affecting Muslims and Christians 
in various communities across the country. These are micro-level, grass-
roots’ discourses whose themes range from mundane issues like killing a 
goat in ‘a ḥalāl (Arab.: lawful) way’, or the extent to which a Muslim fam-
ily can get involved with Christian neighbours ‘keeping pigs’, the activi-
ties of Christian NGOs who are involved in proselytizing, as well as the 
occurrence of intermarriage, especially where Muslim girls are married to 
Christian men. These are touchy issues. 
When the Portuguese arrived in the coastal town of Kilwa, in the 
15th century, an established Muslim community existed which was deeply 
suspicious of the Portuguese missionary intentions. The Portuguese failed 
to establish a beachhead due to the Muslims’ resistance. During the 
German rule (1885–1916), coastal Muslims were co-opted into administra-
tion as local leaders, namely, akidas (Swah.: headmen) and jumbes (Swah.: 
headmen) because of their ability to read and write. Sometimes, this has 
been cited as a factor in the fast spread of Islam in hinterland Tanzania. 
By the end of British colonialism in 1961, however, the mission school 
system had transformed the country’s educational landscape in favour of 
Christians. Three ethnic groups that had early contact with the mission-
ary school systems, the Chagga, the Haya and the Nyakyusa, were bet-
ter educated than the rest of the population. These three ethnic groups 
are predominantly Christian. In 1959, the All Muslim National Union of 
Tanganyika (AMNUT), aware of the imbalances between Christians and 
Muslims, especially in the education sector, submitted a memorandum to 
the colonial Government, calling for independence to be postponed until 
8 Sivalon, John, Kanisa Katoliki na Siasa ya Tanzania: 1953 mpaka 1985, Ndanda: Mission 
Press, 1985; Rasmussen, Lissi, Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa: The Case of Northern 
Nigeria and Tanzania Compared, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993; Ludwig, Frieder, ‘After 
Ujamaa: Is Religious Revivalism a Threat to Tanzania’s Stability?’ in Questioning the Secular 
State, David Westerlund (ed.), London: Hurst & Company, 1996, pages 216–236.
9 Jumbe, 1994; Said, 1998; Njozi, M. Hamza, The Mwembechai Killings and the Political 
Future of Tanzania, Ottawa: Globalink Communications, 2000; Mbogoni, Lawrence E. Y., 
The Cross Vs the Crescent: Religion and Politics in Tanzania from the 1880s to the 1990s, Dar 
es Salaam: Mkuki & Nyota Publishers, 2004.
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Muslims had attained equal status with Christians in education.10 AMNUT 
feared that Christians would use their educational advantage to dominate 
administrative and professional sectors after independence. In 1962, the 
government addressed the question of various imbalances in the country 
in a press release that said in part:
There is no quick way to cancel out the present difference between our 
African and non-African citizens; there is no easy way to remove the existing 
disparity in education between Christians and Muslims, or between the edu-
cated few and the majority of the people, there is no short cut by which the 
Masai and the Wagogo can become Wahaya, Wachagga and Wanyakyusa.11
At the time the Europeans were generally wealthier than Africans and 
Asians. The legacy of European opulence lives on in the form of neigh-
bourhoods known as ‘uzunguni’ (Swah.: European quarter) in most 
towns. Such neighbourhoods are usually posher than the rest of the town. 
Indians dominated the urban retail sector and the European expatriates 
dominated the bureaucracy. The contemporary sharīʿa debates began in 
1989 with Zanzibar’s ill-fated attempt to join the Organization of Islamic 
Conferences (OIC).
A Theoretical Framework
Christian-Muslim relations in sub-Saharan Africa have been characterized 
as harmonious.12 Families are often made up of members belonging to 
different religious affiliations, which encourages mutual understanding 
and tolerance. Also, people remain committed to their ethnic identity, in 
terms of staying in touch with ancestral spirits, even after conversion to 
Islam or Christianity. Ali Mazrui has attributed harmony in Africa to the 
African Tradition Religion’s capacity to tolerate and accommodate alter-
native religious cultures, “the African Traditional Religion ecumenalism”.13 
Harmony among people in Tanzania is also attributed to deliberate gov-
ernment policies like adoption of common symbols such as the uhuru 
(Swah.: freedom) torch which is raced through all regions, every year, as a 
10 Omari, Cuthbert. K., ‘The Management of Tribal and Religious Diversity’, in Mwalimu: 
The Influence of Nyerere, C. Legum & G. Mmari (eds.), Dar es Salaam: Mkuki & Nyota, 1995 
pages 25–31.
11 Said, 1998.
12 Ludwig, 1996, page 216.
13 Mazrui, Ali A., The African Condition: A Political Diagnosis, London: Heinemann, 
1980.
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symbol of unity. Ujamaa ideology that stressed socio-economic egalitari-
anism is another factor that encouraged unity.14 Lately, however, elements 
of African Traditional Religions that united people are weakening due to 
an onslaught from Muslim groups like the Anṣār al-Sunna. The policies 
that cemented unity, such as compulsory national service for all advanced 
secondary school leavers, have been abandoned. National symbols, such 
as the national anthem, are trivialized in some quarters as nothing more 
than elements of Christian hegemony.15 
The statistics on the ratio of Muslims and Christians are a matter of 
sometimes acrimonious dispute. Muslim News International of July 1963, 
for example, put the percentage of Muslims at between 65–70 percent 
of the population two years after independence.16 The first post-colonial 
national population census in 1967, which was the last to address the reli-
gious identity question, registered Christians at 32 percent and Muslims 
30 percent.17 In the early 1970s, the number of Christians was estimated 
at 44 percent and Muslims 32 percent.18 Westerlund, presenting govern-
ment policy, put the number of Christians, Muslims and the adherents of 
the African Traditional Religions (ATR) at a third of the population each.19 
Other estimates show that Muslims make up 45 percent of the population 
and Christians 39 percent.20 In 2006 President Jakaya Kikwete estimated 
the number of Muslims and Christians as 40 percent each.21 
Four questions have guided this study: (1) to what extent have African 
Traditional Religions acted as a bridge between Muslims and Christians? 
(2) How does marginalization (or victimization) rhetoric play out in 
the grassroots’ communities like Kondoa? (3) Do victim-making nar-
ratives work to strengthen identity politics among Muslims of Kondoa 
Municipality? (4) To what extent do sharīʿa related narratives in Kondoa 
reflect the national recorded patterns?
14 Omari, 1995.
15 Njozi, 2000.
16 Nimtz, August H., Islam and Politics in East Africa: The Sufi Order in Tanzania, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980.
17 Mohammed Saeed [sic], ‘Islam and Politics in Tanzania’, Muslim Writers Association, 
http://www.igs.net/~kassim/nyaraka/islam_and_politics_in_tz.html (accessed 11.08.07).
18 Rasmussen, 1993, page 2.
19 Westerlund, David, Ujamaa na Dini: A Study of Some Aspects of Society and Religion in 
Tanzania, 1961–1977. Stockholm: Acta Universitas Stockhomiensis, 1977.
20 Jumbe, 1994.
21 Thompson, John, ‘Tanzanian president offers formula for West-Islam peace’, BU 
Today 2006, http://www.bu.edu/phpbin/news-cms/news (accessed 11.10.2007).
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Kondoa: Description of the Case 
Kondoa is one of the five districts of the Dodoma Region of Tanzania, 
which is located in the semi-arid, central region of Tanzania. People are 
mostly peasants, eking out a meagre living through the cultivation of sea-
sonal crops like millet, cassava, and maize. The ethnic fabric of the district 
is complex.22 The Rangi is the largest ethnic group; others are the Alawi 
(Wasi), Burungi, and Sandawe. Like most towns, Kondoa has attracted 
many people from other parts of the country, coming with their own cus-
toms and beliefs. The town lies on an ancient caravan route that ran from 
the coastal towns of Bagamoyo and Tanga. The route was used by Arab 
traders in the 18th and 19th centuries, which means that Kondoa had had 
contact with Islamic culture for at least two centuries by the time Christian 
missionaries first arrived. As a result of the intensive exchange between 
the coast and the inland trading settlements, Kondoa developed into an 
important Muslim settlement; “33 of the 147 headmen in its vicinity were 
said to be Muslims in 1913”.23 Sunnī Islam is the dominant religion, abid-
ing by the shāfiʿī madhhab (Arab.: School of Law). However, the influ-
ence of Islamic reform movements is increasing amongst the Sunnīs. The 
sunnī Muslim community is experiencing tensions with the arrival of new 
groups like the Anṣār al-Sunna (also known as wahhābī or al-mujāhidūn) 
in the 1980s. The Anṣār al-Sunna (Arab.: the followers of the traditions of 
the prophet) own mosques and challenge the BAKWATA-Muslims (sunnī 
Muslims will be identified as BAKWATA-Muslims and Anṣār al-Sunna) 
on matters of practice and tradition. The Anṣār al-Sunna is the fastest-
spreading brand of Islam in Kondoa within sunnī Islam. Another sunnī 
group is Tablīghī Jamāʿat (Arab.: Jamāʿat al-Tablīgh, Society for spread-
ing faith), which is largely focussed on propagating Islam (Arab.: daʿwa) 
amongst Muslims. The Tablīghī Jamāʿat is a dynamic and fast-growing 
22 On the pre-modern history of Kondoa and its environment: Johnston, H. H. & 
F. J. Bagshawe, ‘The Peoples of the Happy Valley. (East Africa). Part I’, Journal of the Royal 
African Society, Vol. 24, 1924, pages 25–33; Bagshawe, F. J., ‘The Peoples of the Happy Valley. 
(East Africa). The Aboriginal Races of Kondoa Irangi. Part II: The Kangeju’, Journal of the 
Royal African Society, Vol. 24, 1925, pages 117–130; Bagshawe, F. J., ‘The Peoples of the Happy 
Valley. (East Africa).: The Aboriginal Races of Kondoa Irangi. Part III (Continued)’; Journal 
of the Royal African Society, Vol. 24, 1925, pages 328–347; Bagshawe, F. J., ‘The Peoples of 
the Happy Valley. (East Africa).: The Aboriginal Races of Kondoa Irangi. Part IV: The Goroa 
and Their Kindred Hamitic Tribes, the Wambulu, or Erokh, the Wasi, or Alawa, and the 
Burungi’; Journal of the Royal African Society, Vol. 25, 1925, pages 59–74.
23 Iliffe, John, A Modern History of Tanganyika, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999, p. 213.
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transnational Islamic reform movement originating in colonial India. 
Finally, a Shīʿa community was established in the 1990s, made up of eth-
nic Rangi people. The community is unique as Shīʿism in Tanzania is 
largely dominated by Asians and is limited to major urban centres like 
Arusha, Dar es Salaam and Mwanza. The diversity of the Muslim com-
munity makes agreements among Muslims on many issues like Kadhi’s 
courts difficult to achieve. The proliferation of religious groups, move-
ments, and churches is redefining the religious demography of Kondoa. 
The Roman Catholics were the first Christian group to be established in 
the area in 1907, while the Anglicans and Lutherans arrived in the 1960s 
and 1970s respectively. The Pentecostals, also known as the ‘Born Again 
Christian Movement’, have become a strong phenomenon since the 1990s. 
Pentecostal churches include: Calvary Assemblies of God (CAG), Tanzania 
Assemblies of God (TAG), and Tanzania Full Gospel Church. The chang-
ing religious demography is resulting in sectarian social institutions such 
as orphanages, kindergartens and schools. Some of the institutions, espe-
cially a Christian NGO, ‘Compassion International’, which targets Muslim 
children, is becoming a centre of controversy. 
Methodology 
This chapter is based on a qualitative analysis of a sample of 20 inter-
views, part of a two-year study in Kondoa. The interviews were conducted 
in September 2006 and September 2007 with interviewees coming from 
different demographic backgrounds. There were Muslims and Christians, 
religious leaders and laity, male and female, the young as well as the old. 
A semi-structured interview guide was used in all interviews. Interviews 
lasted from 20 to more than 60 minutes. Most of the interviews were 
recorded, transcribed and translated into English. The privacy of respon-
dents is protected by using aliases, generic titles or first names. Interview 
transcripts were analysed by compiling responses to each question across 
the pool of interviews, taking into account demographic details. Thematic 
coding was used to tease out themes across the interview range.24 The 
themes discussed in the findings have been derived from a careful analysis 
of a sample of interviews representing key segments of society in terms 
of demography.
24 Miles, Matthew B. & A. Michael Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis 2nd edit., 
London: Sage, 1994, page 9.
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Findings
Despite numerous references to African Traditional Religions in academic 
literature, few people ever admit to be practitioners. The vast majority of 
Tanzanians identify themselves simply as either Muslims or Christians. 
Yet the interviews were peppered with allusions, practices, customs and 
beliefs associated with ancestor veneration in various forms such as tam-
biko (Swah.: invoking spirits), offering libations, and initiation ceremonies. 
The practices abound among both Muslims and Christians, notwithstand-
ing the prohibition of shirk (Arab.: associating others with God) among 
the former, or the disavowal of pagan practices among the latter. The evi-
dence that such practices are increasingly a source of tension is mount-
ing. Persistence of traditional beliefs among Muslims has its roots in early 
conversion processes, whereby new converts were allowed great leeway 
in the manner in which they practised their new religion. Muslims didn’t 
abjure traditional brew, consulting oracles, or offering sacrifices to ances-
tors. A shīʿa cleric offered a graphic description of the early Muslims:
Muslim converts were given a name and taught the ABCs of Islam like say-
ing: ‘Bismillah Rahman Rahim’. The converts were allowed to drink alcohol 
or partake in offering sacrifices . . . even during the Holy month of Ramadan 
when some wanted to drink alcohol they were allowed to do so. Sheikhs, 
however, insisted that children attend Qurʾānic schools without fail. Thus 
older people continued to drink and enjoy their traditional ways while their 
children and grandchildren mastered proper teachings of Islam . . .25 
This approach has led to the situation whereby older Muslims are toler-
ant and accommodating, while the younger ones are averse to traditional 
ways. What mattered initially was the numbers of people purporting to be 
Muslims, rather than the quality of their belief or practice. Muslim mis-
sionaries had a long-term view of the conversion process. The first gen-
eration could be allowed to be nominal Muslims while the offspring were 
introduced to a stricter version of Islam. As a result, many Muslims remain 
committed to aspects of ATR. The visibility of ATR, however, remains 
low due to the absence of symbols such as temples. Also, the absence of 
strong Traditional Religion movements, such as the Aladura of Nigeria, 
has meant that its presence in public life is limited. Nevertheless, dur-
ing bereavements, natural calamities, and illnesses, people have recourse 
to sacrifices to appease angry spirits over and above observing Islamic 
25 Personal interview with Hussein, 4th September 2007. 
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rituals. Calamities and bad fortune are often blamed on unhappy spirits 
(Swah.: mizimu). People invoke ancestral blessings in times of travelling, 
as shown by a popular blessing Ukalwata wa satu na wa mundi (Rangi: 
may you tread on a python’s skin and a sheep’s skin), which are consid-
ered sacred totems among the Rangi. The blessing is usually made over 
close friends and relatives about to embark on long trips. The invocation 
of ‘python’ and ‘sheep’, even at a metaphorical level, is a testimony to 
the durability of the African traditional beliefs among practising Muslims. 
Such practices, taken for granted for generations as part of an ethnic iden-
tity, are now being questioned and discouraged on religious grounds by 
the Anṣār al-Sunna, as they see such practices as un-Islamic survivals from 
the past.
Anṣār al-Sunna
The arrival of Anṣār al-Sunna in the 1980s heralded divisions among 
Kondoa Muslims. One Swahili word, mapokeo (traditions) has become 
emblematic of disagreements among Muslims. The Anṣār al-Sunna accuse 
Bakwata-sunnīs of abiding by traditions. Although members of Anṣār al-
Sunna and BAKWATA groups play down their differences, they don’t see 
eye to eye on a number of issues. Some of the differences mentioned by 
a senior BAKWATA Muslim cleric include Anṣār al-Sunna not celebrating 
the mawlid (birthday) of the Prophet and not recognizing the companions 
(Swah.: maswahaba) of the Prophet who fought to introduce religion in 
Saudi Arabia. Sometimes there is even a hint of suggestion that the Anṣār 
al-Sunna may be heretics.26 Other differences may seem to be cosmetic but 
they are important. The Anṣār al-Sunna demand that their women-folks 
cover themselves from head to toe. This practice is not common among 
the BAKWATA sunnī Muslims. The burial ceremonies also differ radically 
in the two groups. The BAKWATA-Muslims cover graves with a piece of 
clothing during burials so that people cannot spy what is happening when 
a body is being laid to rest. The Anṣār al-Sunna do not cover graves dur-
ing burials. While the Anṣār al-Sunna abide by a printed calendar, the 
other Muslims depend on a lunar one. Naturally, this has implications 
for practices like the celebration of ʿīd al-aḍḥā (Arab.: Muslim festival at 
end of Hajj) in Tanzania. The Anṣār al-Sunna celebrate on the same day 
that it is celebrated in Mecca while the BAKWATA-sunnī groups  celebrate 
26 Personal interview with Mohammed, 4th September 2006.
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ʿīd al-aḍḥā on a different day. These differences lead to controversy, 
year in, year out.
Kadhi’s Court
The proposed Kadhi’s court, so far, has not generated much interest in 
Kondoa. Muslims are keenly aware of its religious import. Yet some say 
it brings nothing new to the manner in which they have practised their 
religion until now. Some Muslim leaders suggest that the Kadhi’s Court 
is not a grassroots’ agenda but rather has been imposed from ‘above’. A 
Bakwata-sunnī cleric summarized the situation in the following words: 
After independence we were advised that we ought to have one court 
system . . . people could choose whether they wanted their personal matters 
decided in a customary or a religious court . . . there existed a Marriage Board, 
an Inheritance Board, and a Divorce Board . . . now someone ‘from above’ 
has discovered that something is amiss . . . the Kadhi’s courts must come 
back . . . Muslims must handle their own affairs in their proper courts.27 
The re-introduction of Kadhi’s courts in Kondoa lacks the urgency mani-
fest in newspaper reports. Mostly Muslim interviewees were happy with 
the status quo. A local Shīʿa Muslim said: “We have always managed 
our affairs without any problem; I don’t see why change now”.28 Usually 
Muslims have recourse to Mosque councils to solve their personal matters 
related to waqf, inheritance, and divorce. According to some, economic 
motivation underlies the clamour for the introduction of Kadhi’s courts 
as some sheikhs want to join the government payroll.29 The financing of 
the Kadhi’s court is a moot point. Many people, mostly Christians, say it is 
unfair to use taxpayers’ money to run a religious institution in a country 
with a secular Constitution. A female pastor with the Anglican Church 
said setting up and running a Kadhi’s court must remain a prerogative 
of Muslims, not the government. A certain apprehension exists in some 
circles that once the government pays for the operation of the court, it 
might eventually interfere with the politics of its running. A troubling pre-
cedence exists. BAKWATA’s current pariah status in some Muslim quar-
ters is due to the perception that it was a government creation. Some 
feel the same might taint a government-supported Kadhi’s court in future. 
27 Personal Interview with Swalehe, 4th September 2007.
28 Personal interview with Hussein, 4th September 2007.
29 Personal interview with Hussein, 4th September 2007.
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Lately, a new dimension in the Kadhi’s court debate has emerged. In 2005 
the ruling party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), promised to re-establish 
Kadhi’s courts once re-elected. The matter has since divided the country 
along religious lines. Some Muslims want the party to live up to its prom-
ise while others feel that the country’s secular Constitution should prevail 
over the ruling party’s election manifesto. The President, a Muslim, is now 
distancing the party from the Kadhi’s court agenda. Meanwhile, a morato-
rium has been imposed on the Kadhi’s court debates pending a report of a 
Law Commission set up to give advice to the government on the matter. 
Christian NGOs
Some Christian NGOs are a source of unease in the Muslim community 
in Kondoa. ‘Compassion’, for example, operates four children’s centres 
under the auspices of the Lutheran and Anglican Churches. According to 
its motto, the NGO seeks to release children from poverty in Jesus’ name. 
Its activities revolve around a child sponsorship programme with funds 
coming from North America and Europe. The prerogatives of sponsors 
include, “exchanging letters and photos as well as fostering children’s 
spiritual growth”. The children receive education, health care, supple-
mental nutrition, and the guidance from committed Christian workers.30 
According to Anglican and Lutheran pastors involved in the project, more 
than 75 percent of the children receiving sponsorship in Kondoa are either 
Muslims or Roman Catholics. Children, irrespective of their religious affili-
ations, are exposed to the Bible as the source of moral teachings. Muslim 
clerics wonder why expose Muslim children to Christian values and not 
vice versa. A BAKWATA-sunnī sheikh summarized the feelings of many 
Muslims thus:
Children are asked to sketch a church, draw a cross, or to pray in a certain 
Christian manner during meal times. If Compassion is committed to reli-
gious democracy, why not teach children some Islamic practices as well? 
Tell them to draw a Mosque and see what happens. . . .31 
Members of Muslim groups like Shīʿia, Anṣār al-Sunna and BAKWATA-
sunnī share the view that ‘Compassion’ activities among children are not 
30 Compassion ‘Releasing Children from poverty in Jesus’ name’, http://www.compas 
sioncanada.ca (accessed 14.06.2007).
31 Personal Interview with Mohammed, 6th September 2006.
252 bernardin mfumbusa
acceptable as they are tantamount to a covert proselytization programme. 
An Anglican pastor overseeing the Compassion programme, however, 
was unmoved by Muslims’ complaints, maintaining ‘Compassion’ would 
continue to draw from the Bible as the principle source of moral values. 
“No one is forced to join the programme. So those who feel they don’t 
want their children to participate are free to take them away”.32 
Furthermore, some Muslim children are taken to distant boarding 
schools to pursue secondary education. Control over the children’s reli-
gious upbringing is not guaranteed. There are more than 15 children from 
Kondoa now attending secondary schools in Dar es Salaam under the 
‘protection’ of ‘Compassion’.33 The timing of ‘Compassion’ activities on 
Saturdays is a source of disagreement. Children meet to write letters to 
their personal sponsors, but this baffles both Catholics and Muslims who 
feel that children are spirited away from catechetical and Qurʾān studies 
which usually take place on Saturdays. Some Muslims feel that poverty 
and hunger are excuses to impose Christian values on Muslim children. 
Meanwhile, the ‘Compassion’ programme is generating tension in polyg-
amous Muslim families where some children get help but others don’t. 
Children receiving help under the ‘Compassion programme’ are seen as 
rich, according to a Muslim cleric. If such children refuse to share the 
‘goodies’ with the rest of the extended family, it becomes a problem. Why 
‘Compassion’ targets children in a culture where male adults are bread-
winners is a matter of debate. A Shīʾa cleric sees this as a way of mak-
ing children used to Christian religion, namely, through schooling them 
and giving them clothing and cooking oil, among other things. Sometimes 
ḥadīth are invoked to underline the Muslims’ fear of ‘Compassion’ activi-
ties among the needy Muslim children. A ḥadīth related by a Shīʿa cleric 
is typical:
Jesus’ preaching was met with limited success among the early Jews, accord-
ing to the ḥadīth. Jesus opted to reach out to children instead. After some 
time the elders realized that the children were absorbing Jesus’ teachings. 
The elders decided that Jesus should not see the children again. When Jesus 
came, the village elders said the children were not around. A chuckle, how-
ever, was heard from inside a nearby house. “Who is that?” Jesus asked. 
“Piglets”, the elders replied. Frustrated, Jesus went his way. Meanwhile, the 
children had become real piglets.34
32 Personal Interview John in Kampala, 6th July 2007.
33 Personal Interview with Hilda, 10th September 2006.
34 Personal interview with Hussein, 4th September 2007.
 “chaos will never have a chance” 253
Whether the ḥadīth is apocryphal or not, the anecdote drives home the 
Muslims’ disquiet over ‘Compassion’ and its activities among Muslim 
children. Some Muslims wrote a letter to the President of the United 
Republic accusing the NGO of using poverty as an excuse to convert 
Muslim children. Most religious leaders interviewed, while aware of the 
existence of the letter, could not produce a copy. The furore notwith-
standing, ‘Compassion’ is not contemplating a change of strategy. Citing 
an Ethiopian experience where ‘Compassion’ had an ill-fated programme 
in the 1990s, one leader said the resistance from the Muslims in Kondoa 
would slacken with time. ‘Compassion’, in the Ethiopian case, was forced 
by members of a Muslim community to stop the programme. Yet, three 
years after the forced departure, people came “begging for us to return”.35 
Places of Worship
Pentecostal churches located in Muslim neighbourhoods are a source of 
serious disputes. This has brought a new dimension to sharīʿa debates 
in the area. Until the mid-1980s, few symbols of Christianity existed in 
Kondoa town centre. The Catholic Church, the oldest in the area, is located 
four kilometres outside town. Mosques and madrasa (Swah.: Qurʾānic 
schools) are found in every corner of the town of 21,000 people. Kondoa 
town is sometimes called kwa vabonde (Swah.: the place of the Bondei). 
The Bondei are a Muslim coastal ethnic group that brought Islam to the 
area. As a metaphor, kwa kabonde means a place of Muslims. This sense 
of ownership is reflected in the sentiments of a local Muslim populace. A 
Muslim cleric summarized the feelings of many Muslims when he said: 
“Kondoa is like Somalia—one ethnic group, one religion”.36 This view 
may no longer reflect the demographic reality on the ground. Pentecostal 
churches are challenging the dominance of Islamic institutions. The Full 
Gospel Church, for example, occupies land on which once stood the first 
mosque in Kondoa.37 A female preacher with the Full Gospel Church 
offered a graphic picture of her early days as a missionary in Kondoa, a 
decade ago:
35 Personal interview with John in Kampala, 6th July 2007.
36 Personal interview with Rashid, 4th September 2007.
37 Kabia, Hilda. ‘An examination of Muslim and Christian relations in Dodoma urban 
and Kondoa districts, Dodoma region, Tanzania’, St. Paul’s United Theological College in 
Limuru, Kenya. Unpublished MA dissertation, 2006.
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When we arrived with my husband here, there were no Pentecostals. We 
went from door to door, house to house, telling people why we came. When 
we moved into our current building an Arab neighbour gave us an ultima-
tum: ‘I don’t like the noise (prayers) you are making. I am giving you seven 
days to clear out or face the consequences.38 
The sharīʿa debates are becoming increasingly centred around the debate 
over ownership of the town. ‘To whom does Kondoa belong?’ is central 
to the debates according to most narratives. Other Church leaders share 
similar experiences of harassment. Calvary Assemblies of God (CAG) has 
had a short but chequered history. Founded in 2004, it drew a motley con-
gregation of about 30 people who met for prayers in a public building. The 
members, however, were banned from using the premises owned by the 
Kondoa Municipal Council. The congregation dispersed; it is now rebuild-
ing in a rented house, in a Muslim neighbourhood. Sometimes the con-
gregation is pelted with stones during prayer sessions.39 The government’s 
failure to assign appropriate places for houses of prayer is largely to blame 
for some of the tension. A senior BAKWATA Muslim cleric said: 
Now you see churches and mosques side by side, this is something 
new . . . when I make a call for prayers . . . there is a bell tolling inviting 
Christians to pray . . . now if I say, Jesus is not God, according to my belief 
and someone else says Jesus is God in his church next door . . . there is 
conflict . . . .40 
Tensions notwithstanding, the religious demography of Kondoa remains 
simple. Most Rangi people, the dominant ethnic group in the area, are 
either sunnī Muslims or Roman Catholics. The Pentecostals are a growing 
but recent phenomenon. The Full Gospel Church (FGC) is still run by its 
founder, who came from northwest Tanzania. Pejoratively, some refer to 
FGC as “the church of the young Haya man”. Haya is one of the prominent 
Tanzanian ethnic groups from the north-west of the country, but the eth-
nic allusion is a sign of disrespect. Despite evidence of mounting tension, 
people say the extent of conflict and disagreements among Muslims and 
Christians in Kondoa ‘is exaggerated’.41 
38 Personal interview with Sophia, 2nd September 2006.
39 Personal interview with Peter, September 2007.
40 Personal interview with Swalehe, 4th September 2007.
41 Personal interview with Matthew, 2nd September 2006.
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Hardening Sectarian Attitudes 
For many generations, religion has been a matter of personal choice among 
people in Kondoa. Intermarriages are common; virtually all families have 
members belonging to different religious affiliations. In Kondoa, people of 
different religious or ethnic backgrounds are not corralled into exclusive 
neighbourhoods, something which has encouraged understanding and tol-
erance. Yet a hardening of sectarian attitudes is evident, especially among 
the younger generations. Many Muslim youths are falling under the spell 
of the Anṣār al-Sunna, the fastest-growing Muslim group. An Anṣār al-
Sunna cleric enthused: “We are everywhere in town, in villages around 
and even in the hills”.42 Some Anṣār al-Sunna Muslim youths get training 
outside the country, in Kenya, Saudi Arabia, or the Sudan, bringing back 
new ideologies. According to a young Anṣār al-Sunna, newly back from a 
study trip to Lamu, Kenya, the rationale for going was to learn ‘true Islam’. 
This implies BAKWATA-sunnīs abide by mere traditions (mapokeo). The 
so-called ‘true Islam’, however, often entails turning one’s back on tradi-
tional practices, harbouring new attitudes towards other Muslims. 
Public Rallies (mihadhara)
Public rallies (Swah.: mihadhara) organized by Muslim groups are a 
source of constant friction. Muslims tend to use ‘the Bible’ as the basis of 
their public preaching. Muslim preachers cite verses Christians are said 
to contradict. A popular Biblical reference that Muslim preachers use is 
Psalm 115, said to condemn idolatry. Christians are baffled by Muslims’ 
public rallies’ propensity to attack elements of their faith. A Pentecostal 
elder summarized the frustrations of many Christians: “If Muslims say 
Jesus is not God it is fine. If we use the Qurʾān to illustrate some of 
our teachings, Muslims call in the police saying we have insulted their 
religion”.43 This is a perennial problem. Kondoa Anglicans once asked a 
Muslim convert to offer witness in a public rally; Muslims were riled. The 
convert, who had been an imām, is alleged to have received five million 
Tanzanian shillings (about US$5,000) to convert to Christianity so as ‘to 
destroy Islam’. Muslims organized a counter rally ‘to correct the teachings 
of the Muslim convert’, as one sheikh said. The basis of the rally’s sermons 
was the Bible. “We showed them the truth using the Bible . . . we said look 
42 Personal interview with Juma, 4th September 2007.
43 Personal interview with Shannel, 7th September 2006.
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here alcohol is forbidden . . . look here eating pork is forbidden . . . look 
here idolatry is forbidden”.44 Apparently the preaching was based on the 
Old Testament book of Leviticus. Such tit-for-tat tactics guarantee harden-
ing of feelings across the religious divide.
Muslims and Non-Muslims 
The younger people increasingly appraise one another through the prism 
of religion. A member of Full Gospel Fellowship Church said, “When 
growing up in the 1970s, we lived with Muslims like brothers . . . there was 
no difference . . . now if I look at a Muslim I know there is difference . . .”.45 
The sentiment is mutual. An Anṣār al-Sunna cleric summarized the chang-
ing sentiments towards Christians in the following words:  “If my relative 
were to become a Christian then the bond of kinship will be broken . . . a 
kāfir cannot inherit my property or share in my life”.46 Tolerance is tested 
in many other ways. Some Christians interviewed said their Muslim land-
lords won’t allow them to host prayer-meetings. 
Generation Gap
Younger Muslims and Christians appear to be less amenable to dialogue. 
Members of Anṣār al-Sunna view Christians—even their relatives—with 
limited respect. Sentiments like “If you are Christian, you are kāfir,” are 
becoming common. A convert to Pentecostalism shared a dim view of 
Muslim-Christian relations: 
when I was young we didn’t think much of our religious differences . . . now 
people point at you and say mlokole (Swah.: Born Again Christian) . . . now 
Muslims have been made to understand that Christianity is something, 
which should be wiped out of the face of the earth.47 
The older people have recourse to phrases like: “Rangi people have no 
religious quarrels” and “Rangi people are blood brothers”. The changing 
sentiments reflect an influence of new religious ideologies. 
Marginalization and Victimization
Confession-specific institutions like kindergartens and primary schools 
are proliferating. Until the mid-1980s, children attended the same kinder-
44 Personal interview with Mohammed, 6th September 2006.
45 Personal interview with Shannel, 7th September 2006.  
46 Personal interview with Juma, 4th September 2006.
47 Personal interview with Shannel, 7th September 2006.
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gartens or schools irrespective of gender, religion or race. The country’s 
policy put an emphasis on integration. Now there are orphanages and kin-
dergartens exclusive to either Muslims or Christians. Older Muslims said 
there has never been overt marginalization in non-Muslim institutions 
like schools. Up to 75% of the students of Catholic mission schools in the 
1950s were said to be Muslims.48 A senior BAKWATA cleric who attended 
a Catholic Middle School acknowledged the lack of forced conversions 
in the schools. Over-emphasis on Qurʾānic studies at a tender age, and 
failure by many Muslim parents to check truancy, appear to have exacer-
bated the problem of literacy among Muslims.49
Conclusion
Several issues have emerged in the study. 
One: sharīʿa debates appear to heighten religious awareness and ten-
sion in Kondoa. Issues of ownership of the town, and belonging, are 
becoming a prominent part of the sharīʿa debates. As a Shīʿa sheikh said: 
“Kondoa, like Somalia, is a place of one ethnic group and one religion”. 
The arrival of the Anṣār al-Sunna is challenging the orthodoxy of the 
BAKWATA (mainstream) Sunnī and Shīʿa Muslims. Increasingly, people 
see themselves first as members of a specific religious group rather mem-
bers of an ethnic group. 
Two: tendencies reflecting generational perspectives are evident. Older 
people are optimistic that chaos born of religious conflict is not inevitable. 
The conviction is based on the view that ethnic bonds are stronger than 
religious ones. Among the younger people, religious discourses betray 
signs of incremental radicalisations.
Three: the discourses in Kondoa lack victimization rhetoric, which has 
characterized much of the discourses in the public sphere. The grassroots’ 
preoccupation is with day-to-day problems: proselytization, intermar-
riage, contents of public rallies and churches encroaching into Muslim 
neighbourhoods. As a sign of recognition of potential conflict, there is an 
inter-religious committee charged with nipping problems in the bud. Both 
Muslim and Christian leaders interviewed said the committee is impor-
tant in resolving conflicts in the area. The identity politics is encouraged 
by the teaching and arrival of new groups or sub-groups rather victim-
making narratives among Muslims of Kondoa Municipality. 
48 Personal interview with Alois, 5th September 2006.
49 Personal interview with Mariamu, 5th September 2006.
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Four: the sharīʿa narratives in Kondoa do reflect the national recorded 
patterns on issues like Kadhi’s court, Organization of Islamic Conferences 
(OIC), Danish cartoons, and the Middle East conflict. Events like the Iraq 
war or the Hezbollah-Israel war are celebrated in graffiti. 
Five: there is a marked divergence between the micro-level discourses 
which are preoccupied with quotidian issues and the macro-level dis-
courses pervaded by victimization and marginalization rhetoric.
Finally: African Traditional Religions acts both as a bridge as well as 
a wedge. Older people across the religious divide share a lot in terms 
of common ethnic heritage and usage. The younger Muslims belonging 
to Anṣār al-Sunna and Christian Pentecostals frown at many traditional 
practices as being incompatible with their worldview. 
From the foregoing, it is clear there are two dimensions in the Sharia 
debates in Tanzania. One dimension is the macro-national level discourses 
dominated by academicians, politicians, and the media. Here, themes 
include the need for Kadhi’s courts in Tanzania, victimization of Muslims 
(in 1999 some Muslims presented a list of 12 grievances to then President 
William Benjamin Mkapa), wearing of hijab in schools and workplaces, 
and the question of who is the authentic representative of Muslims in the 
public sphere. There are hundreds of Muslim organizations in the country. 
Another dimension is the micro-level grassroots’ level discourses. Themes 
such as locations of places of worships in contested sites, activities of 
Christian NGOs, and preaching of hatred often emerge. In general there 
is a dissonance between the macro-level discourses, which are politicized, 
and the micro-level discourses which touch on peoples’ daily lives.
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